

THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA


WALTER GASTON SHOTWELL

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THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA

VOL. I.

THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA

BY
WALTER GASTON SHOTWELL

AUTHOR OF
'THE LIFE OF CHARLES SUMNER'

VOLUME I

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PREFACE

It has been the author's purpose to write an accurate and interesting history of the Civil War within moderate limits. In preparation for this work, he has visited all the principal battlefields, so as to see for himself the ground upon which the war was fought. This has brought him into contact with the people of the South and made him somewhat familiar with their character and habits, as well as their country and their occupations. It has enabled him to see with considerable accuracy the background of the events with which he was concerned. Thus his preparation has not been altogether a labour with books. It has been one of observation as well. And he has sought to transfer to his pages some of the impressions he has thus received.

From books his materials have been the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. For a copy of which, comprising a hundred and thirty volumes with numerous maps and charts, the author is indebted to the Hon. Joseph J. Gill, sometime a Member of Congress from Ohio. For this and other kindness a heartfelt acknowledgment is here made in the hope that it will also perpetuate the remembrance of a friendship which continued unbroken for many years. The author has also given attention to other narratives of actual participants. While the works of many others have been consulted.

The preparation of the book has been a pleasant employment for the author, and it is hoped that its perusal will prove so to the reader.

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THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA

CHAPTER I

Early Causes of the War—Absorbing Political Power of the South—Slavery—Union.

THE Civil War will always make one of the most important as well as one of the most interesting periods in American History. It involved great issues—the integrity of the Union, the freedom of the Black Race, the permanence of Popular Government. And naturally, as the struggle advanced, it aroused the deepest passions. The causes were of slow growth and concern even the early history of the Republic.

If we look back two centuries from the opening of the War, upon the country where it was fought, we see a long line of Atlantic coast indented with numerous pretty inlets of the sea and mouths of noble rivers, but the land everywhere covered by impenetrable forests. Only here and there had they given way before the pioneer's axe for his cabin and clearing. There was a chance patch of Indian maize. A few settlements clung closely to the sea and marked, yet indistinctly, the sites of future cities. But the green fields and blossoming orchards were not even planted.

Back of this coast there was the wilderness, still unexplored. The future had yet to reveal that some two hundred miles inward, running parallel with the coast, there rose beetling mountains, beyond which lay a land of wonderful fertility, interlaced with streams that united to form a network of rivers. With a similar network farther west, they formed the great Mississippi system. This land was still the home of the wild beast and the Indian, which were soon, however, to be crowded out by restless hunters and trappers, and they in turn to be followed by hardy pioneers and farmers, who were to make it their permanent home. It was a land of wonderful promise, and its marvellous development into the home of thirty millions of people shows the virile character of the men who accomplished it.

To the north, this country was churlish and cold, the winters long and severe, with deep snows ; to the south, warm, seldom freezing, with only a wet and a dry season. Providence and forethought were as native to the one as ease and plenty to the other. The Indians in the north found it necessary to jerk their bear and buffalo meat, to bury their corn, to clothe themselves with peltries and to provide wigwams to protect them against the winter. But their brethren

of the south lived perennially on fruits and required shelter only from the rain. Those of the north lived more apart in families, were larger, stronger, more hardy and warlike, with greater power of endurance, were more independent; those to the south were cultivated, lived more together in towns, were more skilled in the arts, made crockery, lived in adobe houses, and were familiar with the manufacture of metals.

This difference of climate, it has been argued by Mr. Draper, in a very ingenious and interesting section of his history of the period, was one of the causes of the Civil War. However this may be, it is certain that the inhabitants of the two sections had grown widely apart. Though the people who had settled both were of the same stock, they had been subjected to different climatic conditions and there had resulted a difference of character. In the cold climate, physical exertion was pleasurable; in the warm, unpleasant. In the North, everyone worked; in the South, few did who could avoid it. Whoever could, shifted this burden to other shoulders. Those who were able to do so were considered fortunate. Physical labour was regarded as degrading and a badge of inferiority. So slavery found there a natural home. In the Southern States and in Northern Africa, both on the same isothermal line, the system prospered as nowhere else.

It was introduced into America in 1620. The same wintry sea that bore the Pilgrims to Massachusetts brought a Dutch vessel with twenty slaves to Virginia. This was a small cargo. But it was the first plant of a crop that was to bring ominous consequences to America. Slavery spread widely; in the North to Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey and Pennsylvania; in the South, to all the states below parallel $36^{\circ} 30'$ and to Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri above. But it did not prosper in the North. The climate, the small farms, the character of the people were all against it, and it soon disappeared. But in the South it found a congenial climate and fostering influences. From 657,479 in 1790, the number of slaves grew to 3,952,801 in 1860. This rapid growth was owing to the increased price of cotton and the larger profits of the crop. The invention of the cotton-gin added greatly to the latter. In consequence, the South demanded an abundance of labour for its large plantations. The white race neither could nor would furnish it. The planters, the overseers, the drivers were whites; but the hard toil in the fields was done by the blacks. They were fitted by constitution for the climate, as the whites were not. And they could be driven as slaves to the work, whether willing or unwilling. And thus cultivated, their number grew.

With the abolition of slavery in the North there had grown up a settled opposition to the system. This was partly owing to discussions among the Northern people of the wrongfulness of slavery, but perhaps even more to a desire to curb the absorbing political ambition of the South. The wealthy class of that section lived apart on plantations, surrounded by books, with time for reading and reflection. Their sons were educated at Northern colleges, Princeton

and Yale ; and at William and Mary in Virginia, where Jefferson was educated, and at the University which he founded. They came home with a taste for public life, which was easily gratified, owing to the blacks being allowed representation, though without the right to either vote or hold office. There was a consequent absorption of political honours by the wealthy class. Longer terms of service were accorded to Southern representatives ; and they thus acquired a peculiar facility for manipulating political conventions and securing appointments to office. And of course the latter were all secured for their section. This seniority of service also kept them at the heads of the committees and enabled them to control legislation both in the House and Senate.

Alexander H. Stephens, shortly before he became the Vice-President of the Confederacy, in a speech delivered before the Secession Convention of Georgia, in which he sought to dissuade his state from taking any step to disrupt the Union, held up the advantages the South had already realised from it. He declared that she had held the Presidency for sixty years, while the North had only had it twenty-four ; that she had secured eighteen judges of the Supreme Court, the North only eleven, this too although four-fifths of the business of that court came from the free states ; that she had elected twenty-four presiding officers (*pro tem.*) of the Senate, the North only eleven ; and twenty-three speakers of the House, the North only twelve ; had secured fourteen Attorney-Generals, the North only five ; eighty-six foreign ministers, the North only fifty-four ; a vast majority of the higher officers of both the army and navy, and equally so of the clerks, auditors and comptrollers filling the executive departments ; that she had two-thirds of the latter, though she had only one-third of the white population of the nation. It must be confessed that this was a formidable catalogue of offices. And so it is not to be wondered that Stephens was reluctant to quit a field where so many had been gathered and where he felt that others could still be secured.

But while the South was thus busy getting offices for herself, she overlooked some other things that she afterwards had cause to regret. At the formation of the Constitution a provision was inserted that the African slave trade, the importation of slaves from Africa, might be abolished in 1808. And it was then abolished, the South consenting. The loss of this source of supply was not felt by the South at the time. But in the decade between 1850 and 1860 there was a great want of slaves with which to cultivate the rapidly extending cotton fields of the South. The failure of this supply was then sorely felt ; and there was serious talk of an effort to restore it. But the South saw that this could not be done, that it was too late. The North would not tolerate its restoration, and she could not carry it against that opposition.

Again, at the formation of the Constitution, Virginia had a great territory that lay north-west of the Ohio River. It was known as the North-West Territory. Other states made claims to it, but they relinquished theirs. And then Virginia surrendered the territory to the Union. It comprised the present states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and a part of Minnesota. Promptly

upon its cession the Congress of the old Confederacy adopted an Ordinance for its government. And in the last article it was provided that there should be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in this territory, otherwise than in punishment of crimes, whereof the party should be first duly convicted. Thus slavery was prohibited in all the territory. And the states that were carved out of it then became free.

And so by this Ordinance slavery was *for ever* prohibited within the boundaries of five great states. For in a clause of this Ordinance it was provided that its provisions should be considered as articles of compact between the original states and the people and states in said territory, and for ever remain unalterable, unless by common consent.

And so it has been well said that this Ordinance was the beginning of the end of slavery. And there was a good deal of truth in this assertion. For the Ordinance checked the advance of slavery at the banks of the Ohio. There could be no further growth in that direction. It must stop there. And from the absolute prohibition by the Ordinance the opponents of slavery also drew a lesson which they insisted was inculcated by the fathers of the Republic—that they were opposed to the further extension of slavery. And thus it furnished them a vantage ground on which to stand and face the slave-holders who were seeking an extension of the system.

The Ordinance was supported on its passage by the unanimous vote of the Southern States then represented. They were all for it. And it is significant that this was the first territory of which the United States had exclusive control. All the territories to the south of the Ohio River belonged to the Southern States; Kentucky to Virginia, Tennessee to North Carolina, and Alabama and Mississippi to Georgia. And it is significant, too, that these territories all became slave states. Indeed, it was expressly so stipulated by the ceding states at the time the territories were surrendered to the general Government.

But the provision in the U.S. Constitution prohibiting the African slave trade, and that in this Ordinance, were not the only lapses that the South had made. There was another, greater still. In 1803, President Jefferson, himself a Virginian, purchased from France the Louisiana Territory. The South supported him in this purchase. There was considerable opposition to it in the North, but it was overcome by the South. She was looking at the slave territory at the mouth of the Mississippi. But she overlooked the immense extent of it to the north. This great cantle of territory reached from the Mississippi on the east to the Rocky Mountains on the west, and from Canada on the north to the Gulf of Mexico on the south. It has since been carved into fourteen states. A part of it, Missouri, was admitted, in 1820, as a slave state, after a hard struggle, which ended in a compromise, whereby it was agreed, on behalf of slavery, that no more slave states should be created north of parallel 36° 30', that being the south line of Missouri. We shall see that this compromise was later a fruitful source of bitterness.

What the South failed to appreciate at the time of the purchase

of the Louisiana Territory and also at the time of the admission of Missouri, which was a part of it, was that this territory was so much wider at the north than at the south. It was a right-angled triangle in shape, with its base on the Canadian border, its perpendicular on the Mississippi River and its hypotenuse running from the mouth of the Mississippi to the Canada line in Western Montana. The South had below parallel $36^{\circ} 30'$ only the narrow angle, comprising the present states of Louisiana, Arkansas and a part of the Indian Territory—the last by solemn treaty dedicated to the permanent occupation of the Indians. Above this line was the great North-West, destined to become eleven populous states, with many millions of white voters. As they soon out-numbered the voters of the sparsely settled South, the significance of this situation soon became apparent.

At the adoption of the Constitution, slavery had a clear majority in both Houses of Congress. In the Lower House, Virginia was first with ten members, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania each had eight, and New York was next with six. It must be remembered that slaves were still held in Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York and New Jersey, while there were six of the original thirteen states that continued to be slave states till their condition was changed by the Civil War. But the new states coming in and the rapidly changing sentiment of the North soon swept away this majority in the Lower House. The old states of the North were abolishing slavery and the new states were coming in free. Then commenced the struggle for supremacy in the Senate, where each state was entitled to two votes. With this essential part of the law-making power in Southern hands, they could prevent hostile legislation. The struggle thus originated was maintained for thirty years. And it was only when the South saw it was hopeless to continue it longer that secession was resorted to as the only remaining remedy. The plan first adopted was to have a slave state admitted whenever a free state came into the Union. Thus we find Kentucky and Vermont came in together, then Tennessee and Ohio, Mississippi and Indiana, Alabama and Illinois, Missouri and Maine, Arkansas and Michigan, Florida and Iowa. They did not, of course, come in precisely at the same time ; but they did come in always with reference to each other.

The tide of immigration had set strongly to the north. The immigrants came mostly from Northern Europe, and were attracted by the fertile and cheap farming lands of the north and north-west. Naturally they followed isothermal lines, as emigration usually does. The hardy German and Swiss, with their children, pushed over the mountains and took up land in the rich valleys of the Tuscarawas and Wabash, and joined the march of pioneers from the trails of Pennsylvania and Virginia, to people Ohio and Indiana. The French steered over their favourite track, from across the sea up the St. Lawrence River and along the shores of the Great Lakes into Michigan, Illinois and Wisconsin, while the Swedes and Norwegians went still crowding over them to the boundless prairies of Minnesota and Dakota, thus heading off and crowding back the surplus population from the older Northern states, into Iowa, Nebraska and Kansas. This was all essentially a free population. It built its own homes ;

it tilled its own farms; it furnished its own schools. The black man was hardly a factor in it. Everyone was free, and no one could see why another should be a slave. Thus the great states north of 36° 30' carved out of the Louisiana purchase were all coming in free. They were uniting with the opposition in the older states to wipe out the slave system entirely.

But side by side with this territorial growth against slavery a new force had appeared. This was an increasing appreciation of the importance of the Union. This too had to be reckoned with in the coming struggle. While slavery was the absorbing subject of consideration in the South, and drew after it the question of Secession, the importance of the Union had become a thing of substance in the North. Each, Secession and Union, in a manner faced the other. As one grew, so grew the other. As Calhoun and his followers represented slavery, to which he had attached the threat of secession, so Webster and his followers represented the importance of the Union.

Let us see what this argument for the Union meant. In brief, the Union was composed of many states. Their association gave to the weakest, for the purpose of protection, the strength of all. If one was attacked, all would resist and unite to punish the aggressor. If, for example, the fishing or commercial rights of the people of one state were invaded, the other states would all unite to see that a just settlement of the question in dispute was forthcoming. Even the rights of a single private citizen would be vindicated by the powerful arm of a great nation. This was an important consideration. But another was that this Union also prevented the discords which might arise among numerous petty states. If the Union were broken up, many independent states might result. They would all be small and weak, and much discord might arise. Friction and wars would be inevitable. But the Union of all would prevent this, for it would furnish tribunals for the settlement of all such controversies. And again, the Union placed it beyond the power of one state to foment trouble or institute wars with foreign powers. While it settled its own controversies in its own courts, it left all international questions to be settled by the Congress of the Union and the Central Government. This diminished immensely the risk of foreign wars. Moreover, weak states invite aggressions from the strong. By the creation of one great and strong nation, the Union insured the peace of the world. It reduced the temptation to attack this concentrated power. It especially insured the peace of the American world, for it united a great part of this under one Government. And the wisdom of that was shown by the wonderful strides this nation had made in wealth and power as compared with the feeble steps of the petty states to the south. It became the most powerful nation in the Western hemisphere, able to dictate terms and guarantee the peace of the others. It thus secured quiet at home. But the Union insured a controlling position in dealing with the nations of Europe, because of its united wealth and population. And with all these advantages there was still another consideration that could not be overlooked. The breaking up of the Union would not only create a formidable rival on its own shore,

giving it control of the mouth of its one great river system, but its dissolution would also point a lesson upon the instability of republics and the popular form of government. This it had been its pride to hold up as the hope of the world.

But while such matters were under consideration, a systematic agitation of emancipation was also in progress in the North. Benjamin Lundy is entitled to be named first among its advocates. He was born in New Jersey of Quaker parents in 1789. At the age of nineteen he left his father's farm and went first to Mt. Pleasant, a Quaker settlement in Ohio, and then to Wheeling in Virginia, where he learned the saddler's trade. This city, on the Ohio River, was a considerable market for the sale of slaves. They were brought here from Maryland and the part of Virginia, especially, that lay beyond the mountains, and sold to parties living 'down the river.' Witnessing the long lines, chained together in coffles and marching through the streets of the city, from the auction-block to south-bound steamboats—hatless and shoeless too, often even in winter; raised in ignorance and treated with inhumanity; wives separated from husbands and children from parents; the marriage vow ignored; women consigned to concubinage—the horrors of the system made a deep impression upon the sensitive mind of this Quaker youth. After learning his trade, he returned to Mt. Pleasant, where he married. He soon removed to St. Clairsville, still in Ohio and on the National Road only a few miles from Wheeling. Here he remained four years, plying his trade and accumulating property worth three thousand dollars. St. Clairsville was then a village with a population of less than eight hundred. But it was beautifully located on a commanding ridge, in the midst of a fertile country, and was the home of much intelligence; for it was the seat of a populous county bordering on the Ohio River. The religious life of the village, recently settled by hardy Scotch Covenanters and English Methodists, with a strong sprinkling of Quakers, awakened a moral sentiment that responded quickly to the irritating scenes of the neighbouring slave-mart. Here Lundy lived happily. He had his wife and children about him; he cultivated his quiet garden; he was prosperous in business and enjoyed his friends. But he was troubled in conscience over slavery.

In a room of his own house he organised an anti-slavery society, the first of a kind afterwards very numerous. It started with only six members. But under their efforts it grew till it numbered five hundred. They were gathered from the best people of the neighbourhood and extended their influence far and wide. Lundy sought to promote his cause in other ways. One Osborne had established an anti-slavery paper at Mt. Pleasant, and Lundy contributed to it, mainly selections. But in 1816 he published an appeal for Emancipation, which was remarkable for its clearness and force.

In 1819, having accumulated a considerable stock of harness and saddles, he took it by steamboat to St. Louis for sale. He found this city the centre of a tremendous excitement over an attempt to gain admission for Missouri as a slave state. Trade was stagnant, feeling was bitter, anti-slavery men were boycotted. But he could not

resist the temptation to make his sentiment known through the newspapers, and thus aid his side. But he suffered the penalty of his temerity. And this was that, after a new view of the ills of slavery, he returned home almost penniless. His business venture had resulted disastrously. But his feeling against slavery was confirmed, and he was determined to be more diligent in his efforts for emancipation. The question was how to promote the work.

He was without education or eloquence or money or influential friends, and he had a family to support. How could *he* accomplish anything? But at this juncture an unexpected opportunity offered itself. Osborne had tired of his anti-slavery paper at Mt. Pleasant and he offered it to Lundy. And he took it up as a monthly under the name of *The Genius of Universal Emancipation*. He was ignorant of printing and had to have this work done in Steubenville, twenty miles away. He travelled there, frequently on foot, and returned with the edition of his paper on his back. He started with only six subscribers, but the number increased rapidly.

He was later induced to move his location to Jonesborough, near Knoxville, Tennessee. This was in the same neighbourhood that afterwards produced such loyal friends of the Union as Parson Brownlow and Andrew Johnson. And it is only fair to conclude that the decided stand that this district took in the War was partly the growth of the seed thus early sown by Lundy. He here learned the printer's trade, and was soon issuing the *Genius* as a weekly. It was then the only distinctly anti-slavery publication in the United States. And it soon had a large circulation and was exerting a decided influence. But Lundy was diligent in other ways. In those days, long before railroads, he travelled twelve hundred miles to attend the first American Abolition Convention. This was held in Philadelphia in the winter of 1823-4. And it was while there that he was induced to move his paper to Baltimore, which he did the following summer.

This journey also was made on foot. And on the way he delivered his first anti-slavery address. This was in a grove near the Friends' Meeting House at Deep Creek, North Carolina. It was after the usual church service of the day, and made such an impression that he was asked to speak again that evening in the church. Then an anti-slavery society was formed. He addressed numerous other meetings that he gathered along the way; one at a house-raising; another at a militia muster, where the captain of the company was made president of the society; and still another at Raleigh, the state capital. A dozen or more Abolition Societies were thus formed in North Carolina. They awakened an interest. And so subscribers were procured for his paper. He followed the same method through Virginia.

In Baltimore, his paper again prospered. And he made a trip to Hayti the following year to secure homes for some emancipated slaves. But when he reached home, he found that his wife had died in his absence, and that his children had been adopted into the families of some friends. Thus she had ended her part. Her death was a severe blow to him, for he loved this companion and inspiration of

his life. He never married again ; but henceforth gave his whole time to the cause for which they had already sacrificed so much.

In 1828, he made a lecturing tour through New England, organising anti-slavery societies and soliciting subscribers for his paper. He could find no Abolitionists in Boston then. But he visited the ministers and explained his plan, and thus commenced his work among them. It was this trip that was the occasion of an important accession to his ranks, for at Boston he met William Lloyd Garrison, a young printer, and interested him in the work and persuaded him to go to Baltimore to work on the *Genius*. Garrison went, but he remained in Baltimore only a short time and then returned to Boston to establish the *Liberator*, which he continued to edit till slavery was abolished. Owing to his position on the paper and his location at the centre of influence of anti-slavery New England, he became one of the best known and most influential Abolitionists in the country.

Lundy made numerous trips—to Hayti, Texas, Mexico and Canada—to find places where he could colonise emancipated slaves. The laws of the South then generally required them, when freed, to be removed from the slave states. As his methods were pacific and his purpose was to *persuade* owners to manumit their slaves, this imposed an additional duty upon him. He was constantly travelling through the country and was untiring in his efforts to improve the conditions and secure the freedom of the slaves. He lectured and organised societies wherever he could, travelling much of the time on foot. Sometimes, when hard-pressed, he secured means to aid in defraying his expenses, by work as a saddler. But at the same time he did not neglect to write articles for his paper and forward them to the office by mail.

His paper, never of much property value, was now removed to Washington and later to Philadelphia. In Baltimore he had been assaulted by a slave-trader. And at Philadelphia his little property was burned by a mob. It consisted chiefly of books and papers and some clothes. But among these there was one thing more valuable than all the rest. This was the diary which he kept while on his journeys. It comprised the only material for a biography of his eventful life. But this too was burned, and so we have only materials left sufficient for a sketch.

His last move was to La Salle county, Illinois. And here he was gathering his children about him, and had commenced the issue of his *Genius*, when he was attacked by a prevailing fever and died. This was in 1839, in the fiftieth year of his age. And thus closed this heroic life. And when he went, he took a man's life with him, for the world has seldom seen one more unselfishly devoted to the cause of humanity.

It is an interesting career as illustrating the humble origin of the great movement for Emancipation. And it is instructive ; for the methods he inaugurated were those generally employed by the Abolitionists that came after him. And they were continued in use till these principles finally triumphed.

Lundy himself was a small man with little in his appearance to attract the attention of a stranger. And from his youth up he was

so defective in hearing that he could converse with difficulty. He had not learned, when young, the art of public speaking, and so had none of the training in advance to fit him for his part. And he really had little that was acquired. But though he had none of the graces of the orator, yet with his earnestness and deep conviction, chastened by charity for his opponents, he was a speaker of surprising power. He enlisted friends for his cause wherever he went. And ere he died he had the satisfaction of knowing that greater forces were marshalling for still greater events, and that abler hands were everywhere taking up the cause he had so unselfishly served.

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CHAPTER III

California seeks Admission as a Free State—The Compromise of 1850—
'Squatter Sovereignty'—The Fight for Kansas—Election of
Buchanan.

SOON after the close of the Mexican War the slavery question came up in Congress again. This time it was caused by California. In the autumn of 1848 a settler named Sutter was engaged in erecting a saw mill on the American branch of the Sacramento River. When digging the race, some gold was found in the deposit. An effort was made to keep this discovery a secret. But such a secret was not easily kept. And the fact becoming known, and further discoveries being made, a wild excitement followed. With one of those wonderful tides of immigration that have occasionally distinguished the Anglo-Saxon race, the new country was soon filled with eager hunters for gold. And the wild trails of the West were crowded with others coming. They resolutely faced every danger of famine and drought, of deep and impassable streams and inaccessible mountain passes, of savage beasts and even more savage bands of marauding Indians. And it is sad to relate that these very trails were soon marked by the bleaching bones of many who had perished by the way. But others came, and still the crowd pressed on, eager for gold. Some found their way to the new El Dorado by sea, around Cape Horn. And still others encountered the perils of both sea and land by way of the Isthmus of Panama.

San Francisco, which had less than two thousand inhabitants at the beginning of 1849, had twenty thousand at the close of that year. This growth illustrated the wonderful movement to all parts of California. Miners were everywhere, by mountain and stream, in deep and inaccessible passes and under the gloom of the forests and on plains and in swamps, with their shovels and pans, searching for gold, washing it out of the deposits and storing it away. It was a scene of the wildest confusion. For mechanics deserted their shops and merchants their stores, and even soldiers their regiments, to seek for gold. Honest labourers and thieves and gamblers were all mixed together in this mad rush for wealth. They had no homes, and there were no homelike restraints.

There was no law, for no government had yet been organised. And with the soldiers disorganised and deserting, something had to be done. So vigilance committees were improvised to ferret out and punish criminals. Things were fast tending to anarchy, for claims were frequently defended with the knife or the pistol. An appeal was made to Washington to send some sort of relief.

President Taylor did send a Government agent to encourage statehood, and the military Governor, by proclamation, called upon the people to choose delegates to a convention to frame a constitution. The delegates chosen met at Monterey, on September 3, 1849, and after a quiet session of six weeks formed a constitution, which a month later was adopted by the people. Though fifteen of the forty-eight delegates to the convention were from the slave states, the convention unanimously agreed to insert in the constitution a provision prohibiting slavery in the state. And the people voted, twelve to one, in favour of adopting this constitution.

A Legislature was promptly chosen; and two United States Senators were elected. At the opening of Congress, in December, 1849, the Senators were present demanding the admission of their state. And their application was indorsed by the message of the President.

Here was a new tangle. For the Southern delegation in Congress was now confronted with the old question, the admission of a free state to disturb their equality in the Senate. But this new state had been formed out of territory they had lately wrested from Mexico for the very purpose of making slave states. That it should ask for admission as a free state was a surprise. It seemed like a flank movement against slavery. How were they to meet it? They were sure that the admission of California would be supported by the North. Though they had hoped that President Taylor, a Southern slaveholder himself, would insist upon a constitution legalising slavery, they had also been disappointed in this. For he felt that he could not insist upon such a provision in the face of the almost unanimous vote of California to the contrary. But still they were not willing to give up their position of equality in the Senate. For this they would stand and fight.

And there were other questions in dispute now—what provision was to be made as to slavery in the remainder of the territory acquired from Mexico; Texas had a dispute with New Mexico as to her boundary line, and Texas was a slave state, but New Mexico was not; the North was insisting upon the abrogation of the slave trade, the buying and the selling of slaves, in the District of Columbia, the seat of the National Capitol; the South was dissatisfied with the existing Fugitive Slave Law; the courts had held that state officers need not assist in executing it and that the use of state and municipal prisons might also be refused in aid of it. These were all serious questions.

With Webster, Clay, Calhoun and Benton still in the Senate, and wielding a controlling influence, the suggestion of a compromise to adjust these sectional controversies was a natural solution. These great men had compromised so often for slavery. And they were all patriots, with a love for the Union and a hope for its perpetuity. But impressed by long experience in public life with the dangers that lay hidden in these sectional rivalries, like old men, they were timid, with a dread of seeing younger men overlook the lessons of prudence that they had learned. Clay had acquired the sobriquet of 'the great pacificator.' He represented a slave state. But he was, nevertheless, the leader of the Whig Party. And it had more

anti-slavery proclivities than the Democratic. All naturally turned to him in this new crisis.

In the month of January he introduced in the Senate the measure that has since been known as the 'Compromise of 1850,' in derision called sometimes the 'Omnibus Bill.' It included so many subjects that its opponents were ready to insinuate that it was intended to make provision for everything. It did embrace, first, the admission of California, with her constitution prohibiting slavery; second, governments for the remainder of the territory acquired from Mexico, without prohibition of slavery; third, giving the Texan territory in dispute to New Mexico, and to off-set this, making an appropriation of ten million dollars to Texas, to be used to pay the debt with which she was burdened when annexed; fourth, the abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia; fifth, a more effective Fugitive Slave Law.

Clay supported his bill by a speech, in which he described these troubles as five bleeding wounds threatening the country. And he enumerated them on his fingers. Benton opposed the bill vigorously, and, derisively referring to the five gaping wounds, said Clay would have found more wounds, if he could have had more fingers. Calhoun prepared a speech on the bill. And this was destined to be his last. He came into the Senate as if intent on doing his duty to the end. His face was wan and his eye feverish. He was too weak to walk alone and was supported between two friends. He was unable to deliver the speech, and asked Mason of Virginia to read it. And the Senate was hushed to silence as it realised that it was listening for the last time to a Senator who had spoken for the South for so many years. He pointed out the aggressions of the North and referred solemnly to the dangers to be expected from them, and urged some action that would restore the equilibrium of the two sections. There was no bluster and no threat, but only, as it seemed, one last earnest appeal to the better nature of both sides. His last words were: 'Having faithfully done my duty to the best of my ability, both to the Union and to my section, throughout this agitation, I shall have the consolation, let what will come, that I am free from all responsibility.' And then he was led away. And so the curtain fell upon his great career—great in its achievements and great in its consequences, even though wrong in principle and disastrous to his country. His integrity there was none to dispute. Men who knew him best knew he was at least sincere. He might be mistaken. But he was never a hypocrite. A few days later he died, murmuring with his latest breath, 'The South! The poor South! God knows what will become of her!'

Webster, still erect and strong, but evidently worried, delivered his fatal 'Seventh of March Speech' in support of this measure. He defied the anti-slavery feeling of Massachusetts. And it cost him the loss of old friends by the thousand. Massachusetts had changed. And the day for a compromise with slavery had passed.

The bill was defeated. President Taylor's influence was against it. Though from the South, the stern 'rough-and-ready' soldier believed that his section was asking too much. And he would not grant it.

But suddenly the whole situation was changed. This was by the happening of one untoward event. President Taylor died on the ninth of July. He was succeeded by Millard Fillmore. And Fillmore was for the bill. The effect of this change soon became apparent. Webster and Corwin, both pronounced advocates of the bill, were appointed to places in the Cabinet. Other similar evidences of Executive favour followed. And the effect on Congress was apparent. The separate clauses of the 'Omnibus Bill' were drafted into distinct bills, and in this form they were all passed. Thus the 'Compromise of 1850' became a law.

The extreme men on each side felt that the other had asked too much. Everyone seemed to think that his section had not been sufficiently favoured. The Southern members protested against making the entire Pacific coast Free. An effort was made to confine California to what lay north of $36^{\circ} 30'$. Jefferson Davis, who by the death of Calhoun had succeeded to the leadership of the extreme South, insisted upon the right of slaveholders to take their slaves into all the territories, and thought this principle should have been recognised in the government of the territory acquired from Mexico. Among Northern people there was widespread dissatisfaction with the new Fugitive Slave Law. It permitted the question of a man's liberty for life and, therefore, in substance his life itself to be tried by a United States Commissioner, a petty officer, without the intervention of a jury, while the Constitution required a jury trial in all cases where more than twenty dollars were involved. This did not. For certainly a man's life was worth more than twenty dollars. To him it was of inestimable value. And to others it was apparent that he would sell in the market for a thousand. More than this, the Commissioner was to receive a fee of ten dollars if his decision consigned the man to slavery and only five if it gave him his freedom. This was in reality offering a bribe to the Commissioner to decide in favour of slavery. And though small, everyone knew it was sufficient to influence small men.

But in Congress both sides were disposed to accept the settlement in good faith and abide by its terms as a final adjustment with slavery. In fact both sides were tired of the Compromise. They had laboured faithfully for it. Almost every member had delivered a set speech and franked it to his constituents. Naturally *they* felt that the incident was closed.

But not so the people. After reading the speeches that had been furnished so freely, and each section getting only its own side of the discussion, they felt that they were still to be heard from. Calhoun's advice had been asked before he died, and his death had only added weight to the answer he had given. He had advised a convention of the Southern people to consider what they should do. Such a convention had been called to meet at Nashville. And it had met and resolved in favour of secession. This was before the Compromise had been passed. But the convention had adjourned to meet again. After the passage of the Compromise, the convention did re-convene. And then cooler counsels prevailed. It was then resolved that the situation did not yet justify secession. But the convention,

nevertheless, advised no trade or travel relations with the North and the exclusion of all Abolition literature from the South.

The North was disposed to treat this as all bluster. It was considered only as another effort on the part of the South to intimidate. And the North was in no mood to be intimidated by either threats of secession or resolutions of non-intercourse. Just as well undertake to stop the torrent of Niagara as the movement of the Abolitionists. Meetings of merchants and manufacturers of the Northern cities, called to counsel moderation, were of no avail. And so the movement for education among the people of each section went on unchecked. To a sincere lover of his country, viewing it with an unprejudiced eye, this was a sad spectacle and seemed to call for more patriotism and less passion and likewise for cooler counsels from the leaders of both sections.

Cooler counsels did prevail in the Presidential campaign of 1852 which followed. Franklin Pierce was nominated by the Democrats and Winfield Scott by the Whigs. Both parties in their platforms declared in favour of supporting the Compromise as a final adjustment. And with the large majority of each party this was considered the safe solution of the difficulty. Pierce was elected because it was felt that his party, the Democratic, having been foremost in supporting the Compromise, could be more safely trusted to maintain it in good faith.

But just here was where the trouble occurred. President Pierce was no sooner installed in office than his party broke away from this pledge to maintain the Compromise as a finality. It proceeded to make new aggressions for slavery. Of course there were mitigating circumstances. The Fugitive Slave Law had not proved a complete remedy for slaves running away. No law could. Naturally some slaves wished to escape from cruel masters. And just as naturally some humane persons, convinced of the wrongfulness of slavery, were willing to assist them. The 'underground railroad' continued as popular a thoroughfare as ever. It was a very simple arrangement. The fugitive escaped at night and travelled to the cabin of some other slave, farther north. Here he lay concealed the next day, and was fed and rested for a journey the next night to a cabin still farther north. Having in this way reached a free state, some friendly Abolitionist would conceal him during the day and take him in a wagon to the friendly shelter of some house farther north the next night. In this way, by easy stages, he was soon in Canada, where he could not be reclaimed by law. Many fugitives stopped along the road in small villages, in the free states, where they could not easily be discovered. Thus many thousands annually found the 'underground railroad' a safe path to freedom. The practice of running away grew, and it was very hard to remedy. Indeed it never was remedied. But the Fugitive Slave Law afforded a very extreme, if not a perfect, remedy. At all events it was the one the South had agreed to accept as a satisfactory ground for the Compromise. And it was her duty to stand by the agreement she had made and make no further aggressions for slavery. But did she do this? We shall see.

With the incoming of the new Administration steps were taken looking to the annexation of Cuba, for fear it would become an asylum for runaway slaves, like Hayti, where the emancipated blacks were trying an experiment of self-government and thereby causing anxiety to the slaveholders of the South. The President had appointed James Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, Minister to England; John Y. Mason, of Virginia, to France; and Pierre Soulé, of Louisiana, to Spain. These appointments were significant. Though from a Northern state, Buchanan had always proved friendly to Southern interests. And Mason and Soulé, being from the South, were of course so. Under instructions, they sought to secure favourable terms from Spain for the cession of Cuba to the United States. But failing in this, at a meeting held at Ostend, they issued what has since been known as the 'Ostend Manifesto,' in which they declared in favour of the acquisition of Cuba by purchase, if this could be done on favourable terms. But if not, then they insisted that Cuba might be taken by force from Spain. This meant the application of the principle of highway robbery to the situation—get another man's property, if you can, on your own terms, and if you cannot, take it anyway. Of course anti-slavery men were not in favour of any such means of procuring territory for the extension of slavery. And there was a violent outburst of feeling in the North. President Pierce in consequence disclaimed the act of his ministers. And Soulé in a pet resigned his mission. Here the incident ended. It had been accompanied by some fillibustering expeditions from the United States to Cuba. And several Americans engaged in them, being captured in Cuba, and tried by a court-martial, were shot. There was a retaliatory riot, too, in New Orleans, in which a Spanish newspaper office was destroyed. And the Spanish Consul was compelled to flee for safety.

But a more serious cause of complaint arose against the Democratic Congress. Stephen A. Douglas, a leader of this party and the chairman of the Committee on Territories, in January 1854 introduced a bill for the organisation of a government for the territory now comprising Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas, Montana, Wyoming and Colorado. It provided that any part of this territory might be admitted as a state, with or without slavery as its constitution might provide. In other words, the people of the proposed state were to decide, by a majority vote, whether, when formed, the state was to be free or slave. This was the origin of what was afterwards known as 'squatter sovereignty.' And it was about to be applied to a territory that, by the Missouri Compromise of 1820, was for ever to remain free.

It was freely charged that this was a bid by Douglas for the support of the South, in his campaign for the Presidency. It was the signal for another burst of indignation from the anti-slavery men of the North. And this storm was not allayed when the bill was followed a few weeks later by another, introduced by Douglas, with the approval of President Pierce, declaring that the Missouri Compromise of 1820 was abrogated by the Compromise of 1850. This second bill also provided for the creation of the two territories of

Kansas and Nebraska. It was evidently the hope that one of these territories, under the new doctrine of 'squatter sovereignty,' could be colonised and captured for slavery. This was a daring scheme. Anti-slavery men felt that no one in 1850 had thought of such an interpretation being given to the Compromise then being made, as that it abrogated that of Missouri made in 1820. Certainly no one had intimated such a construction during the long discussion in Congress. For more than thirty years the Missouri Compromise had been regarded as a sacred compact between the North and the South. The older statesmen of both sections had always observed it with the utmost good faith. And so, venerable with age and sacred in the observance, the country had come to regard it as having no less binding force than the Constitution itself.

Douglas little realised what a firebrand he was casting into the magazine of anti-slavery sentiment. For the same day that he introduced his second bill an appeal was made to the country, signed by Salmon P. Chase and Charles Sumner, United States Senators, and by four Representatives. It was published widely over the country in the newspapers, and purported to explain the Douglas bill, its reversal of the settled policy of the country to restrict the spread of slavery and its contrary purpose to establish it in an immense territory that had been guaranteed as free by a solemn compact. This appeal was in very forceful language and was intended to arouse the North to the danger. It characterised the Douglas bill as 'a gross violation of a sacred pledge; as a criminal betrayal of precious rights; as a part and parcel of an atrocious plot to exclude from a vast unoccupied region immigrants from the Old World and free labourers from our own states, and convert it into a dreary region of despotism, inhabited by masters and slaves,'—as 'a bold scheme against American liberty worthy of an accomplished architect of ruin.' It closed by declaring that the signers of this appeal would resist the passage of the bill with all their ability, and if overborne in Congress, that they would go home and erect anew the standard of Freedom and call upon the people to rescue the country from the domination of Slavery.

This protest, coming from well-known senators and representatives, produced a profound impression in the North. Mass-meetings were held, addressed by anti-slavery orators, at which condemnatory resolutions were adopted. Legislatures took similar actions. And petitions signed by ministers and their congregations were sent to Washington. The bill was made the especial subject of services in the Churches. Sermons were preached and prayers were offered against it.

But Douglas was a determined man. And encouraged by the members from the South he stood his ground firmly. He denounced the 'appeal' vigorously, as condemning his measure before he was given an opportunity to be heard. He insisted that his purpose was only to take the whole question of slavery out of politics and leave it to the people about to form a state to decide whether they would have slavery or not. An acrimonious debate followed, in which the two sections were arrayed against each other, and counter charges were made with more violence than ever before.

But what had become of the old leaders Webster, Clay and Benton, who had poured oil on this troubled sea so often? It was their work that was now threatened with destruction. But time had wrought its changes here as elsewhere. Clay had died at Washington in June 1852, believing that the Compromise of 1850 was the crowning achievement of his political life, and that the peace of the country was thereby secured. Webster had followed him to the grave in October of the same year. But his experience, during the short time he lived after his 'Seventh of March Speech,' had made him less sanguine of the future. His successor in the Senate, Robert C. Winthrop, elected through his influence, had been defeated for re-election by Charles Sumner, a pronounced Free-soiler, after a stormy campaign, in which the doctrine of Webster's speech was the issue. Webster had again been a candidate for President. But with all his sacrifice for the South, he could not get a single vote, in the convention, from there. Everywhere he saw evidence of his loss of support. Wherever he spoke there was still an eagerness to hear him, for his fame as an orator was, at least, secure. But in all his speeches there ran a tone of explanation and apology. It was a sad spectacle. And when he died, surrounded only by plain farmers and fishermen of the neighbourhood, his life seemed to go out in gloom. The years since and the still growing appreciation of his great work in maintaining the Union through a troubled period of its existence and in expounding the principles of the Constitution have done much to restore his fame. But his Seventh of March Speech still remains, something that his friends would be glad to forget.

So Benton alone remained. And what had become of him? For his part in the Compromise he was denied a re-election to the Senate. His faithful district, however, returned him to the Lower House. And here he opposed the new doctrine of 'squatter sovereignty.'

But the bill passed both Houses and was approved by the President. It became a law by the first of June, 1854. This result served to anger the anti-slavery people still more. A race was at once started between the North and the South, to see which could first people the new territories. Kansas, lying on the western border of Missouri and near to Arkansas and Texas, both slave states, became at once the bone of contention. Both sections determined to acquire it. Slaveholders from Missouri moved in and staked off land, which they claimed to own, and asserted their right to citizenship. They also claimed the right to vote at all elections. In fact many of them only came temporarily, to vote. And having demanded and exercised this privilege, they retired to their real homes in Missouri.

In the North, Emigrant Aid Societies sought by systematic efforts to promote emigration to the territory. As a consequence, large numbers of settlers, in search of cheap homes, were encouraged by the advertisement of rich land upon her valleys and prairies to go to Kansas. Many anti-slavery men, actuated by a desire to wrest her from the control of the South, were also attracted thither. Among the latter were John Brown and his sons, who later took part in the insurrection at Harper's Ferry. So some, it seems, were daring spirits.

Clashes became frequent between the settlers from the North and the South, especially at the elections. And sometimes men were killed. At the first election of a Delegate to Congress, held in November 1854, companies came armed from Missouri, to the number of more than a thousand, and voted. And this was repeated afterwards at succeeding elections. Finally, being resisted, the Missourians determined to drive the Free-soilers from the territory. They brought cannon and encamped opposite the village of Lawrence, a Free-soil settlement, and commenced to throw up fortifications and threatened to wipe out the town. The Governor called out the militia, and appealed to the President by telegraph. Some blood was shed, but the situation was finally quieted.

At first the elections resulted in favour of the pro-slavery party. Later the anti-slavery men grew in numbers and in boldness. They called an election for delegates to a constitutional convention. The pro-slavery men, who preferred to continue under the Territorial laws they had enacted to protect slavery, rather than take the chance of a change, remained away from the polls. So delegates were elected. And the Topeka Constitution, prohibiting slavery, was formed and later adopted. In January 1855, State and National officers were chosen under this constitution. Thus there were rival governments created at home. An application for admission as a state was also made to Congress. It came before the Senate on a bill introduced by Douglas to require a population of ninety-three thousand as a pre-requisite to admission. This was a most unreasonable condition as compared with that on which the other states had been admitted. And so the House appointed a committee to go to Kansas and investigate the affairs of the territory.

While these measures were pending, two events happened which produced great feeling in the North. One was the assault on Senator Sumner. He spoke in the Senate on the Douglas bill. And for some references in his speech to South Carolina and one of her senators, Butler, he was attacked in the Senate Chamber, on May 22, 1856, and violently beaten, with a heavy cane, by Preston S. Brooks. Brooks was a Representative from South Carolina and a distant relative of Butler. The assault nearly caused Sumner's death and did compel his absence from the Senate for four years. Naturally it caused great feeling. The other event was the sacking of the town of Lawrence by a pro-slavery mob. Some of the mob were from Missouri. Several buildings and newspaper offices were destroyed. And the affair at Lawrence was followed by some marauding in Kansas under the leadership of John Brown, in which several pro-slavery men were killed. Coming together and immediately preceding the Presidential campaign, these events entered into the discussions, and left a permanent impression upon the history of the country. It had often been asserted that the South was determined to suppress the right of free speech. Now it was claimed that this was proved. Sumner had been beaten down and the Kansas newspapers destroyed.

The Whig Party disappeared with this campaign. The Know-nothings nominated ex-President Fillmore; the Republicans, John

C. Fremont ; and the Democrats, James Buchanan. The Know-nothing party refused to commit itself on the subject of slavery. The Democrats adopted the doctrine of 'squatter sovereignty,' and proposed the annexation of Cuba. The Republicans pronounced against the extension of slavery and demanded the admission of Kansas as a free state. So that at last Slavery and Freedom stood face to face. The opposing parties were arrayed against each other, by which Slavery was to stand or fall. Fillmore had hardly any following. Fremont polled a large vote. But Buchanan was elected. And so again the South had succeeded.

CHAPTER IV

Buchanan's Inaugural Address—The Dred Scott Decision—The Struggle for Kansas—Lincoln and Douglas Rival Candidates for the U.S. Senate.

IN his Inaugural Address, President Buchanan exclaimed: 'What a happy conception then was it, for Congress to apply this simple rule,—that the will of the majority shall govern—to the settlement of the question of domestic slavery in the territories!' That the will of the majority shall govern is, and always will be, a popular rule. But when he meant to say, as he did then, that the application of the doctrine of 'squatter sovereignty' to the territory of Kansas was a happy solution of the troubles of that storm-swept province, the declaration, in the light of history, provokes a smile. For at the very period in which he spoke the opening scenes of the Civil War were being enacted in Kansas. The slavery and anti-slavery forces were almost daily skirmishing. And the doctrine of 'squatter sovereignty' was the immediate cause of this condition of affairs.

Another expression in his Inaugural, on the subject of slavery, attracted attention at the time, and was recalled with some bitterness afterwards. Speaking of the time when the people of the territory should decide the question whether they would have slavery or not, he said this was a judicial question, belonging legitimately to the Supreme Court of the United States, where it was pending and would be speedily and finally determined, and to this decision all good citizens would cheerfully submit. The public were surprised. They did not know that any such question was under consideration by the Supreme Court. And the expression provoked speculation as to what he meant. When the decision, thus promised, was finally announced, there were certainly some good citizens who were not willing cheerfully to acquiesce. Abraham Lincoln declared that he thought it was erroneous, that he knew that the court that made it had often overruled its own decisions, and that anti-slavery men must do what they could to have it overrule this one. The decision in question was in the case of Dred Scott against Sanford.

Let us see what this decision was. Though it concerned immediately only a very poor man and his family, it attracted a great deal of attention. Dred Scott had been born a slave in Missouri and was purchased by Dr. Emerson, a surgeon in the United States Army. In 1834 Emerson was transferred from Missouri to Illinois, which, it will be remembered, was a part of the North-West Territory, where slavery had been for ever prohibited. He took Dred with him. Later Emerson was transferred to Fort Snelling in Minnesota. This was a part of the Louisiana Territory in which slavery was prohibited by the Missouri Compromise. And he took Dred with him again.

At Fort Snelling the Doctor purchased from Major Talliaferro, also of the U.S. Army, a slave girl, Harriet. By the consent of the doctor, Dred and Harriet were married. Afterwards they had two daughters, one born on a steamboat, on the Mississippi River, north of Missouri, and the other at Jefferson Barracks, in Missouri, to which state the Doctor with Dred and his family had returned. Here the Doctor sold them to John F. A. Sanford of New York City.

Dred claimed that having been taken to the North-West Territory, and later to the Louisiana Territory, in both of which slavery was prohibited, that he and his wife were thereby freed, and that their children, born of free parents, were also free. He was claiming the freedom of himself and his wife on the same principle which, in the English law, declared that the moment a slave sets foot on the soil of England he is free. Dred insisted that slavery did not exist in these parts of the Louisiana and North-West territories, and that the law would not recognise it, and that, therefore, he and his wife had been made free. This was an important legal principle that he was claiming, and if so decided it would be of far-reaching effect as a precedent in other cases.

The suit was brought against Sanford, in the Circuit Court of Missouri. It was for the detention of Dred himself and his family. The case was tried in this court and resulted in a decision in favour of Dred. It was then taken to the Supreme Court of Missouri, where the judgment of the Circuit Court was set aside. It then went to the National Tribunals and had been argued in the U.S. Supreme Court. And that Court was ready to decide it before Buchanan was elected President. But feeling that the decision, if announced then, might unfavourably affect his prospects, it was withheld till after the election. So great was the feeling created, when it was announced, that it was believed that if it had been given out before the election, it would have defeated Buchanan.

The defendant Sanford insisted that Dred was not a citizen of the United States because his parents had been slaves, that no state could give the child of slave parents the rights of citizenship, and that, therefore, he could have no standing in court, could not bring or maintain a suit. The Supreme Court upheld this plea. Here the case should have ended. If the Court had no case before it, as it held when it decided that Dred was not a citizen and, therefore, could not bring a suit, and that the Court was on this ground without jurisdiction, then the Court had nothing further to decide. Having given its reasons for so holding, it should have stopped. It would probably have done so upon any other question than one affecting slavery. But of the nine judges, five—Taney of Maryland, Wayne of Louisiana, Daniel of Virginia, Campbell of Alabama and Catron of Tennessee—were all from slave states. Two of the others—Nelson of New York and Grier of Pennsylvania—were of pro-slavery sentiment. The question at stake being an important one for slavery, the Court doubtless felt that with the authority it held, as the highest judicial tribunal of the country, it could settle the whole controversy now being waged about the territories.

Instead, therefore, of stopping with the question of jurisdiction, which, according to its own decision, really disposed of the case,

the Court went outside, in the syllabus, which stated the legal principle it was settling, and held that 'the Constitution recognised slaves as property and pledged the Federal Government to protect it . . . that the Act of Congress, therefore, prohibiting a citizen of the United States from taking his slaves when he removed to the territories . . . was an exercise of authority over private property which was not warranted by the Constitution.' The Act of Congress referred to was the Missouri Compromise. And thus with one stroke of the pen this Court wiped out the prohibition of slavery in the Louisiana Territory, enacted by this Missouri Compromise of 1820, in which the country had acquiesced for thirty-six years. And it planted itself on the broad doctrine of Jefferson Davis that a slaveholder had the right to take his slaves into all the territories of the United States, and hold them there in slavery. In other words, all the territories were open to slavery, and even Congress had no power to interfere and change this condition while they remained territories. Nor could all the settlers in a territory, by their votes, change this condition while it continued a territory. The doctrine of the right of a majority to change it was thus wiped out also.

This was a startling doctrine to be announced by the Supreme Court of the United States, after full argument and mature deliberation. Chief Justice Taney read the opinion of the Court. And it was concurred in by six other members of the Court. But each of the six, as if to show his fealty to slavery, adopted the unusual course of delivering a separate opinion. To their honour be it said that the other two judges—McLean and Curtis—delivered vigorous dissents, in which they repudiated the decision of the seven, and held that Dred and his family were entitled to their freedom. But, of course, the holding of the majority stood as the decision of this Court of last resort.

The whole case as reported occupies two hundred and forty pages of the closely printed volume, 60 U.S. Supreme Court Reports. The pages are 393 to 633, inclusive. This was an unprecedented amount of space to be given to such humble subjects as Dred and his family. Especially does this appear when it is remembered that half a dozen pages ordinarily sufficed for the disposition of a case.

But perhaps no decision in the whole range of jurisprudence ever contemplated such consequences as this. The only one to be compared to it was that of Lord Mansfield, in the case of *Somerset*, which abolished slavery in all the United Kingdom of Great Britain. The American decision was unfortunate. For the Supreme Court till now had held a proud place in the public esteem. And this was deservedly so under the administration of Chief Justice Marshall and his associates, who had given the Court a high reputation for both wisdom and learning. But no other decision, it was thought, ever tended so much to degrade the standing of the Court as this one in the case of *Dred Scott*.

And yet, bad as the decision was, the reasoning, especially of Taney, the Chief Justice, by which it was supported, was still worse. A single sentence that has been often quoted may be given as an example. Speaking of the African race, at the time of the Declaration of Independence, he said: 'They had for more than a century

before been regarded as beings of an inferior order and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that *they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect*; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his own benefit.' A principle, let it be added, that could not truthfully be applied to a horse, and was utterly without foundation as a statement of either law or fact. And what was worse, this was all so apparent, that even the unprofessional reader would know so at a glance. What, then, must be his reflection when he knew that it was a quotation from the opinion of the highest judicial officer of the United States, in a case so important that it introduced slavery as a domestic institution in nearly a million square miles of their national territory. Of course, the far-reaching effect of the decision was appreciated more fully by professional readers. But others also knew and appreciated its importance. For it was too important to be overlooked.

What was to be done was the question. In the case of Kansas, this was easily answered. Increase the vote of the anti-slavery men and secure its admission as a state as soon as possible under a constitution prohibiting slavery. Then slavery would be abolished in Kansas as a state, if, according to the Supreme Court, it could not be while it remained a territory. Colonisation was accordingly hurried on from the North to Kansas, with such success that when Robert Walker of Mississippi, whom Buchanan had appointed Governor, reached his post, he declared that the idea of making it a slave state was preposterous.

In 1856 the Territorial Legislature was, however, still pro-slavery. It had called an election for delegates to a constitutional convention to be held at Lecompton in June, 1857. The Free-soilers were afraid that this convention would not submit its constitution when formed to a vote of the people, and also felt that a satisfactory constitution had already been formed at Topeka, under which the state should be admitted. They accordingly refused to participate in the election of delegates to the Lecompton Convention. So that, though the register showed nine thousand voters in the territory, only twenty-two hundred votes were cast, at this election, for delegates.

But a constitution was formed by the delegates thus chosen, which was afterwards known as the 'Lecompton Constitution.' As anticipated by the Free-soilers, the voters were not permitted to vote for or against this constitution, when it was submitted to the people. They were only permitted to vote for the constitution *with slavery*, or for the constitution *without slavery*. They must vote *for* the constitution in any event, and, if it carried without slavery, it left the constitution, as thus adopted, with other odious provisions in it. The Free-soilers again refused to vote, and so it carried by a small poll. But the Free-soilers had, in the meantime, elected a Free State Legislature. And *it* submitted the question, whether the Lecompton Constitution should be adopted. And now, the people having an opportunity to vote for or against the constitution, it was defeated by more than ten thousand votes.

When the question, upon this state of facts, came before Congress, whether Kansas should be admitted under the Lecompton

Constitution, Douglas's term as senator was expiring, and he was looking forward to a re-election in Illinois. His record upon 'squatter sovereignty' had created some bitter opposition and, therefore, he was reminded that, if he wished to be returned, he must act more circumspectly upon the slavery question. Thus admonished, he opposed the admission of Kansas, under the Lecompton Constitution, vigorously and carried with him some of the Northern Democratic Senators. Still, the bill passed the Senate, for the influence of President Buchanan was for it.

But in the House it was amended so as to require that the constitution be again submitted to a vote of the people of Kansas. The Senate refused to concur in this amendment. But by a conference it was agreed, by both Houses, to submit the constitution to a new vote, coupled with a condition that, if adopted, it would carry a large grant of land. This was, in fact, an attempt to bribe the people of Kansas to vote for the Lecompton Constitution. But the people of Kansas were not to be bribed into creating a slave state. And they defeated the constitution by a vote of eleven thousand to two thousand.

This left Kansas, however, still a territory and not a state. But some important results came from this prolonged controversy. In 1857 Minnesota applied for admission as a state. As she had no coloured population of consequence, and possessed sufficient population, no pretext for opposing her admission could be offered. And she was admitted. This gave the North two votes more in the Senate. A still more important result was the division of the Democratic party. It was now hopelessly divided, North and South, by the Dred Scott decision. For this decision had eliminated the doctrine of 'squatter sovereignty,' whereby it had been united in 1856 and had carried the election. But now the Northern wing, with Douglas in control, still adhered to 'squatter sovereignty.' While the Southern, under the leadership of Jefferson Davis, embracing the doctrine of the Supreme Court, insisted upon its right to carry slaves into all the territories, repudiated 'squatter sovereignty,' and with it its author, Douglas. Thus the way was opened for the election of a Republican President in 1860.

The Republicans saw this quickly, and at once placed themselves in position to make the most of it. The first step taken was when Douglas went back to Illinois to secure a re-election to the Senate. He found his crusade for 'popular sovereignty' had been unpopular in his own state. Though his fight later against the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution had in a measure restored his popularity at home, this had brought him the hostility of President Buchanan. Thus he was here between two fires. And coming on the eve of his re-election, the Republicans feared that he was not sincere in his last move. So they determined to oppose his return to the Senate. And at their convention, held in Springfield on June 17, 1858, they nominated Abraham Lincoln to make the race against him. The campaign which followed proved a battle of the giants, with the widespread people of the country for an audience. As sometimes happens in politics, it far out-reached in importance the contemplation of those immediately concerned.

CHAPTER V

Stephen A. Douglas—Abraham Lincoln—The Speech of Lincoln accepting the Nomination for Senator—The Lincoln and Douglas Debate.

Two men more unlike than Douglas and Lincoln could hardly have been found. Douglas was born in New England, of good parentage, his father being a physician and his mother a descendant of a Governor of Rhode Island. He studied law in New York and then went to Illinois. Here his promotion was rapid. He was elected Prosecuting Attorney at twenty-two years of age, Member of the Legislature at twenty-three, Secretary of State at twenty-seven, Judge of the Supreme Court at twenty-eight, Member of Congress at thirty, United States Senator at thirty-three. And he was a candidate for the nomination for President at thirty-nine. This was in 1852. And he was again a candidate in 1856 and still later in 1860. This is a long list, and these preferments were rapidly secured. Together they argue exceptional skill in political management. And this Douglas had.

In personal appearance he was rather below medium height, but compactly built and handsomely proportioned, with a large head, good face, always clean-shaven, scrupulously neat in his dress, withal a handsome man. He was easily approached, and was warm in his friendships. But he was aggressive and rather unscrupulous in his methods. As a public speaker he had few equals, ready, quick at repartee, prompt to see the lapse of an adversary and swift to turn it to his own account. Generally speaking, he was a good debater. And he was physically strong and of wonderful power of endurance. His admirers not inaptly dubbed him 'The Little Giant.' But nevertheless he was a good deal of a pettifogger in politics. And he was superficial and illogical in his habits of thought.

Lincoln, on the other hand, was born in a log cabin in Kentucky. His father belonged to the class, hardly above the coloured race in condition, known in the South as 'poor whites.' His mother died when he was only nine years old. And his shiftless father took him when a child, in a wagon, first to Indiana and then to Illinois. In each place the boy assisted to build the log cabin and split the rails to enclose it. Of schooling he had, all told, not more than six months. He grew up, tall, gaunt and muscular, excelling only in the wrestling matches and feats of strength common to the hard border life in which his lot was cast. Of books, in his youth, he had access to hardly any. But the family had a Bible, and somehow the boy secured a copy of Euclid. Both he studied carefully. He became deeply versed in the teachings of the Bible, and was always ready to quote a text or

apply a parable. And he learned to reason with the precision of a demonstration in geometry. He developed a strong mind and a quick perception of right and wrong, with an aptness for telling a good story. And these gifts were of rare value to one with his surroundings. His rude life, his hard lot, his low place in the social scale and the early loss of his mother seemed, however, to make him habitually sad. And he was slow of speech, seemed to weigh his words before expressing himself, was unobtrusive in manner, and so made few enemies. And by his kindness and sincerity he attracted friends.

He made two trips to New Orleans in a flat-boat. Thus he saw slavery in some of its worst aspects and also had his vision of life widened. These trips gave confidence in himself and a certain self-reliance. And with this his career seemed to change and tend upward. He volunteered in the Black Hawk War, and was elected captain of his company. Returning, he kept store awhile, then became a surveyor. And he was finally elected to the Legislature. And to this office he was elected four times in succession, serving eight years. The experience that he acquired during these years was of incalculable service to him in later life. He thus saw how appointments were made and laws enacted, and how influence was exerted. He learned to know men and how to manage them. And when he came rather suddenly to the larger duties of the Presidency he was really no tyro in politics, for he had already passed through a long experience of that kind, though on a smaller scale, at home in Illinois.

While in the Legislature he had studied law. And when he retired he settled down to practise at Springfield, which he had aided to make the capital of the state. In 1845 he was sent to Congress. But here he incurred some unpopularity by opposing the Mexican War and was not returned. With this his political life seemed to end. And he returned to his law books, apparently for life. He had married a wife above him in station, pretty, fond of society and its frivolities, apt to be attracted by what was fashionable more than by things of real worth. Children came, and it was necessary for him to make provision for a growing family. He worked hard in his profession, and became a strong advocate, especially in cases that were tried by a jury. In such cases his reputation for rugged honesty and his masterful management of the facts served him well.

He was six feet four inches tall, careless in dress, his clothes hanging loosely on his spare frame. And his features were homely. He had a shock of coarse black hair, deep-set eyes under shaggy brows, and a face graven deep with lines of care. And yet there was a look of kindly tenderness about it that was irresistible. He was slow to reach conclusions, but firmly adhered to convictions he had once formed. And he had deep convictions against slavery. Though not graceful, he was a forceful speaker, especially when roused and thoroughly interested in his subject. His voice, shrill at first, mellowed as he proceeded. And his wonderful power of lucid statement and apt illustration would make a point so plain that the most ordinary hearer could not fail to appreciate his meaning. As a master of clear, concise and closely reasoned speech he had few equals. He had a large

acquaintance and was appreciated in his own state, but was little known beyond it, till he was nominated to oppose Judge Douglas. The latter was already of country-wide fame, and the rivalry naturally attracted attention to Lincoln.

In anticipation of his nomination for the Senate, Lincoln had prepared a carefully considered speech, setting forth his view of the issues before them. It was delivered at the close of the convention. In opening he said, 'A house divided against itself cannot stand.' He believed that this country could not endure permanently half slave and half free. He did not believe the Union would be dissolved. But he did believe that it would become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery would arrest its further spread and place it where the public mind would rest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates would push it forward till it would become alike lawful in all the states. He reviewed and criticised the Dred Scott decision, and added that the Supreme Court had only further to decide that, when the people of a territory came to form a constitution preparatory to becoming a state, they had no right to exclude slavery, and then the system would become alike lawful in all the states. Such a decision he believed would probably come unless the power of the existing political dynasty should be met and overthrown.

This was taking advanced ground on the slavery question. No one had yet argued that this country could not endure permanently half slave and half free, and that it must ultimately become *all* one or all the other. Nor had anyone warned the people that the Supreme Court, having assumed the right to decide that slavery was lawful in all the territories and that this condition could not be changed by its law-makers or its citizens, had only to advance one step farther and hold that when forming a constitution preparatory to becoming a state the voters had no right to exclude slavery and then the system would become lawful everywhere. And yet, concede the Court's right to decide what it had done, and you must admit its right to take the next step and legalise slavery everywhere under its jurisdiction.

In a speech delivered in Chicago on the 9th of July, Douglas replied to Lincoln. He attacked this doctrine that 'a house divided against itself cannot stand.' He said that Lincoln would have all the free states meet and make war upon slavery in Kentucky and in all the slave-holding states, and then notify the slave-holding states to stand together as a unit, and make aggressive war upon the free states so as to establish slavery in them all. He also took exception to Lincoln's criticism of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case. He had no idea of appealing from the decision of the Supreme Court, upon a question of constitutional law, 'to a tumultuous town meeting,' though he had known an Illinois lawyer who thought her constitution should be amended so as to permit an appeal from the decision of her Supreme Court, on a constitutional question, to a Justice of the Peace. He insisted that this government of the U.S. was formed on a white basis, was made by white men for the benefit of white men, and hence that there was an irreconcilable

issue between himself and Lincoln. He spoke of the latter as 'a kind, amiable and intelligent gentleman' whom he had known for twenty-five years.

Lincoln was present at this meeting. The next evening he replied with the story of a Democrat, who wanted to beat Douglas, who believed that his original Nebraska bill was right in the abstract but wrong in the time that it was brought forward, wrong in its application to a territory in regard to which the question had been settled, and brought forward at a time when nobody had asked him; it was tendered to the South when the South had not asked for it, but when she could not well refuse it; that it had sunk the best Democrats all over the nation; and now, when President Buchanan was struggling with this difficulty of his getting up, Douglas deserted him. So he was for putting him where he would trouble them no more.

Lincoln explained that this new doctrine was called 'squatter sovereignty,' because the slaveholders from Missouri had squatted down in a territory that was free and therefore did not belong to them, and that he (Lincoln) did not say in his Springfield speech that he was in favour of a war by the North on the South to destroy slavery, or by the South on the North to nationalise slavery, that he had not said he was in favour of anything. He had only made a prediction. He had not said even that he was in favour of putting slavery where it would be in the course of ultimate extinction. But, he added, 'I do say so now, so there need be no longer any difficulty about that. . . . I have always hated it, but I have always been quiet about it, until this new era of the introduction of the Nebraska bill began. I always believed that everybody was against it, and that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. . . . We had reason so to believe. The adoption of the Constitution and its attendant history led the people so to believe. Else why did those old men declare that it should not go into the new territory, where it had not already gone (the North-West Territory), and declare that within twenty years the African slave trade, by which slaves were supplied, might be cut off by Congress' (as it was cut off in 1808).

As to the Dred Scot decision, Lincoln said: 'We let this property (Dred and his family) abide by this decision. But we will try to reverse that decision. . . . What are the uses of decisions of courts? They have two uses. As rules of property they have two uses. First, they decide upon the question before the court. They decide in this case that Dred Scott is a slave. Nobody resists that. Not only that, but they say to everybody else that all persons standing just as Dred Scott stands are as he is. That is, they say that when a question comes up, upon another person, it will be so decided again, unless the court decides in another way, unless the court overrules its decision. Well, we mean to do what we can to have the court decide the other way.'

Douglas answered him at Bloomington on July 16, and Lincoln was again present. Douglas spoke at Springfield the next day, and Lincoln answered him that evening. Here he referred to the disadvantage under which he laboured as a candidate against Douglas.

Thus: 'Senator Douglas is of world-wide renown. All the anxious politicians of his party, or who have been of his party for years past, have been looking upon him as certainly, at no distant day, to be President of the United States. They have seen in his round, jolly, fruitful face, post-offices, land-offices, marshalships and cabinet appointments, chargeships and foreign missions, bursting and sprouting out, in wonderful exuberance, ready to be laid hold of by their greedy hands. And as they have been gazing on this attractive picture so long, they cannot, in the little distraction that has taken place in the party, bring themselves to give up the charming hope; but with greedier anxiety they rush about him, sustain him, and give him marches, triumphal entries and receptions beyond what even in the days of his highest prosperity they could have brought about in his favour. On the contrary, nobody has ever expected me to be President. In my poor, lean, lank face nobody has ever seen any cabbages sprouting out.'

And in the same vein Lincoln referred to the main points in the Douglas campaign, first 'popular sovereignty,' second and third, attacks on his speech before the convention. 'Auxiliary,' he added, 'to these main points, to be sure, are their thunderings of cannon, their marching and music, their fizzle-gigs and fireworks. But I will not waste time with them. They are but the little trappings of the campaign.'

Then he neatly disposed of Douglas's doctrine of 'popular sovereignty,' to which, he had vauntingly said, he had devoted several years of his past life and proposed to devote the remainder. Lincoln asked what he meant by it. Did he mean to say that he had been devoting his life to securing to the people of the territories the right to exclude slavery from the *territories*? If he did, he meant to deceive. Because Judge Douglas and everyone knew that the Dred Scott decision forbade the people of a *territory* to exclude slavery. This decision covered the whole time from the settlement of a territory till it reached the population entitling it to become a state. During that time this decision of the Supreme Court, which Douglas said he sustained, declared that the people had no constitutional power to exclude slavery. So if he was upholding this decision, he was upholding the very thing that annihilated his 'popular sovereignty.' This being disposed of, what was left? Was he contending for the right of the people, when they come to make a *state* constitution, as suits them best, to have slavery or not have it, as they wished? If he meant this, then he was Quixotic, for he could find no one opposed to him on this proposition. The people had always had this right, and no one had ever yet disputed it. Everyone, Democrat and Republican alike, admitted it. So that Judge Douglas's vaunted 'popular sovereignty,' to which he had been and proposed to devote his whole life, really amounted to nothing. It was 'the most arrant humbug that had ever been attempted on an intelligent community.'

Not much better was the claim for defeating the Lecompton Constitution. Lincoln agreed to the rightfulness of this opposition. But of the Douglas party in the Senate just three had voted that way, and in the House just twenty, while it took a hundred and twenty to defeat it. In other words, Douglas had furnished just twenty of the

votes that actually did defeat it in the House, for it carried in the Senate, while the other party furnished the other hundred. Why, then, should he claim *par excellence*, as the very quintessence of the opposition? It could only be on the theory of the parable of the lost sheep, that there is more rejoicing in heaven over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety and nine just persons that need no repentance.

Thus far Douglas and Lincoln had always spoken to separate audiences; but on July 24 Lincoln challenged him to a joint debate. And the challenge was accepted. It was agreed that they would speak at seven places. At four of them Douglas was to open with one hour, Lincoln then to have an hour and a half, and Douglas to close with half an hour. Lincoln was to open and close at the other three places. And so the debate ran along henceforth at short range.

Under Lincoln's crowding Douglas lost his temper several times, called Lincoln some hard names, charged him with having been a grocery-keeper—in other words, a saloon-keeper, for the groceries in the West sold liquors in those days—and again referred to Lincoln's early life. The passage is specially interesting now as a contemporaneous revelation of Lincoln's early life: 'I met him (in the Legislature) and had a sympathy with him because of the uphill struggle we both had in life. He was then just as good at telling an anecdote as now. He could beat any of the boys wrestling or running a foot-race, in pitching quoits or tossing a copper, could ruin more liquor than all the boys of the town together, and the dignity and impartiality with which he presided at a horse race or fist fight excited the admiration and won the praise of everybody that was present and participated.'

Lincoln replied to the charge of keeping a grocery: 'The Judge is wofully at fault about his early friend Lincoln being a grocery-keeper. I don't know that it would have been a great sin if I had been; but he is mistaken. Lincoln never kept a grocery anywhere in the world. It is true that Lincoln did work the latter part of one winter in a little still-house up at the head of a hollow.' And as to Douglas's characterisation of him as being 'a kind, amiable and intelligent gentleman,' Lincoln said: 'Then, as the Judge complimented me with these pleasant titles, I must confess to my weakness I was a little "taken," for it came from a great man. I was not very much accustomed to flattery, and it came the sweeter to me. I was rather like the Hoosier with the gingerbread, when he said he reckoned he loved it better than any other man and got less of it.'

But Lincoln brought him back to the original question, What is necessary to make slavery national? 'Not war. There is no danger that the people of Kentucky will shoulder their muskets and, with a young nigger stuck on every bayonet, march into Illinois and force themselves upon us. There is no danger of our going over there and making war upon them. Then what is necessary for the nationalisation of slavery? It is simply the next Dred Scott decision. It is merely for the Supreme Court to decide that no *state* under the constitution can exclude it, just as they have already decided that under the Constitution, while a *territory*, neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature can do it.'

'When he invites any people, willing to have slavery, to establish it, he is blowing out the moral lights around us. When he says "he cares not whether slavery is voted down or voted up"—that it is a sacred right of self-government—he is, in my judgment, penetrating the human soul and eradicating the light of reason and the love of liberty in this American people. And now I will only say that when by these means and appliances Judge Douglas succeeds in bringing public sentiment to an exact accordance with his own views—when these vast assemblages shall echo back all these sentiments—when they shall come to repeat his views and to avow his principles and to say all that he says on these mighty questions—then it needs only the formality of the second Dred Scott decision, which he indorses in advance, to make slavery alike lawful in all the states—old as well as new, North as well as South.'

And again in Lincoln's closing speech of the debate: 'The real issue in controversy—the one pressing upon every mind—is the sentiment on the part of one class that looks upon the institution of slavery *as a wrong*, and of another class that *does not* look upon it as a wrong. . . . That is the real issue. That is the issue that will continue in this country when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be silent. It is the eternal struggle between these two principles—right and wrong—throughout the world. They are the two principles that have stood face to face from the beginning of time; and will ever continue to struggle. The one is the common right of humanity and the other the divine right of kings. It is the same principle in whatever shape it develops itself. It is the same principle that says "You work and toil and earn bread, and I'll eat it." No matter in what shape it comes, whether from the mouth of a king who seeks to bestride the people of his own nation and live by the fruit of their labour or from one race of men as an apology for enslaving another race, it is the same tyrannical principle.'

Lincoln had him easily beaten in the argument. But he was at a disadvantage in the election. Douglas controlled a large amount of patronage, the President being a Democrat and the other Senator from Illinois a Republican. He had numerous office-holders, who held their places by his gift and were liable to be displaced at his nod. There were also some hold-over members of the Legislature who were Democrats. The last Legislature, having been Democratic, had refused a new apportionment of members for the incoming one, to conform to a recent increase of population in Republican counties. The state had been normally Democratic, the present officers were Democrats. And Douglas was the real leader of the organisation.

The result of it all was that, though the Republican State Ticket was elected, Lincoln, the candidate of the Republicans for a seat in the National Senate, was defeated. The other benefits that naturally followed were all with the Republicans. For this election paved the way for the final overthrow of the Democrats in Illinois, the election of Lincoln to the Presidency and the destruction of slavery.

Lincoln's first fame rests on this debate. In June he was not known outside of Illinois; in September his ability and his character were understood in all the non-slaveholding states. He had placed himself

distinctly on Constitutional-Union ground. He had furnished a chart for the platforms of his party. And to him more than to anyone else was it indebted for its early character, its measures and success.

The next year, 1859, Douglas spoke in Ohio. And Lincoln was asked to follow him. This he did, speaking at Columbus and Cincinnati. At the latter place, just across the river from Kentucky, he addressed a part of his speech to the Kentuckians. He argued that the Southern people should nominate Douglas for President, that he was a better candidate than any that they could choose from among themselves, that he was holding the North firmly in line, by adopting a policy that was plausible there and yet really in the interests of the South, that though he did not go the full length of the most advanced pro-slavery advocate, he was going just as fast as it was safe to go if the North was to be held for the Democrats, that he could be depended on to advance with them whenever they could take the North along, as it was necessary to do if they were to continue in control of the Government. Lincoln then illustrated his argument by showing the different measures Douglas had already advocated in the interest of slavery.

This was a method of attack that Douglas hardly knew how to meet. It was like political manœuvres frequently are. He knew it to be true and yet he did not wish it to be known. He did want the nomination for the Presidency and the support of the South. And he was at the same time striving to maintain his hold on the North. He saw that the two wings of the Democratic party were drifting apart and that the problem was to find some common ground upon which they could both unite in the coming campaign. Lincoln foresaw that this would probably be impossible. And he sought to emphasise the situation to the South by pointing out the double-dealing of Douglas. This would confirm the extreme pro-slavery men in the belief that he was not a safe candidate. And this was not hard to do in view of the recent Dred Scott decision. For in 1856 Douglas had succeeded in committing them to his 'popular sovereignty' measure. This they now regretted. For they realised that they should have taken the position of Jefferson Davis and the Supreme Court, that the people had no power to exclude slavery from the territories.

In the same speech Lincoln told the Kentuckians that the Republicans proposed to elect the next President. And having thus told them what the North proposed to do, he turned the question to them and asked what they would do. He had heard that they intended, in that event, to rebel and divide the nation at the Ohio River. He reminded them that they were good men and could fight as well as any living people in a good cause. 'But,' he added, significantly, 'man for man you are not any better than we are; and there are not so many of you as there are of us.' And it proved that this was the whole ultimate situation of affairs between the sections. It was stated to the South in a single sentence. But it took four years of war to convince her of this truth. And then at last she yielded. But ever since she has made this apology for her defeat—that she was simply overborne by numbers.

CHAPTER VI

Some Dissatisfaction with Slavery in the South—Helper's 'Impending Crisis'—The Insurrection of John Brown—Its Influence North and South.

LINCOLN knew that there were many people in the South that were not in favour of slavery. In the small villages most of the white people had no slaves. And even in the cities there were many who did not own them. Often those who did, held only one or two as family domestics that could easily be replaced by hired help. Such people had little interest in the perpetuity of slavery. And there was a reason with them for wishing it to be abolished. The large slaveholders, who really depended on slavery, lived apart from the rest of the community in a kind of baronial splendour, and purchased their supplies from wholesale dealers living at a distance, often in Northern cities. They frequented Northern travel resorts. They were the envy of their less fortunate neighbours. For the young man from the plantation could always outclass his less fortunate rival, the clerk of the merchant, in his suit for the pride and beauty of the village. And the old planter could as easily surpass the shopkeeper himself in the splendour of his equipage. It was only natural that both, when defeated, should feel the sting of outrageous fortune and, secretly at least, hope for the downfall of the institution that maintained such distinctions. Already there were signs that some day there might be an upheaval from these causes. We have already noticed the resolutions of the Nashville Convention, called to consider the grievances of the South leading up to the Compromise of 1850, that advised all Southerners to purchase their supplies at home and cease spending their money at the watering-places of the North.

Another evidence of dissatisfaction appeared in a book written by Hinton Rowan Helper. He was born in North Carolina, of slaveholding parents, but had engaged in mercantile pursuits. He had afterwards drifted to California, and was living somewhere in the North when his book was published. The slaveholders then denounced him. But the book proves him to have been an intelligent and resolute young man, actuated by a desire to do something to elevate the section where he was born. His book was entitled 'The Impending Crisis of the South—How to meet it.' It pointed out the vast superiority in wealth, resources and general civilisation of the North, and argued that this had been brought about by slavery, and that, by reason of the ignorance, unskillfulness and laziness of the blacks in this condition, their presence was not desirable, that they should be replaced by whites, and that, by the removal of the

blacks and the immigration of whites, there should be inaugurated a division of the large plantations into small farms. The book disclosed a decided hostility to the 'slavocrats' and 'lords of the lash,' and showed that they constituted only a small part of the white population of the South, and maintained their ascendancy only by patronage and intimidation. Helper insisted that the other class of Southern people should unite in political action to take the control of the section from the slaveholders and, by imposing heavy taxes on slaves, cause their removal.

Altogether the book disclosed the existence of a sentiment that might, if left alone, have eventually destroyed slavery by peaceable means. The slaveholders always sought to conceal the existence of such a sentiment. And it was to their interest to do so. But, nevertheless, it was a fact that such a feeling did exist and that it was growing stronger.

But an untoward event happened, in 1859, that at once suppressed this sentiment and aided materially to precipitate a conflict between the North and the South. This was the insurrection at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, under the leadership of John Brown. It served promptly to unite the slaveholding and non-slaveholding classes of the South.

Brown was a New Englander by birth. But when he was only five years old his father emigrated from Connecticut to Hudson, Ohio. Here the boy grew up under strong anti-slavery influences. He was originally intended for the ministry, and was sent to Massachusetts to be educated. But, owing to a weakness of his eyes, he had to abandon this purpose. He returned to Ohio and adopted the kindred occupations of farmer and tanner. He enjoyed the respect of his neighbours and was esteemed an earnest and pious young man. He married, and by this wife had seven children. She died at last in childbirth, and a year later he married again. By his second wife he was the father of thirteen children. He was never successful in business, moved about too much, changed his occupation too often, was at one time in England with a cargo of wool, and then in Northern New York instructing negroes how to farm, and later still in Kansas. He thus saw something both of his own country and Europe. But he never made money. He was too visionary. He early became an Abolitionist of the most ultra type and participated in their most extravagant plans.

At the outbreak of the Kansas troubles he was living on some land in the Adirondack Mountain region of New York, where Gerrit Smith was colonising some negroes. He had given Brown a tract, on condition that he assist the negroes to manage theirs. But a man of Brown's temperament could not resist the appeal of the situation that Kansas presented. And, leaving his home in New York, he hurried with four of his sons to Lykins County in the southern part of Kansas. This was near the town of Ossawatimie and not far from the Missouri border. Their wives and their families were left behind in New York.

Brown soon became identified with some of the roughest scenes of this storm-swept territory. He was one of the most daring leaders

of the Free-soilers. In the incident known as the Battle of Black Jack he commanded twenty-eight 'Free State men' and defeated, on the open prairie, fifty-six 'Border Ruffians,' under the command of one Pate, a Virginian. The battle terminated in the surrender of Pate and all that remained of his band, twenty-one men, and their horses and mules and camp-equipage, with some plunder they had lately taken at the sacking of a Free-soil village. This was only one of many similar scenes in Brown's rough life. He even crossed the border into Missouri and assisted slaves to escape from their masters. And he made repeated trips to Canada to colonise runaway slaves and to New England to promote emigration to Kansas.

In the camp of his followers he enforced the strictest discipline, abolishing profanity, enjoining religious worship, always asked a blessing upon the meal before it was eaten and said grace after it was dispatched. On one occasion he compelled some 'Border Ruffians,' who had been made prisoners and were swearing at their ill-luck, to down on their knees and pray at the point of the pistol. He made them afterwards unite in the morning and evening worship of the camp. And when they escaped from their captivity and related their religious experience afterwards in Atchinson, the laugh at their expense became so hearty and so general that they soon after left town, never to return.

In one of his pitched battles in Kansas, Brown's son was killed, as it was supposed by a preacher named White. Soon afterwards White returned to his home in Missouri, and later was elected a member of the Legislature. In a blatant moment he entertained his fellow-members with an account of this deed. At the close of the session he started home. But he never reached there. His lifeless body was found by the road with a bullet through it.

After four years of marauding of this kind, Brown's name became such a terror that his own party, which had now come into power, was compelled to disown him. The Governor offered a reward of three thousand dollars for his arrest, and President Buchanan added two hundred and fifty more. Thus outlawed, Brown left Kansas under an assumed name, and went back East. He was now fired with a project of arousing the slaves to rise up and, by a general insurrection, secure their freedom.

Being without means himself, he raised money in New York and Boston, as he had previously done to promote his anti-slavery work in Kansas. The subscribers, knowing the spirit of the man and the cause he had so much at heart, did not care to inquire too particularly what use he purposed to make of it. And under pretty much the same circumstances he procured the loan of some firearms from the chairman of the 'Massachusetts State Kansas Committee.' With these and some pikes which he had contracted to have made he took possession of a farm he had rented in Maryland, about six miles from Harper's Ferry. Here he gathered some kindred spirits about him.

He was known as a farmer, by the name of Smith, looking for a location adapted to wool-growing. Some of his daughters came and went and the wives of some of his men. They were sociable with the neighbours, paid cash for what they bought, and made friends. The

men spent much of their time tending some stock which the owner had left on the farm and hunting squirrels in the neighbouring mountains. So they excited no suspicion. Religious worship was observed as faithfully as it had been in Kansas. The men came and went to Harper's Ferry, where they soon became familiar with the surroundings and with the United States Arsenal, which was located there. The Arsenal contained 100,000 to 200,000 stand of arms. And it was these arms which attracted Brown to the place as the scene of his opening operations. With them he expected to arm the slaves that he hoped would flock to his standard and thus organise a wholesale uprising.

The night of October 24 was first fixed as the date for raising the flag of insurrection. But as the time drew near, Brown became fearful of discovery. And so on Saturday, October 15, 1859, a council was held and on Sunday evening another. Then it was determined to proceed to Harper's Ferry that night. Thus with a force of seventeen white and five coloured men, Brown went to the village, quietly slumbering in its nest among the mountains at the confluence of the Potomac and the Shenandoah rivers. It was also at the junction of two railroads and within fifty-seven miles of Washington and eighty of Baltimore. At half-past ten o'clock they seized the watchman of the railroad bridge over the Potomac. And they then secured the three guards of the Arsenal. Some of the party arrested one slaveholder and liberated his slaves, others another. As arrested, they were imprisoned in the Arsenal. The lights of the town were turned out, and anyone found upon the streets was arrested.

So things proceeded until between forty and fifty prisoners were held. If asked their purpose, the answer was 'To free the slaves.' If further asked, 'By what authority?' the answer was 'By the authority of Almighty God!' At midnight another guard of the bridge, coming to relieve the one under arrest, was ordered to stop, but he fled and was shot at as he retreated. An hour later a passenger train arrived from the west and was detained. The porter of it, a free coloured man, was ordered to halt, but, starting to run away, he was shot in the back and died the next morning. The conductor of the train, upon going to the bridge, found it patrolled by armed men.

The telegraph lines were cut and some railroad track was torn up so as to prevent the use of the road. But the next morning the train was permitted to proceed eastward, and it carried the news that Harper's Ferry was in the hands of a mob. As the workmen came to their work at the Arsenal, they too were arrested. But everyone under arrest was permitted to communicate with his friends, and he was allowed to procure his freedom by bringing in a slave.

But of course the slaves were not fleeing to the support of this uprising. And gradually the people of the village recovered themselves. What could twenty-two men do then? The militia was called out, and Brown's fate was sealed. By noon he and his men were surrounded in the Arsenal. Some citizens got possession of a house overlooking this building and fired on the guards, killing two. One was Brown's son. Another company of militia came, and still

later a company of United States Marines, under the command of Colonel Robert E. Lee, later the commander of the army of Northern Virginia. The fighting had already become general, and several were killed. Some of the insurgents, trying to escape, were shot down. Some others, that had been sent to capture slaveholders and liberate slaves, were unable to return, and fled. In some instances they were afterwards captured. One sent out with a flag of truce was killed. And one was killed after being captured.

When the Arsenal was surrounded and attacked, Brown, with his remaining men, took refuge in the engine-house, where the appliances for extinguishing fires were stored. This was of brick. When fired on here, his men returned the fire. One of his prisoners who witnessed the fighting declared that through it all Brown was the coolest man he ever saw. He seemed to defy death. With one son dead at his side and another shot through, he felt the pulse of the dying son with one hand, held his rifle with the other, and commanded his men with the utmost composure, encouraging them to be firm and sell their lives as dearly as possible. Later, in talking with this prisoner, Brown told him he had not pressed his sons to join the expedition, but that he did not regret their loss, for they had died in a good cause.

At seven o'clock on Tuesday morning, still refusing to surrender, the door of the engine-house was broken in by using a ladder as a battering-ram, the marines rushed in, Brown was knocked down and beaten and twice wounded by a bayonet. Thus he was captured. And the three surviving insurgents with him were also secured. After being examined before a magistrate as to the purpose and plan of the conspiracy, the four—Brown and another, badly wounded, in a wagon and the other two marching between files of soldiers—were conducted to the jail at Charlestown, the county seat. Here three other insurgents who were afterwards captured were also imprisoned.

Brown and these six of his confederates were promptly indicted for treason, murder and conspiracy. They were all tried, convicted and sentenced to be hanged. Through these proceedings Brown displayed the same coolness and courage that had characterised his whole career. On the 1st of November he was unexpectedly called into court to receive sentence. On being asked if he had anything to say why sentence should not be pronounced, he spoke feelingly but firmly, denying everything except what he had all along admitted. He insisted that his only design was to free the slaves. He denied that he intended murder or treason or the destruction of property, or to incite slaves to insurrection. And he admitted the candour and truthfulness of the greater portion of the witnesses who had testified against him. He said that if he had sought to interfere on behalf of the rich and powerful and so-called great, or of their friends, as he had on behalf of the poor and lowly, every man in the court-room would have deemed it worthy of reward rather than of punishment. He inferred that the court acknowledged the law of God, for he saw a book kissed there, which he took to be the Bible. Yet this book taught him that, whatever he would that men should do to him, he should do even so to them. And it also taught him to remember those that were in bonds, as bound with them. This he had

endeavoured to do. And therefore for him to have interfered in behalf of God's despised poor was not wrong but right. And now, if it be deemed necessary for him to forfeit his life and mingle his blood with that of his children and the blood of millions whose rights were disregarded by cruel enactments, he was ready to submit, but he felt no consciousness of guilt.

To his wife and children he wrote a week later urging them not to come to see him, that they could do no good, for he was being treated kindly by his jailor, that the journey would only consume their scant means, which were already needed to make them comfortable, and that the little pleasure it might afford them to meet again would be dearly bought by the pains of a final separation. In a postscript he added: 'I cannot remember a night so dark as to have hindered the coming day, nor a storm so furious or dreadful as to prevent the return of warm sunshine and a cloudless sky.' And he urged them never to forget the griefs of the poor that cry and those that have no help. And, commending them to God and His infinite mercy, he reminded them that, in this world, they had no abiding-place or continuing city. His wife did, however, visit him a short time before his death.

The day of his execution was fixed for December 2, and on this day, having visited his companions, none of whom had yet been executed, and given each a quarter, as a token, he walked out of the jail 'with a radiant countenance and the step of a conqueror.' A black woman, with a little child in her arms, stood by the door, and he stopped and, stooping, kissed the little one. Another, as he passed, exclaimed 'God bless you, old man! I wish I could help you, but I can't.' He looked at her with a tear in his eye and passed on. He mounted the wagon beside his jailor, and they were immediately surrounded by six companies of militia, one of them composed of cadets from the Virginia Military Institute under the command of Stonewall Jackson. And so he was conducted to the gallows. The day was one of the beautiful bright days of the late autumn, when the seared leaves were golden. Brown remarked on the beauty of the weather and the scenery. Was he thinking of his old home in the North? Being asked if he felt any fear, he answered, 'It has been a characteristic of me, from infancy, not to suffer from physical fear.'

He bade adieu to some friends at the foot of the gallows, and with a firm step was the first to mount the scaffold. Being asked if he would drop a handkerchief when he was ready, he answered 'No; I am ready at any time. But do not keep me needlessly waiting.' In defiance of this wish, however, he was kept standing several minutes, which seemed an hour, while a parade of the militia was enacted as if to repel a resistance. Even the soldiers began to murmur 'Shame!' Then the trap fell, and he was soon dead. His body was delivered to his widow at Harper's Ferry—memorable as the place of his insurrection—and by her it was conveyed to the beautiful Adirondacks which he had loved in life and was now to consecrate with his ashes.

Jackson, witnessing it, expressed regret for his death. And everyone now would admit that it closed the life of a brave and well-meaning

man, even though he was misguided. The reports of the whole affair awakened genuine sympathy for him in the North, especially among those who were opposed to slavery. And during the next four years the tread of marching armies kept time to the slogan :

John Brown's body lies a-mouldering in the grave,
But his soul is marching on.

And after more than fifty years men are still disputing about his character and his place in history. Both, perhaps, will continue to be subjects of dispute. He was executed in the presence of nearly three thousand militia, and cannon were planted so as to sweep every approach to the jail and blow the prisoner into atoms in case of an attempted rescue. For it was well said that ' Virginia held her breath until she heard that the old man was dead.'

But it was not Virginia alone that was excited. The whole South was. And the incident showed what a dread there was of an uprising of the slaves. And there was some ground for this. In several of the Southern states the slaves were greatly in the majority. The whole white population of South Carolina, for example, was only 301,271, while the slaves numbered 402,541. The white population of Mississippi was 354,700 ; the slave, 436,696. In many instances a white planter lived apart from the rest of the community with his wife and children. They were only a few in number, while they were surrounded by hundreds, sometimes even by thousands, of slaves. A sudden uprising under such circumstances would be something which the whites would be altogether powerless to resist. And the nameless crimes that might then be committed against white women, worse than death itself, made them even more fearful of such a crisis than the men.

The possibility of such an uprising had been a frequent subject of discussion. And it was held up as a cause of complaint against the Abolitionists of the North that their agitation of the wrongs of the slaves increased this danger. The circulation of such books as ' Uncle Tom's Cabin ' was also complained of as having the same tendency. It was argued that this was an overdrawn picture of life in the South, which was calculated to injure the slaveholders.

The latter held up the dangers to be apprehended from such insurrections as Brown's for the purpose of suppressing the growth of any anti-slavery sentiment among other classes. The planter himself and his family, they argued, were not in as great danger as the poor whites. For the overseer often controlled slaves with the lash and, therefore, incurred their ill-will ; while the slave-owner could cultivate their affection by never using the lash himself and by occasionally interfering when it was used by others. Besides, the master was looked up to as a superior and was regarded with the awe which superiority inspires, while the poor whites were regarded only as ' trash.' Where the enmity would first fall in case of an uprising, it was said, could be easily foreseen.

The effect of the Brown insurrection was, therefore, materially to injure the prospect of a peaceable solution of the slavery question. Such encouraging signs as Helper's ' Impending Crisis ' soon

disappeared, and the whole South, rich and poor alike, was united. None could contemplate this aspect except from one point.

Of course Brown's movement led to a further misunderstanding of the attitude of the North. She knew that Brown's scheme was visionary in the extreme. Only a mind disordered by long brooding over one subject could have failed to see this. There was in it an entire misconception of the character of the negro, as shown by his history in the South. There never was such an uprising. And though the South was in dread of it, and well might be if the negro had been Anglo-Saxon, yet there never was any real cause to apprehend it when it was remembered that he was an African.

The cheerfulness and the submissiveness of the negroes under any, even the most adverse, conditions were marked traits of their character. They were generally contented if only they had sufficient food and clothing. And no less marked was their fidelity to their masters. This loyalty has since been a fruitful theme among Southern people. It was illustrated during the war. When everywhere around them were scenes of blood the slaves, to the last, protected and shielded their master's family, and this though the master himself and his sons were far away fighting to maintain them in slavery. In no instance was this trust of the white race ever betrayed by the coloured. It was everywhere the same. And it has been frequently a subject of remark since the war, in the North as well as in the South.

So that when Brown believed that he could have the slaves come flocking to his standard and take up arms to assist their freedom, he was basing his whole expedition upon a misconception of the character of the slaves. They were not either assertive or rebellious. And if they had been, and had risen at Harper's Ferry, he had no plan for a simultaneous uprising all over the South. And before the flame that he kindled here could spread, the authorities that controlled the military branch of the local government would have suppressed it. And even if it had been general the United States Government would have been required to exert her whole power, if necessary, to suppress it. Such reflections show the utter folly of Brown's project.

The North saw this and had no thought of indorsing it. But a great part of the Northern people were convinced of the wrongfulness of slavery and were tired of the dictation of the South. And, above all, they could not help admiring the real heroism of the life and death of Brown. And they sympathised with the sad close of his career. Hence there was in many places in the North evidence of sorrow and sympathy. On the day of his execution flags were at half-mast, houses were draped, church bells tolled, prayer-meetings were held, and even the Senate of Massachusetts came within three votes of adjourning out of respect for the occasion.

While it was never so meant, this was heralded through the South as an approval of Brown's expedition, and as showing a purpose on the part of the North to encourage insurrection. Such an impression industriously fanned continued to grow. And it was felt that all classes must stand together and keep down dissensions as to the character of slavery in the presence of this peril that threatened all in the South.

CHAPTER VII

Congress investigates the Insurrection—Republican elected Speaker—
The South bolts the Democratic National Convention—Separate
Candidates nominated—Lincoln elected.

WHEN Congress met on December 5, 1859, only three days after the execution of Brown, the Senate, upon a resolution introduced by Mason of Virginia, called for an investigation into the recent occurrences at Harper's Ferry. The House, on the other hand, proceeded to ballot for Speaker. John Sherman, of Ohio, and Galusha A. Grow, of Pennsylvania, were the Republican candidates. After the first ballot a motion to adjourn was made and lost. And thereupon John B. Clark, of Missouri, introduced a resolution that no member of the House who had recommended a book entitled 'The Impending Crisis of the South,' by Helper, was fit to be Speaker. It appeared that the book, as being an effective anti-slavery argument, had been recommended to the public by a circular signed by two-thirds of the Republican members of the last Congress. And among them were both Sherman and Grow, the candidates now for Speaker.

Thus opening, both Houses proceeded for several days to discourage the agitation of the slavery question by discussing Brown and Helper, adding spice to the proceedings of the one by reading choice extracts from Helper's book, inveighing sometimes in violent language against the 'Oligarchs' and 'Terror Engenderers' of the South; and to the proceedings of the other by discussing a resolution, offered by Jefferson Davis, affirming and emphasising the worst points of the Dred Scott decision. The result was that both Sherman and Grow failed of an election, though Sherman came within three votes of it. The office went to William Pennington, another Republican, who was a new member. And the efforts to fix the responsibility for the John Brown invasion on the Republicans and the anti-slavery leaders of the North was also a failure.

The discussion of the resolutions introduced by Davis in the Senate continued at intervals through the winter of 1859 and 1860. Davis, since the death of Calhoun, had succeeded to the leadership of the extreme pro-slavery wing of the Democratic Party. The purpose of his resolutions was to fix the ground upon which they proposed to stand in the next Presidential campaign. They wished also to defeat the nomination and election of Douglas. This wing of the party had abandoned the Douglas doctrine of 'squatter sovereignty' and had planted itself on the Dred Scott decision. They held that the slaveholder had a right to take his slaves into the territories, and that neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislatures

could enact laws to impede or prevent it. This was in direct contravention of the theory advanced by Douglas in his debate with Lincoln, that the Territorial Legislatures could prevent it by refusing to pass laws for the protection of slave property or by hostile enactments, such as unequal taxation, thus driving slaves out of the territory and destroying the value of such property. This plan was originally brought out by a question propounded to Douglas by Lincoln, at Freeport, Illinois. The question was evidently one that Douglas did not wish to have propounded, and he answered it with some show of temper. But the answer to the question, as Lincoln then predicted, if it enabled Douglas to return to the Senate, would for ever prevent him from becoming President. This prediction was now being fulfilled. It did aid Douglas to return to the Senate, but it was now barring him from the Presidency.

The debate in the Senate was interrupted, at last, by the Democratic National Convention, which was called to meet at Charleston, South Carolina, on April 23, 1860.

There was, in advance, abundant evidence of a storm. There were contesting delegations from New York and Illinois, one favourable to Douglas and one against him. The Douglas delegates were seated. Then came a contest over the platform. The committee was composed of a member from each state. Thus constituted, the majority was with Davis, and on the fifth day this majority reported a platform in conformity with his resolutions in the Senate. The minority report simply reaffirmed the Cincinnati platform of 1856, which had indorsed 'squatter sovereignty,' and further recited that as differences of opinion existed in the party as to the nature and extent of the powers of Congress and a Territorial Legislature over slavery within the territories, the party would, therefore, abide by the decision of the Supreme Court on constitutional questions. This, of course, was intended as a straddle, so as to permit the North to be carried by the Douglas theory and the South by the Davis. The majority of the Committee insisted on a plain and unequivocal statement of the Southern position, that the Constitution guaranteed to every slaveholder the right to settle in a territory with his slaves, and that the standing of such property, when there, could neither be impaired nor destroyed by congressional or territorial legislation.

An acrimonious debate followed, which continued till April 30, when the minority (Douglas) report was adopted. Thereupon most of the delegates from the slave states withdrew from the Convention, on the ground that they had been instructed not to submit to a 'squatter sovereignty' platform, and to withdraw if one was adopted. The states that withdrew were Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, Louisiana, Florida, Texas and Arkansas. This was the real beginning of secession, the first step in defiance of majority rule, and the opening movement for a separation of the South from the North. The others naturally followed. It will be noticed that these were the first states to secede.

In the Convention, as soon as quiet was restored, a call for the nomination of candidates was made. Here another difficulty was encountered. A rule had been adopted that a vote of two-thirds of a full convention was necessary to nominate. Though Douglas was

easily in the lead, he was unable to secure the necessary two-thirds vote. And so, after fifty-seven ballots, the Convention on May 3 adjourned, to meet in Baltimore on June 18.

The Convention met accordingly in June. But it was only to reenact the same scenes of dissolution and disorder as had been enacted at Charleston. At first, some time was spent in settling contests for seats. Feeling, when this was done, running high, the contests were promptly decided so as to increase the strength of Douglas, he having a controlling vote in the Convention. This angered the few remaining anti-Douglas delegates from the South. And withdrawals again commenced. Thus most of the delegates from Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri withdrew. The situation became ludicrous, when at this crisis Caleb Cushing and Benjamin F. Butler, of Massachusetts, with a majority of that delegation, also withdrew. Butler was as blunt then as ever. And he gave as the reason for this action of the Massachusetts delegates that there had been a withdrawal, in part, of a majority of the states. And he added, for himself, amid an uproar of the Convention, that he would not sit in a Convention where the African slave trade, which was piracy by the laws of his country, was approvingly advocated. And Cushing, just as erratic politically then as ever, quit the chair of this Convention to become chairman of the seceding Convention.

What was left of the original Convention then proceeded to the nomination of candidates. Douglas had one hundred and seventy-three votes on the first ballot and a hundred and eighty-one and a half on the second. And the other candidates had only thirteen. Douglas not having two-thirds of the vote of the full Convention before any withdrawals had taken place, as the rule previously adopted at Charleston required, a resolution was passed that he, having received two-thirds of all the votes cast in this Convention, be declared the nominee of the Democratic Party of the United States. And so he was, at last, nominated. Benjamin Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, was nominated for Vice-President. The Convention then adopted another plank for the platform, declaring that whatever restriction the Supreme Court, in interpreting the Constitution, had or would place upon territorial legislation, on the subject of domestic relations, should be respected by all good citizens and enforced by the Government. It then adjourned. Two days later Fitzpatrick declined the nomination for Vice-President, and Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia, was substituted by the National Committee.

And what had become of the seceding delegates? After their first withdrawal, they met in another hall in Charleston. And here they adopted the Davis platform. And having spent some time in discussion, they then adjourned, to meet in Richmond, Virginia, on June 11. Here, still waiting to see the effect of their action upon the other convention and contemplating the gravity of the step they were taking, for it meant secession, they adjourned again, to meet in Baltimore on June 28. Here they again adopted the Davis platform, and then unanimously nominated John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, for President, and Joseph Lane, of Oregon, for Vice-President. Then, after listening to a speech by William L. Yancey, of Alabama, 'the

Wendell Phillips of the South,' they adjourned. So the Democrats now had two tickets in the field.

Already another, the Constitutional Union, Party had held a national convention in Baltimore. It met on May 19, and nominated John Bell, of Tennessee, for President, and Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, for Vice-President. In the preamble of its platform it recited, what the plain people would now agree was true, that the platforms adopted by partisan conventions had had the effect of misleading and deceiving the people and at the same time of widening the political divisions of the country. It therefore made its platform very brief. In a single resolution it declared simply for the Constitution of the country, the Union of the States, and the enforcement of the laws. This was all very sound doctrine. But during the next four years Lincoln found it very hard to enforce.

The Republican National Convention met in Chicago on May 16. All the free states and Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri of the border states were represented. But the other slave states were not. A committee of one from each state and territory was appointed to draft a platform. On the evening of the second day this committee reported a platform, declaring for the principle of the Declaration of Independence, that all men are created equal and that the Constitution and Union must be preserved, that each state must be allowed to control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment, that the subserviency of the existing Democratic Administration to sectional interests, in its efforts to force the Lecompton Constitution on Kansas, was wrong; that the new dogma, that the Constitution of its own force carried slavery into all the territories, was revolutionary in its tendency and subversive of the peace of the country; that, on the contrary, the normal condition of all the territories of the United States was that of freedom, and that the authority of their Legislatures or of Congress to give legal existence to slavery therein must be denied. It also pronounced against reopening the African slave trade and declared for a protective tariff, for adequate homestead and naturalisation laws, for internal improvements and for aid to build a railroad to the Pacific.

On the third day it proceeded to ballot for candidates. On the first ballot for President, Seward had a hundred and seventy-three votes and Lincoln one hundred and two. There were scattering votes for Cameron of Pennsylvania, Chase of Ohio, and others. Cameron then withdrew, and on the second ballot Seward had one hundred and eighty-four votes and Lincoln a hundred and eighty-one. On the third ballot Seward had one hundred and eighty and Lincoln two hundred and thirty-one and a half, or within two and a half votes of the necessary majority. Thereupon a delegate from Ohio changed four votes from Chase to Lincoln, giving him a majority. Other changes followed, until Lincoln had three hundred and fifty-four votes out of the four hundred and sixty-six in the Convention. His nomination was then made unanimous. Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine, was the same day nominated for Vice-President. And then the Convention adjourned. Its harmony was in marked contrast with that of the Democrats. And this, with the enthusiasm everywhere

shown in the party for the platform and the candidates, augured well for the success of the Republicans.

Lincoln's name had not been so generally before the public as some others, and hence an understanding prevailed then, and does still to some extent, that he was nominated as a dark horse. The facts, however, do not bear out this impression. For a year before the Convention his friends had been pressing his claims, not so much as an aggressive candidate, but as one upon whom the party could unite in case of a serious disagreement among the delegates. Lincoln was aware of this, and was preparing the way. After his speeches in Ohio, in the fall of 1859, he was invited to speak in Brooklyn. And the date finally fixed was February 27, 1860. He went, expecting to speak in Brooklyn, but the place was changed to Cooper Institute, in New York City. His debates with Douglas had been published and widely read. Douglas had since been speaking all over the country, and had published a political article in *Harper's Magazine* the preceding winter, setting out his views of 'squatter sovereignty.' He very frequently used Lincoln's name and combatted his expressions.

This served to give prominence to Lincoln. So that when he appeared in New York there was an eagerness to hear him. A large audience of the best talent of the city was present. The closely reasoned exposition of the principles that he felt should guide the country in the crisis caused by Douglas and his party surprised and satisfied his audience. It was in marked contrast with the inflated style of uncultured speakers, some of whom had already found their way from the new West. The audience was hardly prepared for an address that, in precision of definition, clearness of argument and accuracy of historical illustration, could rival the effort of a constitutional lawyer before one of our highest tribunals. It was said afterwards that this speech made Lincoln President. But that was claiming too much for it. The speech only proved that the good impression already made by his other addresses was well founded. And when this one was published in full by the New York dailies, and was widely read, it greatly extended his reputation. From New York Lincoln went to New England, and made several speeches there.

He was, therefore, by no means an accident. He had laid well the foundation of the campaign for a nomination. And he had an advantage in the location of the Convention in Chicago, the chief city of his own state, for he was already well known there. And the Republican State Convention of Illinois had already indorsed his candidacy. The leading politicians of the state, such men as David Davis and Richard Oglesby, were for him. And Lincoln himself was no tyro in party management. He was the logical man to confront Douglas, for he was his rival and from the same state. And the precaution had not been neglected to fill and surround the convention by those who would shout for 'Lincoln, the rail-splitter,' whenever an opportunity offered. Though he had telegraphed to Davis to make no promises of appointments, even a Cabinet place is said to have been taken into consideration in the canvass for votes. In fact, his campaign had been quietly, but very efficiently, managed.

There was a very decided opposition to Seward. He had been the leading candidate, a very dangerous position, as experience has shown, for one who does not have the votes to nominate on the first ballot. For it is pretty sure to engender jealousies that are dangerous. He had been Governor of the great state of New York and was nearing the close of his second term in the United States Senate. This had given him wide prominence. But experience has shown that the Senate is not the best pedestal from which to reach the Presidency. There are too many men in that body of large political influence to view, with envy, the promotion of one of their number above the rest. Besides, Horace Greeley and the *New York Tribune* were against Seward, in his own state. And the long discussion of his candidacy had developed some doubts of his fitness. Would he not be too conciliatory with the South? Was not a man of sterner fibre needed? Some of his expressions, too, as of an 'irreconcilable conflict' between freedom and slavery, had been criticised. It was feared that they might drive away recruits that were looked for from the disorganised Democrats.

Such claims were freely pressed against Seward, and at last with success. Naturally his defeat caused some feeling among his supporters. It was feared that this might enter into the campaign and affect the result in New York, whose vote in the electoral college was large. But these fears soon disappeared in the prevailing enthusiasm of the new party, largely composed of young men inspired by prospects of success. Apparently as the campaign progressed the Republicans were gaining at the expense of their only real rivals, the Democrats, many of whom were disgusted at the action of their party in dividing the Convention and ruining every prospect of success by having two candidates. There was a feeling, too, that the South had been too dictatorial, and that Douglas also had shown a rule or ruin spirit when, by retiring, he might have secured harmony. This feeling was not improved when he took charge of his own campaign and spoke in many places, both North and South. By the leading politicians of the South this 'squatter sovereignty' doctrine to which he had given such prominence was regarded only as a meaner sort of Wilmot Proviso. And this was putting it strongly, for no issue made by the North with slavery thus far had ever been more unpopular in the South than this Proviso.

The result was clearly foreshadowed in the September elections. Maine, Vermont, Pennsylvania and Indiana all went Republican by substantial majorities. And before the day of the November election had closed it was known that Lincoln was elected. He carried every free state but New Jersey, and even there he secured four of the electors. At first it was thought that no candidate would have a majority in the Electoral College, as the Constitution required, and that a choice would have to be made by the House of Representatives, where it was feared a Democrat would be chosen. But the returns showed that Lincoln had one hundred and eighty electoral votes, while all the others had only a hundred and twenty-three. Breckinridge had seventy-two, Bell thirty-nine, and Douglas only twelve, those of Missouri and three of those from New Jersey. This

was a surprisingly poor showing for Douglas. But a closer inspection of the returns revealed his strength with the people. For of the whole popular vote, Lincoln had 1,857,610; while Douglas had 1,291,574. Breckinridge had 850,082 and Bell 646,124. So that, though Lincoln had a considerable majority of the electoral vote, he had 465,085 less than half of the popular vote. He had only 26,430 votes in the slave states, while Breckinridge had 570,871. And Douglas had nearly as large a popular vote as Lincoln and almost as large a one as both Breckinridge and Bell combined.

CHAPTER VIII

Secession—Vacillating Course of Buchanan—Attempt to conciliate the South—Southern Members leave the Cabinet—Stanton becomes Attorney-General—Changed Attitude of Buchanan.

THE election of Lincoln precipitated the secession of the South. But it is hardly fair to attribute this result to the people of that section, for they were not really responsible for it. As a whole, both planters and business men were satisfied to allow the situation to remain as it was. They had their slaves and their plantations, and their business was prospering as it never had done before. In the decade between 1850 and 1860 the wealth of the South had increased \$3,000,000,000. Crops had been abundant and prices higher than ever before. The Southern people appreciated this and were pursuing the even tenor of their way. No one offered to disturb them in their homes and their slaves. They had no reason to rebel, and they generally felt so.

But slavery as an institution was one thing, and slavery as a political force was quite another. The trouble was with the ruling class, the politicians. All the steps in secession originated with them. A little attention to the steps that were taken will convince the reader of this.

On November 5, 1860, the Legislature of South Carolina met pursuant to the call of Governor Gist. The purpose of this session was to cast the vote of the state for presidential electors the following day. In all the other states they were elected by the people; but here the vote was cast by the Legislature.

When the Legislature met to discharge this duty it was urged by Governor Gist to continue in session to learn the result of the election. He advised that South Carolina should secede from the Union if Lincoln was elected. There was a gathering of the leading politicians of the state to meet the Legislature and support the Governor in this advice. James Chestnut, jun., one of the United States senators, was among them. And a meeting was arranged for the evening of the day the Legislature assembled. Upon being called out, Chestnut urged secession, as did William W. Boyce, a member of Congress, and a number of others.

This advice was given in accordance with a resolution reached unanimously at a meeting of the delegation of South Carolina in Congress, held at the house of Senator Hammond, near Augusta, in the preceding month. Only one Representative was not there, and he was detained by sickness. This was not the first meeting of the kind that had been held. There was a similar meeting convened, at

the suggestion of Governor Wise of Virginia, four years before. It was held at Raleigh. But that was of the Governors of the Southern states. And the purpose was to take similar action in the event of the election of Fremont. In the present instance Governor Gist, as well as ex-Governor Adams and ex-Speaker Orr, with others of prominence in South Carolina, had been present at Senator Hammond's. The situation was discussed, the probability of the election of Lincoln was admitted, and it was agreed that, if he was elected, South Carolina should secede. In fact, those present were indifferent to the result, and really hoped for a pretext for secession. So that the advice given by Governor Gist to the Legislature was in accordance with the conclusion then reached.

The course marked out at this meeting of the South Carolina delegation in Congress was followed by the Legislature. It cast the vote of the state on November 6 for Breckinridge, and continued in session until the news of the election of Lincoln had been received. Then resolutions were adopted calling for the election of delegates to a convention to consider secession, the delegates to be elected on November 22 and to meet in Columbia on December 17. But such a conclusion was not reached with unanimity. There were a number of members of the Legislature that insisted that they should, at least, wait to see whether the other states of the South were willing to unite in this radical step. Resolutions were offered and vigorous speeches were made urging delay. But the Legislature was hurried on by inflammatory speeches, some of them even by persons outside the state. For example, Edmund Ruffin, the editor of an agricultural monthly that had a considerable circulation among the planters of the South, was present from Virginia. And while admitting that his state was not so ready for such action as South Carolina, he urged that the step be promptly taken here, so as to promote the secession of Virginia, which he very much desired. Even if South Carolina proceeded alone, he claimed she would be able to maintain herself against any power that could be brought against her. It was apparent that these enthusiastic advocates of secession were afraid of delay. But they succeeded.

The bill calling the Convention was passed by the Senate on November 9 and by the House on the 12th. As soon as this was done the Judge and the Marshal of the United States Court for that district, the Collector of the Port of Charleston, and the Sub-Treasurer all sent their resignations to Washington. The Senators Chestnut and Hammond and the Representatives in Congress all announced their withdrawal from the Senate and House. The one of the Representatives, William P. Miles, who had been detained by sickness from the meeting at Senator Hammond's was elected a delegate to the Secession Convention. And when it opened at Columbia he made a speech advocating immediate secession, saying he was just from Washington, where he had been in consultation with friends representing other Southern states, and that they had agreed to urge prompt secession on South Carolina. Lawrence M. Keith, late a member of Congress and a confederate of Preston S. Brooks in his assault on Senator Sumner ; Robert B. Rhett, prominent in the affairs

of the state; Charles G. Memminger, soon to be Secretary of the Treasury of the Confederacy; and the late United States District Judge, Magrath, were also among the delegates. And they all urged immediate secession, as did also commissioners who were present from the states of Alabama and Mississippi. In their speeches these men agreed that secession doctrines had been cultivated for many years in the South, and they argued that now an ample cause for immediate action was presented in the election of Lincoln by a united party in the North, pledged to restrict the extension of slavery.

Under such influences the action of the South Carolina Convention was promptly taken. Owing to a smallpox epidemic at Columbia the place of meeting was changed to Charleston, but here, the fourth day of the session, an Ordinance of Secession was unanimously passed. And the ratification of the Constitution of the United States, adopted in 1788, was repealed. The Convention also adopted a Declaration of Causes for this step. This was, in substance, the infidelity of the free states to slavery. A commissioner was also appointed to visit each slave state and invite co-operation. And three commissioners were appointed to proceed to Washington and lay this action of the state before the President and treat for the delivery to it of all property heretofore held by the United States within its bounds. On the evening of the day that these measures were adopted, the Ordinance of Secession having been engrossed, the Governor and Legislature were invited to be present and witness its signature. And then the formal announcement was made that South Carolina was now and henceforth would be a free and independent state. The Legislature having, on November 13, elected Francis W. Pickens, Governor, and his Cabinet having been appointed, South Carolina now assumed a place among the nations. Her press printed the happenings in other states as 'Foreign News.'

South Carolina was the first state to secede. And the different steps in this movement and the names of those prominent in it have been given to enable the reader to judge where to place the responsibility for it. Thus it is made clear that the politicians, mostly those holding positions under the Federal Government and of congressional experience, were chargeable with the career upon which the state had now entered. The people were only appealed to when their sanction was deemed necessary to give it an appearance of validity. And they were then hurried through their part without time being given for either discussion or reflection. Just ten days were permitted to elapse between the calling of the Convention and the election of delegates to it. No meetings could be called, and no adequate discussion of this momentous question be had, within this time. Much less was there room for reflection, calmly and soberly, and fireside talks among neighbours about it. Even in the selection of delegates the names of interested officials were thrust upon them. And others stood at their elbows until they were chosen. And in the Convention the work was pushed through with the same indecent haste. Those in charge knew what they wished to do, and pushed right on to its consummation.

The step was taken with the full expectation that other states

would follow. Secession and a Southern Confederacy had been the subjects of much conference among the Senators and Congressmen from all the slave states, and when Lincoln was elected they generally agreed that the time had come for action. And they as promptly announced that South Carolina must be sustained. And on January 5, 1861, the senators from Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Arkansas and Georgia held a meeting in Washington, and as a result they instructed the governing officers and others of influence in their states that South Carolina must be supported and that such action must be taken at once, so that a general convention of delegates from their states could be held at Montgomery, Alabama, by February 15. Under such instructions the Ordinances of Secession were quickly passed; by Mississippi, January 9; Alabama and Florida, January 11; Georgia, January 19; Louisiana, January 25; and Texas, February 1. These dates themselves show the same indecent haste, the same want of discussion and reflection, and the same disregard of the people as had characterised the movement in South Carolina. And they illustrate too clearly the work of machine politics. The power higher up knew the end aimed at, and simply tramped over everyone in the path to success.

Delegates from these six states, in accordance with the invitation of the Convention of South Carolina, met with the delegates from that state at Montgomery on February 4, 1861. Here they adopted a Constitution for the Confederate states of America. The Convention also elected Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, President, and Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, Vice-President, so that these seven states were the original Confederacy. Later, four other states passed Ordinances of Secession and united with them: Arkansas, March 11; Virginia, April 17; North Carolina, May 20; and Tennessee, June 8. The purpose was to have the Confederacy fully organised before Lincoln was inaugurated, so that when he took his seat he would be confronted by the rival government completely equipped and ready to maintain its independent existence.

It is unnecessary to follow in detail the action of the different states in passing these Ordinances, or to illustrate the pressure that was brought to bear. It is sufficient to say that the prominent men proposed and advised secession and that they usually succeeded in promptly inducing the steps they desired. There was always a strong tendency to oligarchical forms of government in the South. It was fostered by the large and well-organised influence of the slaveholding class and the suppression of the votes of the blacks, though they were allowed to be counted in fixing the basis of representation. This tendency was never stronger than at the opening of the war. But there was a decided opposition shown in some instances—in the case of Georgia, for example. There Alexander H. Stephens made a strong speech against the movement. And in Texas, her Governor, Sam. Houston, refused to call a Convention to consider secession. Houston had carried his state, the previous fall, on a platform opposed to secession. And he now bravely maintained the pledge he then gave. But both Stephens and Houston were quickly overborne. And Stephens then submitted and, as we have seen, soon became the Vice-President

of the Confederacy. This office he continued to hold till the end. But Houston was of sterner stuff. He held out for the Union. But he too was overborne. And despised and forsaken as 'a traitor to Texas and the South,' he sank into his grave before the war was ended. Events, however, vindicated his wisdom.

As each state seceded, her Senators and Representatives withdrew from Congress and returned home. In most instances they merely announced the passage of the Ordinance of Secession by their state and their consequent renunciation of their seats in Congress. But in some cases, notably in that of Jefferson Davis, the reasons for this act were briefly stated. Davis frankly said he had favoured the Ordinance of his state and that this step was taken by his advice. He undertook to draw a distinction between secession and nullification as advocated by Calhoun and suppressed by Jackson. That, he said, was an attempt to nullify a law while South Carolina still maintained its position as one of the states of the Union. But in the present instance the state withdrew from the Union and severed its connection entirely from the others. He neglected, however, to mention that, in the case of nullification, South Carolina had ordained secession itself as the final means of enforcing her resistance to the obnoxious law. And this made the two identical in principle.

Southern statesmen in precipitating their people into secession overlooked the fundamental principle of the Federal Government. It is true there was a Union. But it was not a Union of *sovereign* states, held together at the convenience of its several members. The Constitution expressly provides: 'We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.' '*We* ordain and establish this Constitution.' Who are meant by 'we'? The Constitution itself answers: 'the people.' The states were ignored. And the Union was formed of the people. It was the people that made up the nation and established the Government. The states were not recognised. And the people had united in making their union perpetual. It was not subject to dissolution whenever some dissatisfied state desired to dissolve it. The President, when he entered upon his office, was required to take an oath that he would 'preserve, protect and defend' this union as it then existed under the Constitution. What was meant by this word 'preserve' if it was not to maintain it in its integrity? And the Senators and Representatives, as well as all executive and judicial officers, both state and national, were likewise required to take the same oath. Hence we see the importance that the framers of the Constitution attached to the maintenance of the Union. And Lincoln in his first inaugural address, when he stood face to face with the seceding states, reminded his dissatisfied countrymen that they had no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government, while he had the most solemn one to preserve, protect and defend it—that is, to maintain its integrity, support its present boundaries, and not suffer erring states to go off separately.

Under this Union the Government, representing the people, had built fortifications and harbours, dredged rivers, opened roads and

constructed public buildings. These improvements could not be removed and they could not be divided. Lincoln reminded the South that this country, with its institutions, belonged to the people, that he derived all his authority from them, and that they had conferred none upon him to fix terms for the separation of states, that it was his duty to administer the Government as it came to his hands—this meant in South Carolina as well as New York—and transmit it unimpaired to his successor. And though he made no threat, it was clear that this duty he meant to perform.

It was unfortunate for the country that it did not have in the early days of secession a President of equally clear convictions and firmness of purpose. But the South had chosen an opportune time during the closing days of the administration of Buchanan. He had taken four of his Cabinet—Cobb of Georgia, Floyd of Virginia, Thompson of Mississippi, and Brown of Tennessee—from the South. These secretaries were all strong men, and they were all opposed to the party that had elected Lincoln. They had controlled the Cabinet, and they had persuaded the President that the cause of all this trouble lay with the Abolitionists of the North. When Congress met on the first Monday of December, South Carolina was taking the first steps that, if persisted in, necessarily led to war. A strong President, by a decisive enforcement of the law, might then have quickly stopped this state in her unfortunate career. But Buchanan failed to do this. On the contrary, he sent a message to Congress that had exactly the opposite effect. In it he charged that the long-continued and intemperate interference of the Northern people with the question of slavery in the Southern states had at last produced its natural result, that they had excited the slaves with notions of freedom which had produced a feeling of insecurity among the people of the South, that this feeling had been increased by the election of a sectional president and the passage of personal liberty laws designed to obstruct the apprehension of fugitive slaves, etc. In other words, he was arguing the case for the South. He then proceeded to declare that the Constitution gave neither Congress nor the President power to coerce a state into submission when it was attempting to secede. This, he argued, might be accomplished by conciliation, but not by the sword. So here was the whole case stated for the South. She could desire nothing more. She could go on and no one could stop her.

Of course, with this encouragement, the cause of secession did go rapidly forward. South Carolina had not then passed her Ordinance of Secession. But within two weeks it was passed. The whole South was notified by the President that all she had to do was to persist and she would succeed, that the Federal Government could not interfere. And so state after state seceded. Nothing could have been more ill-starred than such a message at such a time. It encouraged the South to believe that the North would not fight.

Buchanan's Attorney-General, Black, had advised him that he might uphold the courts, but that he could not coerce a state. If he could uphold the courts, why could he not suppress an insurrection in general defiance of the Federal laws? Could he not punish treason? The wider the extent of it, and the more numerous those engaged,

only made its suppression the more imperative. True, he had no United States Court in South Carolina, for the Judge and the District Attorney, and the Marshal as well, had resigned. But why could he not appoint loyal men to fill their places and vigorously uphold them in the suppression of the revolt? This he could have done by the use of United States troops. But he did not do it. What he did do was to sit still, at the very time when he should have acted with vigour. He never seemed to appreciate that his official oath required him to preserve, protect and defend the Union. This he overlooked. And he seemed complacently to feel that, as his term of office was closing, he would just finish it in peace and leave these momentous questions to be solved by his successor.

Even Congress did not do much better than the President. It followed his suggestion that something might be accomplished by conciliation, and proceeded to see if it could cajole the South by offers of compromise. So that the unfortunate message of the President seemed to do as much harm in the North as in the South. It withdrew the moral support from the weak and doubting friends of the Union, who should have been strengthened and encouraged by sound advice from those upon whom they had a right to rely.

In the Senate a committee of thirteen was appointed. And they reported that they were unable to agree upon any plan of conciliation.

In the House a committee of thirty-three was appointed. Many propositions were submitted. Corwin, of Ohio, proposed a declaration that it was not expedient to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. Davis, of Maryland, desired Congress to urge the Northern states to repeal their personal liberty laws, so that the ground of complaint that slaveholders were interfered with in the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law would be removed. Taylor, of Louisiana, wished the Constitution amended so that no person should be allowed to vote for anyone for an office under the Federal Government except a person of pure and unmixed Caucasian blood. And Adams, of Massachusetts, proposed an amendment, that no subsequent change could be made in the Constitution, interfering with slavery, unless the change originated with a slave state and was assented to by every one of the states of the Union, a startling proposition to come from such a source. And yet the committee of thirty-three had only three members opposed to it. These propositions were all referred to that committee and they were embraced in its report. The committee further proposed to admit New Mexico as a slave state and to amend the Fugitive Slave Law so as to have the alleged fugitive tried in the state from which he was claimed to have escaped, instead of in the state where he was apprehended. These were sweeping concessions.

But even this report did not satisfy the members from the South. Their hopes were now centred on secession, and the eagerness of their opponents to compromise only emboldened them to persevere. They thought this hesitancy showed the weakness of the North.

But when the report of the committee was considered in the House, the amendment to the Constitution proposed by Adams was changed to read: 'No amendment shall be made to the Constitution, which will authorise or give to Congress the power to abolish or inter-

fere, within any state, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labour or service by the laws of said state.' This was to be numbered the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. And it received the necessary two-thirds vote in both the House and the Senate. If adopted, it would have made slavery perpetual in all the states where it existed so far as the Federal Government could control. But it is in strange contrast with the Thirteenth Amendment as it now stands: 'Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.' The contrast provokes a feeling of wonderment at the ascendancy which slavery had acquired in Congress. But the sequel showed that the people of the country were never prepared for this amendment. For when it was submitted to the states for ratification, only two, Maryland and Ohio, gave it their assent. The New England states promptly rejected it. And most of the others never acted on it at all.

When the report of the committee with these provisions in it was adopted by the House, the report also included what is known as the Crittenden Compromise. This had previously been offered in the Senate. It proposed six amendments to the Constitution—all in the interest of slavery: first, all territory of the United States, then held or thereafter to be acquired, south of $36^{\circ} 30'$, to be slave territory, not to be interfered with by Congress, but to be protected by the Territorial Government during its continuance; second, Congress to have no power to interfere with slavery, even in those places under its exclusive jurisdiction, in the slave states; third, Congress never to interfere with slavery in the District of Columbia except by consent of Virginia and Maryland and the people of the District, nor without compensation for the slaves; fourth, Congress to have no power to interfere with the transportation of slaves from one state to another or a territory in which slavery was permitted; fifth, Congress to provide for the payment to the owner of a fugitive slave from the National Treasury, when the officer whose duty it was to arrest him was prevented from making the arrest by violence or intimidation, or when the fugitive, after arrest, was rescued by force; sixth, no amendment to the Constitution ever to be made affecting any of the five amendments just recited, or the existing provision for counting three-fifths of the slaves in the basis of representation, and the one for the recovery of fugitive slaves, or to permit Congress to interfere with slavery in any of the states where it then existed.

These were all radical suggestions. The first was fraught with dangers of future wars with Spain for Cuba, and with Mexico for territory for more slave states. But the last was even more objectionable. It proposed to write into the Constitution a provision making future amendments impossible that would in any case interfere with slavery, and this too at the very time when slavery was disappearing all over the world and when Christian nations were uniting to condemn it as a relic of barbarism. It was a misnomer to call these propositions a compromise; for they were all concessions to slavery and so great that till now they would never have been considered by the North.

When this report reached the Senate, Clark, of New Hampshire, offered as a substitute for the whole one single resolution, viz., that all attempts to dissolve the Union were dangerous and destructive, that in the opinion of the Senate they were impracticable, and that, therefore, the energies of all departments of the Government and the efforts of all good citizens should be directed to the maintenance of the Constitution as it then existed. This was certainly sane and sensible and suited to the times. And this substitute was adopted by a vote of twenty-five to twenty-three. But when this vote was taken, one fact is especially worthy of note, for it shows the attitude of the Southern Senators. Six of them refused to vote. They might have defeated the substitute, but they would not. They really preferred to have the Crittenden Compromise go down and all efforts at reconciliation frustrated. The protection of slavery was not their real aim. What they really wanted was the spoil of office, that they had enjoyed so long. In a new confederacy they contemplated a more fruitful field.

And there was still another effort at compromise. On January 19, 1861, the Legislature of Virginia issued a call for a Peace Conference. The delegates were to be chosen by the Legislatures or the Governors of the states. And this Conference met in the city of Washington on February 4, 1861. All the free states were represented but Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, California and Oregon; and all the slave states that had not passed Ordinances of Secession but Arkansas and Texas. Ex-President John Tyler came from Virginia and was made President of the Conference. Such men as Fessenden of Maine, Boutwell of Massachusetts, David Dudley Field of New York, Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, Wilmot of Pennsylvania, Chase of Ohio, Palmer of Illinois, Harlan of Iowa and Reverdy Johnson of Maryland were among the delegates, and by February 27 they had agreed upon a set of resolutions. They recommended the prohibition of slavery in the territories north of $36^{\circ} 30'$; the continuation of slavery south of this line; that neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature could hinder the taking of slaves from any state into the existing territories south of $30^{\circ} 30'$, nor pass any law impairing the right to slave property there; that any territory, North or South, might be admitted as a state, with or without slavery, as its constitution might provide, when it had the population requisite for a congressional district; that territory could be annexed by a two-thirds vote of the Senate, a majority of the Senators from the free and slave states both agreeing; that Congress should have no power to legislate in regard to slavery in the states, or those places subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within the slave states, or in the district of Columbia, without the consent of Maryland and the owners of slaves in the district, and the payment of damages to the slaveowners not consenting; or to interfere with the slave trade between the states; or to tax slaves higher than land. But they might prohibit the foreign slave trade. It was proposed that these articles should be made amendments to the Constitution, and should be irrepealable and unchangeable except by the consent of every state in the Union, and that the existing provisions as to fugitive slaves and for counting

slaves in the basis of representation should be made subject to the same guarantee against change. It was further agreed to provide payment for fugitive slaves out of the U.S. Treasury, whenever their return should be prevented by mobs or riotous assemblies.

It is worthy of note that a majority of the slave states represented voted in the Conference against all these recommendations, except only those prohibiting the foreign slave trade and the payment for fugitive slaves. Even the State of Virginia, which called the Conference, had changed her attitude, and now declared dissatisfaction with the whole list, on the ground that they did not offer a sufficient guarantee for her rights.

The recommendations were considered in both Houses of Congress. But their adoption was opposed by the Virginia Senators. And it soon became apparent that they would offer no aid in pacifying the South. And as this would be their only object, of course nothing was to be gained by adopting them. But under the leadership of Douglas and Crittenden they were adopted by the Senate on the last night of the session. But they failed in the House. And upon the whole it was well that they did. The states never would have ratified them and never should have done so.

The unamendable feature of these proposed guarantees of slavery was itself enough to condemn them. To exalt slave property in this way above every other kind would have been an intolerable blot. And besides no country should have any unamendable provisions in its Constitution. Such only serve to invite revolution. The inevitable law of human progress is that civilisation will advance, and it cannot be kept back by such devices. If it cannot progress under the forms of law, it will break down such barriers and progress otherwise; in other words, in defiance of law and by revolution.

With the consideration of the recommendations of this Conference ended all attempts to pacify the South. From the first this was hopeless. While it is humiliating to read many of the proceedings of this Congress, showing its anxiety to avoid the inevitable, these efforts do have one redeeming aspect. They show the willingness on the part of the Northern members to do everything that reason could dictate to prevent a conflict. As the Republicans had not yet come into control, they had *done* nothing to provoke the situation. They had *passed* no law; they had *made* no change in the Constitution. Of *actual* grievance the South had none to complain. The Constitution and the laws as they stood she herself had assisted to make. And so far she had lived under them. Hence it was only vague apprehensions for the future that she had to hold up before her people. But could apprehensions alone justify revolt? If so, the wildest imagination could always be ready with a pretext. Here the North earnestly prayed her adversary to pause and consider before taking the fateful step. Congress showed everywhere a willingness to hear, and a desire to be heard, that the parties might adjust their differences before resorting to arms. But all her efforts were in vain.

At the very time that these efforts were being made Southern Senators and Representatives were writing and telegraphing their

constituents to hurry up, and take at once the steps that they advised. The result of their efforts we have already seen.

But a new difficulty now confronted them. They found that a mere resolution to secede, with however much applause it was received at home, did not sever their connection with the Union.

On December 26, the three Commissioners appointed by South Carolina to treat with the United States for the delivery of the National property—the fortifications, arsenals and government buildings—within this state, came to Washington; and two days later they delivered to President Buchanan a communication setting forth the secession of the state, their own appointment and the purpose of it, and asked that the U.S. troops be removed from Charleston Harbour, because they threatened to bring to a bloody issue questions that should be settled with temperance.

There were three fortifications in Charleston Harbour: Castle Pinckney, Fort Moultrie and Fort Sumpter. At the secession of South Carolina, Major Anderson was occupying Fort Moultrie with a small force of one hundred men. He had been instructed by the Secretary of War to continue to hold these fortifications, and if in his judgment an attack upon him was meditated, to remove his garrison to the strongest. Believing that the situation demanded it, according to these instructions, during the night of December 26 he had removed his force to Fort Sumpter. This was effected by two schooners, which passed directly under the observation of the harbour guard-boat *Nina*, with the clear light of a full moon. After the garrison had been removed, with the provisions and portable munitions, the remaining gun carriages were burnt and the guns spiked, so that they might not be used against him. This act was complained of by the Commissioners as a breach of the promise that had been implied, rather than expressed, in a communication with the President.

Following Major Anderson's removal, the Federal arsenal, containing many thousand stand of arms and some military stores, and the Custom House, Post Office, and Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie and the lighthouses at Charleston were seized by South Carolina troops, and the state flag was hoisted over them.

The President refused, when requested by the Commissioners, either to order the return of Major Anderson to Fort Moultrie or the evacuation of Charleston Harbour. Thereupon the Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, resigned on December 29, giving as his reason the refusal of the President to order Major Anderson back to Fort Moultrie. He said that he had promised South Carolina before the transfer that no change would be made.

But in fact there were other reasons for Floyd's resignation. An order had been issued from his Department for an extensive transfer of arms and especially of heavy ordnance from the Allegheny Arsenal near Pittsburgh—forty-six cannon to Ship Island at the mouth of the Mississippi River and seventy-eight to Galveston, Texas. Such transfers had been quietly going on for months. And this new movement having aroused the loyal citizens of Pittsburgh, a mass-meeting was called on the evening of December 27, at which Buchanan

was asked to purge his Cabinet of everyone known to be in complicity with rebellion. Floyd thus knew that his conduct was attracting attention.

Another irregularity of his administration of the War Department was discovered about the same time. Some contractors for the removal of stores from Fort Leavenworth and other points had become embarrassed, and had procured Secretary Floyd to issue acceptances of drafts in payment for work that was still unfinished. This, of course, was unlawful. And these drafts being dishonoured, a clerk in the Interior Department had been induced to take them up and give in exchange some bonds in his custody, on the faith of the contractors' promise to protect him. And this they were unable to do. So Floyd was soon after indicted for malfeasance in office and conspiring to defraud the Government. He probably knew of these proceedings some days before his resignation.

It was under these circumstances that the President accepted Floyd's resignation and appointed Joseph Holt, of Kentucky, his successor. So by the time the indictment which was subsequently found against Floyd was returned he was far away from Washington, engaged in the work of secession and secure from prosecution.

The steamer *Star of the West* left New York on the night of January 5, 1861, unannounced, with reinforcements and supplies for Fort Sumpter. Secretary of the Interior, Thompson, whose department had also been implicated in the irregularities of Floyd, sent a dispatch from Washington, informing the authorities of South Carolina of the destination and purpose of this vessel. And then he too resigned, giving as his reason the attempt to provision Fort Sumpter. He also returned to the South to forward secession.

Howell Cobb, of Georgia, had already resigned the office of Secretary of the Treasury on December 10, leaving the Treasury in a hopeless condition. And he too had joined the Confederacy. His place was filled by John A. Dix, of New York.

The forts and arsenals and Federal buildings everywhere in the South, and even the naval vessels found in Southern waters, were being seized by the Confederacy. The National authority was set at defiance. Even the regular troops were being turned over to aid secession. A scene of inextricable confusion and hopelessness for the Union prevailed. Even the revenue vessels were being surrendered. It was a dark day. But in the saddest and darkest hour one ray brightened the gloom. The revenue cutter, *McClellan*, stationed at New Orleans, being threatened with surrender, Secretary Dix telegraphed: 'If any person attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot.' The dispatch was too late, for her commander had already surrendered the vessel. But the message caused a thrill in the hearts of millions, who were waiting and hoping for some clear word from Washington. Quickly it was taken up and re-echoed as the slogan of the North.

But another member left the Cabinet whose departure made a greater impression on Buchanan than either Thompson's, Floyd's or Cobb's. This was his venerable Secretary of State, Lewis Cass. He resigned on December 14, after a long and exciting meeting of

the Cabinet which was held while the President was still being controlled by the members from the South. He resigned because he could not subscribe to the doctrine of the President's message at the opening of Congress, and to his persistent refusal, up to that time, to reinforce Fort Sumpter. He did not rush into the newspapers with the reasons for his resignation. But he made no attempt to conceal his convictions from those who had the best right and likewise the most need to know them.

He believed, and so told the President, that his course was fatally wrong, and was leading directly to national ruin, and that he, Cass, could not continue in a place where his presence seemed to give approval to such a policy. The popular applause that followed him into retirement was a much needed jolt to the President and his legal adviser, Black. They both now saw that the course they had been pursuing was unpopular, and that for the sake of their own reputations it should be changed. If it could matter little to Cass, who was an old man and whose career was now closing, it was of great moment to Buchanan, whose administration would be judged by it, and to Black, who was still in his prime, for he was only fifty years of age, and had hopes of promotion before him. Cass was succeeded by Black as Secretary of State. And he recommended Edwin M. Stanton for Attorney-General.

Stanton was born at Steubenville, Ohio, in 1814. His father was a physician, who died in 1827, leaving a widow and four children, the eldest, Edwin, only thirteen years of age. Of property there was substantially none but the home, and it was found necessary to sell that a few years later to support the younger children. So under these circumstances Edwin, the eldest, was soon put to work. He found his first employment in a book-store, and here he was quick to learn. He had already acquired some knowledge of the Latin, and was proficient in the common branches. And in the store he acquired a taste for reading. But he did not neglect his work. He soon became so useful to his employer that he sent him to assist in a branch store which he was establishing at Columbus. And in this employment Edwin continued for four years. Besides assisting the family, he was able to save sufficient from his wages to get a year's tuition for himself at Kenyon College. Then at eighteen years of age he turned to the study of law with his guardian, and in due time was admitted to the bar. It had been a long, hard pull, with difficulties at every turn. But he was fortunate in having a mother, and guardian too, of sturdy good sense, to advise him.

Having been admitted, he rose rapidly in his profession, devoting himself exclusively to that, holding no offices but those of Prosecuting Attorney and Reporter of the Supreme Court of the State, strictly in the line of his profession. He was a tireless worker and a hard fighter. And besides there was a certain fearless ruggedness of manner that made others beware. His short, compact figure was sturdily erect, his legs planted well under him. And his broad shoulders and short neck supported a massive head. His strong face and direct look met his antagonist whether as opposing counsel, a hostile witness or even a doubting court, squarely and in no hesitating mood. He was

a man of action and of rugged tenacity. His short, crisp words went directly to the point. When once thoroughly enlisted in a case, his ardent and aggressive nature would see no end but success.

He travelled the circuits in South-eastern Ohio, and here his fame grew so that he was employed in great cases, in Pittsburgh, Wheeling and Cincinnati. He soon removed to Pittsburgh, and later to Washington. And it was here that he was employed by the Government in some land fraud cases in California. He went to the Pacific coast and spent months of tireless work upon these cases, and returned victorious. It was thus that he became intimately acquainted with Black, the Attorney-General. And he, appreciating the sturdy worth of the man and feeling the need of him in the Cabinet, recommended his appointment. Stanton accepted, and in the Cabinet he served under Buchanan, Lincoln and Johnson. His removal by the latter culminated in the impeachment. But this being decided for Johnson, Stanton retired at last, a prematurely old man, worn out by hard work, and so poor that he had not the means of present subsistence. Under these circumstances, he was nominated by Grant for Judge of the Supreme Court. And he was confirmed by the Senate. But he died before taking his seat.

A man of his strong personality could not be long in making his influence felt. In the Cabinet he powerfully supported Black in his changed attitude towards the Confederacy. And with Holt and Dix of the same sentiment, and the sinister influence of Floyd, Thompson and Cobb removed, the re-organised Cabinet became a new force which the South had to combat. Such a Cabinet could not be reckoned on quietly to acquiesce in schemes of secession.

And this was the condition of affairs when the Convention of the seceding states met in Montgomery, Alabama, on February 4, 1861. It proceeded to form a Constitution for the Confederate States. This was done by simply making some changes in the Federal Constitution. The preamble declared that this new Constitution was formed by delegates of sovereign and independent states. This was a substantial change. For the original read: 'We, the people of the United States.' The State Rights doctrine was thus advanced and the popular one suppressed. The President's term was to be six years and the incumbent was to be ineligible for re-election. This was a change, but it did not prove a material one. A tariff to promote any branch of industry was prohibited. It was always claimed that these tariffs had operated unjustly against the cotton states, and had favoured the manufacturers of New England. Hence South Carolina had attempted to nullify the tariff laws of 1828 and 1832, and had threatened to secede in Jackson's time. But that stern old patriot had reduced her to submission by issuing his Proclamation against Nullification, threatening the strong arm of the law, and holding up before Calhoun and his followers the penalties of treason. Slavery was protected, in the new Constitution, by requiring the Governors of the states to return fugitive slaves when apprehended. It also prohibited the importation of slaves from a foreign country or from any state not a member of the Confederacy. This provision was intended to operate against those slave states, like Virginia,

that had not yet seceded. The purpose was to induce them to join the rebellion and thus obtain a market for slaves that would not be needed at home, and that the owners would wish to sell in the states farther south. The Confederacy might also acquire new territory, but in all such, slavery as it existed in these states was to be recognised and protected by Congress and the Territorial Government.

This Convention also chose Jefferson Davis for President and Alexander H. Stephens for Vice-President. Davis was born in Christian County, Ky. But the family soon removed to a plantation near Vicksburg, Miss. And this then became his home. His education was commenced at Transylvania University in Kentucky. But he later received an appointment to West Point, and here he graduated. Robert E. Lee was in the succeeding class. Davis upon graduating entered the Army, and continued in the service about seven years. During his last year, after a somewhat sensational elopement, he married the daughter of Zachary Taylor, later the President of the United States. She died within a few months. And Davis then resigned his commission and retired to his plantation in Mississippi. Here he remained till 1844, occupied with the ordinary duties of a planter, with abundance of leisure for reading and study, which he seems to have improved. In 1844 he emerged from this retirement and became a Presidential Elector on the Polk and Dallas ticket. The next year he was elected to Congress. And he then married his second wife, a Miss Howell of Natchez, Miss., a noted beauty, the daughter of a well-known attorney and the grand-daughter of a Governor of New Jersey. The writer remembers her, half a century later, at a summer resort on an island in Lake Erie when the Bar Association of Ohio was in session. When introduced she drew him to her with a hearty clasp of the hand, and in seeming confidence said, 'Do you know I meet so many judges and lawyers here that I feel quite overwhelmed.' And then rang out the merry laugh that once had charmed Richmond society and the old South. Davis took her to Washington with him. But he soon resigned his seat in Congress to enter the Mexican War. Here he distinguished himself in the battles of Monterey and Buena Vista. Returning home wounded, he was appointed to fill a vacancy in the U.S. Senate. He was elected for the unexpired term and then for the full term. But he again resigned, this time to make a campaign for Governor of Mississippi. In this he was defeated. But he was almost immediately made Secretary of War in President Pierce's Cabinet. And during his four years in this office he conducted its affairs with ability and success. He then returned to the Senate, where he remained till the opening of the Civil War.

Upon his shoulders had fallen the mantle of John C. Calhoun, with the leadership of the extreme South. Though not ostensibly a candidate in 1860, his conduct shows the Presidency had been occupying his thoughts. In 1858 he went to Portland, Maine, to spend the summer, and while there he suffered himself to be serenaded and to make a lengthy speech. On his return he spoke at Faneuil Hall, in Boston, to a considerable audience, presided over by Caleb Cushing, with whom he had been associated in Pierce's Cabinet.

In this speech he paused long enough to eulogise Daniel Webster, in his home town, and claim some credit for a vote in Webster's behalf. In both speeches he appeared as a pronounced defender of the Union. He with difficulty found words strong enough to express what would be his disgust with those who, having taken an oath, as a senator on entering office, to support the Constitution, would then be found in rebellion against the Government. In 1850 he had repelled the imputation that he was a Secessionist: 'The man does not breathe, at whose door the charge of disunion might not as well be laid as at mine. Son of a Revolutionary soldier, attachment to the Union was among the first lessons of my childhood; bred to the service of my country from boyhood to mature manhood, I wore its uniform,' etc. And he was now with the Presidency apparently in mind only reiterating these asseverations of loyalty. But his failure to attract attention to himself as a candidate, and the election of a Republican, changed all this. He then appeared in the camp of the Secessionists and secretly united in the cabals at Washington to promote disunion. While he was not a strong man, he did have a talent for graceful speech. And this probably led to his selection. For good speakers were appreciated in the South.

He was at home, on his plantation in Mississippi, when notified of his election, and in his progress to Montgomery to take the oath of office he was everywhere received with applause. From his train he made several short speeches. He urged the union of the people of the South to meet the resistance of the North, with war if necessary. In his inaugural, delivered on February 18, 1861, he was more guarded. He then expressed the hope that they would not be obstructed by hostile opposition, that nevertheless if they might not avoid war, that they could at least expect that posterity would acquit them of having needlessly engaged in it. And he added in conclusion that experience in public stations of a subordinate grade to this, which their kindness had conferred, had taught him that 'care and toil and disappointments are the price of official elevation.' And it certainly proved so in this instance.

One omission from this address seems surprising. There was no mention of slavery and no intimation that it was the cause of the separation. But what *his* address lacked in this, was vigorously supplemented a few weeks later, March 21, 1861, by the speech of Vice-President Stephens. Alluding to the fact that Thomas Jefferson had anticipated that slavery was the 'rock upon which the Union would split,' Stephens said, 'He was right. . . . The prevailing ideas entertained by Jefferson and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old Constitution were that the enslavement of the African race was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally and politically.' But Stephens added with some emphasis, 'Those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. . . . Our new Government is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas; its foundations are laid, its corner rests upon the great central truth that the negro is not the equal of the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior

race, is his natural and normal condition. This, our new Government, is the first in the history of the world based upon this great physical, philosophical and moral truth.' And as if to give this still greater emphasis he added: "'This stone which was rejected by the first builders, is become the chief stone of the corner"' in our new edifice.' Thus the Confederacy was started, with slavery confessedly its corner-stone.

Davis appointed as his Cabinet: Robt. Toombs, of Georgia, Secretary of State; Chas. G. Memminger, of South Carolina, Secretary of the Treasury; Leroy Pope Walker, of Alabama, Secretary of War; Stephen R. Mallory, of Florida, Secretary of the Navy; and John H. Reagan, of Texas, Postmaster-General. And in the following autumn Davis and Stephens were re-elected without opposition, by a popular vote, each for a full term of six years.

When the Confederate Government was thus organised, Buchanan, in the North, was surrounded by his re-organised Cabinet. On January 8, 1861, he had addressed a special message to Congress. While there was in it a painful effort to reconcile his new position to that taken in his message at the opening of Congress, he now declared that it was his duty to execute the laws of the United States throughout the entire country, and that it was his purpose to do so. He informed Congress that Major Anderson had transferred his forces to Fort Sumpter because the South Carolinians were preparing for a hostile movement and his troops in Fort Moultrie would be in great danger of being captured. He declared that it was his duty, as Chief Executive, to collect the public revenues and to protect the public property and to use military force against those who resisted. But he reminded Congress that they alone had the power to declare war and to remove grievances which might secure peace.

The President at last had planted himself upon Constitutional ground. No other position was tenable. He was the Chief Executive. And it was his duty to see that the laws were enforced and the public property protected, and to say with emphasis that in this crisis he proposed to measure up to the requirements of his office. The influence of the clear head and decided character of the re-organised Cabinet was apparent.

The President had not long to wait till he could show that he meant what he said. The *Star of the West*, as we have seen, had been ordered to Fort Sumpter with reinforcements and supplies. The vessel had reached Charleston Bar the day after the delivery of this message. But upon attempting to enter the harbour she was fired on from Fort Moultrie and Morris Island. Struck, but not disabled, without reaching Fort Sumpter, she then put back to New York. Two days later the Governor of South Carolina demanded the surrender of the Fort. Major Anderson refused, but said that if the demand was reduced to writing he would depute one of his subordinates to carry it to Washington. The Governor instead sent his Attorney-General to make the demand. When this messenger reached Washington he was met by the senators from Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida and Texas. And they persuaded him to let them ask the President for an assurance that

Fort Sumpter would not be reinforced. The President, through the Secretary of War, answered on January 22 that he would not give this assurance, but on the contrary would say that if Major Anderson's safety required reinforcements every effort would be made to supply them.

Rumours had also been whispered in Washington that Lincoln would not be permitted to be inaugurated. The President did not himself apprehend that the inauguration would be interfered with, but he assured Congress that it would be his duty to preserve the peace. And he accordingly made provision for an ample military force to carry out this purpose.

This change in the attitude of the President produced a decided sensation in the South. It was realised that they had now lost control of the Executive. And there was consternation. The contrast of this new position was so marked that the South was unprepared for it. An explosion followed in which the opinion of the new Buchanan was rather emphatically expressed. Judah P. Benjamin declared he was 'a Senile Executive under the sinister influence of insane counsels.' And this pretty well voiced the sentiment of the South.

In the North, Buchanan's reformation was received with marked favour. Though his former lapse had not been forgotten—and perhaps it never will be—the Northern people were ready now to give him credit for good intentions. This change was so marked in Massachusetts that her Legislature passed resolutions commending his special message as firm and patriotic, and as showing his determination to discharge his Constitutional duty by enforcing the law and preserving the Union. They also proffered him such aid in men and money as might be required to maintain the authority of the National Government. And this likewise pretty well voiced the sentiment of the North.

It was unfortunate that Buchanan had not assumed this position when South Carolina was taking the first step in secession. By such action then, he might have prevented the war. For a very moderate obstruction will prevent the starting of a ponderous railroad train. Though the same obstruction will be wholly powerless to arrest its progress when it has acquired the momentum of its full speed. The wheels were turning too fast now to be easily stopped, as Buchanan found.

But in justice to the President it must be remembered that many of the questions he had to deal with were new. And others had doubts as to how they should be solved as well as he. Besides, he had to have a public sentiment to back him in any firm stand he would take. And this had not crystallised even yet as it did later. With the first impulse of resentment at the defeat of his party by Lincoln he was also unduly influenced. But the real trouble was that he was not a strong man. And his whole life had been passed in positions where he could easily await the development of events before it was necessary for him to act. Then he could follow the direction of his naturally conservative mind. Neither by nature nor by training had he been fitted to confront great emergencies alone. So the final disposition has been not to question either his good intentions or his patriotic purposes, but rather his wisdom and firmness.

CHAPTER IX

Lincoln's Journey to Washington—Passes through Baltimore at Night—
The Inauguration—The Inaugural Address—The New Cabinet.

ON Monday morning, February 7, 1861, the President-elect stood in the little station at Springfield, ready to commence his journey to Washington. His party consisted of his wife and three sons, his two private secretaries, a half-dozen military officers, and as many others who were special friends. The morning was cold and stormy. And as the bad weather seemed to furnish an ill omen, it likewise cast a gloom over those who were present. Though he could not see into the future, a thought seemed to occur to Lincoln that perhaps he was bidding these neighbours good-bye for the last time. It had been a happy home-life that he had passed in this little Western city. And before starting, his thoughts had gone back to his old office, and he had asked his partner not to change the sign, 'Lincoln and Herndon,' during the absence of the senior for four years in Washington. Now a thousand or more of his neighbours had gathered at the station, and as he stood there waiting, they were passing by, generally in silence to take his hand. This half-finished ceremony was interrupted by the ringing of the bell of his train. He entered his car and the crowd following had gathered around it. The conductor paused with his hand upon the bell-rope ready to give the signal for starting, when Lincoln reappeared upon the platform and raised his hand to command attention. The crowd pressed closer, with heads bared to the falling snow, and listened.

'My friends,' he said, 'no one not in my situation can appreciate my feeling of sadness at this parting. To this place and the kindness of these people, I owe everything. Here I have lived a quarter of a century and have passed from a young to an old man. Here my children have been born, and one is buried. I now leave, not knowing when, or whether ever, I may return, with a task before me greater than that which rested upon Washington. Without the assistance of that Divine Being who ever attended him, I cannot succeed. With that assistance, I cannot fail. Trusting in Him, who can go with me and remain with you and be everywhere for good, let us confidently hope that all will yet be well. To His care commending you, as I hope in your prayers you will commend me, I bid you an affectionate farewell.'

And so, with this tender reference to the past and expression of hope for the future, and with this parting benediction, they heard him there for the last time. As his voice died away the train started.

Formal invitations had been extended by the Legislatures of

Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts and New Jersey, tendering him the hospitality of the people of their states. And they invited him to visit their capitals on his way to Washington. Lincoln was a man of retiring disposition and not fond of display. But no other President was ever so approachable. He seemed to crave the sympathy of the 'plain people.' For he knew their cares and could appreciate the motives from which they acted. The abject poverty of his youth and early manhood seems never to have been forgotten. He liked those he had chopped with, boated and mowed with, and to whom he had made humorous speeches from the top of a hay-cock in the meadow. And he liked to meet and mingle with them. The men who never went to Washington, never sought office, and could rarely be seen elsewhere than at home, formed a class that he was always willing to see. He knew they exerted a much greater influence than was generally supposed. And he would make a wider acquaintance here and propitiate them in his favour, and have them feel, when they read his speeches and messages, that they knew him. He did not have so wide an acquaintance as Presidents usually do. That of Douglas, his rival, was much larger, and this had been used against Lincoln during the campaign. Such considerations led him in answering the invitations of the Legislatures to extend his route so as to include the principal cities of the North, Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Columbus, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Buffalo, Albany, New York, Trenton, Philadelphia and Harrisburg. And he regretted that he could not visit Boston also. While these were the principal cities visited, he also stopped at many smaller places.

At the latter, some of the most characteristic incidents occurred. At one, being unexpectedly called out for a speech, he admitted his embarrassment by saying that he felt like the old woman who was called on to serve a dinner, when she had no pot and nothing to cook in it. At another, where he was to speak from an improvised platform in the street, a small boy, to get a better view of the new President, climbed up one of the supports of the stage. He was in danger of falling and being trampled by the crowd, or if the stage should collapse of being crushed. Lincoln, seeing this, paused in his speech and, reaching down, took him by the arm and placed him on the stage. From there the little fellow had a good view and was likewise out of danger. And, I may add, he never forgot the incident. At still another station, a Quaker friend handed him a basket of apples, with the words, 'Here, Abraham, is a basket of apples for thee and thy children. Thee will find no Secession in them.' And he took the apples and smilingly thanked the giver from the platform of his car as the train started. And so he met and found his way to the hearts of the people.

There was a certain disappointment felt by those who heard and read his speeches, that he did not intimate the policy he would pursue towards the seceding states. This subject he at first carefully avoided. It was feared that he did not appreciate the gravity of the situation. What to do with the South was the anxious thought in the minds of many. But the wisdom of his course soon became apparent. For having been elected upon a platform opposed to the

extension of slavery, and having decided convictions of his own against the right of secession, there was little he could say that would not aggravate a situation that was already serious enough. Threats were being made that he would not be permitted to be inaugurated. So the one important object just now was to get possession of the Government, and be firmly seated and in control of its powers before the situation became any more threatening. 'Let us do one thing at a time and the big things first.'

Once or twice, as he neared the end of his journey, perhaps emboldened by the generous receptions he had received, he did make some deviation from this purpose. But even then the allusions were of the most guarded character. At Steubenville, just across the river from Virginia, a slave state, a stage had been built facing the beautiful hills on the other side. Here, with these hills, like the Swiss Mountains, emblems of Freedom, before him, he quietly but firmly expressed his conviction of the right of the majority to rule, evidently in allusion to the South, seceding because a majority had chosen a President unsatisfactory to her. Again, at Philadelphia, as part of the exercises in honour of his visit, it was arranged that he should raise a flag, on Washington's birthday, over the hall where the Declaration of Independence was signed. And he was unexpectedly called on for a speech. He said he had often inquired of himself what great principle it was that had kept the Colonists together in their struggle. And he was convinced that it was not the mere matter of separation from the motherland, but the sentiment in the Declaration which gave liberty not alone to the people of this country, but the hope of it to all the world, for all future time. And he added, evidently in allusion to the fact that this principle of liberty for all men, with an equal chance for all in life, thus fought for by the fathers, was now threatened with destruction, in the effort to found a slave empire, that he would be the happiest man in the world if he could help save the country on the basis of liberty and equality, that if it could not be so saved, it would be truly awful, that he was about to say he would rather be assassinated on the spot than surrender it.

Later in the day, he referred to this incident, at a reception in Harrisburg. In describing the raising of the flag, he said, 'When, according to the arrangement, the cord was pulled and it floated gloriously to the wind, without an accident, in the bright glowing sunshine of the morning, I could not help hoping that there was, in the entire success of that beautiful ceremony, at least something of an omen of what is to come.' And he added, 'In the whole transaction I was in the hands of the people who had arranged it, and, if I can have the same generous co-operation of the people of the nation, I think the flag of our country may yet be kept flaunting gloriously.'

Here ended the receptions. From Harrisburg he returned to Philadelphia, and went on to Washington the same night. He had expected to spend the next day in Baltimore, the capital of a slave state, but he was warned that there was danger of physical violence, and perhaps assassination, at the hands of a mob on the streets if

he attempted to carry out this plan. There had been for some time rumours and threats, some of which had found their way into the newspapers, that he would never be inaugurated, that it would be prevented by violence, that Washington would be seized and the government buildings burned. In connection with secession, these rumours created a feeling of apprehension in the North.

S. M. Felton, president of the railroad, whose line connected Washington with the North, had noticed troops training along the road, and the purpose seemed suspicious. He employed a detective and furnished him with the facts, and with eight assistants set him to work. They joined the military organisations and found among them some Southern sympathisers and heard some threats against Lincoln, and of an intention to destroy the bridges of the railroad, march to Washington and take it from the hands of the authorities. They thought they discovered circumstantial evidence of a plot to assassinate Lincoln. This could easily be done in Baltimore, where the cars were detached from the engine and hauled through the streets of the city by horses. Besides, the city was of strongly Southern sentiment and had some reputation for pro-slavery mobs. It is to be remembered that soon after this a Massachusetts regiment was set upon here and lost four of its men in this way.

Felton at Philadelphia laid the evidence he had obtained before some of Lincoln's party and urged a change in their plans. He suggested that Lincoln avoid the danger, by going to Washington that night. This was on the evening of February 21. Lincoln replied that he could not go that night, as he had promised to raise a flag over Independence Hall the next morning, and go to Harrisburg to meet the Legislature in the afternoon. They remarked, however, that no committee from the state officers of Maryland or the city authorities of Baltimore had been announced to meet and accompany them from Harrisburg, as there had been in the places they had so far visited. Lincoln said if there was, he would take this as an evidence of good will and freedom from danger and go on according to previous arrangement. Otherwise, his plans might be changed.

The next day, without knowledge of the investigation made by Felton, William H. Seward, who had been chosen for Secretary of State in the new Cabinet, sent his son to Lincoln with word that there was serious danger of violence and assassination if he went through Baltimore should the time of his passage be known, citing in evidence of it the secret meeting of rowdies, threats of violence and intimations of a wish for his assassination, and that the danger was one which the authorities of the city would not be able to control. Seward advised him to avoid all risk by passing through the city at night and unannounced. This message was concurred in by General Scott, the head of the Army, who had made an investigation of conditions in Baltimore similar to that made by Felton.

These independent but concurrent warnings, coming from persons so high in authority, Lincoln felt he could not ignore, especially in the absence of a friendly sign from Baltimore. For no committee appeared to accompany him. He therefore decided at the close of the reception at Harrisburg to return to Philadelphia and go on

to Washington. One of his party, a devoted friend, of powerful physical proportions and of undoubted courage, proposed to accompany him. Accordingly, attired in a plain travelling suit, with this single companion, he went through to Washington that night as an ordinary passenger on a regular train, unrecognised by anyone. He was met at the Washington depot by Seward and one of the Congressmen from Illinois. The remainder of the party followed directly from Harrisburg to Washington the next day, according to the previous programme. They met with no incivility in Baltimore. And we may add that no further evidence of a plot has ever been discovered. But whether well or ill founded, the incident illustrates the tension of the times.

This secret journey, at the time, provoked some unfavourable comment. Lincoln's critics regarded it as undignified, unnecessary, and as showing a want of courage. But Lincoln was a brave man, and during the trying scenes of his administration he patiently faced many dangers to which he was exposed. He foresaw now that unfavourable comments would be made and that the advice under which he acted could not then be known. But he felt that a time would come when it would be and that, at any rate, the state of the country required him to omit no precaution to have the administration, of which he was the lawfully elected head, peacefully installed in office.

He was inaugurated on Monday, March 4, 1861. It was a bright and beautiful day, reminding those present from the North of their month of May. The intervening time had been passed at his rooms at Willard's Hotel, receiving visiting statesmen, completing the work of Cabinet-making and perfecting the draft of his inaugural address. The danger that was apprehended of an interruption of the inaugural ceremonies was very fully provided against. The President and President-elect rode from Willard's Hotel along Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol between double files of a squadron of cavalry, preceded by a company of soldiers and followed by a body of infantry. Riflemen were placed on the roofs of commanding buildings to guard against an attempt to fire upon the Presidential carriage from the windows looking out upon the avenue. Regular cavalry guarded the streets crossing the avenue, and moved from one to another as the procession proceeded. At the Capitol a battalion of troops was placed near the steps and riflemen in the windows of the wings overlooking the place of inauguration, and on the brow of the hill commanding the approach there was a battery of flying artillery, where General Scott remained, ready to take personal command should any occurrence render it necessary. But there was no attempt made to create disturbances.

The ceremony of administering the oath of office to the new Vice-President was performed in the Senate Chamber. It was quickly over, and then the procession returned to the east front of the Capitol, where the great audience had gathered to witness the transfer of the administration of the Government from its old masters to the new. This was a marked change. The old, dominated by the South, had almost uninterruptedly held sway since the early years of the Republic. It had been an aristocratic organisation. But it was now laying down

the reins, and a new party, more free, more democratic, but more commercial and with less of the picturesque than the old, was quietly taking them up.

The principal actors in this scene had a dramatic interest. The venerable Chief Justice, Roger B. Taney, appointed by Jackson, from a slave state, and the capstone of whose work on the bench was the decision that extended slavery to all the territories, was there in his flowing robes to administer the oath of office. James Buchanan, who had accepted this decision in all its length and breadth, and attempted to engraft its principles, in the Lecompton Constitution, on Kansas, had attended the new President to the place of inauguration. And as Lincoln arose he was visibly embarrassed to know what to do with his new silk hat. When Stephen A. Douglas, the author of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, lately a rival candidate for the Presidency, politely took it from his hand and held it during the remainder of the ceremony. Lincoln himself must have wondered at this strange conjunction of old antagonists. The 'Roger,' 'James,' and 'Stephen' of his early senatorial debate were all present. Only one of this group was wanting. This was 'Franklin,' who had already passed into retirement, where 'James' was now following him. And they too were soon to be followed by 'Roger' and 'Stephen'; for both of them were dead before the end of Lincoln's term. And their places were filled by new men of the new party. Lincoln, a year before, had solemnly warned them all that the people were the rightful masters of both Congress and the Courts. And this seemed at last to be fulfilled.

Others there, were to take a nearer part in this great tragedy. John C. Breckinridge, the retiring Vice-President, another defeated rival for the Presidency, was there to count the votes for Lincoln and Hamlin and declare the result in the presence of both Houses of Congress. But he was soon to be in the full tide of rebellion, as a Major-General of the Confederate Army. As Lincoln arose to deliver his inaugural address, he was introduced by Senator Edward D. Baker, of Oregon, a graceful and brilliant orator, who by the fire of his eloquence had almost precipitated a riot at the grave of Broderick, who was killed by Terry, Chief Justice of California, in a duel growing out of slavery. Baker, in turn, was soon to fall, riddled by nine balls, while leading his brigade in a disastrous encounter near Ball's Bluff.

Around this central group were gathered the Supreme Judges in their robes, foreign Ambassadors in court dress, senators, congressmen, and others high in authority. But more important than all, and masters of all, a great audience of the people, estimated at thirty thousand in number, who had united in decreeing the change, were now present to see it inaugurated.

When Senator Baker closed his introduction, Mr. Lincoln stepped forward, amid a thunderous burst of cheers from the audience, and in a firm, strong voice, thoroughly practised in addressing the great open-air gatherings of the West, commenced to read his inaugural address. It was largely directed to the South. He argued that her peace, property and security were in no way endangered by the advent

of a Republican President. He declared he had no purpose to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it existed, and further that he would uphold the Constitutional provision for the return of fugitive slaves. But notwithstanding he was known by his previous utterances and the declaration of the platform on which he was elected to be firmly committed on these questions, a disruption of the Union, heretofore only menaced, was now formidably attempted. He declared that the Union of the states was perpetual, that perpetuity was implied if not expressed in its fundamental law ; but that, if it was only an association of states, it was a contract that could not be unmade by less than all the parties who had made it ; that its perpetuity was confirmed by its history, formed in fact by the Articles of Association in 1774, continued by the Declaration of Independence of 1776, matured and the faith of all the then thirteen states pledged that it should be perpetual by the Articles of Confederation of 1778, and finally that it was declared in the Constitution in 1787 that it was 'formed to make a *more perfect Union*.' It therefore followed, he said, that no state upon its own mere motion could lawfully get out of the Union, and that all ordinances to that effect were legally void. He, therefore, considered the Union unbroken, and to the extent of his ability would take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoined, to see that the laws were faithfully executed in all the states. In doing this there need be no bloodshed, and there would be none, unless it was forced upon the national authority. But the power confided in him would be used to hold, occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the Government and to collect the duties. And he earnestly urged those who were seeking to destroy the Union to pause and reflect. 'In *your* hands,' he said, 'my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in *mine*, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail *you*. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. *You* have no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the Government, while *I* shall have the most solemn one to preserve, protect and defend it. I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained it must not break our bonds of affection.'

It will be noticed how Lincoln emphasises the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union. Even thus early he planted his feet firmly on this rock.

The address being finished, the Chief Justice arose and the Clerk opened the Bible, and Mr. Lincoln with his hand upon it, in a clear voice, repeated the oath. As his voice died away, the crowd cheered and the battery on the hill thundered out its salute. And so the impressive ceremony ended.

The address effectually removed every unfavourable impression that had been held by those who too eagerly expected some pointed expression of his policy and purpose in his speeches on the way to Washington. The public now knew where he stood. The Union was perpetual ; the South had no right to secede ; the power of the Government would be used to recover and hold the national property ; and the laws of the nation would be enforced in all the states. It

only remained to be seen what the South would do. Would she quietly recede from her ill-considered position, or would she force the issue of war?

The next day Lincoln sent to the Senate the names of his Cabinet ; for Secretary of State, William H. Seward of New York ; for Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase of Ohio ; for Secretary of War, Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania ; Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles of Connecticut ; Secretary of the Interior, Caleb B. Smith of Indiana ; Attorney-General, Edward Bates of Missouri ; Postmaster-General, Montgomery Blair of Maryland. By some, there was disappointment expressed at this list. It was feared they would be too much disposed to compromise with the South. And it was said that there were not among them three such staunch Union men as Dix, Holt and Stanton.

The constitution of the Cabinet was unusual. Four of the members, Seward, Chase, Cameron and Bates, had been Lincoln's rivals for the nomination. Never had any President been so generous to his rivals. It had been customary, in the early days of the Republic, to appoint some prominent member of the President's party Secretary of State, with the expectation that he would succeed to the Presidency. And as they generally did succeed, this came to be denominated the 'easy succession.' But this practice had been broken up by bitter agitation against it by rival candidates. And so no such purpose had led to Lincoln's appointments.

But there was another reason for his course. The members each had a large following of friends. And if they could be brought to work together harmoniously, these friends would furnish a strong support to the Administration. Three members had been Whigs and four Democrats. As Lincoln himself had been a Whig, they thus became evenly divided. Their old party affiliations could be expected, in the new alignment that was taking place, to draw recruits. And besides this new method of forming the Cabinet could reasonably be expected to create confidence in the purpose of the President to unite all factions in support of the Government. They could save the Union by a united North. And this was Lincoln's purpose.

The members were generally men of marked ability and of experience in public life. The diverse views they would represent would furnish the fullest opportunity for an exchange of opinions upon the questions that were likely to arise, and thus give hope of a proper solution.

But the real difficulty would be in getting such master spirits to work together. This Lincoln saw must depend largely on himself. The sequel showed that for this difficult part he was well qualified. He was naturally patient in disposition. And in his toilsome path upward, he had found ample opportunity to develop a talent for managing men, so that in this field he now had few equals.

CHAPTER X

Opening Scenes in the Senate—Seizure of Federal Property by the Confederates—Lincoln refuses an Audience to their Commissioners—Fort Sumpter attacked—Its Surrender.

THE Senate met in extra session on the day of the inauguration. It promptly confirmed the Cabinet appointments. Stephen A. Douglas was still in that body and had now become the recognised leader of the Democrats. The withdrawal of the Southerners, with Jefferson Davis, Robert Toombs and Judah P. Benjamin among them, had removed all competitors. John C. Breckinridge, it is true, remained, but the absence of the others left him without support, and the determination to go himself, which he had already formed, made him little care who led. The defeat of Douglas for the third, and, as he probably felt, for the last time, in his race for the Presidency, left him in no uncertain mood towards the South. Numerous passages occurred between him and the few Southerners that remained. Wigfall of Texas made an offensive speech and was expelled.

In a dispute between Douglas and Breckinridge, the latter had argued that the rights of the South in the territories had not been properly respected. Douglas showed how utterly absurd this claim was, when at that very time these rights were greater than they had ever been before. Down to 1859, slavery had always been prohibited by Congress in some portion of the territories, but now for the first time there was no foot of ground in America where slavery was prohibited by Act of Congress. He said there had never been a time when the right of the slaveholders to emigrate to the territories and carry their slaves with them and hold them on equal footing with all other property, was so fully and distinctly recognised as now, and that this too had been brought about by the unanimous vote of the Republicans in Congress. Therefore under the law as it now stood the South had all the rights that Breckinridge claimed. Douglas was referring to the fact that at the last session, Acts had been passed organising the territories of Colorado, Dakota and Nevada without containing a word of prohibition on the subject of slavery. These Acts were signed by President Buchanan only five days before Lincoln was inaugurated, and had been voted for by the Republicans in the hope of conciliating the South. The whole had been a triumph for Douglas, for the passage of these Acts had conceded all that he had contended for in his Kansas-Nebraska bill. And they proved, as he was now claiming, how unfounded was the pretext for secession, that the South could not get her rights in the Union.

Douglas's course was of inestimable service to the Administration.

For he had a larger following of friends than any man of his day. And they were devotedly attached to him. Just fresh from the field under his leadership, where they had trained through three successive Presidential campaigns, they followed where he led. And many were ready to follow him into the Republican camp. It was destined to be his last session. When he returned to his state, Fort Sumpter had been fired on and the wisdom of his course was apparent. He was received with all the applause of a popular hero. And the speech he made for the Union, at the reception given him by the Illinois Legislature, was the crowning effort of his life. He died at the time of his greatest fame, on June 3, 1861, only forty-eight years of age. And his followers, so suddenly bereft of their chief, then in full career as a devoted supporter of Lincoln, easily became Lincoln's friends, and many of them later joined his party. It was a much needed help that was given at a critical time. Lincoln felt profoundly grateful. For he realised that if the Union was to be saved he would need the support of both parties, and while he was the leader of the Republicans, Douglas was of the Democrats, in the North.

When Lincoln was inaugurated, the national flag was flying at only three points in the seven Confederate States : at Fort Sumpter, in Charleston Harbour ; at Fort Pickens, opposite the Pensacola Navy-yard ; and at Key West in Florida. Every other fort, arsenal, dockyard, mint, custom-house and government building had been seized. The mint at New Orleans was taken, and it contained more than half a million dollars in gold. The extent of such losses to the nation will be further appreciated when it is remembered that in these states the Federal Government held upwards of thirty defensive fortifications, which mounted over three thousand guns and had cost upwards of twenty million dollars. The Confederates had also seized Forts Macon, Johnson and Casewell in North Carolina and the arsenal at Little Rock in Arkansas, though these states had not yet seceded. And the extent of this loss was augmented by the fact that Secretary Floyd, before he quit the Cabinet of Buchanan, had turned over to the South almost all the available arms of the Federal Government. By a single order he took one hundred and fifteen thousand muskets and rifles, of the most improved patterns, from the Springfield and Watervliet arsenals and sent them to Southern posts. The total loss to the Government in military stores alone, before Buchanan left the White House, was estimated at thirty million dollars.

A single illustration in detail will show the nature of such losses. At the opening of the war, Brigadier-General Twiggs was in command of the department of Texas. He went over to the Confederacy and became a major-general in that army. He turned over to the authorities of Texas his entire army, with all his posts and equipments. This included eighteen hundred mules, valued at ninety thousand dollars ; nine hundred and fifty horses, valued at one hundred and forty-two thousand five hundred dollars ; five hundred wagons and the harness, ninety-five thousand dollars ; clothing and commissary stores, two hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars ; ordnance stores, four hundred thousand dollars ; tools and repair materials, two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. This meant the loss of

about one-half the available military force of the United States and fully that much of the military property. At actual cost, this single loss in property was estimated at a million and a half dollars. It could not have been replaced then for two million dollars. To this should be added the loss of the ship *Star of the West*. For after her return from attempting to provision Fort Sumpter she had been dispatched to Texas, laden with supplies and munitions for Twiggs' army. And as she entered the harbour at Indianola in Texas, her officers entirely unsuspecting of what had taken place, she was easily captured.

Soon after Lincoln was inaugurated the arsenal at Harper's Ferry and the navy-yard, ships, munitions and two thousand cannon at Norfolk were seized. This made a loss estimated at ten millions more.

From these figures it will be seen that the Confederacy had seized substantially all the defences of her coast line, and the arms to equip an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men.

And what right had the Confederacy to this property? True, much of it was located within the states in rebellion. But could mere location give title? If so, the money in the pockets, and the contents of the trunks, of travellers in foreign lands would at once become the property of those among whom they were sojourning. The property taken belonged in fact to the National Government as certainly as did the White House or the Capitol at Washington. And the South had no more right to take it than the citizens of the city of Washington had to move their Mayor into the Executive Mansion, or their common council into the Capitol. All were bought and paid for by money from the treasury of the nation, belonged to the nation, and one state or seven states could not rightfully claim to own it, nor even a part of it. The pretence of title to what was in the South was that, as it belonged to the nation from which they were separating, they had a right to a partition of it. But certainly upon this basis they had no more right than one partner of a firm had to seize all the partnership property he could and hold it in defiance of the claims of his co-partners. In disregard of all right, it must be said, they took it. And so they continued to hold it, until it was destroyed or retaken in the course of the war.

Its possession greatly encouraged the promoters of secession. They felt now that they had in their hands the means of maintaining a successful resistance to any attempt that could be made to subdue them. They had troops already marshalled in militia companies largely in excess of those of the Union. And they had General Twiggs' army. They had also many army and navy officers, educated at the expense of the Union, in the academies at West Point and Annapolis. To offset all this, the Union army did not number more than twelve thousand men, and the whole navy would not make one large squadron. And the little there was of both was distributed at remote points so as to make it as unserviceable as possible.

To add to the perplexity, the Union did not have the money to supply her needs nor even the means of getting it. The revenues were not yielding more than twenty millions per annum, and the

national credit was so low that one per cent. a month was being paid for the funds necessary to meet the current expenses of the Government. It was an appalling condition with which to confront the most formidable rebellion in modern history. And the Confederates might well smile at the thought of an attempt to reduce the South by force. Lincoln was depressed at the weight of responsibility that was thus thrust upon him.

But the principal fortification on the Southern coast was still held by the Union. This was Fort Sumpter. It commanded the entrance to Charleston Harbour. But it was occupied by only a small force of seventy men, under the command of Major Robert Anderson. So long as he continued to hold it, there existed a menace to the safety of Charleston. And it was a constant aggravation to this hot-bed of secession. The flag waving over it showed the supremacy of the Union. And it was a sign of the weakness of the Confederacy. Efforts had been made to obtain a surrender of this fort by treaty with President Buchanan. But while he received the Commissioners appointed by the Secession Convention to treat for its surrender and discussed the question with them, he refused to yield and continued to hold the fort. And under the advice of his re-organised Cabinet he threatened to provision and reinforce it. Owing to the growing gravity of the situation, Brigadier-General Beauregard had been appointed by the Confederate Government to the command of the harbour of Charleston. He decided that the weakness of the garrison in Fort Sumpter constituted just now his greatest advantage and that his efforts should be directed to prevent its reinforcement.

When Lincoln became President, after many anxious discussions of the question with his Cabinet, he decided that it could not be surrendered without yielding the pledge of his inaugural address that he would hold the property and places belonging to the Government. Here would be a good place to make the test. While he had said he would not commence a war, he would continue to hold this fort, so that if the South was determined to have it, she must fight for it. If she did, she would open the war, and he would then take up the gage thus thrown down. Fort Sumpter thus became an object of absorbing interest.

In compliance with a resolution of the Confederate Congress, President Davis appointed three Commissioners to treat for the settlement of all matters in relation to the public property. These Commissioners came to Washington about the time of the inauguration, and assuming that they represented an independent nation they sought an interview with Seward, the Secretary of State, the official having charge of negotiations with foreign powers. Being in doubt as to how they would be received, they applied to him through Senator Hunter, of Virginia, for an informal interview, thinking this would be an easy approach to the work of their mission. But the Secretary declined to receive them. They then sent a formal note to the Secretary, informing the U.S. Government of their presence and their object, and asking that an early day be appointed for an official interview. The Secretary still refused to recognise either

the existence of the Confederate Government or its power to appoint them and made no direct answer to this formal notice. But he did file in his office a 'memorandum,' reciting the receipt of their note, that he saw in the events in the South not a rightful and accomplished revolution and an independent nation, with an established government, as they claimed, but rather a perversion of a temporary and partizan excitement to the inconsiderate purposes of an unjustifiable and unconstitutional aggression upon the rights and the authority vested in the Federal Government. He called attention to the principles announced in the inaugural address of President Lincoln, and denied that the seven states either had or could withdraw from the Union or appoint diplomatic agents; that, therefore, he could not receive or hold any communication with them. He further added that he had submitted this 'memorandum' to the President and that he concurred in the views it expressed, and sanctioned the Secretary's decision, declining official intercourse. This, of course, was final. The Commissioners could go no further. For both the President and the Secretary were against them.

It will be noticed that Lincoln here declined to go as far as Buchanan. The former President received the Commissioners from South Carolina and discussed the objects of their mission with them. But Lincoln refused to receive these from the Confederacy and declined to discuss any question with them—would not recognise *them*, or the *government* from which they were accredited.

The Commissioners being unable to secure an audience with the President or his Secretary, Judge Campbell, a citizen of Alabama and one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, appeared upon the scene. And he assured the Commissioners that he felt confident that Fort Sumpter would be evacuated within the next ten days. And still later he assured them that it would not be supplied until due notice of this intention had been given to Governor Pickens of South Carolina. These assurances were given after some talks between him and Secretary Seward. What authority from the Secretary, Judge Campbell had to make these assurances has always been a subject of dispute and perhaps always will be. The Secretary, of course, was not wishing to precipitate a crisis. And Judge Campbell was a sanguine friend of the Confederacy and, soon after, left Washington to join its fortunes. Like others prominent in the movement, he hoped to see secession accomplished by the peaceable acquiescence of the Federal Government. And he was doing what he could to promote this object.

At his instance the 'memorandum' of the Secretary was withheld from the Commissioners. Though dated March 15, it was not read by them until April 7 or 8. On the 9th the Commissioners wrote the Secretary that the conclusions expressed in the 'memorandum,' together with the formal notice they now had that the President intended to provision Fort Sumpter, by forcible means if necessary, could only be received as a declaration of war. For, they said, the President knew this could not be done without the effusion of blood. On behalf of their Government, they said they accepted the gage thus thrown down,

Of course, the Commissioners had no authority to declare war. And so this last expression could only be regarded as reflecting their private opinion. But they did have a right to give up their mission as hopeless and return home. And this they did, after more than a month spent in Washington.

The time the Commissioners had spent in Washington was not, however, wasted by either side. In the South, Fort Sumpter was beleaguered. Its supplies were running low, and of necessity it would soon be starved out if not relieved. For the little garrison was not permitted to buy fresh provisions, and no one was allowed to visit the fort except by permission of the Confederate authorities. And now preparations to prevent supplies being forcibly furnished and to reduce the fort, in case a surrender was refused, were pushed quietly forward. From the North, President Lincoln sent confidential agents to Charleston to learn the sentiment of the people. He desired to know whether there was a patriotic party still remaining in the South devoted to the Union, or whether all were bent on secession. He appreciated the gravity of the situation and wished to act only upon full information and with due deliberation. But the reports of these agents were all discouraging. They found almost an entire absence of Union sentiment, and the people generally absorbed with dreams of secession.

Behind each Government was its people awaiting developments with absorbing interest. The situation of President Davis was becoming strained. His Government had been organised for two months. And while it had been quietly seizing all the Federal property within reach, it had made no show of force. And it was felt that it was not sufficiently active in preparing for a war which many now believed to be imminent. A half year had passed since Lincoln's election and the weak administration of Buchanan had disappeared. Lincoln's quiet firmness seemed to be casting contempt on the whole movement for secession. Davis was reminded by the press that something must be done promptly or the Confederacy would fall to pieces. A prominent member of the Alabama Legislature told him that 'unless he sprinkled blood in the faces of the Southern people they would be back in the old Union in less than ten days.' Public meetings were held to urge action. And at a serenade in Charleston, Roger A. Pryor, of Richmond, told the crowd that it was only necessary for the Confederacy to strike a blow and then Virginia would secede in less than an hour.

At the North all eyes were centred on Sumpter. The people did not know what the determination of the President was. But they saw that the fort was not being surrendered, though the Confederates were demanding it. Naturally the feeling obtained that here was to be made a test of the purpose of the South to have war. And quietly but firmly the determination was crystallising that the President must be loyally sustained. The policy announced in his inaugural was accepted as the real solution of the question. 'The Union of these states is perpetual.' 'No state of its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union. Resolves and Ordinances to that effect are legally void.' There was, therefore, a declared purpose of the Union constitutionally to defend itself.

But all doubt on both sides was removed on April 8, 1861, when Lieut. Talbot arrived in Charleston as a messenger from President Lincoln and gave notice to Governor Pickens that the fort would be provisioned. The Union Navy Yards were in a commotion, and a dozen vessels provided with provisions were dispatched from the North to the Southern forts. On receipt of this notice, General Beauregard telegraphed it to Montgomery, and on April 10 he received an order from the Confederate Secretary of War to demand the surrender of the fort and, in case of a refusal, to reduce it. The demand for surrender was made at 2 P.M. on the 11th. It was declined, Major Anderson adding that unless relieved soon he would be starved out. At 11 P.M. he was asked when he would evacuate, if not relieved, and he answered: 'At noon on the 15th.' This answer was unsatisfactory, and at 3.20 A.M. of the 12th he was notified that fire would be opened in one hour. Punctually to the moment the deep roar of a mortar on Sullivan's Island and the shrieking of a shell announced that the era of diplomacy was ended. And the war was begun. Another shell and still another followed, and soon the thunder of fifty cannons and the crashing of timbers and the crumbling of masonry announced that there could be no alternative—secession must be granted or the war must come.

For three hours the little fort endured the fire, and then belched forth her answer that the issue was accepted. War must be the arbiter between the North and the South.

The first gun was fired by Edmund Ruffin, of Richmond, Va., the editor of an agricultural monthly that had a large circulation among the planters of the South. Though already an old man, with white hair falling about his shoulders, he had begged this privilege. About the close of the war he committed suicide, leaving a note saying he could not survive the liberties of his country. The first gun of the North was fired by Captain Arthur Doubleday. The Union gunners were divided into three squads. They were to serve the guns for four hours in succession. Doubleday commanded the first squad. And so to him fell the lot of firing the first shot on his side. The Union guns could do little damage. For the balls fell upon fortifications and buried themselves in the sand, or glanced off the roofs that were constructed of iron rails taken from the railways.

But within Fort Sumpter the officers' quarters and barracks for the men had been constructed of wood. By means of red-hot balls these were soon set on fire. The flames were extinguished on the first day. But on the second they were fired again, and by reason of their exposed position and the want of water, nothing could be done to save them. The heat and smoke from these buildings made the position of the little garrison almost insufferable. The guns in the parapets by reason of their exposure could not be worked, and the casemates were now become so hot and full of smoke that the men could only endure to occupy them by lying on the floor and breathing through wet blankets. But notwithstanding these difficulties they continued to work their guns.

Some Irish labourers, hired for other than military service, were within the fort. And true to Irish nature, many guns had not been

fired before they too were engaged. One of them was seen stooping over with his hands on his knees, convulsed with laughter. 'What are you doing here, with that gun?' was asked. 'Hit it right in the centre,' was the reply, meaning that his shot had just taken effect in the centre of a Confederate floating battery. It was a fortunate shot. But, as has been said, the Union guns generally did little execution. While those of the Confederates, especially some rifled guns on Cumming's Point, became extremely accurate. They cut out large quantities of masonry around the embrasures at every shot and threw the debris among the cannoneers and slightly wounded some.

The flag, on a staff in the centre of the fort, was shot down nine times, and as often raised again. But the last time it was so inextricably tangled with the halliards that it could not be righted. And it was then nailed to a staff and placed upon the ramparts. The heat became so great, that more than ninety barrels of powder were emptied into the sea, for fear they would explode. Only four were saved. And they were all used. The ammunition in the upper service magazine did explode, and scattered the tower and portions of the building in all directions. Cartridges were exhausted and more had to be made. Blankets were used for this purpose and also shirts, the sleeves of the latter being easily converted to the use desired.

The booming of the cannon had brought out the whole population of Charleston. The crowd was drunk with excitement. 'It is regarded as the greatest day in the history of South Carolina,' ran the dispatches. And so it was. No other is so well known and will be so long remembered.

Of course there could be but one issue to this unequal conflict. The fort was not designed to sustain such a battering at short range. It was built to meet and keep at long range and destroy ships approaching from the sea. So when the battle had lasted thirty-four hours, Senator Wigfall of Texas, who had only a few weeks before been expelled from the Senate, on the afternoon of the second day, seized a skiff and rowed out, and, waving a white handkerchief on the end of his sword, asked to see Major Anderson. He desired to know on what terms the fort would surrender. Not being able to make terms, Senator Chestnut and Representatives Roger A. Pryor and W. Porcher Mills, whose names will also be recognised, then appeared. And after some conference, it was agreed between Anderson and Beauregard that the fort would be evacuated. The men were to retain their arms, with all personal and company property, and march out with the honours of war. And when all the baggage had been removed, a number of gunners were appointed to salute the flag. This was done with fifty guns. As the last was fired the little garrison gave three cheers for the flag, and it was then lowered. And the men marched out, following the flag and accompanied by the music of their band. They were transferred to the Federal steamship *Baltic*, which, with the relieving ships, had appeared off the bar, but realising the hopeless nature of the conflict had taken no part. And by the *Baltic* the garrison was carried to New York.

When the last gun was fired in the salute to the flag, there was

a premature explosion, which killed one man and wounded three others. But no one was killed, nor was any one seriously injured, on either side, during the engagement. It was a bloodless fight.

In this respect it was in marked contrast with the war it inaugurated. Those who witnessed this initial engagement, so like a Fourth of July celebration in its noise and want of fatality, had little thought that it was ushering in the greatest war in American history. The people of the South supposed the struggle upon which they were entering was to perpetuate slavery. They little thought of it as brought about by a few angered politicians—disappointed at the result of an election, discouraged at the prospect of diminished patronage and ambitions of honours in a new republic—and that it would end in the destruction of slavery. These were all after developments.

But care had been taken now, by the most elaborate preparations, that the first battle should not fall short of the dazzling pictures of conquest that had been painted. And this design succeeded. But if the people of Charleston could have cast their eyes forward only to the next Presidential Inauguration and have seen the fearful scenes of blood and destruction intervening, and then a little farther and have seen the victorious army of Sherman, after a devastating march through the heart of the South, knocking at the gates of their city, now desolated by fire and torn by explosions and deserted at last by her own defenders and driven to receive protection at the hands of hostile soldiers, how different would have been their realisation of what war was!

CHAPTER XI

Lincoln calls for 75,000 Troops—The Fight for the Border States—
Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri go with the North—
Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas and North Carolina with the South—
Advantage of the South in Compactness of Territory.

FORT SUMPTER was evacuated on April 14, 1861. It was on a Sunday morning. But a Cabinet meeting was held at the White House. And Lincoln submitted to it a draft he had made of a proclamation calling for seventy-five thousand troops. It was not known what action the Administration would take, for Lincoln rarely disclosed his purpose in advance. He sometimes said: 'My policy is to have no policy; I am not controlling events, events are controlling me.' In these trying days he could not always foresee what might happen. And he did not know what he would do till the situation was developed. But the contingencies at Charleston had been carefully considered and he was prepared. The proclamation he now submitted to the Cabinet was discussed, then approved, and later sent to the State Department to be sealed, and copied for publication in the next morning's papers.

Though Sunday was ordinarily a day of rest and comparative seclusion at the White House, this was an exception. For it was a busy day. People were coming and going, army officers for conference, friends to express confidence and hope, Senators and Representatives to pledge the support of their states. Patriotic messages too came from the excited country. Orders were to be signed, messages sent and plans discussed. There could be no rest. Senator Douglas, who had not yet left Washington, came in the evening for a conference, by appointment with the President. And for two hours, after all others were gone, the two former rivals discussed the situation frankly and Douglas pledged the President his unqualified support.

The newspapers of the following day contained the proclamation of the President and, side by side with it, the authorised interview with Douglas that he would sustain the Administration in all its constitutional efforts 'to preserve the Union and maintain the Government and defend the Federal capital.'

The proclamation recited that the laws of the United States in the seven Confederate states had been violated and their execution obstructed for some time, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. It therefore called forth the militia of the several states to suppress these combinations and secure the execution of the laws. It appealed to all loyal citizens to favour and aid this effort to maintain the Union and

the perpetuity of popular government. It recited that the first service assigned to the forces would probably be to re-possess the forts and property which had been seized, but that the utmost care would be observed, consistently with this purpose, not to destroy or interfere with the property of peaceable citizens. It further commanded the persons composing such combinations to retire peaceably to their homes within twenty days. And it also called a meeting of Congress on July 4, to consider such measures as in their wisdom the public safety might demand.

The proclamation was sent to the Governors of the states not then in rebellion. Accompanying it was a circular from the War Department, explaining that the call was for regiments of infantry of seven hundred and eighty men, and apportioning them among the states, according to population. New York was to furnish seventeen; Pennsylvania, sixteen; Ohio, thirteen; Indiana and Illinois, each six; New Jersey, Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, each four; Virginia, three; Massachusetts, Tennessee and North Carolina, each two; and eleven other states, each one. As this did not make up exactly the required seventy-five thousand, the remainder, about sixteen hundred, were expected to be furnished by the District of Columbia. The troops were to serve for three months. No requisition was made of the two states, California and Oregon, west of the Rocky Mountains. For according to the ways of travel, they having then no railway connection with the East, the getting of troops promptly from there was considered out of the question.

The Governors in the free states east of the Rocky Mountains were all Republicans, except in Rhode Island. There Governor Sprague was elected as an independent conservative. But they were all loyal and ready to do everything in their power to furnish the troops required. Governor Sprague promptly furnished and volunteered to lead the regiment from his state. This was the first work that Lincoln required of these Governors. But it was not the last. And in the trying days that followed, they all maintained the highest standard of efficiency. Probably at no other time were there ever so many men, of commanding ability, occupying these gubernatorial chairs. And they enjoyed a wide popularity and possessed the entire confidence of their constituents. So that they quickly rose to the requirements of their position and acquired in consequence a deserved fame. The 'War Governors,' as they were afterwards called, such as Andrew, Washburn and Buckingham, in New England; Morgan, Curtin and Dennison, in the central states; with the towering figures, Morton, Yates and Kirkwood; and Ramsey, Randall and Blair, in the West and North-West, formed a galaxy of which their country had good reason to be proud.

But their fame would not have been so bright, if they had not been so loyally sustained by the people. With the firing on Sumpter a war-wave seemed to pass over the North. There must be no more attempts at compromise, no further concessions to slavery. There was no doubt now about the policy to be pursued. The people, regardless of party, were agreed that prompt and repressive measures should be employed. And if anyone felt otherwise, he discreetly kept

silent. The enthusiasm and determination and numbers *for* war, were too great to be encountered. The soldiers of the Union had been attacked, its flag had been shot down, the authority of the Government and the execution of its laws had been defied. The sleeping lion of the North was aroused. It was seen that if it took blood sprinkled in the faces of the Southern people to prevent their return to the Union, the men who advised this step could have had little conception of the effect that this would have upon the North. Within two weeks the Northern capitals became great camps for the drilling of soldiers. More men were offered than could be accepted. Arms could not be furnished as fast as the men volunteered. And the most serious feature of the situation for the South was, that this enthusiasm could neither be concealed nor denied. The Southern people and the nations of Europe could see it.

Judge Campbell had now resigned his seat on the bench of the Supreme Court. But he still remained in Washington, acting as a spy on the movements of the Government. He wrote President Davis on April 28: 'The Northern States are in the wildest condition of excitement. Some of the truest friends of the South have given in their adhesion to the policy of "defending the capital." General Pierce, General Cushing and Mr. Dickinson will occur to you at once as men not likely to yield to a slight storm. . . . The seven Confederate States have not more than double the number of male population, capable of bearing arms, which have been offered to this Government as volunteers since the fifteenth of this month. New York, Boston and Philadelphia will pour out their capital even for subjugation. The impression that we had firm, staunch friends North who would fight for us was a delusion. Oh! I pray you do not rest upon it.'

This picture was not overdrawn. Everywhere there were preparations for war. The existing armouries were being driven to their utmost capacity. New ones were being built. And the foundries were turning out more heavy guns. From every direction came demands for arms and fortifications. The Atlantic seaboard was fearing the effect of privateers, and the Western rivers, especially the Ohio, were demanding gunboats to serve as patrols and prevent invasions. To meet these demands, money was required. But here again the patriotism of the North appeared. For in the three weeks ending on May 8 donations were made for war purposes estimated at twenty-three million dollars. The national credit seemed boundless. It was accounted treasonable to talk of Government securities not being a safe investment. The men that were offering their lives were not less willing to place their money where it would be used in defence of the Union.

This was a situation that the Confederacy had not allowed its people to contemplate. And it did not itself expect to see it. On March 4 it submitted estimates for a moderate peace establishment for the War Department, and as late as the 14th of the same month it issued a call for five thousand troops to reduce Fort Pickens—a design that proved hopeless, for at the time that the expedition was fitted out to relieve Fort Sumpter another was dispatched to Fort

Pickens, which was entirely successful. The fort was then completely garrisoned upon a war basis, and continued to the end of the war in the hands of the Union.

Southern statesmen still blustered. On the evening of April 12, at an assembly in Montgomery, in congratulation over the tidings that General Beauregard, acting under orders from the War Department, had fired on Fort Sumpter, the Secretary of War was called on for a speech, and he predicted that the Confederate flag would float over Washington before May 1 and might eventually over Faneuil Hall, in Boston. But this was a mere ebullition of his enthusiasm. Even after Sumpter was evacuated, Howell Cobb declared there would be no war and advised the people to go on cultivating their crops. And Governor Letcher of Virginia counselled his people, as late as April 24, to return to their usual vocations. The dispatches from Montgomery were that the Confederate Cabinet read President Lincoln's proclamation, calling for seventy-five thousand troops, amid bursts of laughter. And Vice-President Stephens was reported as saying that it would require seventy-five times seventy-five thousand men to *intimidate* the South.

Their Secretary of War had conditionally asked for twenty thousand volunteers on April 8, and on the 16th notified the Governors of their states that thirty-two thousand more should be immediately got ready to take the field. And the next day, the 17th, President Davis issued a proclamation, inviting applications for letters of marque and reprisal, thus proposing to give to ships of war, owned and equipped by private persons at their own expense, the authority of his Government to seize and plunder the vessels of the North and ravage its commerce. Two days later, April 19, President Lincoln issued a counter proclamation, blockading the ports of the South. This would exclude neutrals from these ports under penalty of capture. His proclamation further declared that the Confederate privateers would be treated as pirates. Thus the two principals, the seven Confederate states of the South and the sixteen free states of the North, stood facing each other: the North determined to maintain the Union and enforce obedience to its laws; the South determined to secede and establish a separate nation.

But between the two there was a debatable land, the eight slave states—Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas and North Carolina—known as the 'Border States.' The serious question was what effect the bombardment of Fort Sumpter would have upon them. Both Lincoln and Davis were natives of this section. And they were from the same state, Kentucky. But they were born to such different conditions that this seemed materially to affect their regard for the land of their birth. And their mental constitutions were different. The high-bred, aristocratic Davis found congenial surroundings in large plantations, with numerous slaves and his easy life of cultivated idleness, in the extreme South. He cared little for thoroughbred horses and great cattle and flocks of Southdown sheep, such as grazed on the blue-grass hills of Kentucky. His mind more easily turned to history and the military life of his early days, and to politics, in which he was now engaged—

to the companionship of Southern statesmen, under the magnolias and the live-oaks, festooned with tree-moss and looking out upon the waters of the Mississippi and the Gulf. He looked to the border states as suited only to amplify his dominions and to furnish pork and beef and slaves for his plantations, as they had done in the past, and now for the means to sustain his Government. But not so with Lincoln. The dark and serious scenes of his childhood, the, at times, sad and melancholy moods of his mind, with his periods of introspection, called his thoughts back, easily and tenderly, to the land of his birth and the graves of his kin. So that, aside from its material importance to the Union, he felt a sentimental attachment to this border-land. How often did he wish to see Kentucky on the right side and free!

The governors of all the border states were Democrats. From six of them—Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri and Arkansas—came flat refusals to obey the President's call. And the Governors of Maryland and Delaware did not obey. No Ordinance of Secession had been passed in any of these states. They all recognised they were in the Union. But they were slave states; and slavery was a strong bond. In two of these states, Maryland and Delaware, Lincoln had an especial cause for anxiety. They were between his capital and the North. In Washington there was a well-grounded fear that the next move of the Confederacy would be against the capital. It was almost defenceless, was situated on the border between Virginia and Maryland, on land ceded by the latter state to the Government. If Maryland should secede and claim the right, as South Carolina had done with Fort Sumpter, to resume possession of the District of Columbia, as a grant made which she might resume at pleasure, and she would prevent the passage of troops over her territory to the relief of the city; and Virginia, acting in conjunction, would mass troops on the opposite side of the Potomac and shell the town, how far-reaching might the consequences be! What would be the effect upon this country and Europe of the loss of the capital? For five days after the fall of Sumpter the situation was appalling. The gasconade of the Confederate Secretary of War that their flag would yet wave over Washington showed that this was at least a vision. And the condition of the defences of the city showed that it might prove a reality.

On April 17, by a secret vote, the Convention at Richmond passed the Ordinance of Secession. Though less than ten days before it had been rejected by a vote of two to one. Now it was resolved to submit the question to the people for ratification. The day appointed for this vote was May 23, more than a month later. But the vote, when taken, was a mere farce, and the Secessionists, assuming that it would be, immediately on the passage of the Ordinance, seized the Arsenal at Harper's Ferry and the Navy-yard at Norfolk. The former was abandoned by the commandant, after setting it on fire. But the fire was extinguished and most of the guns were saved. And preparations had been made to blow up the dry dock and sink some of the ships at Norfolk. But they too were saved. Thus the Confederates acquired a great arsenal and the best navy-yard in the United States.

With Virginia also went two of the ablest men in the Union Army, Brigadier-General Joseph E. Johnston and Colonel Robert E. Lee. They were both natives of the state, graduates of West Point and in the prime of life. In the old army they were held in the highest esteem. Each became in turn the commander of the leading Confederate Army. Lee was the choice of Scott for commander of the Union forces in the field, and was unofficially offered the place by Lincoln. Instead of accepting, he resigned his position as Colonel of the First U.S. Cavalry, to which he had just been advanced; and at once became chief in command of the Virginia state troops. While Johnston was made a major-general and placed in command of the Department of Northern Virginia.

Lee's family was one of the most aristocratic of the Old Dominion. He was a son of 'Light-Horse Harry' Lee, one of the generals of the American Revolution. And his wife was a grand-daughter of Martha Washington. He lived on, at the time of his resignation, and held in the right of his wife, the beautiful estate of Arlington. It was just across the river from Washington, and comprised eleven hundred acres. It was at one time held by General Washington, and had been in the family for many years. The mansion-house, overlooking the capital, was one of the finest private residences in the South. Its façade was modelled after the Temple of Theseus in Athens. It was of brick, a hundred and forty feet in width, with an immense portico upheld by eight massive Doric columns. It was surrounded by patriarchal trees, mainly oak and chestnut. In front the grounds sloped down gracefully to the river. Within its walls Lee, then a young lieutenant in the United States Army, had married the beautiful Mary Custis, the only child of the proprietor. Wedding trips were then unknown. Instead, the guests remained at Arlington for a week of festivities. It is recorded that every night, at the hour for retiring, the servants brought in a brimming punch-bowl that had been presented to General Washington by Colonel Fitzhugh, a former aide. Inside of this bowl there was painted a ship with its hull resting on the bottom and its masts projecting to the brim. And it was the law of the house, always strictly enforced, to drink down to the hull. The wedding festivities ended with a ball at Gunston Hall, the neighbouring seat of the Mason family. And then the guests departed, leaving the young couple to continue their married life amid the beautiful surroundings of Arlington.

Here they had continued to live with all the luxury that wealth could furnish or rank command, dispensing hospitality to their friends and attracting the admiration and respect of strangers. Children came and made the home-life happy. Slaves did the work in the fields, and they loved and respected the master. The land was rich and the crops abundant. Altogether it was one of the best pictures of the prosperous days of old Virginia plantation life.

But the scene changed. With Lee the commander of a Confederate army, his family could no longer stay here. And they went south. The estate became a fortified camp of the Federal Army. And later it was confiscated by the Government and dedicated for use as a national cemetery. And here now lie buried the dead of

the Union armies in largest number of any national cemetery in the country. Thus the home passed permanently out of the family. Some years after hostilities ceased efforts were made to recover it. But they were unsuccessful. Only a modest recompense was made in money. The house still stands, and with its sad memories, supported by the enchanting view of its river and surrounding hills and its picturesque panorama of the American capital, it continues to be a favourite resort for visitors. But Lee survived the war and died in 1870. After its close he supported his family on a modest salary as President of Washington College. And there he lies buried, in its chapel at Lexington, Va. And it is worthy of note that his state, situated between the rival capitals, became the principal battleground of the war and suffered hardly less from its ravages than he.

Much as Lincoln desired to retain Virginia in the Union, his thoughts just now were more occupied by the situation in Maryland. This was threatening. On the afternoon of April 16, four or five hundred Pennsylvania troops crossed the state and reached the capital. On the 18th a few more arrived. But on the 19th the 6th Massachusetts, uniformed and armed, undertook to go through Baltimore. The cars, containing seven companies, here drawn by horses, had safely passed from the northern to the southern depot. But by this time a mob had gathered and commenced to obstruct the track in the street. So that the four remaining companies were compelled to march through the city. The mob pelted them with stones and other missiles and then fired pistols. The police undertook to interfere, but were powerless to quell the riot. The soldiers were compelled to protect themselves. And this they did at last, by clearing the way with bullets and bayonets. Four of the soldiers were killed and others wounded. And a dozen or more of the rioters were killed and a considerable number wounded. So, marching and fighting, the soldiers reached at last the southern station and joined their comrades. All were placed on board their train and started for Washington. But after the train started a shot from one of the soldiers killed a prominent citizen. And this greatly aggravated the trouble.

The rioting occurred in the forenoon between ten and twelve o'clock. The regimental band was left behind in the northern depot. And some Pennsylvania troops, unarmed, were in another train following. A few of the latter jumped off to escape violence. And they and the members of the band, being scattered, were secreted and cared for by charitably disposed persons, until they could get away in safety. The other cars of the Pennsylvania troops were carried back up the railroad to a place of safety. And during the remainder of the day the city was in the hands of the mob. Feeling was intense. A mass meeting was called for four o'clock in the afternoon and, as might be expected, it proved to be a great Secession gathering. Speeches were made. The Governor of the state and the Mayor of the city both spoke. The Governor said he would suffer his right arm to be torn from his body before he would raise it to strike a sister state. At midnight the Mayor and Marshal and Board of Police and, they say, the Governor consulted and deliberately ordered

the destruction of the railroad bridges between Baltimore and the cities of Harrisburg and Philadelphia. Before daylight three bridges on each road were accordingly destroyed. The Governor afterwards denied complicity in this affair. But the Marshal could not do this, for he headed one of the parties. He was a Secessionist from principle. And while on his way to destroy the bridges he telegraphed a kindred spirit to send armed men into Baltimore, that its streets were red with Maryland blood, that fresh hordes would be down on them the next day; and they would whip them or die.

The Governor and Mayor both sent word to President Lincoln to send no more troops through the city. The President replied that he must have troops and that they must come through Maryland; but that he would make no especial point of bringing them through Baltimore if some other route could be found. Accordingly the 8th Massachusetts and the 7th New York, now on their way to Washington, were sent to Annapolis. Here Governor Hicks met them and again remonstrated, this time with General Butler commanding the Eighth, against landing them. And the Governor again appealed to the President, now asking that no more troops be sent through Maryland. Meanwhile a committee from one of the religious bodies of Baltimore, headed by a Baptist clergyman, appeared before the President and asked him to recognise the independence of the rebellious states. In reply the President said: 'You ask for peace on any terms, but have no word of condemnation for those who are making war. I have no desire to invade the South, but I must have troops to defend this capital. It is surrounded by the soil of Maryland and so necessity requires that they must come over that state. They are not moles and cannot dig under the earth. They are not birds and so cannot fly over it. There is no way but to march across it, and this they must do. Keep your rowdies in Baltimore and there will be no bloodshed. If they will not attack us, we will not attack them; but, if they do attack us, we will return it, and that severely.' This was plain language. But the circumstances justified it.

Washington was now in a state of siege. Prices of provisions were rising. Doors and windows of public buildings were barricaded, the streets were deserted, travel was suspended and business was at a standstill. The theatres and places of amusement were closed. With the burning of the bridges at Baltimore the means of transportation from the city were closed. The telegraph was interrupted, the mails delayed, and no daily papers came from the North. Officers in the army, commanders in the navy, and clerks in the departments, of Southern sentiment, were resigning and stealing away. Even the hordes of applicants for office were eager to escape. For there were rumours now of a purpose to impress all male persons in the city for military service. Two companies had been formed of *volunteers* from this motley crowd, one headed by Cassius M. Clay of Kentucky and the other by James H. Lane of Kansas. They were composed of about *thirty* men each. But probably from a sense of their own importance, the organisations adopted the flowing titles of 'Clay's Battalion' and 'Frontier Guards.' One camped in Willard's

Hall, with orders to patrol the streets, and the other in the famous East Room of the White House, where banquets were served. The latter was charged with the duty of protecting the Executive Mansion. But the office-seekers were not ordinarily willing to volunteer. They had not come to Washington to serve their country in this way. So they generally hurried off to Baltimore, and from there got home however they could. Willard's Hotel, which a week before was crowded with guests, was now deserted. Only an occasional servant was to be seen flitting about here and there in the corridors or long halls.

The very silence of the city was appalling. It was like the silence of nature before a storm, when even the birds seem to cease twittering to watch the black clouds roll by. And each day had its great disaster: Virginia secession on the 17th, the burning of Harper's Ferry on the 18th, the Baltimore riots on the 19th, the capture and destruction of the Norfolk Navy-yard on the 20th—all near to and surrounding the city. And there were daily rumours of Confederate troops in Virginia to threaten the city. But no new regiments came from the North! What was to be done?

It was learned that two regiments were at Annapolis, but no word came from them. Why did *they* not come? It was known that the railroads were disabled. But could they not walk? It was only twenty miles. Lincoln, usually so calm, was in a state of nervous tension. On the evening of the 23rd he paced the floor of his office, unconscious of the presence of anyone, and, stopping at the window and looking down the Potomac in the direction of the expected troops, he broke out in the exclamation, 'Why don't they come? Why *don't* they come?' Two of the messengers sent by General Scott from Washington to hurry them up had reached Annapolis with orders to General Butler to stay there with *his* men and keep the way open, and to hurry the others on to Washington. Four more ships had brought as many more regiments to Annapolis. They were all now landed.

And at last a disabled locomotive was found and repaired. The railroad where torn up was also repaired. And at Annapolis Junction two flat cars were found. On these were mounted howitzers and some soldiers. Three passenger cars were filled with others. And the train started for Washington, repairing the road as it went. These troops arrived on April 25. And as the 7th New York, the crack regiment of the metropolis, with its exact military step, marched down Pennsylvania Avenue to the music of its band, its flag floating in the air, the citizens gave a sigh of relief. And life seemed then to return to the beleaguered city.

Four other regiments were brought in; and still others came. A military department for General Butler, of twenty miles on each side of the railroad from Annapolis to Washington, was established, and thus a route was kept open. No further effort was made to disturb the troops or the railroads. Then Baltimore yielded. Finding that obstruction was fruitless and that her trade and travel relations were interrupted, and a new route was being established that might cripple the city, she submitted. And so the sending of troops that way was resumed.

The first to pass Baltimore, Sherman's battery and five hundred regulars, went through on May 9. Four days later, in the dusk of the evening and under cover of a thunderstorm, General Butler moved into the city with a thousand men and established a camp on Federal Hill. This he proceeded to fortify. The next day he sent out men and captured a quantity of arms stored near the scene of the riot. And loading them on thirty-five wagons and drays he started with them for his camp. And with the aid of the police, notwithstanding some riotous demonstrations on the streets, he succeeded in reaching his destination. Governor Hicks, loyal but wavering, soon raised the quota of troops required by the President's call. And some companies of Secessionists went south and joined the Confederacy. Thus they too unwittingly aided Butler and Hicks to restore order. The number that went was small. But henceforth Maryland gave no serious trouble to the Union.

The movement of General Butler on Baltimore was entirely without orders and did not escape a reprimand. But Butler was one of those rough-and-ready men that, seeing anything to be done, put his hand to and did it. His conduct was immensely popular in the North, where this riotous conduct was watched with interest. Four soldiers in their uniforms, advancing to the defence of the capital, had been set upon and killed. This was under the clear light of day and in the presence of officers of the law, who were powerless to protect them. The soldiers were peaceably pursuing their way upon the streets of a city where they had a good right to be. And they were attacked without excuse. The cause they represented was that of their country. The city was on two of its highways, and troops must pass that way. Others knew not how soon their own sons might be waylaid and killed. Feeling was intense, and there was angry talk of marching an army on Baltimore to wipe out the city, if necessary. But fortunately the orderly part of her people prevailed and restored a better feeling.

It is naturally asked why the South did not take advantage of this defenceless condition of Washington. Certainly by prompt action, with the troops already marshalled at Charleston and other places, the city could have been captured. Virginia had already formed a military league making her a member of the Confederacy. Her armies were under its control. The railroads of the South could have concentrated these troops. And her newspapers did advocate an advance. But the leaders still clung to the hope of peaceable secession. And so the movement was not made. Much too was due to General Lee. He had only recently gone over to the Confederacy, and hesitated thus early to attack his late friends. He did not yet appreciate his real position, for events were moving too fast. The officers in command at Alexandria and along the Potomac were ordered to act solely on the defensive. And the troops murmured, but obeyed. But by the first week in May the soldiers were pouring into Washington, rebellion in Maryland was suppressed, and then the opportunity was gone.

With the State of Delaware there was little trouble. She had only eighteen hundred slaves out of a total population of one hundred

and twelve thousand. And being isolated among free states, there was little reason to expect that she would join the Confederacy. When a commissioner from Mississippi appeared before her Legislature and argued in favour of secession, the members listened courteously; but nevertheless promptly and unanimously passed a resolution, declaring that it was due to themselves and the people of their state to express their unqualified disapproval of the remedy proposed. While the Democratic Governor did not comply with the call for troops, he did recommend the formation of volunteer companies and gave them the option of offering their services to the Government. And they unhesitatingly supported the Union. The full representation appeared in Congress at the extra session called for July 4. And thenceforward the state continued to sustain the Union. Thus two of the slave states were saved and the lines of communication with the North were safe.

Lincoln was now able to turn his attention to Kentucky. That time might be given for the development of a more patriotic feeling with a greater love and deeper appreciation of the Union, he had postponed the special session of Congress for eighty days from the issuing of his proclamation. Kentucky had not yet elected her representatives to this Congress. The election was ordered by the Governor to be held on June 20. Immediately the leading Union men of the state, headed by the venerable John J. Crittenden and Garrett Davis, both intensely loyal, plunged into the campaign. And in the present state of affairs it was easy to excite popular interest anywhere, but especially in the home state of Henry Clay. He had long been the leader of the Whigs and the upholder of the Union against the threats of Calhoun and his followers. Lincoln felt that Clay had sown some good seed that would yet bring forth fruit for the Union. And he was justified in this, for in the later election Kentucky had given a popular majority for Bell and Everett on their platform of 'The Constitution of the Country, the Union of the States, and the Enforcement of the Laws.' And they received this vote in spite of the fact that Breckinridge, the extreme pro-slavery candidate for President, was a resident of the state.

The result of the Congressional election showed that Lincoln had not miscalculated. It was an overwhelming victory for the Administration. The popular vote showed 92,365 for the Union candidates, and only 36,995 for the Secession, a Union majority of 55,370—more than two to one. Nine of the ten Congressmen elected were Republicans. It was a popular uprising for the Union that carried its influence even beyond this state into Western Virginia, where a revolt from the Old Dominion was rapidly culminating. Together these uprisings stimulated the growth of Union sentiment elsewhere.

In Kentucky, concurrently with the campaign for Congress, another movement was going forward. Its government, both legislative and executive, was in the hands of Breckinridge Democrats. Governor Magoffin, under the pretext of preserving neutrality, was really doing all he could to promote secession. Lincoln seeing this, knew that the state would soon become a battle-ground of the South. And while respecting the desire for neutrality, he concluded to place

himself in a position to answer the call of the Union men for protection, as soon as it would become apparent that his help was needed. His plan was to organise the Union people of the state. So he gave William Nelson, a young naval officer of the United States and a native of Kentucky, leave of absence from duty in the navy to go to Louisville with arms. They were to be distributed among the Union military organisations in the central part of the state. Major Robert Anderson, who had commanded at Fort Sumpter, was also sent to Cincinnati to receive volunteers from Kentucky and West Virginia into the United States service. A little later L. H. Rousseau, a strong Union man and a member of the Kentucky Senate, was commissioned to organise a brigade of Kentuckians for the United States army. He established his camp across the river in Indiana. Thus enlistments went rapidly forward at all these points. And Kentuckians, in considerable numbers, also joined Ohio regiments.

But the Governor called the Legislature together, and in his message declared that the Union was practically dissolved. He recommended the arming of the militia as 'State Guards,' under the command of General Simon B. Buckner, and advised the calling of a convention to determine what the state would do. But the Legislature proved loyal and declined to follow his advice. It refused to call a convention and rejected his request for three million dollars to arm his 'State Guards.' On the contrary it passed a law requiring an oath of allegiance to the United States Government from each soldier in the 'State Guards,' a refusal to take it, to terminate his membership. It also authorised the organisation of 'Home Guards,' into which loyal men largely volunteered. Thus Secessionists were weeded out of the state military organisations. If anyone wished to become a Confederate, he had to join a Confederate regiment. He could not masquerade under the name of his state, and in her military organisations spread the seeds of secession.

So the passage of a Secession Ordinance was prevented and Kentucky was saved. The Legislature adjourned on May 24. But the Senate before leaving resolved that Kentucky would not sever her connection with the Union. And Senator Rousseau very pointedly said, in support of this resolution: 'The time will come when we shall all be together again. The politicians are having their day. The people will yet have theirs. I have an abiding confidence in the right. And I know this secession movement is all wrong. There is in fact not a single substantial reason for it. If there is, I should be glad to hear of it.'

If Missouri had been as fortunate in her Legislature, the situation would have been less trying there. But her Governor and a majority of the Legislature were in favour of secession. On January 16, the Legislature issued a call for a convention. But when chosen it proved to be overwhelmingly opposed to secession. It resolved without one dissenting vote that there was no adequate cause to impel Missouri to dissolve her connection with the Union. It then adjourned, to meet on the third Monday of December, unless called together sooner by the committee which it had appointed to determine the necessity for an earlier meeting. Foiled here, the Governor then

devised a scheme to get possession of the U.S. Arsenal at St. Louis and made an effort to corrupt the commandant. But he was again foiled, this time by Francis P. Blair, jun., who by interceding with the President had the commandant changed. The Governor then proceeded to organise 'Minute Men' under the direction of his state Brigadier-General, Frost. Blair and his Union friends formed a Committee of Safety and organised companies of 'Home Guards.' And when Lincoln was inaugurated they had Captain Nathaniel Lyon, a thoroughly capable officer, appointed to command the U.S. troops at St. Louis. Blair had also a new friend now in Washington. This was his brother, Montgomery Blair, Lincoln's Postmaster-General. And the President, appreciating the threatening aspect of the situation in Missouri, authorised Blair and his Committee of Safety to proclaim martial law in St. Louis and create a military force of ten thousand men to serve under Captain Lyon. Thus enlistments went on concurrently, of Secessionists under the Governor, called 'Minute Men,' and of Unionists under Blair, called 'Home Guards.' When Sumpter was surrendered the Governor, thinking the time was opportune, established a state camp in St. Louis, under the command of Frost, and appealed to President Davis for arms. The arms were sent from New Orleans by boat and were landed and taken to the camp.

The day after their arrival Lyon, now having a substantial force under his command, went in person, but secretly, to the camp, saw the arms and felt that he now had conclusive evidence of the treasonable purpose of the Governor. The next day, with a force, he proceeded to surround the camp and demand its surrender. The movement was so successful that the commander, Frost, promptly yielded without a shot being fired. And the prisoners, with the arms obtained from New Orleans, were marched back to the Union camp. On the way they were met by a mob in the streets. And the troops being attacked, fired. And some twelve or more of the mob were killed and others wounded. But Lyon with his captures reached his camp in safety.

In this crisis a new obstacle appeared to interrupt the success of the Union men. General Harney, the commander of the Department, came to St. Louis and assumed command, thus displacing Lyon. Harney was loyal, but he was an honest, easy-going soul, entirely without guile himself and incapable of believing it of others. And so it was only natural that he was soon induced to believe that Jackson and his 'Minute Men' meant no mischief. He was even inclined to disband the 'Home Guards' of Blair. This being known, Blair and his friends sent a deputation to Washington to present their case to the President; and so did the other side. Blair's brother in the Cabinet supported him. But the Attorney-General, Bates, was from Missouri, and he was inclined to Harney. The President himself, however, by this time pretty well knew the situation, and he decided to support Lyon. He sent Blair an order, relieving Harney from command and raising Lyon to the rank of brigadier-general, placing him over the troops in St. Louis. But the President directed Blair to hold this order till he saw an imperative necessity for using it.

It was while Harney was in command that an incident occurred that illustrates the difference between his character and Lyon's. Governor Yates of Illinois was in need of some arms for the troops required of his state, and applied to Harney to furnish them from the St. Louis Arsenal. But Harney, with his easy indolence, answered that he did not have them to spare. Yates then went to his subordinate, Lyon, who knew they had plenty and more than they could use. He indorsed his application for ten thousand stand. A messenger was hurried with this paper to the President. And he, with the approval of Secretary Cameron and General Scott, gave an order for the arms. The question now was how to get them out of St. Louis without the knowledge of Jackson and the Secessionists. It was arranged that they should be boxed and carried to a steamboat at midnight and then hurried away. Lyon, for fear they would be captured in St. Louis, let the Governor have eleven thousand more than the requisition required and also a supply of ammunition. But when they were loaded on the boat, to their consternation, it was found that she could not be moved. She was fast aground. What was to be done? The hours were slipping away, and it would soon be morning, with the danger of discovery and trouble. By shifting a part of the cargo to the stern, the prow was at last lightened and the boat was then backed into deep water. 'Where away?' now asked the captain. 'Straight to Alton,' was the reply. 'What if we are attacked?' 'Then we will fight.' 'What if we are overpowered?' 'Run to the deepest part of the river and sink the boat.' But by early dawn, without discovery, they reached Alton. Here the fire-bell was rung. And citizens of the town being thus assembled, they stood to and quickly loaded the cargo on a waiting train, and then, followed by cheers, it was off for Springfield. Yates in his report acknowledged the receipt of 21,000 stand of arms, 110,000 musket cartridges, and two field pieces. In his hands they were safe. And there were still 8,000 stand left in the arsenal at St. Louis.

Seeing such things, the dissatisfaction with Harney continued to grow. But Blair still discreetly held the order for his removal. At last, however, it became apparent that Jackson and the Legislature, now in session at Jefferson City, were preparing for rebellion and that Harney was apparently indifferent. And then, on May 30, the order relieving him from command was delivered.

Jackson could stand this interference with his plans no longer. He sought an interview with Blair and Lyon in St. Louis and demanded the dissolution of the 'Home Guards' and that no more U.S. troops be brought into the state. But Lyon refused and pointedly told him that he would march U.S. troops into and through Missouri at discretion, as he had the right to do. The Governor pronounced this a declaration of war by the United States on Missouri. And returning to Jefferson City, burning the railroad bridges behind him, he published the result of the interview and called for fifty thousand men to take up arms for the state against the Federal Government. But Lyon in a steamboat followed him up the Missouri with a force of men, and took possession of the capital, excluded the

Governor from his office and held the state under martial law, as the President had authorised. The convention, which had been elected to determine whether Missouri would secede, was re-assembled on July 22. And it, recognising the entire recreancy of Jackson and his associates, chose Hamilton R. Gamble, a loyal Union man, for Governor and also established a loyal State Government, fixing its seat at St. Louis. And thus Missouri was saved.

Too much praise cannot be given Blair and Lyon for their part in this crisis. Against the determined opposition of the State Administration, bent on precipitating Missouri into secession, and at the risk of their own personal safety and sometimes of their lives, they made a stand for the preservation of the Union. They and their friends formed a nucleus around which the wavering people gathered and took courage to act a worthy part.

The conduct of John Bell of Tennessee was in marked contrast to that of Blair. Bell was now an old man. He had always been a staunch and conservative supporter of the Union. He had entered Congress as early as 1827, and was accustomed to refer with pride to the fact that he was then supported by the votes of some free negroes. He was elected Speaker of the House at thirty-seven years of age, and was then promoted to the Senate. These honours he owed to the Whig Party, the conservative opponent of slavery. In the Senate, he was the only senator from the South to oppose the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. And he united with Chase and Sumner in defeating the threatened 'Crime against Kansas.' He was nominated for the Presidency in 1860, on the ticket with Edward Everett, on a platform, as we have seen, for the Constitution and the Union and the enforcement of the laws. And on this platform he had carried his own state as well as Virginia and Kentucky, and almost Missouri, Arkansas, Maryland and Florida. He thus became the recognised leader of the Union people of the South. He had now a great opportunity to immortalise himself by a manly resistance of those who, ignoring his platform, were bent on destroying the Union, violating its Constitution and defying its laws. But Bell ignobly turned his back upon all the best traditions of his life, and deliberately walked into a secession meeting at Nashville, after the fall of Fort Sumpter, and gave in his adhesion to the Confederacy, and he was never heard of politically afterwards. He had been weighed in the balance and found wanting.

The Legislature had submitted to the people of Tennessee the question whether a Convention should be called to consider secession. On March 10 the result of this vote was officially announced: No Convention, 91,803; for the Convention, 24,749; Union majority, 67,054. But in the face of this vote, on April 18, Bell and his associates issued an address from Nashville to the people of Tennessee, approving the refusal of her Governor to comply with the call of the President for troops, declaring it to be the duty of the state to resist by arms and at any cost the purpose of the Federal Government to subjugate the seceding states, and calling upon her authorities fully to arm to accomplish this purpose. A secret agent of the Confederacy was present, and the Legislature, having met and secretly authorised

the Governor to appoint three commissioners to enter into a military league, they proceeded to frame an agreement between the state and the Confederacy, placing its military forces and operations under the control of the Confederate states and turning over to them all the public property, naval stores and munitions of war on the same terms as the others had done.

This agreement was ratified by the Legislature and an Ordinance of Secession was also passed. The Ordinance was to be ratified by a vote of the people on June 8. But the military property and operations of the state having by that time already been in the hands of the Confederacy for a month, there was really but little left for the people to do but acquiesce. The vote was a mere farce. The Governor proclaimed Secession carried.

But there was a strong Union sentiment in East Tennessee. Here 'Parson' Brownlow and Andrew Johnson lived and were true to the principles that John Bell had ignominiously forsaken. Theirs was a region of small farms and substantial country homes, where the family tended their own crops and gathered around their own tables and firesides after the day's work was done. They had no slaves, needed none. There was no place for such in their economy. Liberty was almost as prevalent a principle as among the Swiss mountaineers. Here on June 17 a Convention of Unionists was held. It adopted a declaration that the secession election was not a free one, that no speeches against secession were permitted, and that Union papers were not allowed to be circulated, that Union men were overridden, that Secessionists conducted the election and declared the result, and that there was no provision for an examination of the returns or for contesting the election. They therefore declared that the result as announced by the Governor was not expressive of the will of the majority. And they petitioned for their section to be permitted to remain in the Union. But in this petition they were again overborne. Tennessee remained in the Confederacy until it was recovered by the arms of the North.

The people of North Carolina had also voted against calling a Convention. But after the surrender of Fort Sumpter the Governor seized the Federal Mint at Charlotte and the Arsenal at Fayetteville, and called an extra session of the Legislature for May 1. This met and adopted resolutions authorising the Governor to tender to the Confederate states so much of her volunteer force as might be necessary for the defence of the state against any attempt by the Administration of Lincoln to reduce the revolution, which was declared to exist within North Carolina, against the U.S. Government. It also called a Convention, to be elected on May 13 and convened on May 20. This Convention met and adopted an Ordinance of Secession and ratified the Confederate Constitution.

It will be noticed that in all these efforts for the secession of the border states there was a uniformity in the steps pursued. First, the Governor was secured to the support of the Confederacy. This was not usually difficult, for he was generally a pronounced proslavery man and held his place by the favour of that interest. Second, have him place the arms and military force of the state, on some

pretext, in the hands of the Confederacy. This done, and, as has been seen, it was really only the work of a very few, two or three, the state was then so entangled with the Confederacy that it could hardly be extricated. Thus the work was half accomplished. Third, efforts would then be made to secure the adoption of a Secession Ordinance by some body, either a Legislature or a Convention, whichever could be most readily persuaded to adopt it. If by a Convention which had to be elected by the votes of the people, have the election machinery in the hands of Secessionists, declare the result promptly for Secession, and submit to no review. By this Convention the Ordinance would be passed, the Confederate Constitution ratified, and all the military resources of the state placed at the disposal of the Confederacy. Then it would be, to all intents and purposes, one of the Confederate states.

Of course by this plan the Federal authorities were always at a disadvantage. Their officials in these states were generally few, and even they were usually in sympathy with the South; for they held their places by home influence and under appointments made, before Lincoln was elected, by Democratic Presidents. While the state officials were numerous and subject to the direction of influential Southern statesmen. Lincoln's Administration, lately installed in office and deeply absorbed with difficulties pressing upon it about Washington, had little opportunity to defend its interests in numerous places remote from the capital. So that the plan adopted was pre-eminently suited to the powers and purposes of the Confederacy.

The border states she thus carried—North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas—were all comparatively near to Montgomery, the seat of the Confederate Government, and easily accessible from it. Virginia was hardly an exception. For all the routes of travel, from the Confederate states to Washington, lay through her territory, bringing her constantly in touch with all that was transpiring in the South. And that part of Virginia that was not so situated—West Virginia—went ultimately with the Union. The other border states that were remote from Montgomery—Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri—all went with the Union.

The secession of Arkansas was accomplished with even less effort than any of the others. A Convention was called. But when the vote for delegates was taken, it resulted, 20,626 for the Union and only 17,927 for Secession—a Union majority of 5,699. The Convention met on March 4 and was addressed by a member of the Confederate Congress. He brought a letter from President Davis urging secession on account of identity of institutions and interests. But after deliberating upon it and having a full knowledge of Lincoln's Inaugural Address, the Convention on March 18 voted not to secede. This, of course, was not satisfactory to the Secessionists. And they persuaded the Convention to submit the question to a vote of the people on August 1, and receive this as an instruction. The Convention adjourned on March 22, to meet again on August 17, when the vote of instruction could be received. But upon receipt of the news of the fall of Fort Sumpter, this same Convention re-convened and passed an Ordinance of Secession. And this was never submitted

to a vote of the people. Nor was the vote previously ordered ever taken.

The Confederacy had hopes that the Pacific Coast would somehow aid her. But the enthusiastic devotion of both California and Oregon to the Union was both a surprise and a disappointment. Lincoln had carried California over Douglas, in 1860, by only six hundred and fourteen votes; but in the fall of 1861, the Republican candidate for Governor carried it by a majority of more than twenty-five thousand. And the growth of Union sentiment in Oregon was not less pronounced.

So the boundaries of the Confederacy were now defined. The old line of 36° 30' still obtained. The Confederacy had no territory north of it but Virginia, and the Union nothing to the south but Southern California. And so the two sides stood facing each other and preparing for war. In population and area the Union largely preponderated. The North had twenty-three states, the South only eleven. The preponderance of population on the side of the North was something more than two to one. But the disparity in wealth was even greater. The North was largely engaged in commerce and manufacturing. She did the carrying trade for the South and sold her implements and clothes. The South was essentially agricultural and her products mainly sugar and cotton, with little capital required for the production of either. Her wealth was in land and slaves. And the value of both soon became depreciated.

But the South had some advantages to compensate for this disparity in population and wealth. Her territory was compact and admirably suited for a defensive war. She had short hauls and quick communication from one part to another. The lines of her mountain ranges and her valleys, in which her railroads were built, led in convenient directions. For example, from the city of Richmond, which soon became the capital of the Confederacy, troops were sent to support Bragg at Chickamauga, by a direct line, and the distance was only 550 miles. While from Washington troops were sent to support Rosecrans first to Cincinnati and then south to Chickamauga, around the other two sides of the triangle, a distance of 900 miles. This short haul was a great advantage in military operations. In the earlier years of the war, the South frequently transferred troops from the Eastern to the Western army and back, to sustain a hard-pressed position. And thus the same men could be made to do service in two armies. The troops of the South were likewise always nearer their homes. In times of inactivity in the army, they were frequently furloughed to go home to superintend the planting and gathering of crops. In this they were aided by slaves, who, in the earlier years, were little used in military operations and so remained at home working the plantations. The homes of the Northern troops, on the other hand, were scattered from Maine to California. It was impossible for them to give any attention to home affairs. And having no slaves, the male population of the North had to be divided, one part doing service in the field and the other raising crops at home.

This compactness also facilitated communication. By the telegraph the South could know in an hour what had happened in

any part of her field of operations. But her territory being thrust between, completely interrupted the means of information of the North. For example, the news of the capture of New Orleans was first learned at Washington from rumours that leaked out through Richmond. It could not have been known for a week by the means of communication the North had. When it is remembered that in war the means promptly to follow up a victory and reap its full rewards or to repair a disaster and prevent greater loss, are absolutely necessary, if the best results are to be attained, the importance of this situation becomes apparent. It took the North some time to discover the advantage the South had. And the fact had to be compensated, at last, by a larger expenditure of life and property.

CHAPTER XII

The Secession of Virginia—Causes the Creation of a New State—West Virginia—General George B. McClellan in Command—Campaign in West Virginia.

THE manner in which the Secession of Virginia was accomplished caused Lincoln some feeling. The delegates when elected to the Convention were for the Union by a decided majority. As late as April 4 they had resolved, by a vote of eighty-nine to forty-five, not to secede. When this action was taken, it was, of course, unsatisfactory to the Secessionists, who composed the lobby. And having failed in getting the Ordinance adopted, they next commenced to ply the members with inquiries as to what the Convention would do if the Federal Government would attempt to coerce the seceding states. It was insisted that this was Lincoln's purpose. A difference of opinion existing upon this question, the Convention was persuaded to send a committee to the President to ask him to communicate to them the policy he intended to pursue. These commissioners did not obtain a formal audience with the President until the day Fort Sumpter was surrendered.

There was some irony in making such an inquiry at that time. But wishing to restrain the Convention from further action and still not compromise himself, Lincoln gave the committee a guarded answer. He informed them that he had outlined his policy in his Inaugural and that he had then stated that he would use the power vested in him to hold the property belonging to the Government ; but beyond what was necessary for this purpose, there would be no invasion or use of force. By the property he intended to hold, he said he meant the military posts belonging to the Government. He added that if, as now appeared, there was a purpose in the South to drive the United States authority from these places, and this had been accomplished in the case of Sumpter, he would hold himself at liberty to re-possess it, as he would the other posts that had been seized before he became President ; and that in doing this he would repel force by force, if resisted ; that he considered them all as belonging to the Federal Government, though within the boundaries of the states in secession. He thus only re-affirmed the policy he had already announced.

But with this answer the committee returned to Richmond. And there, under the excitement produced by the assault on Sumpter and its surrender, this answer of the President was heralded as a pronounced determination to coerce the South. And then it was insisted that the Convention should at once vote to secede. So the next news the President had came through Montgomery that the

Virginia Convention had adopted a Secession Ordinance, by a vote of eighty-eight to fifty-five ; and while this was still a secret had set military forces in motion to capture the Arsenal at Harper's Ferry and the Navy-yard at Norfolk.

Under these circumstances, Lincoln felt that his answer had not been fairly treated in Richmond and that his efforts in the interest of peace had been used to promote secession. He believed that the whole matter of appointing and sending the committee to Washington and securing his answer was only a trick to trap the Convention and the state into the hands of the Confederates. And he was naturally provoked.

But one gratification he found. This was in the vote of the Convention. There were fifty-five cast against secession, and these came mostly from delegates sent from the part of the state that lay west of the mountains. The people of that section were very generally opposed to secession. And they saw in the action of the Convention, that it was proposed, by a sudden wave of excitement, to carry them out of the Union, where they desired to remain, and where they felt that it was greatly to their interest to stay, and into a Confederacy to which they were decidedly opposed. They thought the action precipitate and unfair and were not long in letting this be known in Washington. The situation presented an opportunity for both Lincoln and these people to square some old accounts.

There had long been a rivalry between the two sections of Virginia. The older or southern part that lay on the tide-water side of the mountains had been first settled. And in the earlier days, when the soil was rich, her people had made money rapidly by the growth of tobacco. The land had been held in large estates that were worked by slaves. And the wealth accumulated was spent on great houses, embosomed in the shade of beautiful trees, with sweeping lawns, commanding delightful prospects. With wealth and leisure, generous entertainments became a marked feature of this baronial life. And 'Virginia hospitality' was justly famed. The old men on the verandas discussed their crops and their estates ; the dames their linen and plate ; while the young people danced and rode and played games. Their tables groaned with the good things that only black cooks with full larders could furnish. And the 'F.F.V.'s,' in other words, the First Families of Virginia, took no second place, in point of material comfort, to any that might be found elsewhere. The fathers had been crowned with political and military honours and the children had intermarried, with a certain pride of ancestry on each side. The elder sons continued at the head of the estates and the younger, living near the capital, with easy access to the military and naval academies, had found rank in the army and navy, or in the learned professions. And these too had led up to political preferment.

But it was not so on the other side of the mountains. That section was settled by hardy pioneers, hunters and trappers, soldiers of the Revolutionary War, who had located lands on warrants for military service. They depended on their good right arms to accomplish for them what fortune had denied. Instead of the gently

rolling, easily cultivated land on the tide-water side, her people found a rough country, covered with dense forests, cut with deep and narrow ravines, fitted best for grazing stock, which they had not the means to buy, and if they did, could not keep from the wild animals that infested the woods. Their mineral wealth, now known to be of priceless value, was undeveloped. At a time when their more fortunate brothers were surrounded with luxury, they were occupying the rude lumber camps, the cabins and the clearings of settlers, striving to wrest a hard living from inhospitable surroundings. They did not care to cross the mountains, where they felt they were never appreciated. But their routes of travel carried them down the course of their streams to the Ohio and its tributaries. For one that had visited Richmond and Norfolk, ten had gone to Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis. And when they had pushed forward to the 'River Front,' where they had easy means of communication with the world outside and had built their principal towns and Wheeling, their only city, they adopted the habits and tastes and love of free institutions of their neighbours of the free states. Slavery could find no support in such surroundings.

While Eastern Virginia had 472,000 slaves, Western had only 18,000. The latter had, therefore, little interest in a war either to maintain or extend slavery. The spirit of this hardy people, living in secluded homes, in the simple companionship of their wives and children, rather hated the system that they felt had fostered 'the proud man's contumely.'

In 1861, Eastern Virginia had 1,200,000 people; Western, 370,000—less than one-third. The West paid a rateable proportion of the taxes. But thus far, she had been treated more as a tributary province, or a colony, than as part of the state. The East elected her own friends to the state offices. And as she had a majority in the Legislature, she got by far the most of the improvements made by the state—the canals, the bridges, the roads and the railroads. It was in vain that the West pointed to her salubrious climate, the wealth of her forests and the untold fortunes concealed in her minerals, and asked for state aid to develop them. She had thundered her opposition to the existing current of legislation and had shaken her fist and hurled threats at the East for generations. But the tyranny of the majority had answered only with a smile and a vote of more appropriations for the East. Realising at last the hopeless want of unity in their interests, the West sought a separation. She had desired it for sixty years. But the East would not consent. The alliance was too profitable. And she had the Federal Constitution on her side, for it provided that no new state could be formed within the jurisdiction of any other state, without the consent of the legislatures of both, as well as of Congress. So a separation was easily prevented. The East had the majority in the Legislature of old Virginia and would vote against it.

But now the opportunity of the West had come. The Ordinance of Secession had been adopted. The East claimed this took the whole state out of the Union. Her senators and congressmen were in the Confederate Congress, and while she was thus refusing to participate

in the Federal Government, this Government was holding that the Ordinance of Secession was void and that Virginia, from a legal standpoint, was still in the Union, that if Mason and Hunter had left the Federal Senate and gone to sit in the Confederate at Montgomery, so many members of the Virginia Legislature as still remained loyal might meet and declare that this act on their part was in effect a resignation of their offices, and elect two other senators. The West was quick to see her opportunity. She saw that if she remained loyal, she would be recognised as the state of Virginia and thus, at last, the Western minority would be in control. When the Legislature, with members from the West only in it, assembled, it would be the Legislature of Virginia. It could consent to the separation of the two sections under the Federal Constitution and create the new state.

Accordingly, the delegates from the West to the Virginia Convention returned to their homes fully determined what they would do. The Ordinance of Secession was adopted on April 17, and on May 4 a Union mass meeting was held at Kingwood in Preston County, on the Pennsylvania and Maryland border, and a determined hostility to secession was avowed. A separation from the tide-water section was demanded, and the meeting resolved on the appointed day to vote for and elect a member to the Federal Congress and send him to Washington to represent them. Another mass meeting was held at Wheeling on the following day, at which similar steps were taken, and it was further resolved to render no further tribute to the Confederate Government at Richmond, in either money or troops. On May 13 five hundred staunch Union men met in Wheeling, in a Convention, and denounced secession, pledged their loyalty to the National Government, and in view of the approaching vote on the ratification of the Virginia Ordinance of Secession to be taken on May 23, asked the people of the counties there represented, in case the vote was for ratification, to select delegates on May 26 to assemble in Convention at Wheeling on June 11 to determine what West Virginia would do. The ratification of the Ordinance of Secession having been carried by the votes of the East, forty counties of West Virginia held the election on May 26 and chose delegates to the Wheeling Convention.

The Convention assembled on the appointed day, and on June 13 it adopted a declaration, denouncing the action of the Richmond Convention in pretending to sever Virginia from the Union, repudiated the attempted allegiance to the Confederacy, and declared the offices of all the state officials who adhered to secession to be vacant. It chose Francis H. Pierpont for Governor of Virginia and loyal men to fill the other vacancies. On the 20th it voted unanimously in favour of a division of the state. And on June 25 it adjourned till August.

The Western members of the Legislature of Virginia, previously elected to serve in Richmond, met soon after in Wheeling on the call of Governor Pierpont, enacted some laws for the aid of the provisional government, and chose two senators, John S. Carlile and Waitman T. Willey, who four days later were admitted to seats in the U.S. Senate. This Legislature also assented to the formation of the new state, then called Kanawha, from the name of its principal river.

But this action was all taken without the participation of the part of the state that adhered to the Confederacy. It was essentially the part that lay west of the Alleghany Mountains that took the action, though it was subsequently concurred in by Alexandria and Fairfax counties in Middle Virginia, and by Accomack and Northampton counties on the eastern shores of Chesapeake Bay. The first two of these counties were just across the Potomac from Washington, and were occupied by Union troops. The other two adjoined the state of Maryland and, being across Chesapeake Bay, were separated by it from the rest of Virginia.

In August the Wheeling Convention reassembled, and on the 20th adopted an ordinance creating the new state, and provided for a popular vote of ratification to be taken in October. The ordinance was approved by a vote of the people on the fourth Thursday of the month, and on November 26, 1861, the Convention assembled again in Wheeling and framed a constitution for the new state. This was also approved by a vote of the people on the first Tuesday of April, 1862, there being 18,862 for and only 514 against it. This action was then presented to Congress, and after some discussion and delay it was approved and the new state admitted to the Union under the name of West Virginia.

By this action, with the consent of people living along it, the whole line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was in a country friendly to the Federal Government. It was vitally important for the Union to keep possession of this line of communication between Washington and the great and populous central and western states. For they were all loyal and were supporting the Administration generously with troops and supplies. The railroad, starting from the capital, crossed the mountains by a single line to Grafton, in West Virginia; there it divided, one branch reaching the Ohio River at Wheeling and the other at Parkersburg. It was the most direct line of communication between Washington and all that part of the United States lying west and north-west of the Ohio River—Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Missouri, as well as Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Iowa.

West Virginia was also surrounded by the loyal states of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Kentucky. And portions of them were tributary to this railroad. A part of the new state, known as the Pan Handle, reached far north of the south line of Pennsylvania by a narrow strip between it and Ohio, to within a hundred miles of Lake Erie, on the northern boundary of the Union. Through this strip passed another great line of railroad, now a part of the Pennsylvania system. If the South had succeeded and had continued to hold West Virginia, this would have almost divided the Union, leaving by far the greater portion to the west thus cut off from its capital. It was with these things always before it that the Federal Government kept continually in touch with the movements in West Virginia and did what it could to promote the efforts for the creation of the new state.

Of course the Eastern Virginians were not satisfied with the action of their Western neighbours. This was secession from secession. And they were only in favour of one secession, not two. Governor Letcher

in a special message to his Legislature, declared that President Lincoln and his Cabinet were wilfully and deliberately violating every provision of the section of the Constitution regulating the creation of new states. And General Lee, in command of the armies of Virginia, very much desired to hold or interrupt the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. While the different steps were being taken, both were devising means to hold this section for the Confederacy. Harper's Ferry was captured on April 18, 1861, and for some weeks after this the Confederates kept complete control of the railroad, by fortifying and holding that position. A month later they obstructed the road by destroying several bridges farther west. Governor Letcher, in issuing his calls for militia, also included the counties of West Virginia. And, the responses being slow, he sent officers to endeavour to collect troops there. But he found the feeling very bitter. Men could not be found for his service, though they were going into the Union organisations by thousands. He then sent a few companies from the east to Beverly, under the command of Colonel G. A. Porterfield, with the hope that they would form a nucleus, around which he would be able to rally recruits. With this force Colonel Porterfield advanced to Grafton. But the West Virginians appealed to President Lincoln at Washington for aid in resisting this invasion.

The President, knowing the strength of the Union sentiment in West Virginia, determined not to have any vote there attributed to the presence of United States troops. So, until the elections held on May 23, to determine whether the Virginia Ordinance of Secession would be ratified, and on May 26 to elect delegates to the Wheeling Convention, to determine whether West Virginia would separate from the old state, all Union troops enlisted here and those raised elsewhere, but intended for service in this section, were stationed in camps in Ohio, opposite Parkersburg and Wheeling. Here the recruits were drilled and prepared for service, knowing that as soon as these votes were taken they would probably be needed to resist the efforts of the Secessionists to carry West Virginia into the Confederacy.

Major-General George B. McClellan was at this time in command of the Department of the Ohio. He was thirty-five years of age, born and reared in the city of Philadelphia, the son of a physician of standing. At the age of twenty he graduated from the Military Academy at West Point. And in the fall of the same year he joined the army in the Mexican War. In the campaigns against the Mexican capital, by gallant conduct, he won the brevets of first lieutenant and captain. He continued in the army for eleven years, but the remainder of his service was a succession of special duties, which his agreeable address, his culture and constant good fortune were able to secure for him. He prepared a manual of bayonet exercise, which was officially printed and used in the army; he accompanied an expedition for exploration to the Upper Red River valley and took astronomical observations and made a collection of curios for illustration in natural history; he made surveys for harbour improvements on the coast of Texas; conducted a survey for a Pacific railroad in Washington Territory; was stationed in Washington City to prepare a memoir on railroad construction; and finally, with Robert E. Lee, was sent to the

Crimea to make observations on the tactics of the belligerent armies there.

But he quit the service in 1857. He then had the rank of captain of artillery. And he resigned to become chief engineer of the Illinois Central Railroad. He was chosen its Vice-President in 1858, and was elected President of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad in 1860, and was so engaged at the commencement of the war. Being in Cincinnati, and some citizens, apprehensive for the safety of the city, having learned of his military education, applied to Governor Dennison and secured his appointment as major-general in command of the thirteen regiments required of Ohio under the proclamation of President Lincoln. General Scott was also in search of men of military education. And on May 14, finding him already at the head of the Ohio troops, he assigned him to the command of the Department of the Ohio. To give him corresponding rank, he was made a major-general in the U.S. Army. His department covered the three states of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. And as the call required from these states twenty-four regiments, he was thus placed in command of twenty thousand men. As he was only in command of a hundred when he left the army four years before, it will be seen that he had received an unusual promotion.

His first work was to organise, equip and discipline the troops. He was well fitted for this service and entered upon it with commendable enthusiasm. It was while so engaged that he was applied to for aid in West Virginia. And he had accordingly established the camps opposite Parkersburg and Wheeling and was ready to assume the offensive as soon as the elections of May 23 and 26 were over.

Promptly on the evening of May 26, as soon as the election of delegates to the Wheeling Convention was over, he ordered four regiments from Parkersburg and Wheeling to rendezvous at Grafton. Their advance was slow, for the bridges on the railroads had been destroyed. Porterfield had advanced to Grafton with the intention of threatening Wheeling and completing the destruction of the railroads. But he was too closely pursued to do this. The Union forces arrived at Grafton on May 31 and greatly outnumbered his. He hastily retreated to Philippi, some fifteen miles farther south, and there issued a proclamation calling upon the Virginians to stand by the voice of their state and rally at once to her defence. But no recruits came.

On the morning of June 3 the Union forces, under the command of General Morris, advanced against him at Philippi. Two brigades of two regiments each approached his camp by different roads. The Confederates had only six to eight hundred men, and so were greatly outnumbered by the Union forces both in front and rear. The Unionists in front, under Colonels Dumont and Lander, opened with artillery and promptly charged with infantry. The Confederates started to retreat, when the Union force under Colonel Kelley, himself a West Virginian and at the head of a West Virginia regiment, came upon them from the rear. The Confederates were utterly demoralised and dispersed. Colonel Kelley was shot through the lungs and two Union men were killed. The Confederates lost sixteen

killed and ten prisoners, with all their provisions, tents and most of their arms. Colonel Porterfield collected his forces and retreated south, first to Beverly and then to Huttonsville.

The Richmond authorities sought as quickly as possible to remedy Porterfield's disasters and sent ex-Governor Henry A. Wise, now a Confederate brigadier-general, and Major-General Robert S. Garnett, who had been a major in the U.S. army, with reinforcements. They gathered up the remnant of Porterfield's force and advanced to Beverly. The long turnpike from Staunton to the Ohio River branches here, one fork going to Parkersburg and the other to Grafton, one through a pass over Rich Mountain and the other through a pass in the same range seventeen miles farther north, there called Laurel Hill. General Garnett fortified both passes, taking command himself at Laurel Hill, with three or four regiments, and placing Lieut.-Colonel John Pegram at Rich Mountain with a regiment and six guns. He left a small force at Beverly. The situation, he confessed, was discouraging. His men were not properly armed, fed or clothed. And he found the inhabitants hostile, keeping the Union men informed of his movements, while he was compelled to grope in the dark as if he were moving in a hostile country.

General McClellan arrived in person at Grafton on June 23, and at once issued a proclamation to the people of West Virginia, condemning the guerilla warfare pursued by the Confederates and ordering his troops to abstain from pillage or outrage of any kind, reminding them that the people among whom they were operating were their friends. By other troops brought up from Ohio and gathered in West Virginia his force now amounted to about thirty thousand men ; while the Confederates had only about one-third this number. After reconnoitring and finding Garnett's position on Laurel Hill the stronger, he determined first to attack Pegram on Rich Mountain. He sent Brig.-General W. S. Rosecrans around to gain the rear. Through a cold, pelting rain, by bridle-paths in the mountains, aided by a friendly West Virginian familiar with the neighbourhood, whom he had found in his camp, Rosecrans gained the rear of Pegram and found a small force of Confederates entrenched across this path. They were immediately attacked and routed. They left one hundred and thirty-five dead, with three cannon and some tents and provisions. It being now late in the day, Rosecrans halted where he was and attempted to communicate his success to McClellan and ask him to attack Pegram in front. But the scout sent with the message was wounded and captured by a Confederate picket. Nevertheless, Pegram, learning of the defeat in his rear and seeing himself outnumbered, undertook to escape during the night. But finding this impossible, he surrendered his force of about six hundred to McClellan on July 12.

McClellan pushed on to Beverly the next day, thus outflanking Garnett's position on Laurel Hill. This compelled him to retreat, followed by General Morris. He crossed the mountains eastward on a by-path into the Cheat River valley. But rain fell incessantly, the road was wretched, and the unbridged streams were swollen to torrents, skirmishes were frequent, and four companies of a Georgia regiment,

being cut off, were compelled to surrender. At length, having crossed Cheat River at Carricks Ford, Garnett found a strong position and turned to fight. The Union forces came up in overpowering numbers and attacked him with both artillery and muskets. Colonel Dumont, with his 7th Indiana, crossed the stream and, through a tangled thicket, gained his right flank. Garnett was again compelled to retreat. His road crossed the stream a quarter of a mile below, and here he made another attempt to rally his force. But the Indians were directly upon him. And his men, notwithstanding all he could do, turned and fled. And Garnett, in his efforts to rally them, was shot dead. A slight boyish Georgian, probably an aide, heroically stayed with him to the last and was killed at his side. The pursuit was continued two miles farther, when the Union soldiers halted. And the residue of the Confederates, under Colonel Ramsey, turning sharply to the right, made their way over the mountains to General Jackson at Monterey in Eastern Virginia. The Union loss was about thirteen killed and the Confederate about two hundred. A thousand Confederates were taken prisoners. And they lost also their wagon train and one gun.

Simultaneously with the advance on Beverly, Brig.-General Cox, by General McClellan's order, advanced from Guyandotte on the Ohio River. General Wise, with the remainder of the Confederate troops, went to meet him. Cox captured Barboursville and then crossed over into the Kanawha valley. At Scarytown, on July 17, fifteen hundred of his troops, under Colonel Lowe, met a smaller Confederate force under Captain Patton. And the latter was repulsed with a loss of fifty-seven killed. That night the Confederates retreated, leaving their commander, Captain Patton, dangerously wounded, to become a prisoner. General Cox pushed on up the Kanawha, General Wise retreating before him to Lewisburg, where he was reinforced and out-ranked by Major-General John B. Floyd about August 1. General Floyd advanced to Cross Lanes, where he met Colonel Tyler with the 7th Ohio and defeated him with a loss of 200 men. Moving thence to Carnifex Ferry, Floyd was there attacked by General Rosecrans, who had come down from Clarksburg with 10,000 men from McClellan's force at Beverly, to the aid of General Cox. Rosecrans lost 200 men. Colonel Lowe of the 12th Ohio was killed, and Colonel Lytle of the Tenth and Lieut.-Colonel White of the Twelfth were wounded. Darkness terminated the fight. And during the night Floyd retreated southward to Big Sewell Mountain.

Here Floyd was reinforced and out-ranked by Major-General R. E. Lee. Their force now amounted to about 20,000 men. Lee advanced to the Cheat Mountain region in Randolph County, near the scene of Garnett's and Pegram's disasters, where there was some skirmishing from the 12th to the 14th of September. In this the loss on each side was about a hundred, the Union in prisoners and the Confederate in killed, among them Colonel John A. Washington, one of Lee's aides.

Lee was then recalled to take a command in Eastern Virginia. And Floyd and Wise, being again in command, took a position on the south side of New River, one of the tributaries of the Kanawha, near Gauley Bridge, where they amused themselves by shelling the teamsters

engaged in supplying the Union army, till they were attacked by General Rosecrans on November 12. Then they retreated to Peters-town among the mountains, on the border of East Virginia, and so abandoned the campaign.

In the north-east General Kelley had been stationed to guard the Alleghany section of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. On the night of October 25 he left New Creek and, advancing hastily to Romney, drove out a Confederate battalion and captured two cannon and sixty prisoners, with several hundred stand of arms and some camp equipment and provisions.

General Milroy, in command of 2,000 Union troops, at Cheat Mountain on December 12, made an advance upon four regiments of Confederate troops under Colonel Edward Johnson at Alleghany Summit. The attack in front, by Colonel James A. Jones, of the 25th Ohio, though gallantly made, did not succeed. And the flank, led by Colonel Moody of the 9th Indiana, was likewise unsuccessful. The Confederates were superior in numbers and position. They returned the attack and were also repulsed. Milroy retreated, unpursued, to his former camp, having lost 150 men. But, not discouraged, he dispatched Major Webster, of the 25th Ohio, with 800 men, on December 31, to break up a Confederate post at Huntersville, fifty miles south, on the Greenbrier River. The weather was cold and the ground covered with snow. But the advance was made in three days. The Confederates were driven out and six buildings filled with provisions and forage were burned. And thus ended the West Virginia campaign, with hardly a Confederate soldier on that side of the Alleghany Mountains.

The movements and battles, in point of fatality, as compared with those later in the war, were mere skirmishes. From this point of view, they are hardly entitled to consideration; but viewed in other connections they were vastly important. They saved West Virginia to the Union with her 370,000 people, as loyal as any, entitling them to three Representatives and two Senators in Congress, to uphold the administration of President Lincoln. They pushed the boundary of Confederacy two hundred miles farther south, leaving it nothing north of the old Mason and Dixon line but the great battle-ground between Washington and Richmond. And they saved to the Union the great line of communication between Washington and the West, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The entire country traversed by this road was now Union territory, for West Virginia was extended so as to include the three counties Morgan, Berkeley and Jefferson along it, that lay east of the mountains. This carried it to Harper's Ferry. From there to Washington the road lay in the loyal state of Maryland.

The campaign in West Virginia was of wide-reaching influence, but of more questionable importance, from another point of view. It had been carefully conducted. Its purpose had been accomplished, and with no considerable loss of life and with no mistake of importance from a military standpoint. McClellan had been in immediate general command and had thereby gained the credit for its success, though he had really fought no battle himself and, therefore, had not shown any

considerable military ability. But something had been accomplished there. And the North was heart-sick just now over the disaster at Bull Run that had occurred during its progress. In the absence of a better showing by any other commander, McClellan had gained the credit for military genius, and so was carried by that wave, on November 1, 1861, to the general command of the Union armies. Whatever of credit or discredit is due to him in the later conduct of the war must, therefore, be primarily attributed to this campaign in West Virginia.

CHAPTER XIII

The Battle of Bull Run—Occupation of Arlington—Johnston retreats before Patterson—McDowell advances against Beauregard—The Battle—Defeat—Retreat.

WHILE the events related in the last chapter were transpiring in West Virginia, others of greater interest were taking place east of the mountains. By estimates made by engineers of the army, it was learned that batteries located at Arlington, across the Potomac in Virginia, could by mortars and long-distance guns reach and lay Washington in ruins. It was therefore a military necessity in the defence of the city that Arlington be occupied. A detachment of Confederates was already quartered in Alexandria, within eight miles of the capital. They might, in a night, push up to Arlington, throw up breastworks, erect fortifications, destroy the two bridges that spanned the river, have other troops brought up, and, before the situation could be remedied, do incalculable damage.

With these things in view, sentries were posted on the Virginia end of both bridges, so that no move could be made to possess or destroy them without immediate notice being given. But Lincoln determined here, as in West Virginia, that no move should be made to occupy any part of the state till after the vote had been taken, on May 23, to ratify the Ordinance of Secession. If thereby it appeared that Virginia was in open rebellion, repressive measures would then be justified. The first step toward this would be the nearest, the crossing of the bridges and the occupation of Arlington.

Everything was in readiness when the vote was taken, and promptly at two o'clock the next morning three regiments crossed the Aqueduct Bridge and four more the Long Bridge, each preceded by a squad of cavalry. A bright moon was shining, throwing a soft light over the sleeping city as the troops passed quietly down from their camps. The movement was made without opposition. Out-posts were thrown out in every direction, to guard against surprise, and, when morning dawned, ten thousand Union soldiers were on Virginia soil and the engineers were busy tracing lines and the troops with pick and shovel were throwing up fortifications. This was the beginning of that system of earthworks that soon crowned every eminence for ten miles on that side of the river. They extended from the bend above Georgetown to Hunting Creek below Alexandria. These fortifications gave security to the capital as well as confidence to the country. And they gave assurance to the Army of the Potomac, while fighting in front, that there was a safe harbour in the rear to which it could retreat.

One regiment, the 1st Michigan, proceeded directly from the Long Bridge to Alexandria. The 11th New York, under Colonel Ellsworth, was conveyed by a steamer from its camp on Giesboro Point down the Potomac to Alexandria. The two were to unite and, if possible, capture the garrison. But the Confederates were too quick. Learning from their pickets of the crossing of the troops from Washington, and being summoned to surrender or retreat, they chose the latter alternative and immediately embarked on board a train of cars. As the troops came in from the north they escaped to the south. All were saved except a small detachment of cavalry that was left to guard the retreat, and that was captured.

The whole movement seemed about to close without the loss of a single life, when in an instant an unexpected collision caused a thrill everywhere. This was the assassination of Colonel Ellsworth. He was only twenty-four years of age, but was already well known in Northern cities. A poor boy, of handsome appearance, with a bright mind and a winning manner, he had undertaken to start in professional life in Chicago. As business came slowly, he had turned to the study of military tactics. And he gathered together a company of handsome fellows like himself to spend their evenings in drills. They became so proficient that they claimed they were the best drilled company in the country. They attended county fairs and gave exhibitions of their proficiency. They were poor, but a friendly railroad passed them to Detroit, where they gave exhibitions to which an admission was charged. The experiment was successful, and so they continued on from city to city. At New York they gave two entertainments, one in daylight, before the uniformed militia, in an open field, and the other at night, on a stage at the Academy of Music. They even went to West Point, where military science was taught. And the only criticism that was made there was that they had not adopted the regulation forms. Of course, war was not in their thoughts. It was only diversion at first, and later improvement in tactics.

When Lincoln was elected, it was readily agreed that the handsome officer should become one of his party on the trip to Washington. Here he showed a certain quickness to catch the inspiration of great crowds and an ability to control them. Desiring to enter military life, Lincoln appointed him second lieutenant of dragoons. When the war came, Ellsworth, recognising his opportunity, went to New York and organised a regiment of eleven hundred picked men, and was himself elected the colonel. They were accepted by the Government. And when he went to Alexandria that morning the future seemed bright and all the anticipations of his life about to be realised. But in one short hour they were shrouded for ever in gloom.

For several days a Confederate flag had been flying from the top of a hotel in Alexandria. Being in plain view from the White House, it seemed to be flaunting defiance to the Union. When Ellsworth marched his regiment into the town, and the Confederate garrison was known to have fled, he disposed his troops and stationed his pickets. Remembering this flag, with the enthusiasm of the moment he determined himself to haul it down. He entered the hotel with two of his men. 'Whose flag is that?' he demanded of the man he

met. 'I don't know,' was the evasive answer. Passing quickly by, with his men, he mounted to the roof, and with his own hands cut the halyards. And with the rebel emblem on his arm he descended the stairway, one soldier in front and the other behind. When he reached the third step above the landing on the second floor, suddenly the door opposite opened and the stalwart hotel-keeper, Jackson, stepped out with a double-barrelled shot-gun. And, raising it, he discharged its contents full at Ellsworth's breast, driving a gold badge which he wore, with the inscription 'Non nobis sed pro patria,' almost into his heart. He sank down, dead. The retribution was equally decisive. For the next instant his assailant lay dead at his side, killed by the bullet and the bayonet of the soldiers accompanying Ellsworth. And so thus quickly each passed, without a penance or a prayer, into the presence of his Maker.

The deed made a deep impression. That it was adopted by some in the South with a needless subscription for the family of the assailant did not detract from the feeling in the North. Ellsworth was the first martyr. Mothers named their new-born for him and repeated the story of his death to the little ones at their knees. His fate appealed to those in high places. As he had been a favourite with Lincoln, his funeral was held in the East Room of the White House, and was attended by the President and his Cabinet and others of high rank in civil and military life.

On June 10 there was another death, which terminated another promising life. Major-General Butler, at the time of the movement against Arlington, was sent to Fortress Monroe, at the mouth of the James, with 15,000 men. Detachments of Confederates were at Little and Big Bethel, only a few miles away. And Butler sent two regiments by different routes, in command of Colonels Duryea and Townsend, to gain the rear of the one at Little Bethel. Two other regiments, under the command of Colonels Washburn and Bendix, were to attack in front. But the two regiments under Townsend and Bendix came upon one another unexpectedly in the dark; and Bendix's men, mistaking Townsend's for enemies, opened fire. Townsend's returned it, and the result was two killed and eight wounded before the mistake was discovered. Recovering from this situation, they found that the garrison, forewarned by the noise of these guns, had retreated. They were pursued, and the combined forces of about 1,200 Confederates were found entrenched behind earthworks and their position protected in front by a stream. Here they were attacked; and Major Theodore Winthrop, in an effort to turn this position, was shot through the heart and killed. He was the military secretary of General Butler, a young writer of promise, the author of some books of merit, and his courage and conduct during the fight had excited the admiration of even the enemy.

The attack in front was not successful. The balls of the Union men fell harmlessly upon the works of the Confederates, while they in turn mowed down their assailants whenever they appeared. The fight lasted till towards evening, when the regiment of New York troops under Colonel Townsend became separated, one company being beyond a thickly hedged ditch from the rest, when the colonel,

mistaking the glistening bayonets of this company for a flanking party, ordered a retreat to prevent being surrounded. And the rest of the force followed him. The Union loss was eighteen killed and fifty-eight wounded and missing ; that of the Confederates, one killed and seven wounded. The Union troops returned to Fortress Monroe, And the Confederates, realising that it was only a chapter of blunders that had saved them, retired to Yorktown.

At Arlington, General McDowell, having secured his position, was busy during the next four weeks throwing up fortifications and guarding the approaches to Washington. On June 17, General Robert C. Schenck was sent with 700 men of Colonel McCook's 1st Ohio Regiment from Alexandria towards Vienna to repair and guard the railroad. He left two companies at Fall's Church, two others to guard crossings and two more to guard the railroad and bridges nearer Vienna. As another regiment had patrolled this neighbourhood the day before, no danger was apprehended from the Confederates. The engineer was backing the train, and so the cars conveying the remaining four companies, 271 men, were in front. It happened, however, that General Gregg, with 800 Confederates, carrying two light guns, had left Dranesville that morning to reconnoitre the neighbourhood and receive the Union troops, if they should repeat their visit. They had reached Vienna and planted their guns so as to command the train when it would issue from the long cut as it approached the town. They had waited some time, and towards six o'clock were about to move off, when they heard its whistle. As it came around the curve out of the cut, at a distance of about four hundred yards, they opened upon it the well-directed fire of their two field-guns loaded with grape. They riddled the cars and killed and wounded some of the men. The train was stopped. And the men clambered out and up the sides of the cut and retreated slowly to the shelter of some timber. Colonel Gregg, without pursuing them, returned to Fairfax. While the engineer cut his engine and one car loose from the remainder of the train and made off, leaving the Union troops, with their five dead and six wounded, to make their way back to Alexandria on foot.

While these losses seem insignificant, they played a great part in intensifying feeling in the North, and so become essential to a right understanding of these opening days. The sentiment in the beginning was that the whole movement for secession was only to bully the North out of the fruits of Lincoln's election. But Sumpter and Baltimore and the events in West Virginia, with these isolated losses, convinced the country otherwise. A settled determination resulted to enforce thorough measures of repression. A lurking fear that Congress might yield to the situation and barter the country's rights away by another compromise, only tended to make this sentiment more firm. 'No retraction, no compromise, but on to Richmond,' was now the cry of the North.

This feeling had become so strong that it was really a source of embarrassment to Lincoln and his associates. While they were firmly of the opinion that no backward steps should be taken, that the South should be made to feel the weight of authority and brought

into subjection, they realised that a great rebellion had been organised and that only grim war could repress it. For this, they felt, they were hardly prepared. Seventy-five thousand troops had been raised. But they were all raw recruits. The short time that had elapsed since their enlistment, though faithfully used, had barely served to give them the first lessons in drill. They had no skill in the use of arms, had never been under fire. No one could tell what might be expected of them in actual battle.

General Scott, the head of the army, was an old soldier of considerable experience and was constantly consulted. But he believed that, with this condition of the troops, in the short time that remained of their term of enlistment, no forward movement should be attempted. His advice was that they be used simply to guard Washington, hold the line in West Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri, retain Fortress Monroe and, if opportunity offered, recover the Navy-yard at Norfolk. President Lincoln, as early as April 26, ten days after the issue of the first call, had notified the Governors that other enlistments must be for three years or till the close of the war. And on May 3 he had issued a call for 42,000 more troops. Scott advised him to wait for these troops to come in, encourage those now in the service, with their previous training, to enter the new organisations, give all a thorough drill, and be ready to advance down the Mississippi and open it to the Gulf, enforce a blockade of the coast, retake the forts, and then move from Washington on Richmond, and so envelop and crush the rebellion. This plan has been called ‘Scott’s Anaconda,’ from the habits of the serpent of that name.

It was a wide-sweeping plan. And while subject to no special criticism, Lincoln realised that it was too wide-sweeping for the means at his command, and would require more time for its execution than public sentiment would allow. He argued that large numbers of troops were already under arms and should be employed in securing actual results. The expenses of the war were piling up a national debt with great rapidity. The Confederacy was marshalling its forces. The border states that continued loyal were being plied with efforts to carry them into the Confederacy. And the North was clamouring for prompt movements. Every month of duration gave added strength to the Confederacy in the eyes of Europe. And these considerations could not be disregarded. Delay was dangerous and might result in the success of the rebellion.

The Confederate Government had been removed to Richmond about June 1, 1861. As it had something of the character of a military despotism, one of the purposes of the removal was that President Davis might place himself immediately in touch with the operations of the army in Virginia. He expected his own military education to play some part. And the sequel shows that he did take an active part, not only in advising movements, but even in promoting them by his presence on the field. He realised that Virginia would be the scene of important operations. And in response to a serenade on the evening of his arrival in Richmond he declared that it would ‘become the theatre of a great central camp from which would pour forth thousands of brave hearts to roll back the tide of this despotism.’

With this shifting of the capital, the situation became more threatening. A meeting of Lincoln's Cabinet was called, and General Scott was invited to be present. The question of an advance of the army was the subject for consideration. Johnston was in the Shenandoah Valley with an army of 12,000 Confederates; Beauregard was at Manassas Junction with an army of 20,000; and Magruder was on the Peninsula near Fortress Monroe with still another army. All were really threatening Washington. They might, by a combined movement and quick march, perhaps succeed in capturing the city. Would it not be better to force an issue before this could be attempted? With the North clamouring for action, Lincoln felt that an advance against Beauregard was necessary. Scott opposed it. But it being resolved on, and Scott having anticipated that it would be, he produced a plan of campaign, that had been prepared at his suggestion by General McDowell.

It was in substance that Johnston should be held in the Valley by Patterson, that Magruder should be held on the peninsula by Butler, and that McDowell should advance against Beauregard at Manassas, with an equal or superior force, and attack and defeat him.

The force opposing Johnston was under the command of Major-General Robert Patterson. He was a native of Pennsylvania, sixty-nine years of age, had seen service in the War of 1812 as a lieutenant and captain, and in the Mexican War as a major-general. He was favourably known to Scott as a good second in command. And as under the large quota required by the call from Pennsylvania the state was entitled to two major-generals, the Governor appointed Patterson one of them. When the Department of Pennsylvania, comprising that state and Delaware and part of Maryland, was created, he was assigned by Scott to this command. By June 7 he had assembled at Chambersburg an army of 20,000 men. His first duty was to keep in subjection the rebellious element in his department, more especially in Maryland, where efforts had been made to secure its secession. But, with Butler in command of the district about Baltimore and now in complete control of the situation there, and with the returning tide setting in strongly for the Union, Patterson's task in his own department was easy. With quiet restored, his attention naturally turned to Harper's Ferry, on the border of Maryland.

With its seizure on the adoption of the Secession Ordinance in Virginia, the position had been garrisoned and held by the Confederates. Johnston had been assigned to its command with about 6,000 troops. Being at the entrance of the Shenandoah Valley, and on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, both of which Davis desired to hold, and only across the Potomac from Maryland, which he desired to acquire, Davis regarded Harper's Ferry as a position of great importance. He also considered it a natural military stronghold, and, therefore, thought it would be easy to retain. But when Johnston reached there, his quick eye saw otherwise. It could be easily turned by crossing the river above and below. It would require a strong force to hold it, and it would also be difficult to supply or reinforce, if invested. He communicated his conclusions to Davis, and was

reluctantly given permission to retire towards Winchester in case he believed he was seriously threatened.

Patterson, with the consent of Scott, had concentrated his troops at Chambersburg for the purpose of advancing on Harper's Ferry and, if possible, of driving the Confederates out and capturing the town. Here his character quickly came out. He was timid, hesitating, complaining—always magnifying the strength of his adversary and underrating his own. He wrote, June 10, to his old friend, Simon Cameron, the Secretary of War: 'Remember, I beseech you, that Harper's Ferry, as I have said from the first, is the place where the first great battle will be fought, and the result will be decisive of the future. The insurgents are strongly entrenched, have an immense number of guns and will contest every inch of ground. . . . I beseech you, therefore, by our ancient friendship, give me the means of success. You have the means; place them at my disposal, and shoot me if I do not use them to advantage.' Reinforcements were sent, and he began a leisurely advance to Hagerstown and then to Williamsport. And when he finally did reach the neighbourhood of Harper's Ferry, he discovered that Johnston had 'folded his tents like the Arab and as silently stolen away.'

But before going he had taken the precaution to destroy the railroad bridge over the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and another at Point of Rocks, a few miles away. The arsenal was dismantled, the machinery taken to Richmond and the buildings burned.

Patterson was greatly mystified. 'I believe it is designed for a decoy,' he wrote. 'There may be a deep-laid plan to deceive us.' But he finally got a part of his army across the river, and so verified the report that Johnston had actually gone. And then he claimed it as a victory. 'They have fled in confusion,' he wrote. 'Their retreat is as demoralising as a defeat and, as the leaders will never be caught, more beneficial to our cause. Harper's Ferry has been retaken without firing a gun.' Scott asked, 'What movement, if any, in pursuit of the enemy, do you propose to make?' 'Design no pursuit; cannot make it,' replied Patterson. Scott then ordered the reinforcements that had been sent to be returned to Washington.

Johnston had fallen back to Winchester, keeping his pickets well out towards Harper's Ferry. He was reinforced by some regular troops and militia, and now had about 12,000 men. Patterson, after his reinforcements were sent back, returned to the Maryland side of the river. Here he remained idle till he was advised of the contemplated movement on Manassas and was ordered to remain in front of Johnston and, if he had a superior or equal force, to cross and offer him battle. Two days later, Scott wrote: 'I had expected your crossing the river to-day in pursuit of the enemy.' But Patterson complained that Johnston outnumbered him and asked for reinforcements and batteries; and they were sent. He then recrossed the river at Williamsport, and on July 2, at Falling Waters, had a slight skirmish with some Confederates under Jackson. But, being greatly outnumbered, they fell back to Martinsburg. On July 15 he advanced from Martinsburg and then to Bunker Hill, on the direct road, and only nine miles from Winchester. He met no resistance. But on the

17th he suddenly changed his course. After preparing the day before an order for an advance on Winchester, he retreated to Charlestown. This movement left Johnston free to transfer his force of 12,000 men to the support of Beauregard at Manassas, and, of course, he promptly did it.

When Patterson's order for an advance on Winchester was written by his Assistant Adjutant-General, Fitz John Porter, it was against the wishes of Porter, and he asked Patterson to consult Colonels Abercrombie and Thomas. They were accordingly consulted. And they dissuaded him. His intention being thus changed, late that night Patterson ordered the retrograde movement to Charlestown. This was all against the orders of Scott, who had telegraphed him to make a demonstration so as to detain Johnston in the Valley; but, if Johnston retreated to Manassas and it was too hazardous to follow him, that he should then go, by the way of Keys Ferry and Leesburg, to Manassas. This would ensure Patterson's troops getting to Manassas to take part in the battle, if Johnston got there. Patterson understood him, for he answered 'I have thus far succeeded in keeping in this vicinity the command of General Johnston. . . . If an opportunity offers I shall attack; but, unless I can rout, shall be careful not to set him in full retreat upon Strasburg.' Strasburg was on the railroad to Manassas.

Scott, fearing that the vacillating of Patterson and his indisposition to fight would let Johnston slip, and not wishing to change commanders on the eve of the battle, sent Major-General Charles W. Sanford with four regiments as a reinforcement about July 10. He was to explain the necessity of holding Johnston in the Valley. Sanford made the explanation, and placed his force so as to intervene between Johnston and Manassas; but he was recalled from this position to conform to Patterson's last order for the movement to Charlestown. Again Scott telegraphed Patterson, July 17: 'Don't let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in front, whilst he reinforces the junction with his main body.' And still again, on July 18: 'I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy. If not, to hear that you had felt him strongly, or at least had occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal and, I suppose, his superior in numbers. Has he not stolen a march and sent reinforcements towards Manassas Junction? A week is enough to win victories.' But before this was sent, Patterson had already retreated to Charlestown and Johnston was actually then reinforcing Manassas. Still Patterson answered: 'The enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him actively employed and, by threats and reconnaissances in force, caused him to be reinforced. I have accomplished in this respect more than the General-in-Chief asked, or could well be expected, in the face of an enemy far superior in numbers, with no line of communication to protect.' But this answer was untrue in every particular. Johnston was not superior in numbers, for he had only 12,000 men, while Patterson had 22,000. Johnston had not been reinforced. Johnston had not been kept actively employed. Johnston had stolen a march. And, what was worse, Patterson did not learn it till two days later. His orders were,

in substance, to fight, to hold or to follow Johnston; and he did none of them. He did ruin his own reputation as a soldier, and he did, in large measure, cause the loss to his country of the battle of Bull Run.

Let us now see how this was done. On July 16 Brigadier-General Irvin McDowell left his camp at Arlington and advanced towards Manassas. The men were raw recruits, stopped to pick blackberries by the road, and at every stream to empty and refill their canteens, and could not be kept in rank. So that the advance was necessarily slow, and the enemy was given ample opportunity to prepare to meet him.

His first division of 9,936 men, commanded by Tyler, was in four brigades, under Keyes, Schenck, Sherman and Richardson; his second, of 2,648, commanded by Hunter, in two brigades, under Porter and Burnside; his third, of 9,777, commanded by Heintzelman, in three brigades, under Franklin, Wilcox and Howard; his fourth, of 5,752, under Runyon; his fifth, of 6,257, under Miles, in two brigades, under Blenker and Davies. His total command numbered 34,370. Of this number the fourth division under Runyon of 5,752 was detailed to guard his line of communication, and so must be deducted from those engaged, for it was never within eight miles of the field. The 4th Pennsylvania and Varian's Battery demanded their discharge, on account of the expiration of their term of enlistment, on the day before the battle, and were discharged. So that they also must be deducted. This left McDowell about 28,000 men and 49 guns. The reports show that they confronted, on the field of Bull Run, 32,000 Confederates, with 57 guns. So that McDowell was outnumbered by 4,000 men and 8 guns. Of the Confederates, 12,000 came from the valley with Johnston, released by the incompetency of Patterson. They were under such brigade commanders as Jackson, Bartow, Bee and Elzey. While Stuart commanded the cavalry. These were all able men.

If Patterson had held them in the Valley, as he was repeatedly ordered to do, McDowell would have outnumbered Beauregard by 7,000 men. If Patterson had followed them, as he should have done, if he found he could not hold them, he would have added 22,000 men to McDowell's army, and it would then have outnumbered the Confederate by 16,000. It is humiliating to remember that Patterson did not even know that Johnston had slipped him till after the battle. He then fell back to Harper's Ferry, where, two days later, he was superseded by General Banks and was soon discharged, and so ended his inglorious service.

Manassas Junction is at the intersection of the railroad from Strasburg, in the Shenandoah Valley, with the one from Washington to the west and south. It is thirty-five miles south-west of Washington on a high, open plateau. Bull Run takes its rise in the mountains to the north, flows in a south-eastern direction, passing about seven miles to the east of Manassas and so this much nearer Washington. It is a good-sized mill stream, sluggish and winding, with steep rocky banks, that on the west side well covered with timber, so as to give an army a good position from which to command the approaches from the east, where the bank was low and brushy. The stream

has numerous fords. It is crossed by the Warrenton turnpike, three miles west of Centreville, by a stone bridge; and about eight miles south-east of this point by the Manassas Railroad. Between these points General Beauregard, commanding the Confederate forces, had placed his troops on the west side and facing the run, so as to command these bridges and the intervening fords. There were six of these fords, named, from the stone bridge south, Lewis's, Ball's, Mitchell's, Blackburn's, McLean's and Union Mills. The last is at the railroad bridge, and the others are approximately a mile apart. About three miles north of the stone bridge, and so about three miles north of this end of the Confederate line, was the Sudley ford. The battlefield of Bull Run lay immediately west of the stone bridge and on either side of the Warrenton turnpike. So that the Union army crossed Bull Run before reaching the field.

Tyler, commanding the advance of McDowell's army, reached Centreville on the morning of July 18. Finding that some Confederate troops had retired from Centreville, and that they had crossed Bull Run at Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords, under instructions to observe well the roads but not to bring on an engagement, he followed them towards Blackburn's ford with a squad of cavalry and two companies of infantry. Finding a favourable position for artillery, he sent back for a battery and a brigade to support it. Two guns were planted and commenced a cannonade. The enemy's guns answered. Skirmish lines were thrown out on each side. The Confederates found Bull Run a barrier and retired. Other guns were brought up by Tyler and then a regiment to support the skirmishers, and still later a brigade to scour the thick woods with which the bottom was covered. But it provoked little firing from the enemy. Still desiring to discover their location and number, Tyler found an open place low down in the bottom, where he ordered a couple of howitzers to take position, supported by a squadron of cavalry. The enemy replied with volleys which showed that the whole bottom was filled with troops, and that batteries were in positions to sweep the approaches to the heights beyond. A regiment was deployed and ordered to advance into the woods. Brig.-General Longstreet, who commanded the Confederates here, sent for assistance and received another regiment. And then a combined movement was made upon Tyler's regiment, some of Longstreet's men crossing the stream. The regiment broke and fled. Tyler then began to remember his instructions not to bring on a battle, and ordered the other infantry to retire with the two howitzers. The men sullenly and in ill humour obeyed. The cannonade upon both sides continued some time longer, but at night Tyler retired to Centreville.

This was the preliminary battle of Blackburn's ford. As the Confederates were left in possession of the field they claimed the victory. As the Union forces were ordered into the fight and then, while their blood was up, without being permitted to finish the fray, were ordered out, they were dissatisfied. But the losses were about equal. The Confederates reported sixty-three killed and wounded; the Union loss was fifty-seven killed and wounded and twenty-six missing.

The commanders reported rifle-pits and breastworks in the timber on the western bank of Bull Run and strong forces guarding the ford. In this respect the preliminary battle had an important influence upon the main battle. For it was General McDowell's intention when he came to Centreville to make an attack upon the right flank of the Confederates. But finding from this preliminary battle and some slight skirmishes at Mitchell's ford and the stone bridge that the crossings were defended, he concluded that it would cause unnecessary loss of life to attempt to force a passage there, and that efforts should be made to find an unoccupied crossing. Engineers were sent out for this purpose, and after a search for two days they reported that three and a half miles above the stone bridge, at Sudley Springs, a crossing could be effected without resistance.

This was one of McDowell's mistakes. The stone bridge was feebly defended. It was his natural place of crossing. And there was an unoccupied ford only a half mile above, where Sherman and Howard did cross, with their troops, on the day of the battle. If the attack had been made promptly the day after his arrival, Johnston would not have been there with his army from the valley. And if the long detour necessary to reach Sudley Springs had not been made, McDowell's men would not have reached the field exhausted by a twelve hours' march under the dust and heat of a July sun.

But on Saturday night, July 20, orders were issued that Hunter and Heintzelman with their divisions should leave their camps east of Centreville at 2.30 the next morning, and by a secret and circuitous night march reach Sudley ford and there cross Bull Run and descend on the west side, doubling back the left wing of the Confederate army and driving it south of the stone bridge, so that Tyler with his division, the heaviest, could cross and unite in the battle. While these movements were going on it was hoped to conceal them from the enemy, and so Richardson's brigade was to make a feigned attack at Blackburn's ford to hold the Confederate troops there and prevent them from being massed against the main Union force in the neighbourhood of the stone bridge.

The route of advance for Hunter and Heintzelman was to follow the Warrenton turnpike to an old shop three and a half miles west of Centreville and between Cub Run, a tributary of Bull Run, and the stone bridge, and there diverge to the north and reach Sudley ford over a by-road. But Tyler, who was to advance only to the stone bridge, was encamped between Centreville and Cub Run. While Hunter and Heintzelman, who had the long detour of ten miles to make by Sudley ford, were encamped between Centerville and Washington. Here was another mistake. Tyler's force was two and a half hours late in getting out of camp, and by occupying the road Hunter and Heintzelman were to traverse, so delayed the latter that, while they were to reach Sudley ford by 5.30 A.M., they did not arrive till nine. In their detour through the hot sun of the July morning they necessarily raised clouds of dust and revealed their movements to the Confederates.

Brigadier-General Evans, in command of the Confederate force of a regiment and a half and four guns at the stone bridge, learning

of the Union troops crossing above, withdrew all but four companies and two guns of his command, and threw eleven companies across the path of Hunter. He met him immediately north of the Warrenton turnpike, with his force posted on the north side of Young's Branch of Bull Run, his left resting on the Sudley road and his force at right angles with it, with one gun on his left and another behind his right, some distance on the point of a hill south of Young's Branch. Burnside, one of Hunter's brigade commanders, faced him on a parallel ridge, while Porter, Hunter's other brigade commander, occupied the other side of the Sudley road. The artillery and the skirmishers opened fire about 10.30 A.M. Burnside had four regiments, and they could easily have driven back the eleven companies of Evans that opposed them. And they should have done so and thus have gained the high ground to the south of Young's Branch, which was held by the Confederates all day and formed one of their greatest advantages. It always gave them the advantage of position. But war was new then. This precious opportunity was allowed to escape and could never be recovered afterwards. While the preliminary firing went on, four regiments and two companies of Johnston's army under General Bee were brought up to support Evans. They with Johnston had only arrived the night before. They formed to the right and a little in advance of Evans. The two forces engaged were now about equal in strength and each maintained its ground stubbornly. Hunter sent Griffin's battery into the fields to the right of the Sudley road and Heintzelman hurried up his advance regiment. Under these combined forces the Confederates sullenly retired, in good order, about noon. They rallied and undertook to make a stand about a stone house that stood in the north-east angle of the crossing of the Sudley and the Warrenton roads. But a Union charge dispersed them again. They were swept entirely across the turnpike and Young's Branch and on to the hill in the south-east angle of the intersection of the roads. This hill, the highest in the neighbourhood, falling off on all sides and almost surrounded by the valleys of small streams, its top crowned with a fringe of timber running in the general direction of the Confederate line of battle, and its side next the Union troops marked with small clusters of pines, afforded a shelter of which they took advantage. It was an advantageous position. And they made a stand near the top of this hill in the neighbourhood of the Robinson and Henry houses, and in front of and between them.

Both sides were now hurrying up reinforcements. McDowell sent an order to Tyler to make an attack at the stone bridge. But this was unnecessary, for the remaining four companies of Confederates that had been left there to guard it had retreated, and Tyler had already crossed Bull Run, with Sherman's and Keyes' brigades at the Red House ford, half a mile above the bridge. Sherman directed his course by the firing and marched to Hunter's division, now commanded by Porter, for Hunter had been wounded. Later Sherman reported to McDowell and joined in the remainder of the battle. But Keyes remained on the extreme left, where he took a position separate from the rest of the army, south of the turnpike and between the

Confederates and the stone bridge. Here he remained isolated and beyond the reach of McDowell's orders during the rest of the day.

General Johnston, being the ranking officer, assumed command of the Confederate army upon his arrival. Supposing that Patterson would follow him from the valley, it was planned to move out of the position on Bull Run and attack and defeat McDowell at Centreville, before Patterson could reinforce him. This plan being changed by McDowell's flank movement by way of Sudley ford, Johnston had ordered Bee to the support of Evans at the opening of the battle. They being driven back and their flank being threatened by Keyes, Bee had taken a new position near the Henry house. It was a strong position near the top of the hill, opposite the centre and commanding the line of the Union advance and the cross-roads. Jackson, who had come upon the field with Johnston, had been ordered to a position to protect the Confederate right near the stone bridge, and was just passing as Bee's men were retiring, hard pressed by the Union force. Jackson, with his quick eye and a soldier's instinct, saw the situation and advanced between Bee and his pursuers, with the understanding that Bee would form in his rear. Bee's battery, under Captain Imboden, reversed and advanced with Jackson's brigade and was placed in a commanding position in front of the Henry house. Stanard's and Pendleton's batteries were brought up and placed in line with it. Jackson's line was stretched toward the Robinson house and Wade Hampton, with six hundred men brought up from Richmond that morning formed on his right between the Robinson house and the turnpike. Jackson began a raking fire from his batteries and line upon the Union men, as they came on in pursuit of Bee up the hill. They pressed Jackson, but he held on firmly. 'There is Jackson standing like a stone wall; rally behind the Virginians,' called Bee to his men. The characterisation became a name, and henceforth this hard-hitting right arm of the Confederacy was known as 'Stonewall' Jackson. Till then he was Thomas J. A moment later Bee was killed, and then Barton and Fisher and Colonel Johnson of the Harrytown Legion. General Johnston sent orders for Holmes, Early and Bonham, stationed farther down along Bull Run, to hurry up their brigades. And he and Beauregard galloped to the scene of action, Beauregard to take command on their left and both to encourage by their presence and example the hard-pressed line. Many of the soldiers from Evans' and Bee's commands, giving the day up for lost, scattered off towards Manassas. On the way they spread the dismal news of defeat. They met President Davis on his way to the front and undertook to turn him back.

At two o'clock the Union forces had reached their best organisation. Keyes attacked Hampton from his rear and drove him away from the Robinson house, but owing to the Confederate batteries and the raking fire of their infantry he was unable to advance far and soon fell back behind the hill. Franklin, Sherman, Willcox and Porter pressed the Confederates in front, and they were again pushed back farther up the hill, this time to the protection of the timber. It had second-growth pines in front that effectually concealed them from view. Here Beauregard remembered an assault he had ordered

to be made upon the Union force stationed at Blackburn's ford so as to drive it back to Centreville, and thus be enabled himself to get in McDowell's rear. He found that through a miscarriage of orders this assault had not been made. And he now revoked it and, being hard pressed in front, ordered these troops forward to assist him there. Thus the whole Confederate army was being brought up to confront the Union line of attack, composed of about half McDowell's troops.

The position was the strongest the Confederates had held. They were protected from sight by the timber, so that the Union fire could not be directed at them with precision. They occupied a semi-circular ridge where they could concentrate their fire upon their antagonists. They were above and standing still, so they could direct their fire coolly and with certain aim. They were simply defending a good position, while reinforcements were being brought to back up their rear. Their artillery was planted so as to enfilade the Union forces whenever they attempted an assault.

As against these advantages, the disadvantages of the Union forces were obvious. While they had fought well and had driven the Confederates from one position to another for a mile, these successive retreats had only brought their antagonists together in a massed position, where to assault them they had to climb a ridge in the face of a concealed enemy and pass over open fields raked by the concentrated fire of muskets and artillery. Burnside still occupied the position he took at the opening of the fight. Keyes was where he could not be reached by orders from McDowell. Howard's brigade was not brought on the field till the tide had turned. Schenck and Richardson were across Bull Run. Miles' division was at Centreville, five miles away. And Runyon's was still farther off. So that the brigades of Porter, Willcox, Sherman and Franklin, with slight assistance, were left to make an assault upon the whole Confederate army. Before the fight closed they had been under arms for twenty-four hours, fighting and marching in the hot sun, and without food, for most of them had thrown away their haversacks, containing all they were allowed.

At 2.30 P.M. Ricketts' and Griffin's batteries were ordered to move forward from the Dogan house, across the turnpike, on to the Henry hill. They did so. But they had hardly reached their position when the horses and mules began to fall around them from the accurate fire of the Confederate sharpshooters, now well hidden by the bushes. Only the noise of their guns and the puffs of smoke revealed their presence. Death seemed to lurk on every hand. Eleven Union guns and thirteen Confederate united in an artillery duel at short range. How could men endure it? Even the Confederate regiments in the timber, seeing the frightful position of the Union batteries, could not resist the bait. They swarmed out. And Griffin, absorbed in directing the fire of his guns, was suddenly startled to see a regiment approaching. They were so near and came up so quietly that he debated whether they were friends or foes. He anxiously asked the question of one of his men. The man insisted that they were friends—a regiment sent to support the battery. Griffin was afraid to fire his

guns, which he had loaded with canister, and with which he could have swept them away, for fear of a mistake. He waited till they would come nearer. But suddenly they raised their guns and fired. And every cannoneer was cut down and a large number of the horses were killed. This left the battery almost helpless. And owing to this loss, only three pieces could be taken from the field. But these with the horses and caissons went tearing down the hill, carrying wild disorder among the advancing and supporting lines.

Under the repeated volleys of this same Confederate regiment, a part of the line, discharging their guns, turned and fled. The fight still continued to rage around the disabled batteries, for which each side now contended. Time and again it surged over them and back, while Ricketts lay among his guns wounded. Finally the guns were left in the hands of the Confederates and he was carried to Richmond, a prisoner.

The contending lines sometimes reached the timber, and a hand-to-hand contest was waged. Union men in brigade after brigade, Sherman, Franklin, Willcox, Porter, and Howard's reserves came up and strove to turn the tide, but to no purpose. The afternoon sun was already sinking. The Union forces within reach were exhausted. The Confederate reinforcements continued to come. And at last Elzey, with three regiments more of Johnston's army, came down the road from Manassas. The Union men realised now, what they had not before known, that Johnston's army was on the field. They had relied on Patterson holding it in the valley. But there had been rumours, even before the battle, that it had escaped and come to Beauregard's rescue. In fact, McDowell had been fighting Johnston all day, but did not know it. Thus encouraged, Beauregard threw forward his whole line. The Union men were driven back. But they made still another attempt, this time extending their right in an effort to turn the Confederate left. But just then Early, who later commanded the army in the Shenandoah Valley, came up with three regiments from a near-by ford. And with Stuart's cavalry and Beckham's battery, all fresh troops, they were thrown upon the Union right, now exposed in the effort to reinforce the left. These troops decided the conflict. Brigade after brigade melted away and went back in disorder.

The raw troops were in confusion. Officers were separated from men and men of one command hopelessly confused with those of others. Captain Woodbury declared that at four o'clock 12,000 Union men on this field had entirely lost their regimental organisation. They could no longer be handled as troops, for the commanders were not with their men. When, therefore, these last seven regiments burst upon the field and repulsed the Union forces opposed to them, the battle came quickly to an end. The tired, hungry and disorganised Union forces, now thoroughly exhausted, were in hopeless confusion, and by common consent gave up the unequal contest and made a retreat. They had fought bravely, showing marvellous coolness and persistency for raw and inexperienced troops, and had maintained their part well, repeatedly driving the enemy before them. But at last they saw that, in the organisation and conduct of the battle, the

odds were against them and that nothing was left but a retreat or a slaughter.

And so they retreated. General McDowell and his officers tried to reform them. But on they went. And so he passed the order to gather in the camps near Centreville. They still held the stone bridge and could have quickly retreated along the Warrenton turnpike, the direct road from the field to Centreville. The abatis at the bridge, constructed by the Confederates, had been torn down by the engineers of the Union army. By this route, it was only five miles to Centreville. But the men, having lost all organisation, listened to no one. By a common impulse most of them went back the way they came, apparently for fear of becoming bewildered by new roads and falling into the enemy's hands. The remnants of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions retired by the long detour of ten miles by Sudley ford; the remains of Tyler's division went to the ford a half mile above the stone bridge. This brought the columns of three divisions together on the Warrenton turnpike, near the old shop. And so the road from there to Centreville was a jam. For not only the retreating army was crowding along it, but another army of non-combatants, Senators and Congressmen, in their zeal for a part in what they supposed would be a victory, newspaper reporters, clerks from the Departments, mere sight-seers. They had come out in carriages. And like Virgil's description of the road to Hades, the descent was easy; but to get back—there was the difficulty. The defeat and retreat were so sudden and unexpected that this motley crowd was totally unprepared for it. And in the crush to get away, this added greatly to the inconvenience of the army.

When the Confederate commanders realised that the Union army was in retreat, some feeble efforts were made to follow. Stuart was ordered to pursue, with his cavalry, the column retreating by way of Sudley ford. But he found it so compact and well protected that he could only pick up a stray squad of prisoners here and there. Bonham was ordered to take the remains of his own and Longstreet's brigades and pursue along the turnpike. But he found himself confronted by Tyler's division, and without much success returned at nightfall. Radford's cavalry was sent in pursuit from Ball's ford and was more fortunate. He found the retreating line in front of him protected by the still organised brigades of Sherman, Keyes and Schenck, and could accomplish little till he came near the turnpike bridge over Cub Run. Here a battery of artillery was posted so as to command the bridge and its approaches and the Union lines of retreat. A fortunate shot killed a team of horses and overturned a wagon on the bridge, hopelessly blockading the passage and causing a diversion of the line of retreat around it. The run was a difficult little stream to pass, and when the teamsters came to it, they cut the horses out of the harness and made off on their backs, abandoning cannon, ammunition-wagons and even the ambulances, all of which subsequently fell into the hands of the Confederates. Here they acquired fourteen guns, thirty wagons and ambulances and forty or fifty horses. Only the batteries of Ricketts and Griffin had been taken in the battle, and they were dearly bought. But here many more were abandoned

and fell into Confederate hands. As Radford returned, he charged upon the retreating army between Cub and Bull Run, but came upon a column of 5,000 infantry, supported by a battery of three pieces, blocking his way. All three guns immediately opened upon his command, throwing the cavalry into confusion and killing seven of his men.

When General McDowell reached Centreville, he found his troops still disorganised and continuing their flight towards Washington. The brigades of Richardson and Davies that had been ordered in the morning to Blackburn's ford to guard against an attempt of the Confederates to cross there and get between the Union army and Washington, had made a demonstration in the morning, and had successfully resisted an attempt of the Confederate General Jones to cross with his brigade in the afternoon. So far orders had been faithfully obeyed. But it was still important that this ford be guarded to prevent a pursuit by this route. And McDowell now found that under orders from their division commander, Colonel D. S. Miles, they were also in retreat upon Centreville. What was to be done? Much of the artillery had been captured, most of the ammunition had been used, the men were without food. Efforts to stem the retreat would probably be unavailing. After consulting his division and brigade commanders, it was determined that the army should continue the retreat to the fortifications at Arlington. Orders were accordingly given, and by ten o'clock the army was in motion that way. The brigades of Richardson and Blenker that had not been engaged, drawn up in a compact line, were protecting the rear. This guard left Centreville at twelve o'clock that night, and continued to protect the great army against further disaster till, two days later, it reached its haven on the Potomac.

And thus closed this eventful campaign. The Union loss was twenty-five guns, 481 men killed, 1,011 wounded, and 1,460 prisoners. The Confederates lost 387 killed and 1,582 wounded. These figures show that it was by no means an unequal battle. Though the Confederates remained in possession of the field and were entitled to claim the victory, the loss in killed and wounded was about equal. The narrative shows that both sides fought well and that in deeds of valour they were well matched. It was by no means the cowardly runaway that has so often been described.

But President Davis' cup of rejoicing was full. 'Night has closed upon a hard-fought field. Our forces were victorious,' he telegraphed to Richmond. This was true. But when he added: 'Our force was 15,000, that of the enemy estimated at 35,000,' this we know was far from the fact. The Confederates had on the field 34,000, and the Union only 28,000, as we have already shown. While the number that actually engaged the Confederates was still less.

There was no further pursuit. Why did they not follow up their victory after that day? Davis afterwards wrote Beauregard a frank statement of the reason: 'that so far from knowing the enemy was routed, a large part of our forces was moved by you, in the night of the 21st, to repel a supposed attack upon our right. And the next day's operations did not fully reveal what has since been reported

of the enemy's panic.' In other words, the Confederates did not realise what had actually happened.

The causes of the defeat were obvious. The principal one was Patterson's failure to hold Johnston in the Valley. Johnston himself reached Manassas about noon of the 20th. He was preceded by two regiments of Georgia troops and Jackson's brigade, consisting of five regiments of Virginians. He was accompanied by General Bee with two Alabama regiments and two companies of the 11th Mississippi. The remainder arrived the next day. All were in time to take part in the battle. Though McDowell did not know of the presence of Johnston's army till near the close of the battle, these were in fact the troops that mainly opposed him from the first. In the forenoon Johnston's army furnished four regiments and fourteen guns; and Beauregard's only one regiment and two guns. In the afternoon Johnston's army furnished nine regiments and sixteen guns; while Beauregard's furnished only three regiments and six guns. In the final flank charge by the Confederates, Johnston's army furnished three regiments and four guns; while Beauregard's furnished four regiments but no guns. It will thus be seen that Johnston's army had in the battle a total of sixteen regiments and twenty-four guns; while Beauregard's had only eight regiments and eight guns. These figures show that the men and guns that Patterson let slip in the valley actually fought and defeated McDowell.

This appears from still another point of view. In Johnston's army there were 282 killed and 1,063 wounded; in Beauregard's army there were only 105 killed and 519 wounded. Thus Johnston's fatalities were more than two to one. Every one of his four brigade commanders was struck, and three of the four, Bartow, Bee and Elzey, were killed.

Another cause of the defeat was the inefficiency of General McDowell. He was undoubtedly a brave and well-meaning officer. He accompanied the advance of his army to the field and remained at the front all day, directing its movements and endeavouring to stay its defeat. But he was too slow. He waited two days at Centreville before he made an attack; and in this time Johnston came up from the Valley and reinforcements were sent to Beauregard from Richmond. He marched his men too far around in going to Sudley ford, and exhausted them before they reached the field. The infantry could have crossed a half mile above the stone bridge with the cavalry and cleared the way for the artillery to cross by the bridge. He did not push his success fast enough when in the early stage of the battle he might have carried the high ground about the Robinson and Henry houses, where the Confederates made their stand and were aided so much by this superiority of position later in the day.

He failed to dispose his troops properly. He had too many guarding his way back to Washington. The troops were there to fight, not to retreat. And the paramount purpose should have been kept in view. But in this he failed. Of an army of 28,000 men, he had 5,700 under Runyon back of Centreville, eight miles away; he had 6,200 under Miles between Centreville and Blackburn's ford, six miles away; he had Schenck with 3,000 across Bull Run, a mile

away. Here were 15,000 men, more than half his army, that took substantially no part in the battle and, as the sequel showed, did not aid the retreat. In addition to all this, Keyes, with his division commander Tyler, and four regiments, was behind the hill and out of communication, where he could do little good; and Howard, with four regiments, was left beyond Bull Run inactive till so late in the day that the fate of the battle was already sealed. These things should not have been. And General McDowell should have had them otherwise.

CHAPTER XIV

Congress meets and prepares for War—Missouri—Death of General Lyon—Trouble with Fremont—The Battle of Pea Ridge.

THE battle of Bull Run was a rude awakening to the North. Till then she had no real conception of the determination and power of the South. But here was a crushing defeat of the greatest Northern army. It went home. And it did good. It sobered the North. Some it disheartened. And they would have let the 'erring sisters depart in peace.' But not so with the great majority. They were for war. Official Washington received the news coolly.

By Monday morning fugitive soldiers from the army began to arrive at the Potomac. And without stopping there, many were soon pouring over the bridges and into the city. It was a dismal day. A drizzling rain set in, which continued for thirty-six hours. Foot-sore, weary and disheartened, many soldiers found refuge and food among the loyal homes of the city. But it is worthy of note that when Washington was thus crowded with fugitive soldiers from the army that had suffered defeat, Congress continued patiently at work. The House unanimously resolved that the preservation of the Union was a sacred trust that must be executed, and that no disaster should prevent the performance of this duty. And it pledged to the country and the world the employment of every resource for the suppression, the overthrow and the punishment of those that were in rebellion.

Congress had met pursuant to the call of the President in extraordinary session on July 4. There were present an ample quorum of both Houses. This included full delegations from the border states—Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland and Delaware. Andrew Johnson was present as a Senator from Tennessee. And the part of his state that lay east of the mountains later elected three Representatives to the House. West Virginia also sent three Representatives that were subsequently admitted to seats. And soon after, her two Senators were admitted to the Senate. Galusha A. Grow, who, it will be remembered, had been, with John Sherman, complained of as disqualified for the Chair, in the previous Congress, by reason of having recommended Helper's 'Impending Crisis,' was elected Speaker of the House. And Sherman had already been promoted to the Senate to take the place of Salmon P. Chase, now Secretary of the Treasury. The Republicans had a clear majority in each House.

The President in his message, after reciting the steps that had led to the present crisis and presenting a strong argument against the asserted right of secession, called attention to the fact that while

large numbers of the officers of the army and navy had gone over to the Confederacy, not one private soldier or one common sailor was known to have deserted his flag. To the last man they had resisted the efforts of their officers to convert them, though till an hour before the separation they had obeyed their commands as absolute law. It now remained, he said, for the plain people to demonstrate that those who could carry an election, could also suppress a rebellion ; and that when ballots had fairly decided, there could be no successful appeal to bullets. He recommended that Congress provide the legal means of making the contest a short and decisive one, by placing at the control of the Government at least 400,000 soldiers and \$400,000,000.

When the message was read, this recommendation of the President was greeted with applause. And when Congress came to legislate, it even exceeded the request of the President. It provided for 500,000 volunteers and besides added eleven regiments to the regular army. It gave the Secretary of the Navy general authority to hire, purchase or contract for vessels to enforce the blockade and to enlist seamen to man them. It authorised a national loan of \$250,000,000, and provided for a direct tax upon the states and territories of \$20,000,000 more. It increased the tariff rates and enacted an income-tax law. These resources it was estimated would produce more revenue than was asked by the President.

While Congress limited itself to the immediate work of providing means for the successful prosecution of the war, both Houses passed a resolution, with but four dissenting votes in one and five in the other, introduced by the venerable John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, declaring that a civil war had been forced upon the country by disunionists of the South, and that it was waged on the part of the North, not for conquest or subjugation, or for overthrowing any established institution of the Southern States, but to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and preserve the Union. While there was a disinclination to strain the relations with the border states by a discussion of the slavery question, a bill was passed after the battle of Bull Run, containing a provision that slaves employed in aid of the rebellion, in digging trenches, carrying guns, or with a purpose to destroy the Government, by consent of their masters, should be for ever discharged from servitude. This was the first step towards emancipation. Inasmuch as some of the acts of President Lincoln, in calling for troops and increasing the army and navy and suspending the writ of *habeas corpus*, had been questioned, a bill was also passed, on the last day of the session, declaring that all acts, proclamations and orders of the President, after March 4, 1861, respecting the army and navy, were approved and legalised to the same extent as if they had been issued under the previous authority and direction of Congress. The session terminated at noon on August 6, having lasted only thirty-three days. But its decided and harmonious action in upholding the President and promoting the prosecution of the war did much to improve the credit of the nation and encourage and unite the people of the North.

Thus encouraged and relieved, the President had more time to

give to the prosecution of the war. In the West, affairs were in pressing need of attention. A guerilla warfare was being waged in Missouri for the possession of that state. Having acquired Arkansas and Tennessee and practical control of Indian territory, the Confederate Government was still expecting to secure Missouri and had hopes of Kansas. In Missouri they failed, and with that failure went also their hopes of Kansas. In this warfare, as the fatalities were not large and the consequences extended little further than the permanent acquisition of the state, whose history thenceforward became a part of the loyal North, many of these events are not entitled to an extended consideration.

To this general statement there are, however, some exceptions, and these we note. Claiborne F. Jackson, still assuming to act as Governor of Missouri, had convened his Legislature on May 3, 1861, and though it could not be induced to vote the state out of the Union, it appropriated the school fund and money provided to pay the July interest on the large state debt and all other available means, amounting in the aggregate to about \$3,000,000, to military uses, and placed them at the disposal of Jackson. He invested him with despotic power, and declared every citizen subject to draft at his will. Under these acts, Jackson appointed ex-Governor Sterling Price, Major-General of the state forces, with nine brigadier-generals commanding in as many districts. The state had been so divided. These brigadiers were ordered by Price to muster and organise the militia of their several districts as fast as possible, and lead them to Lexington and Boonville. These places were on the Missouri River, west of and above the state capital. General Lyon, learning of the movements and seeing the danger they threatened to the Union Government that had been organised, left St. Louis with an army to confront them. Jackson, assuming that 'the people and Government of the Northern States of the late Union had, by waging war upon Missouri, dissolved the connection heretofore existing between her and them,' proceeded on August 6 to declare her a sovereign, free and independent republic. He thus attempted to separate Missouri from the Union. Then with his state forces largely reinforced from the South he soon overran the southern part of the state, confining Lyon to Springfield and its vicinity. His army largely out-numbered Lyon's.

Hearing that the enemy were advancing in two strong columns from Cassville and Sarcxie, and wishing to strike the former before it could unite with the latter to crush him, Lyon left Springfield on August 1 with 6,000 men and 18 guns. He encountered and defeated a detachment of Confederates under General McCullough at Dug Springs. The Confederates retreated and joined the column from Sarcxie, and together they advanced to Wilson's Creek, a small stream about ten miles south-west of Springfield. Here at five o'clock, on the morning of August 10, Lyon attacked them. He sent 1,200 men with six guns under Colonel Franz Sigel to make an assault upon their rear, while he, with the rest of his force, attacked in front. Sigel made a vigorous assault and was at first successful, but the Confederates soon recovered and drove him back with the loss of five of his guns. Lyon had simultaneously with Sigel attacked in front

and repeatedly drove them back. But the Confederates, perceiving their own superiority in numbers and having routed Sigel, returned Lyon's charge. Lyon was twice wounded and had his horse killed under him. The second ball struck him in the head and seemed to confuse him. He walked back a few steps and said to Major Schofield, his adjutant: 'I fear the day is lost.' But Schofield answered, 'No, General. Let us try them once more.' Lyon soon after mounted another horse and, though bleeding from his two wounds, swinging his hat in the air, he called his men to follow him. The 2nd Kansas responded, but its colonel was just then struck and fell seriously wounded. 'We are ready to follow—who will lead us?' cried the men. 'I will lead you,' answered Lyon. 'Come on!' At that moment, a third ball struck him in the breast, and he fell mortally wounded, and expired on the field.

And so died General Lyon, one of the bravest men in the Union army, educated at West Point, able and enterprising, a sincere lover of his country and a firm opponent of slavery. More perhaps than any other man he had contributed to save Missouri to the Union. His loss just now was a great one.

After his death silence reigned for perhaps twenty minutes, the command devolving on Samuel W. Sturgis, a major of regulars, commanding a brigade. Then the Confederates advanced a heavy column of infantry from the hill where Sigel's guns had been heard. Thinking they were Sigel's troops, they were permitted to advance to the foot of the ridge where the Union men were posted. Then a battery on the hill behind them began to pour shrapnel and canister upon Sturgis' troops. And his infantry soon encountered the fiercest engagement of the day. But his line held on firmly. Captain Granger rushed to the rear and brought up the support of a battery with two or three companies of the 1st Missouri, three of the 1st Kansas and two of the 1st Iowa, and fell upon the Confederate right and poured into it a murderous fire, killing or wounding nearly every man within sixty or seventy yards. This caused the Confederates to waver and then retire; and as they did so a destructive fire was poured into the disorganised mass. The Union forces were in no condition to pursue. And soon, with no enemy in sight, badly crippled and with ammunition almost exhausted, they withdrew at eleven o'clock, after an almost uninterrupted conflict of six hours. They retired first to a high, open prairie about two miles from the field, and there having gathered up their wounded, they continued the march to Springfield. And the next day they retired to Rolla. General McCullough reported 11,300 engaged, and a loss of 268 killed, 800 wounded, and 30 missing. Lyon had 5,000 engaged, and his army lost 223 killed, 721 wounded and 292 missing.

Lyon's death, which was greatly lamented, as the loss of a man the country could ill afford to spare, provoked severe criticism of Major-General John C. Fremont. On July 1 Fremont had been promoted to this rank in the regular army and placed in command of the Western Department, comprising Illinois and all the states and territories between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains, with headquarters at St. Louis. He was favourably known by reason

of his extensive explorations in the Rocky Mountain regions, his brief but satisfactory career as Governor and then Senator from California, and his campaign as the Republican candidate for the Presidency against Buchanan, in 1856. He was also a son-in-law of Thos. H. Benton, for many years prominent in the politics of Missouri. Though Benton had died two years before, it was thought that Fremont's appointment would attract support to the Administration, and that he would prove a useful and capable officer. But the result proved otherwise. His splendid opportunity as the head of a department that furnished such officers as Lyon, Grant, Blair, Pope, Logan, Schofield and McClernand, and such commands as they led, was frittered away by his own mismanagement.

He dallied in New York City and did not send in his acceptance of the command for sixteen days. He could not be got to his headquarters for a month. When he finally reached there, he found Missouri overrun with guerillas, recruited by Jackson and his brigadiers among the men and the sons of the men that had figured as 'Border Ruffians' in the days of the Kansas-Nebraska troubles. They were terrorising the Union-loving people. The latter were unable to defend themselves because they had no head and no adequate organisation. Lyon had gone to Springfield to do what he could. Blair was in Washington attending Congress, he being a member. Calls for help were coming from all directions. Cairo was threatened with capture. And the loss of such a position as that, in the free state of Illinois and at the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, was a serious one even to contemplate. The Confederate General Polk, for want of someone to keep him busy at Memphis, where he was in command, was sending detachments across the Mississippi to overrun Missouri. Loud complaints were being made against Fremont's mismanagement, and they were embarrassing the President and his Cabinet. Factions had arisen among the Union forces and even Northern Missouri had become involved. General Pope was sent by Lyon's adjutant to attempt to restore order there. But it required eight Illinois regiments.

If Fremont had gone to St. Louis promptly and then acted with vigour, much of this trouble would have been avoided. He did a few days after his arrival lead eight regiments to Cairo and so quiet the apprehensions as to that point. But Lyon had called for help at Springfield and held on to his position there, not knowing whether to expect reinforcements or not. But none came, and he was compelled to fight almost three times his own force, with the result we have seen. The criticism of this carelessness finally roused Fremont to action. He did send some reinforcements to the now crippled army at Rolla. But the complaints by this time had become so persistent that the President was constrained to send his Postmaster-General, Blair, and his Quartermaster-General, Meigs, to St. Louis to make an investigation and report. They came back convinced of Fremont's want of fitness for his place. To complicate matters still further a quarrel had also grown up between him and Blair, the member of Congress and leader of Union sentiment at St. Louis, as well as an officer in the army. Fremont sent his wife to the President

to present his side of it. Of course, this only served to widen the breach. Blair publicly criticised Fremont's want of capacity. And Fremont placed him under arrest. Then Blair preferred charges of mal-administration against Fremont. And counter-charges followed.

Finally, on August 30, Fremont issued a proclamation declaring martial law in Missouri; threatening all persons taken with arms in their hands, within the lines of the occupation of his army, with a trial by court-martial, and if found guilty, to be shot; confiscating the property of all persons who might be directly proven to have taken an active part with the Confederates, and freeing their slaves. This seemed to the President to be a political move of Fremont's to restore his loss of prestige. With the effort that was required to hold Kentucky and Maryland, Lincoln could not permit the question of emancipation to be thus summarily disposed of; nor, for fear of retaliation, could he permit prisoners taken with arms in their hands to be shot. He therefore ordered Fremont to allow no man to be shot under this proclamation without first having the President's consent. He also directed him to modify the part of his proclamation relating to the confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves to conform to the law passed by Congress on August 6 providing for the confiscation of property used for insurrectionary purposes. The incident, especially Fremont's order of emancipation and Lincoln's revocation of it, naturally caused some comment among ardent anti-slavery men. And it had a tendency to raise Fremont with them to the dignity of a rival political leader. This also was embarrassing to the President, and needlessly so, for he had asked Fremont first to make this modification as of his own motion. But the latter in reply insisted that the change be openly ordered. Lincoln accordingly made the public order.

While these things were transpiring, a new disaster fell on a Union command under Colonel James A. Mulligan at Lexington. It was inflicted by a greatly superior Confederate force under Price on September 20. The newspapers made it clear that this might have been avoided by reasonable efforts on the part of Fremont to reinforce Mulligan. Here was another evidence of his unfitness and of his loss of public confidence. There was complaint too of his manner of issuing commissions to officers, and his letting contracts so as to create confusion for the accounting officers. Lincoln now felt that he could refrain no longer. He thought, as General Curtis, one of Fremont's own officers, said, in answer to an inquiry of the President, that 'General Fremont lacked the intelligence, the experience, and the sagacity necessary to his command.' This opinion was concurred in by General Pope, another subordinate, and by the Secretary of War, Cameron. The President, therefore, on October 24, three months after Fremont assumed command, relieved him, and appointed General Hunter to his place.

Fremont was at Springfield when the order reached him. According to his understanding, Price was then on Wilson's Creek, ten or twelve miles away. And as Hunter had not yet appeared to assume command, Fremont, evidently hoping still to improve his reputation, now suffering so much, called a council of war, explained

to it a plan of battle for Wilson Creek, and issued orders for an advance and attack the next morning. Hunter, however, came up during the night and assumed command. And the department was then in better hands. For Hunter, though not a great general, was always judicious. Upon a reconnaissance being made, it was found that there was no enemy on Wilson's Creek and, indeed, had not been since the battle in which Lyon was killed. How Fremont came to be so deceived is not known. Price, in fact, was not within fifty miles, and was then retiring towards Arkansas.

Lincoln's observation of the campaign had led him to fear that there was danger of the Union army venturing too far from its base. And he therefore suggested to Hunter that he withdraw his forces in two corps, one to Rolla and the other to Sedalia, the termini of the railroads, and there recruit and improve them by discipline. This suggestion was followed. For from these positions Hunter would be able to concentrate his forces, to repel any Confederate army advancing from the south-west. And though local uprisings were expected, they could be overcome by detachments. It was hoped that such demonstrations would soon cease, and that before spring the people of Missouri would not be in a mood for submitting during another year to the troubles they had endured in this.

So far there had been a mere sputtering warfare, but it was of a very difficult kind to deal with successfully. Bands of men on their own horses, armed with the common firearms of the country and supplied by ordinary farm wagons, would gather up and reinforce the armies of Price and McCullough. In this way, on a march of a hundred miles, a Confederate commander would swell the number of his troops, by accretions from all sides, so as greatly to exceed the Union force at a given point. After striking a blow, these recruits would melt away, each man to his own home, as silently as they came. Pursuit was hopeless. Wearing the ordinary dress and carrying their own arms, they could not be distinguished from the farmers and villagers of the neighbourhood. Their ordinary farm wagons, that had attended a campaign and supplied provisions for the army, in the barnyard or shed of the owner could not be distinguished from the unused ones of a neighbour. And though such soldiers might be known, it was dangerous to point them out, for often they wandered in bands of twenty or thirty, committing depredations upon all whose sentiments were displeasing. They thus kept whole neighbourhoods in terror of visitation.

But this anomalous field had for its background a setting of serious war. Behind it there was one force of regular troops from the Confederate army, commanded by McCullough, and another under Price and his brigadiers, brought into the field by Governor Jackson. They furnished the warp and woof upon which the war in Missouri was woven.

There were two ways to break up this kind of warfare. One was to keep the neighbourly recruits from offering themselves, by capturing them when under arms and treating them as prisoners of war. And the other was to defeat and scatter the armies of Price and McCullough, and thus break up the regular organisations around which they gathered.

The lot of dealing with these problems finally fell to Major-General H. W. Halleck. He succeeded Hunter on November 9, 1861, when the old department, commanded by Fremont, was broken up into three. Canby was given that of New Mexico, Hunter went to Kansas and Halleck to the Department of Missouri, which included Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Illinois, Arkansas and the portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River.

Brigadier Jno. Pope was placed in command of the force at Sedalia, in a district designated as Central Missouri. Price had advanced into Missouri as far as Osceola. Here the local troops were gathering around him. Pope moved out of Sedalia on December 15, and took a position between Warrensburg and Osceola. Here a flying column sent out under Colonel B. Gratz Brown, later a candidate for Vice-President on the ticket with Greeley, came upon a camp of 3,200 recruits for Price, from Lexington. Brown attacked the camp after dark, drove them out and pursued them that night and the next day until they were dispersed, capturing 150 of the men and sixteen wagons loaded with supplies. At the same time a detachment moved south and captured a company of cavalry with its tents and wagons, a part of Price's force at Osceola, but encamped across the Osage River from his main army. Pope then moved north and intercepted another body on their way to join Price and captured them all, 1,300 in number, with their supply train. He then returned to his camp at Sedalia at the expiration of a week, and Price retreated south to Springfield.

On December 25, Brigadier-General Samuel R. Curtis was appointed to the command of the South-western District of Missouri. It included the country south of the Osage and west of the Meramec River. Curtis had one division under Colonel Jefferson C. Davis detached from General Pope's army. And his other three divisions were under Sigel, Asboth and Carr. All were encamped about Rolla. They made up an army of 12,000 men, with fifty pieces of artillery. With this army Curtis left Rolla on January 23, 1862, in pursuit of Price. After halting a week at Lebanon, he reached Springfield on February 15 and found Price had abandoned it the night before. Curtis followed Price by forced marches, skirmishing every day with his outposts. But Price retreated to Arkansas, where he was joined by McCullough. Together they retired to the Boston Mountains. Curtis advanced as far as Fayetteville and then fell back. His divisions were separated, for more easy subsistence and to ward off recruits intended for Price and McCullough. Davis had taken up a strong position where the main road from Fayetteville crossed Sugar Creek and went over the mountain known as Pea Ridge towards Missouri. Here he proceeded to fortify his position. Sigel and Asboth were three miles beyond Bentonville, and so fourteen from Davis. Carr, with whom Curtis had his headquarters, was at Cross Hollows, twelve miles south of Davis.

For some time there had been dissensions between Price and McCullough. And they were growing in intensity. To end them, General A. S. Johnston, who commanded the Confederate Department of the West, appointed Major-General Earl Van Dorn to the

command of the Trans-Mississippi District. Van Dorn reached the headquarters of Price and McCullough on March 3, and at once assumed command. He estimated his united forces at 16,000 men, though he did not include in this number the unorganised recruits. For his forces were variously estimated by others at 20,000 to 30,000. Van Dorn was a fighter, and he promptly moved out of Fayetteville on March 4 to attack Curtis on Sugar Creek.

Curtis had notice of his coming soon after noon the next day, and at once proceeded to concentrate all his forces on Davis's position. Carr, with whom Curtis was, promptly joined Davis the next morning. But Sigel, owing to his command being scattered on detail duty, was late in moving. And at Bentonville he encountered Van Dorn's advance in front of him, and the main Confederate army pressing him at the rear. He was between two forces, and it was with difficulty that he succeeded in extricating himself. But the Confederate advance being small, fell back by Sigel's flank to the main force, and then he, by holding on firmly, planting a battery on each eminence or favourable turn in the road, fought Van Dorn back while his division advanced. And then the battery followed. And so standing and fighting and retreating, Sigel pursued his way till he was joined by troops sent out by Curtis to assist him. This was at three o'clock. And he reached Davis' camp at five.

The Union line was formed facing south, with Sigel on the right, then Asboth, Davis and Carr, in succession, to the left. The position was entrenched and protected by felling timber in front. Curtis had 10,250 men and 48 guns. Van Dorn did not assault, as expected, on the 6th, but during the night passed around so as to approach Curtis, on the morning of March 7, from the rear. Curtis had knowledge of this movement and faced about his men to receive them, Carr by this change of position having the right. A regiment of cavalry was sent to retard the Confederate advance; and Osterhaus, with three regiments of infantry, was ordered from Sigel's division to support it. Osterhaus met the cavalry returning and threw his line across the path of the advancing army. The pickets sent out to Elkhorn Tavern, where Carr was to deploy, were driven in and he had to take position under fire. The hostile armies were fairly engaged by eleven o'clock. Osterhaus was about being overwhelmed when he was reinforced by Davis. And they were opposed by McCullough and McIntosh, who were leading their troops in person. Here the onset was fierce. But both McCullough and McIntosh were killed. They fell in front of Osterhaus. And here Colonel Hébert, commanding the second brigade of McCullough's division, was captured. Their discouraged and poorly disciplined forces gave way, before the close of the day, under the sturdy and persistent pressure of Osterhaus and Davis, and finally retired toward Elkhorn Tavern.

Carr's division was opposed by Price's army, under the immediate command of Van Dorn in person. His position was immediately south of Elkhorn Tavern, where the Union depot of supplies and the provost-marshal's guard, with some prisoners, had been placed. He was ordered by Curtis to send a brigade to that point at the opening of the battle. And Carr himself went with Dodge's brigade and two

pieces of artillery, and found the Confederates trying to flank him on the east. He drove them back and encountered a storm of shot, shell and grape. Many of his men were wounded or killed. Curtis came to see how he was getting on, and finding him hard pressed, a battery was brought up and served with admirable zeal. Curtis also sent in his bodyguard, then his camp guard, and finally a small reserve that had been guarding a road. Carr was struck three times, and sent word that he was sorely pressed and could not hold out much longer. He had only 2,000 men with 12 guns, while opposed to him were 10,000 men with 20 guns. Curtis sent word to hold on, and himself went to the left and hurried Asboth with his division to Carr's relief. He had been pressed back nearly a mile, and Van Dorn was pursuing him vigorously with the whole weight of Price's army, determined to crush him. But against the combined efforts of Frost's, Rain's, Slack's and Tuttle's divisions of the Confederate army, with four batteries, Carr held on for seven hours. Curtis reached him at last with Asboth's division about five o'clock. The 4th Iowa, retiring for want of ammunition, was met on the way by Curtis. He at once faced it about, with orders to use the bayonet. Asboth placed one battery to the left of the Fayetteville Road and another to the right and opened a concentrated fire upon the pursuing army. This checked its advance. And then deploying his own division to the support of Carr's sorely tried forces, they turned the tide and pressed the Confederates back toward Elkhorn Tavern till night closed in upon them.

Curtis took advantage of the darkness to reform his line. Davis was brought up to support Carr's left, and Sigel was placed next to Osterhaus and Asboth. Curtis found on the right of Carr some rising ground, and planted a battery there, so as to command the Confederate line. Sigel supported his line with four batteries, and Davis his with two. At sunrise of March 8 these changes were still in progress. But Davis, without waiting for Sigel to complete his line, ordered a battery to open upon the Confederate position. Van Dorn's batteries answered. And soon the lines were fully engaged. On the left Sigel moved close to the hills occupied by the Confederates, driving them from the heights steadily towards the ravines to the rear of Elkhorn Tavern. Curtis immediately ordered the centre and right wing forward, the right turning the Confederate left and cross-firing on his centre. Thus enclosed within an arc of a circle, a charge of infantry, extending along the whole Union line, completely routed the Confederate army and swept it from the field. The order for retreat was given by Van Dorn at ten o'clock. And he, with the main body, escaped by a ravine leading off to the south-east. By 3 P.M. they were encamped ten miles from the field. The artillery escaped by another road. The Union cavalry followed the one, and Sigel's infantry the other, but neither with much success. And so ended the battle of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn Tavern, as it is sometimes called.

The Union loss was 203 killed, 980 wounded, and 201 missing; the Confederate total was estimated at 1,000 or 1,300. About half the Union loss fell upon Carr's division, which was so hotly pressed by Price's army, under the immediate command of Van Dorn. Carr

lost about one-third of his command, either killed, wounded or missing.

On the Union side the battle was well fought. The original choice of position was good, and the repeated changes, to conform to the emergencies of the battle as it progressed, were admirable. The commanders of divisions loyally supported one another, and the whole army did hard fighting and to good purpose. In battles where so many are engaged, and there is great excitement and unexpected movements, it seldom happens that mistakes are not made which in a subsequent review can justly be criticised. But in the battle of Pea Ridge this does not seem to have been true of the Union army.

Of the Confederate, the same can hardly be said. It was at a disadvantage of position from the beginning. The main body reached the field by a road that led up a narrow ravine, heavily timbered on both sides. And while still there, and before it could deploy in line, it was attacked by detachments of Union troops and thrown into some confusion. Van Dorn seems also to have made the same mistake that McDowell did at Bull Run. He brought his troops on the field near noon, hungry and exhausted by a long night march. While his troops greatly outnumbered Curtis', they were not equal in quality. His boys from the country and villages that had been gathered in bands, as for a marauding expedition over the border, were without training or discipline. They had not the steadiness of organised troops. They clung to the timber that everywhere fringed the field and failed to achieve permanent results.

The discrepancy in quality of the two armies was illustrated by a body of a thousand Indians under Brigadier-General Albert Pike. His own report of their behaviour is amusing. He recruited them in Indian territory. They refused to march until they were paid. And as by their treaties they could not be taken out of the Indian country without their consent, he had no alternative but submission. And so they were paid. In the battle they were ordered to form behind General McIntosh's brigade. Here the Union force opened fire from three howitzers into the woods where they were. Then with loud yells they charged into the open ground, dispersed the cavalry support, and took the three guns and dragged them into the woods. The horses had run off with the caissons, and hence the Indians could not carry the guns farther. This was their one achievement in the battle. Twenty minutes later, around these captured guns, there was a mass of Indians and others in the utmost confusion, all talking, riding this way and that, and listening to no orders from anyone. Pike tried to get the guns faced to the front to be used against another Union battery. But he could not induce a single Indian to assist in doing so. While he was attempting it, the Union men sent two shells into the woods, and the Indians retreated hurriedly farther into the timber. They were then directed to dismount, and each take to a tree, and this was done. Here they remained patiently for two hours and a half, and until, perhaps, twenty minutes before this part of the action closed. Then they changed position; but still to no purpose. And soon they retreated to Van Dorn's position near the Elkhorn Tavern. And so ended their part of the battle of the 7th.

On the next day, seeing they were of no use in the fight, Van Dorn ordered them to be posted on the high ridges on the right and left of the road to observe the Union army and give him information of any attempt to turn his left. There they remained inactive, till they joined the general retreat. Their utter uselessness is seen when it is remembered that the three howitzers they took were all recovered by the battery to which they belonged a few hours after they were captured. But their worse than uselessness appears when the fact is remembered, that is not mentioned in the report of their commander, that they did, in violation of all the rules of civilised warfare, tomahawk and scalp a few wounded Union soldiers and thereby raise a storm of indignation against the employment of such troops. Soon after the battle they disappeared and returned to their customary haunts, and no very serious efforts were made to detain them. All were glad they were gone. This was the only battle of the war in which Indians, in any considerable number, participated. And this was how they performed their part.

The diminished and scattered forces of Van Dorn were never afterwards reunited. He was soon ordered to report at Corinth, where General A. S. Johnston was gathering his forces for the battle of Shiloh. The regular troops went with him. The wounding of Price and the deaths of McCullough and McIntosh, at the head of the recruits, had a very dispiriting effect upon the latter. Price soon resigned his commission as Major-General of the Missouri State Guard, and his resignation was accepted on April 8, 1862. And the volunteer forces either went home or joined regular Confederate organisations. Most of the Union forces in Missouri were sent to reinforce the army at other points. Some of these, too, went to Shiloh. And General Curtis, after resting the remainder of his army, made a raid across Arkansas, meeting little resistance, and finally reached the Mississippi River at Helena on July 11, 1862.

CHAPTER XV

Pope in command in Northern Missouri—U. S. Grant under him—Grant in command at Cairo—Belmont and Fort Henry.

THOUGH eastern and northern Missouri were, to some extent, overrun by the Confederates, the seeds of rebellion never took root there as they did in the south-western part of the state. Before Pope had been assigned to the command at Sedalia, his district had comprised the part of the state north of the Missouri River, with headquarters at Mexico, the seat of Audrain County. While there the 21st Illinois was assigned to his command. Its colonel was U. S. Grant, who later became the commander of all the armies of the United States.

Grant was then thirty-nine years of age, five feet eight inches tall, weight about a hundred and thirty-five pounds, compactly built, brown hair worn a little long, with full beard, rather closely cropped, small dark-grey eyes, of unflinching expression, well-shaped nose, mouth rather large, with lips well set, a firm chin, withal a soldier of few words, of sturdy sense and of bulldog tenacity, quick to see an advantage and prompt in the pursuit of it, of very quiet manner, but full of restless energy that allowed his adversary no rest,—an altogether healthy man, in mind and body, and a right good representative of the old Anglo-Saxon race to which he belonged.

He was born at Point Pleasant, Ohio. But when only a year old the family moved to Georgetown, a village in the adjoining county. And here his youth was passed. His parents were well to do. The father, a tanner, by thrift and industry, had accumulated a competency, conducting a tannery in the village and owning a tract of land near by, where he was also engaged in farming. The son was sent to the neighbouring schools, but seemed to be fonder of horses than books. At eight years he drove the team to the woods and hauled home the winter's fuel. At eleven he held the plough, and thenceforth did the work on the farm that required the use of horses. He was sent on trips to various places within a hundred miles of his home, in those days when horses did the work which railroads do now. What a healthy boyhood that was! Being busy, he acquired no bad habits. He did not learn to swear, to drink or be idle. He was taught the sober realities of work, steadiness of purpose, to govern his temper, and to get his tasks done. He was self-reliant, and he was modest and truthful.

His father had sufficient political influence to procure the son's appointment to West Point. And there he went, against his will, for a military education. He was not especially distinguished at the Academy for anything, but managed to keep along, graduating

twenty-first in a class of thirty-nine, of which William B. Franklin was at the head.

After graduation, Grant entered the army, seemed to have an instinct for hard fighting, and after the Mexican War was able to say that he had been in all the engagements in Mexico in which it was possible for one man to be. But with the return of peace he soon tired of the routine life and small pay of a soldier, and left the army with the rank of captain. He was already married, and now tried various occupations, farming in Missouri on his wife's land, then the real estate business in St. Louis. And finally he went to assist in a leather store in which his father had established his brothers at Galena, the seat of Jo. Davies county in north-western Illinois. Here, at the beginning of the war, he was engaged in working in the store and travelling for it as a salesman in the neighbouring country. Thus far he had not been successful in life, had hardly been able to support his family, had no influential friends, politically speaking, and did not even know the Congressman of his district. The height to which he rose in four years, by his own merit, shows the possibilities of American citizenship.

When Sumpter was fired on, and Lincoln made his first call for 75,000 troops, a meeting was held in Galena to raise a company of volunteers. Grant attended and, probably for the reason that he had seen service in the army, he was called on to preside. When the company was raised and the officers were to be chosen, he was asked to be captain. But he declined, adding, however, that he would aid the company in every way he could, and would be in the service, in some position, if there should be a war. He never went to the leather store to do any business after that night. He superintended the drill of the company and went with it to Springfield. When the company was mustered into the service, he remained in Springfield, at the request of the Governor of the state, to assist in organising the Adjutant-General's office. When the Legislature authorised the Governor to accept the services of ten additional regiments, he mustered them into the state service. He wrote the Adjutant-General of the United States, offering his services as colonel of a regiment, but received no answer. And when the second call, for 300,000 volunteers, was made and the ten Illinois regiments which he had mustered were to enter the service, Governor Yates appointed him Colonel of the Twenty-first.

It was raised in the neighbourhood of Mattoon, in central Illinois, and had the reputation of being somewhat unruly. So that when it was ordered to Quincy a few days later, there being no transportation, Grant hired wagons to carry the camp and garrison equipage, and proceeded to march his men through. In this way they had reached the Illinois River. But here they were met by orders to proceed without delay to Palmyra, Missouri, to relieve a Union regiment that was surrounded. Grant immediately embarked his troops on a train and went forward, but only to find that the Confederates had retreated. Having orders to proceed against another force twenty-five miles away, he again hired teams to move the tents and provisions and marched his men. The houses along the way and the country were

deserted, the people fearing the depredations of soldiers. But he kept his men in the ranks and forbade them entering houses or taking any property. Though he approached the enemy with some trepidation, he found that they too, like the people, had fled. So he remained in the neighbourhood, guarding the railroads against depredations by Confederates, and was soon ordered to Mexico, Missouri, the headquarters of General Pope, who was in command of the district. By Pope he was placed over a sub-district, with three regiments and a section of artillery, in the immediate neighbourhood. As before, he enforced strict discipline among his troops, and acquired in consequence the respect of the people. This, upon the whole, was not a distinguished service, but he was faithful in small things.

While at Mexico he was recommended, without his knowledge, by the Illinois delegation in Congress, for brigadier-general, and was appointed and confirmed. After holding brief commands at Ironton and Jefferson City, he was ordered to department headquarters at St. Louis. And here he was given command of a district comprising south-eastern Missouri and southern Illinois, with headquarters at Cairo. Thus far he had seen no fighting. But he had been prompt and uncomplaining, accepting promotion when it came, but not seeking it otherwise than by good work. He had now reached a considerable command, and at a post where important services would probably be required. This was at the confluence of two great rivers, and very near the fortified Confederate line.

He reached Cairo on September 4, 1861. The next day a man, representing himself as a Union scout, reported that he had just come from Columbus, Kentucky, twenty miles below, and that troops were being started from there to seize Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee River. This would be advancing their line, giving them further control of that river, and obstructing the Ohio. There was no time for delay. Grant telegraphed the information to department headquarters, and added that he was taking steps to get off that night to anticipate the Confederates. Receiving no answer, he again telegraphed that he would start that night for Paducah unless he received further orders. Hearing nothing, he left for Paducah before midnight with two regiments and a battery, and arrived early the next morning, anticipating the Confederates by six or eight hours. They turned back without attempting to dispute his possession. And he fortified and reinforced the position and placed Brigadier-General C. F. Smith in command. A detachment was also sent to secure Smithland, at the mouth of the Cumberland, a few miles above. Upon his return to Cairo he found a dispatch from department headquarters authorising him to take Paducah, if he 'felt strong enough.'

From the occupation of Paducah till November 1 nothing important occurred in Grant's department. His forces were constantly being increased by the arrival of raw troops, and they were carefully drilled. His command on November 1 numbered not less than 20,000, and the men were growing impatient. They did not relish camp life. And as Grant was even more impatient, they did not have long to wait. An order was issued from St. Louis to make demonstrations down both sides of the Mississippi for the purpose

of detaining the Confederate force at Columbus. And on November 2 he was notified that Brigadier-General Jeff. Thompson was on the St. François River, twenty-five miles below Greenville, Mo., with 3,000 men, and to send troops from Cape Girardeau and Bird's Point to drive him into Arkansas. The next day Grant sent Colonel Oglesby with a force from Bird's Point and Colonel Plummer with another from Cape Girardeau to pursue Thompson. On the evening of November 6, having been notified that Polk was about to send troops from Columbus to reinforce Price, Grant left Cairo in steamers conveyed by two gunboats, with 3,114 men and two guns, to make a demonstration against Columbus. He requested Smith to advance against it at the same time from Paducah. Grant with his force dropped down the Mississippi and encamped for the night on the Kentucky shore above Columbus. At two o'clock the next morning he learned that the Confederates, the day before, had been crossing troops from Columbus to Belmont, to cut off Oglesby. This information determined him to attack Belmont, though he had no orders to do so. He divided his force into two brigades, the first under Brigadier-General McClernand and the second under Colonel Dougherty. He landed two and a half miles above Belmont, on the Missouri shore, out of range of the Confederate batteries. And here he posted a guard. He advanced with the rest of his force, about 2,500, against the Confederates, who had come out from Belmont to meet him. But he drove them back to their camp, and through it and down the river bank, completely disorganised and ready to surrender.

But here the Union troops lost all organisation and became unmanageable. Instead of pursuing their success and taking their prisoners, they stopped in the deserted camp to gather trophies; commanders galloped from one squad of men to another and delivered eulogies on the Union cause and the victory. General McClernand proposed 'Three cheers for the Union.' And the men responded with a will. Some of them fired the guns captured in the camp at empty steamers down the river and out of range, cheering at every shot. Grant tried to get them to turn the guns at loaded steamers above and not so far away, but his efforts were in vain. Finally, he gave his staff orders to burn everything in the camp that could not be moved, in order to stop the pillage. And this succeeded.

Seeing the fire, the Confederates at Columbus knew the camp was in the hands of the enemy and commenced to shell it. The cry 'Surrounded' was soon heard. And Grant's men now saw that while they were rummaging the camp, the Confederates under the river bank, that they had failed to capture when they might, had now worked around and up the river so as to get between them and their boats. And they were now being reinforced from across the river. This brought Grant's men at once to a sense of their danger. He told them that their only hope of escape now was to cut their way out, as they had already fought their way in. They charged the Confederates. And they gave way, but soon rallied and opened fire from either side. The fire was returned, and, fighting their way, the Union forces reached their transports. Grant himself then rode back a few hundred yards to see if the Confederates, that had crossed from

Columbus, were coming upon him. He encountered a large force and hastily retreated to his boat. It had already cast off, but seeing him, a plank was thrust out, and his horse, seeming to appreciate the situation, put his fore feet out and sliding down the steep bank on his haunches trotted aboard. Thus Grant narrowly escaped capture. After the boats had got out in the stream, the Confederates appeared on the river bank and commenced firing. The fire was returned by the men and also by the gunboats, enfilading their line and doing considerable execution. Only three, however, were wounded on the boats. The Union troops then returned to Cairo and the Confederates soon to Columbus.

The Union loss was 85 killed, 301 wounded and 99 missing. Of the wounded, 125 were captured. Among them was Colonel Dougherty, the commander of the second brigade, who was wounded three times on the retreat, the last time in the ankle, so that he was unable to follow his men. But he was treated with kindness and soon afterwards exchanged. Grant, Dougherty and McClelland all had horses shot under them. The Confederate loss was 105 killed, 419 wounded and 117 missing. Grant had the artillery and camp and garrison equipments at Belmont; while the Confederates had taken some arms, ammunition and knapsacks. Each side had a few prisoners. In telegraphing the report of the battle the next day to Richmond, Polk added: 'General Grant reported killed.' He soon learned, however, that this was a mistake.

At the opening of the battle, the Confederates had the 13th Arkansas Regiment, with one battery and a squadron of cavalry. They were soon after reinforced from Columbus by General Pillow with four regiments. He then assumed command. He had, as he reported, 2,500 men. And with this force the battle of the morning was fought. After the camp was fired, General Cheatham came over with his brigade and some artillery. Polk himself followed. So that altogether, before the day closed, the Confederates had on the field about 7,000 men and three batteries, more than twice the Union force. And they had besides the aid of the guns on the other side of the river.

In Grant's command there were three members of Congress, McClelland, commanding the first brigade, Colonel Jno. A. Logan of the 31st Illinois and Colonel Philip B. Fouke of the 30th Illinois. On the Confederate side there was Colonel John V. Wright of the 13th Tennessee, who had also been a member of the last Congress. As they were both Democrats, Fouke and Wright had been friends. When they parted at the close of the session, Wright said: 'Phil, I expect the next time we meet, it will be on the field of battle.' And sure enough, their next meeting was on this field. Wright's horse was shot under him, his black silk battle flag was captured, 49 of his men were taken prisoners, and he with the rest were driven from the field by Fouke's regiment.

The two objects of the battle were accomplished. General Thompson left Missouri, and the Confederates, instead of detaching troops to aid their friends at other points, abandoned Belmont and reinforced Columbus. Colonel Oglesby was notified of the result and ordered back to Bird's Point and Plummer to Cape Girardeau.

Grant, speaking of this battle after the war, said : ' The national troops acquired a confidence in themselves at Belmont that did not desert them through the war.' The remark was perhaps more applicable to him than to his troops. This was *General Grant's* first battle. When threatened with a fight a short time before, as he approached the field, he said, his heart kept getting higher, until he felt that it was in his throat. But the Confederates fled. And when he looked down on the field they had deserted, he realised that they had been as much afraid of him as he had just been of them, a lesson he did not forget. Now he had fought a battle and won, then extricated his troops, when the odds were against him. This too was a lesson he did not forget. It gave him confidence. He knew he could fight and win and, if necessary, conduct a successful retreat.

For a month after his return to Cairo he kept on faithfully drilling his troops. New volunteers were coming in and the summer's manufacture of arms was being delivered. The want of the latter had been severely felt in the opening months of the war. Men could be had by signing a muster roll, but the guns to arm them could not be so quickly made. Now, however, both were in abundance, and Grant, realising that a great war was inevitable, was preparing the troops to meet it. He was occupying his mind, too, with thoughts of how he could use them to good purpose.

The Confederates had established a line of fortifications from Columbus, on the Mississippi, to Mill Springs, on the headwaters of the Cumberland River in eastern Kentucky. There were intervening posts at Bowling Green in central Kentucky and at Forts Henry and Donelson. The two forts were in Tennessee, but near the Kentucky line, about seven miles apart, and so within easy supporting distance of one another. The purpose of this line was to define the northern boundary of the Confederacy and prevent invasions by armies from the North as well as furnish a base for advance movements from the South. General Albert Sidney Johnston was in command of the whole line.

Expecting an effort would be made to open the Mississippi River, the fortification at Columbus had been strongly built. A high natural eminence, commanding the surrounding country and running out to the river, made the position naturally strong. And it had been greatly strengthened by extensive earthworks protected by heavy guns and a large force of troops. It was now considered impregnable, except by a very large besieging army. It was commanded by Major-General Leonidas Polk. The next strongest post in number of troops was Bowling Green, on the line of the great trunk railroad from Cincinnati and Louisville to the south and near where it divided, one branch going to Nashville and the other to Memphis. Its purpose was to control these two great arteries of supply and communication and prevent their use by invading armies. It was commanded by Brigadier-General Simon B. Buckner.

But hardly inferior in importance to these posts were Forts Henry and Donelson. Fort Henry was on and was intended to control the Tennessee River, the largest tributary of the Ohio. It was navigable for small boats as far as Muscle Shoals, near Florence, Ala., and, there-

fore, if opened furnished an easy route of invasion to this point. It was crossed by the Memphis and Ohio Railroad at Big Sandy and by the Memphis and Charleston at Decatur, Ala., the latter the trunk line of communication between the Mississippi River and the Atlantic Ocean, through the northern ends of the cotton states. Passing through the heart of the Confederacy, it was of vital importance to hold this road. Yet with the river open this would be difficult. Gunboats could destroy the bridges and convey troops to invade the country and tear up the railroads. Fort Donelson was on the Cumberland River, the gateway by water to Nashville. If reduced, navigation would be opened to the capital and principal city of Tennessee. The fall of these two forts would also break the line and compel the evacuation of Columbus and Bowling Green. These forts were, therefore, already occupying the attention of the Union commanders.

Colonel Chas. Whittlesey of the 20th Ohio, while acting as chief engineer on the staff of General O. M. Mitchell at Cincinnati, wrote General Halleck, on November 20, 1861, suggesting a movement up the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers as the practicable way of compelling the evacuation of Columbus and Bowling Green. In December General Sherman, in conversation with Halleck in St. Louis, suggested the same line of attack, and Buell again on January 3, 1862. On the same day McClellan, who had assumed general command at Washington on November 1, 1861, General Scott having resigned, wrote Halleck advising an expedition up the Tennessee River towards Mayfield, with a demonstration against Columbus, to prevent reinforcements being sent to Buckner at Bowling Green. This letter was received by Halleck on January 6. And he at once ordered Grant to make the demonstration.

Grant sent General Smith with a force from Paducah up the west bank of the Tennessee River to threaten Fort Heiman, opposite Fort Henry, and General McClernand with 6,000 men from Cairo to threaten Columbus. Grant went with McClernand. The weather was very bad, snow and rain fell, and the roads were intolerable. The men were out for more than a week and suffered much hardship. The object, however, was accomplished. No reinforcements were sent from Columbus or Forts Henry or Donelson to other points. And Grant returned to Cairo, and Smith to Paducah, by January 21.

While the Confederates were thus occupied in western Kentucky, an important event took place in the eastern part of the state. On January 18 a Confederate army of 5,000 men occupied a fortification at Beech Grove, opposite Mill Springs. They were under the command of Major-General G. B. Crittenden. He had nine regiments of infantry, some battalions of cavalry and a dozen pieces of artillery. Brigadier-General Geo. H. Thomas was eleven miles north of him, at Logan's Cross Roads, with seven regiments of infantry and some cavalry. The Confederates, under Brigadier-General Zollicoffer, had been occupying the adjacent country for some months, committing depredations upon Union citizens, confiscating their property, making arrests and driving them from their homes. Bridges were burned and railroads were destroyed. A guerilla warfare was being waged, that had started in Tennessee, but had spread and was now reaching

northward into Kentucky. The real purpose was, by suppressing Union sentiment, to carry Kentucky into the Confederacy and secure recruits for that army. Brigadier-General Alvin Schoepf, commanding a Union brigade, had several slight skirmishes with these troops. But the situation at length became intolerable.

Buell, commanding the department, sent Thomas to take command of the Union troops, with orders to attack and defeat, and, if possible, drive the Confederates out of Kentucky. And the Confederates had sent Crittenden to take command of Zollicoffer's army. Thomas reached Logan's Cross Roads on January 17, threw out strong pickets in the direction of the Confederate camp and waited for reinforcements before taking the offensive. But on the evening of January 18 the Confederates held a council and determined to move out of their camp at Beech Grove at midnight and attack Thomas before his reinforcements could arrive. The movement was to be in two brigades, the first under Zollicoffer and the second under Brigadier-General Wm. H. Carroll ; and the attack was to be made at daylight the next morning.

Accordingly, at midnight the command started. The night was dark and a cold rain was falling. The roads were almost impassable. At dawn of the 19th the Confederate cavalry advance came upon the pickets of the Union army. The pickets retired slowly and reported the advance to Colonel Manson of the 10th Indiana. He immediately deployed his regiment to await the attack and notified Colonel Speed S. Fry of the 4th Kentucky, who also deployed his regiment and notified General Thomas. The First Confederate Brigade under Zollicoffer came up, the 15th Mississippi in advance, followed by some Tennessee regiments, and the firing commenced on both sides.

Just here occurred one of the most tragic incidents of the war. In the dim light of the cloudy morning, with the smoke of the battle hanging low, it was difficult to distinguish objects at any distance. And Zollicoffer, mistaking the Union troops for his own, ordered the 19th Tennessee, his own, to cease firing, under the impression that the fire was upon another regiment of his brigade. He then rode forward to Colonel Fry of the advancing Union regiment and ordered him to stop his men from firing, adding that they were shooting their own friends. Fry turned to give the order to his men. But at this moment, an aide of Zollicoffer came up and, realising the true situation and his chief's mistake, commenced to fire at Fry, wounding his horse ; when Fry turned again, drew his own revolver and shot Zollicoffer three times, once through the heart. He fell from his horse, dead, and his aide, hastily retreating, left the General's body in the hands of the Union troops. Zollicoffer had received no military training or education. But he was well known in Tennessee, before the war, as the editor of a Nashville paper. And he had also filled some minor state offices and served two terms in Congress. Thus he had become well known to the public. And having commanded these troops for some months, he had endeared himself to them. So that his tragic death came as a blow to all.

The fight now became general. The 10th Indiana and 4th

Kentucky were hotly engaged. The Confederates tried to flank the two regiments. But Colonel Robt. L. McCook, commanding the Third Brigade, was sent with his two regiments to their support. And a section of a battery was sent to open fire upon an Alabama regiment that was endeavouring to flank the Union left. It was driven back. Two other regiments were brought up to take the position of those first engaged, now nearly out of ammunition. Immediately after, the Confederates opened a determined and galling fire, but it was returned with spirit. And for nearly half an hour it was obstinately maintained by both sides. The forces were on opposite sides of the same rail fence and poked their guns through to fire at one another. Opportunely another regiment and a new brigade reached the field and opened fire on the Confederate right. It wavered and began to fall back. And then the 9th Ohio charged with bayonets fixed, turned the flank and drove it from the field. Then the whole line gave way and retreated in disorder. The Union troops pursued to the Confederate camp at Beech Bottom, and there surrounded and shelled the works till darkness put an end to the conflict.

During the night, two fresh regiments having come up, General Thomas disposed his batteries and prepared to make an assault the next day. But in the morning the camp was found to be deserted. During the evening of the 19th, General Crittenden had called his officers in consultation. And it was determined to retreat, with every effort to conceal the movement from Thomas. With one little steamboat and two small flats, he ordered the men to be conveyed over the river, the cavalry to swim their horses. The crossing continued through the night and until the steamboat was fired at by the Union guns the next morning. And then the boat was burned by Crittenden's direction. But many cavalry and artillery horses, mules, wagons and eleven pieces of artillery, with the baggage and all camp and garrison equipment and many of the wounded, were left behind and fell into the hands of Thomas.

Crittenden sought refuge for his army, now a mere remnant, at Gainesborough, eighty miles lower down the river, the nearest point where he could have communication with Nashville and obtain supplies. The route lay through a poor country and over bad roads, and it was with difficulty that his men could obtain subsistence. Many of them deserted along the way and, stealing horses and mules to ride, fled to their homes. The river and the want of means to cross it prevented any pursuit by the Union troops.

Thomas's loss was 39 killed and 207 wounded. Among the latter were Colonels Robt. L. McCook and Speed S. Fry. But both continued on duty till the close of the battle. Crittenden reported his loss at 125 killed, 309 wounded and 99 missing. Of this loss, 44 killed, 153 wounded and 29 missing fell upon the 15th Mississippi. That approximately half the loss of this army of 5,000 men fell upon a single regiment, the advance of Zollicoffer's brigade, tells plainer than words can do the heroic conduct of that regiment.

Thomas itemises the captured property thus: 10 guns with caissons filled with ammunition, 100 four-horse wagons, 1,200 horses and mules, 500 to 1,000 muskets, mostly flint-locks, subsistence for

the whole army of Thomas for three days, hospital stores, baggage, and all the Confederate garrison and camp equipment.

Zollicoffer's death was severely felt among the Confederates of Kentucky and Tennessee. This was the first loss of an officer of high rank in the West. And as he was a brave man and a good officer, his death, at the beginning of the battle and in the presence of his troops, already exhausted by a long night march through mud and rain, undoubtedly contributed to their defeat. He had mustered many of the men into the service and had shared their hardships and privations. And naturally his death, in a mistaken effort to shield them, made a deep impression. After the battle his body was cared for with the respect due his rank, and passed through the lines, under a flag of truce, to his friends for burial.

Thomas, after the battle, gathered up his forces and went into camp at Somerset, a nearby town. Here he remained for the next month. His victory gave a decided check to the development of Confederate sentiment in Kentucky and east Tennessee. The news was received by Lincoln, to whom the sufferings of the loyal people of this section had been an object of great solicitude, with real thankfulness. It was followed by a congratulatory order issued, in his name, by the Secretary of War, Stanton. Cameron had resigned to accept the mission to Russia on January 13, 1862, and Stanton was, the same day, appointed to succeed him. The congratulatory order shows the vigour with which he assumed the office. 'The purpose of the war,' he said, 'is to attack, pursue and destroy a rebellious enemy and to deliver the country from danger menaced by traitors. Alacrity, daring, courageous spirit and patriotic zeal, on all occasions and under every circumstance, are expected from the army of the United States.' And he added, that the nation realised its hopes in the victory at Mill Springs and that the people would rejoice to honour every soldier and officer who proved his courage in the face of the enemy's fire. The victory was worthy of the order. It was a small affair as compared with many of the subsequent battles of the war. But it was bravely won, and, like all of Thomas's work, it was complete. And it was the first break in the Confederate line.

Lincoln had been worried at the continued inactivity of his armies. McClellan, after three months of general command, had nothing to show in the way of substantial results. Except for the battle of Thomas at Mill Springs, Buell could show nothing accomplished in his Department. Halleck was equally without accomplishments, except for the battle of Grant at Belmont. It was all marching and counter-marching, drill and muster. The fine fall weather with good roads and easy communication had come to a close. The season of snow and rain, cold and freezing, with bad roads and floods, was at hand. The prospect was disheartening. Lincoln had been directing Halleck and Buell to co-operate, but the only answers were complaints of difficulties and want of means. He telegraphed Buell on January 7, 1862, to name an early day when he could be able to move southward in concert with Halleck. 'Delay,' he said, 'is ruining us and it is indispensable for me to have something definite.' He sent a copy of this dispatch to Halleck. But it was the same old answer; nothing

could be done. Cameron had realised that he was unequal to the onerous duties of the War Department and sought a less responsible place. Halleck and Buell still held on, but did nothing. But if nothing could be done by these old officers, men of younger years and more vigorous minds had their ears to the ground and could appreciate the President's importunities. Grant was pushing Halleck. And Stanton had Cameron's place. If the others could do nothing with the large means already at hand, they could.

It might be well said of both, as it was said of Stanton, that their natures were largely materialistic. Their eyes saw things in a simple and practical light. They were men of action and purpose. There was no variableness, as of winds and waves, but the resistless onward movement of the tides. They were men that, having placed their hands to the helm, never turned back. They kept right on till the work was done. The resistless onward movement of their purpose knew no change.

On January 6 Grant asked permission of Halleck to go to St. Louis to lay before him a plan of campaign against Fort Henry. But the expedition against Mayville interfered. On the return of this expedition, Smith reported that he thought it practicable to capture Fort Heiman. As this fort stood on higher ground and so commanded Fort Henry, the possession of the one, with the aid of gunboats, would insure the capture of the other. Grant felt now that his opinion of the vulnerability of Fort Henry was confirmed by the report of Smith. And so he renewed his request for permission to go to St. Louis. The leave was grudgingly granted. And he went and submitted to Halleck his plan of campaign. But Halleck rejected it, and Grant returned to Cairo disappointed. But he was not a man that was easily turned from a purpose. And he was in no humour now to give up a plan that he was convinced was a good one. Others might suggest and quit, but he would persist. So he turned to Flag Officer Foote who commanded the naval forces at Cairo and who, like Grant, was under the command of Halleck but in a different branch of the service. He was the head of his branch in that field and was, therefore, like Grant, in a position to make suggestions. They consulted together, and Foote agreed with Grant as to the feasibility of a campaign up the Tennessee. The result of their discussion was that on January 28 they both telegraphed Halleck, asking permission to move against Fort Henry. The next day Grant wrote, more fully urging the movement, and adding that if it was not made soon, there was little doubt that Forts Henry and Donelson would both be strengthened. In fact the Confederates were at the time making vigorous efforts to do this.

Halleck now yielded and gave Grant the permission that had been refused before. Several things in the meantime had taken place to change his mind. Thomas had gained a victory at Mill Springs and the country was enthusiastic. There were cries from all sides for onward movements. The President, who had for weeks been importunate, in his confidential correspondence with the department commanders, now published a general order commanding his armies to move, on February 22. This order was for 'a general movement

of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces.' It especially directed the command at Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the one at Munfordsville, Ky., the one at Cairo with the flotilla there, and the naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, to be ready for a movement on that day.

The mailed hand of Stanton was again apparent. The President and his new Secretary had determined to have something done, as Halleck now saw. He had also been telegraphed from Washington that General Beauregard had left Manassas on January 26 with fifteen regiments to reinforce the line from Columbus to Bowling Green. He therefore realised that it was of the greatest importance to cut that line before Beauregard arrived.

He telegraphed Grant on January 30 to make preparations to take and hold Fort Henry. And on the same day he wrote him to send forward all available forces from Smithland, Paducah, Cairo, Fort Holt and Bird's Point, leaving only sufficient garrisons to hold these places against an attack from Columbus, and that Flag Officer Foote, with his gunboats, would protect the transports necessary to carry the troops, adding that Fort Henry must be taken and held at all hazards and that the movement must be made with the least possible delay.

Grant's opportunity had now come. On February 1 he received these instructions, and on the 2nd he started to move 17,000 troops up the Tennessee River. They were conveyed on transports under the convoy of seven gunboats commanded by Foote. The landing was made four miles below the fort and on the same side of the river. It required time to move so large an army, and on the evening of the 5th they were not all up. But Grant, fearing that the fort would be heavily reinforced if the attack was not made, ordered an advance at 11 A.M. on the 6th, believing that his troops would all be landed by that time. The troops and the gunboats were to start at the same time. General McClelland was to take the first division and move forward and get possession of the roads from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson and prevent all reinforcements to, or escape from, the former. General Smith was to take two brigades from the second division across the river and capture the heights commanding Fort Henry, leave men and artillery sufficient to hold them, and then return to camp and follow the first division. A third brigade of Smith's division was to advance up the east bank of the river and charge the fort, or support the first division, as might be required.

The Tennessee is at this place comparatively straight, Fort Henry being built upon a projection into the river, which commanded a view, for a considerable distance, both up and down. It was the view which probably determined the location. A strong earthwork, with bastion front, had been put in good condition for defence. It mounted seventeen guns, on substantial platforms, eleven (one 62, two 42 and eight 32 pounders) so placed as to give a direct fire down the stream, and all arranged so as to fire through embrasures. The fort proper enclosed two or three acres. A camp outside was entrenched with rifle-pits. And beyond these there were out-works

reaching back two miles on the road to Fort Donelson. These out-works were located with a view to holding commanding ground that would be dangerous to the fort if occupied by a besieging army. The rifle-pits were protected somewhat in front by swamps and fallen timber.

But with all this, the position was not a strong one. It was upon low ground, some of which was now, owing to a rise in the river, two feet under water. It was commanded by three hills on each side of the river, all within easy cannon range. The three on the west side enfiladed both the fort and the entrenched camp. It had been the intention to occupy these hills, and some works had been thrown up there. But guns had not yet been procured to complete the occupation. At the same time the entrenched camp, while offering a good protection against an attack from the east, was, two-thirds of it, completely under the control of the fire of the gunboats as they came up the river.

If armed and manned by a large force as contemplated, the whole position might have been troublesome. But Brigadier-General Lloyd Tilghman, who commanded both forts, had only about 2,800 men at Fort Henry and the support of two additional regiments, which he had ordered to move out of Fort Donelson as far as the furnace, halfway between the forts, where they might be used as necessity would require. On February 4 he was at Fort Donelson, and about noon heard heavy firing in the direction of Fort Henry. At 4 P.M. he was notified by a courier from Colonel Heiman, in command at Fort Henry, that the Union army in strong force was landing four miles below. Delaying no longer than was necessary to give proper orders for arrangements at that post, he left under an escort of cavalry for Fort Henry and reached there at eleven o'clock. He ordered over the force from across the river and disposed his troops the next day to make a defence.

On the morning of the 6th he realised his position. With a force of 2,800 men, he saw himself opposed by seven gunboats, and 5,000 men advancing against Fort Heiman and the heights across the river, and 12,000 advancing against Fort Henry on the east side. He argued that Fort Donelson might be held with all the forces under his command at both places, if properly reinforced, as he hoped they would be, but that the reverse was not true. He could not hope to hold Fort Henry against the Union army and flotilla now investing it. The smoke of the gunboats showed that an attack in full force was imminent. He did not hesitate. He manned his guns with a hundred men and started the remainder of his troops to Fort Donelson, with the hope that they would escape and be able to assist in saving that fort.

At 11 A.M. a messenger reported General Grant approaching from the north with a land force. And at 11.30 the gunboats appeared, coming up the river, four abreast in the first line and three a half-mile behind. Some new ironclads, that had been built for the Government at Cairo, were in front, and three steamboats that had been purchased and fitted up with guns, behind. Tilghman, having ordered the retreat of his troops, turned to defend the fort as long as

possible, so as to give them time to get away. At 11.45 the gunboats opened fire, at a distance of 1,700 yards. The fire was returned. The gunboats came steadily forward, firing deliberately, the ones behind throwing shells over the others and into the fort. At 12.35 one of the guns in the fort burst, disabling every man at the piece. Soon after, one of the gunboats was struck by a shot from the fort, exploding her boiler and scalding, with escaping steam, her commander and twenty-eight of his men. And the boat then drifted helplessly down the river and out of the fight. The fire on both sides was now terrific.

The moment had come when Tilghman must decide whether he would catch the rear of his army and retire with it to Fort Donelson or remain with the small band in the fort and prolong the defence. He decided to remain, and ordered Colonel Heiman, his next in command, to follow the troops and take charge of the retreat. The gunboats closed up on the fort to within 600 yards, still improving in the accuracy of their fire. This now began to tell upon the parapets. The shells were burying themselves deep, the cheeks of the embrasures were shot off, bags of sand used to support them were torn loose and thrown upon the banquette. One gun within the fort was disabled by a priming wire being broken off in the vent, which, with all their efforts, could not be extricated. Another was rendered useless by the explosion of a shell from the fleet which struck the muzzle and stuck fast, killing two of the men and wounding several others. A third and later still others, from different causes, were silenced. Their shot struck the boats, but glanced off the heavy iron sheeting that protected their fronts. And Foote directed the advance so that only this part would be exposed. The gunners in the fort became discouraged. Only four of the guns remained serviceable, and even these the men would not work. Tilghman took charge of one himself and tried to encourage the men. But this was in vain. New gunners were sought and could not be found.

It was now apparent that the guns of the fleet were breaching the fort. Several officers, seeing that further defence was hopeless, advised a surrender. But still hoping to prolong the fight and give his retreating troops more time to escape, Tilghman mounted the parapet and waved a flag of truce. But owing to the dense smoke that enveloped them, it could not be seen. He continued the fire for five minutes longer, and then at 1.55 P.M., after an engagement of two hours and fifteen minutes, ordered his flag to be lowered. The fort was surrendered to Foote, who ordered the Union flag to be raised on the same staff from which the Confederate was hauled down.

The boats received 59 shots, 31 of them on Foote's flagship, the *Cincinnati*. A single shot killed one of her men and wounded nine more. Another man was killed on the *Essex*, and 29 were injured by scalding steam. The Confederate loss was 5 killed, 11 wounded and between 60 and 70 prisoners, besides General Tilghman and his staff. Foote also captured a hospital boat with 60 invalids, the effects of the troops within the fort, seventeen guns and barracks and tents for 15,000 men. All were turned over to Grant.

After the flag of truce was waved, Colonel Haynes, the Confederate chief of artillery, refused to be included in the surrender and left the fort. Passing down to the river, he found a horse in the stable, without saddle or bridle, and mounting him he rode up the bank and swam the sheet of back-water a mile above the fort, and soon after came up with the forces *en route* for Fort Donelson. Colonel Gilmer, chief engineer of the Western Department of the Confederacy, was also in the fort. And he too escaped on foot just before the surrender.

About three o'clock, the report reached McClernand's division that the fort had surrendered. He immediately ordered his cavalry to pursue the retreating Confederates. They came upon them, charged the rear and pursued them several miles and until night, killing and capturing 38 and taking six pieces of artillery and a large number of small arms, knapsacks, blankets, etc., which were abandoned in the flight. That night the Union army encamped in the deserted huts and tents within the fortification, and Grant telegraphed Halleck, 'Fort Henry is ours. The gunboats silenced the batteries before the investment was completed.' He added, with characteristic brevity: 'I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th, and return to Fort Henry.' This, however, proved to be more of an undertaking than he anticipated.

After turning the fort over to Grant, Foote dispatched Lieut.-Commander Phelps with his wooden gunboats up the Tennessee to disable the railroads and pursue and capture some Confederate vessels. Foote then left Fort Henry for Cairo, to refit his fleet for the expedition against Fort Donelson.

Phelps proceeded up the river twenty-five miles to the crossing of the Memphis and Ohio Railroad and destroyed some of the trestle-work and removed the rails, so as to make the bridge impassable and cut off communication between Columbus and Bowling Green. He forced the Confederates to abandon and burn six transport steamers loaded with military stores. And he captured two of their steamboats and the *Eastport*, a vessel which was being converted into a gunboat, with a large supply of ship lumber and iron plating to complete her. Having ascended the river as far as Muscle Shoals, near Florence, Ala., he then turned back. And having received information of a Confederate camp of 600 men at Savannah, Tenn., badly armed and some of them known to have been impressed into the service, he sent an armed force of riflemen with a howitzer to attack them. But they dispersed. And he then burned their winter quarters of log huts and captured a considerable quantity of small arms, provisions and equipments, that they abandoned. With this, he returned to Fort Henry carrying along his prizes. He was only absent four days and was back in time to take part in the expedition against Fort Donelson.

CHAPTER XVI

The Siege and Capture of Fort Donelson—The Evacuation of Nashville, Bowling Green and Columbus—Grant retired and then reinstated.

GRANT had been waiting for the return of Phelps' boats before commencing the movement against Fort Donelson. The boats were needed to convey reinforcements and supplies. And his recent experiences at Fort Henry had taught him the value of gunboats in case of an assault. He wrote Foote that he felt there should be no delay in making the attack, but that he did not feel justified in going to Donelson without some of the gunboats to co-operate. He asked him if he could not send at least two up the Cumberland from Cairo, and offered in case he was deficient in men to detach an artillery company to serve on the boats temporarily. 'Start as soon as you like,' he added; 'I will be ready to co-operate at any moment.' But still Foote did not advance.

But the weather was also unfavourable. Commencing on the day after the fall of Fort Henry, there were frequent and heavy rains for the next four days. The rise of the Tennessee River made it necessary for the troops to give attention to saving the property taken with the fort, before they could commence any forward movement. 'I contemplated taking Fort Donelson to-day,' Grant wrote on February 8, 'with infantry and cavalry alone, but all my troops may be kept busily engaged in saving what we now have, from the rapidly rising waters.' He was impatient at the delay, for he knew that every effort was being made by the Confederates to bring reinforcements to Donelson, and he was anxious to strike the blow before they could be prepared for it.

Colonel Heiman, upon whom the command of Donelson regularly devolved upon the capture of General Tilghman, reached there at midnight after the fall of Fort Henry. But knowing that he would be superseded soon, he did not assume the command. Owing to the arrival of successive reinforcements, the command of Fort Donelson changed several times during the next few days. Colonel Head was in command when Heiman arrived, but General A. S. Johnston was telegraphing Brigadier-General Bushrod R. Johnson at Nashville to go at once to Donelson and assume command. Johnson arrived on the night of February 7 and found the 2,600 men that had been brought from Fort Henry by Heiman and the force previously at Donelson, consisting of five regiments, one company of light battery and two companies of heavy artillery. He assumed command. But three days later Brigadier-General Gideon J. Pillow arrived and the command was transferred to him. Brigadier-General Simon B. Buckner arrived during the night of the 12th. General John B. Floyd

came on the 13th. The command thus passed from Head to Johnson on the 7th, from Johnson to Pillow on the 10th, and from Pillow to Floyd on the 13th. And as both Pillow and Floyd outranked Buckner, it did not devolve upon Buckner, by whom the surrender was made, until the night of February 15. These successive changes in command show the anxiety felt for the fate of Donelson by the department commander, Johnston. He was, as he himself expressed it, defending Nashville at Donelson. But so many changes, occurring during the operations against the fort, also show want of preparation for its defence. Among military authorities, it is considered unsafe to change commanders on the eve of a battle. But here were four changes in hardly more than that number of days, and two of them while the siege was actually in progress. This was bad generalship. Not one of the commanders would be able to form and carry out a consistent plan of defence. And even though they desired the changes, they should not have been permitted. One commander should have been deliberately chosen and then held to account for results.

But these changes show the ground for Grant's apprehension that the fort would be strongly reinforced and the necessity for a prompt movement on his part to anticipate it. The successive commanders each brought reinforcements and some of them large ones: Pillow 4,000 from Clarksville and Hopkinsville; Floyd and Buckner 8,000 from Cumberland City and Russellville; Polk sent 1,900 more from Columbus. Thus the anxious eye of Grant saw the clans gathering to defend the citadel.

On February 10 he issued his orders for the advance. It was to take place on Wednesday, the 12th. But to clear the roads, so that the whole force could advance more promptly, the first division under McClelland was to move out on the afternoon of the 11th. Accordingly it did that afternoon move about five miles out and there bivouacked for the night. And at eight the next morning it moved promptly forward. It was followed by the second division under General Smith. Neither tents nor baggage were taken. The men were supplied with forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge boxes and two days' rations in their haversacks. Three days' additional rations were to follow in wagons. Two regiments were left at Fort Henry and a brigade at Fort Heiman to guard those posts. Thus Grant with the main army arrived in front of Fort Donelson about noon of the 12th.

As he was about to leave Fort Henry the first reinforcement arrived. This was a brigade of six full regiments under Colonel Thayer of Nebraska. Grant directed the transports that brought them to turn about and go by the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers under the convoy of the gunboats. There were three to go from Fort Henry, the ironclad *Carondelet* and two wooden boats *Tyler* and *Conestoga*.

Foote was directed to co-operate with Grant. Halleck telegraphed him, on the 11th, that he had gained great distinction by his capture of Fort Henry and to make his name famous in history by the capture of Donelson and Clarksville, that the taking of these places was a military necessity. Foote answered the same day that he was ready and would go up the river that night with three gunboats.

There were some misgivings on the part of both the department commanders, Halleck and Buell, as to the movement against Donelson. Halleck never did order it. He simply acquiesced in Grant's expressed determination to take it. The misgivings were disclosed in the official correspondence. On February 6 Buell telegraphed McClellan that this whole move, right in its strategical bearing, but commenced without appreciation, preparation or concert, had now become of vast magnitude and was hazardous. And on the 7th Halleck wrote to Buell, 'You say you regret that we could not have consulted on this move earlier. So do I, most sincerely. I had no idea of commencing the movement before the 15th or 20th instant, till I received General McClellan's telegram about the reinforcement sent to Tennessee or Kentucky with Beauregard.'

There was also some fear that Grant was not equal to the command. And plans to take it out of his hands were discussed between Halleck and Buell. McClellan entered into this discussion. Halleck repeatedly urged Buell to assume the command and Buell asked Halleck to take it. On February 6 McClellan telegraphed Buell: 'If it becomes necessary to detach largely from your command to support Grant, ought you not to go in person? Reply, and if yes, I will inform Halleck.' And again on the 7th: 'Why not take the line of the Tennessee with your command and operate on Nashville?' To which Buell answered: 'I hope General Grant will not require further reinforcements. I will go if necessary.' On the 11th Halleck telegraphed Buell: 'Can't you come with all your available forces and command the column up the Cumberland? I shall go to the Tennessee this week.' And again, February 13: 'Why not come down and take immediate command of the Cumberland column yourself? If so, I will transfer Sherman and Grant to the Tennessee column.'

On February 8 Halleck suggested the change in another form. He telegraphed the Secretary of War: 'Brigadier-Generals Sherman, Pope, Grant, Curtis, Hurlbut, Sigel, Prentiss and McClernand, all in this department, are of the same date, and each unwilling to serve under the other. If Brigadier-General E. A. Hitchcock could be made major-general of volunteers and assigned to this department, it would satisfy all and reconcile all differences. If it can be done there should be no delay, as an experienced officer of high rank is wanted immediately on the Tennessee line.' And again February 10, to McClellan: 'Telegraph to General Hitchcock officially, informing him of his appointment, and assign him to duty in this department.' But Hitchcock was not sent, and Grant remained in command.

Lincoln partook of the anxiety for the capture of Fort Donelson. But he did not question Grant's fitness for the command. 'You have Fort Donelson safe,' he wrote Halleck on February 16, 'unless Grant shall be overwhelmed from the outside, to prevent which latter will, I think, require all the vigilance, energy and skill of yourself and Buell acting in full co-operation. . . . Our success or failure at Fort Donelson is vastly important and I beg of you to put your soul in the effort. I send a copy of this to Buell.' So the talk of superseding Grant ended, for the reason that it had no encouragement from

Lincoln or Stanton. Grant was a general that would move, and their efforts were to encourage him. They sent the Assistant Secretary of War, Thos. A. Scott, to Cairo to promote the work. 'Is General Grant strong enough and quite ready for the Cumberland and Donelson movement?' Scott asked Halleck from Cairo. 'Position is said to be very strong and we should be strong enough to be very certain of success,' he added.

Once Grant's stout heart seemed to quail, though he would not confess it. This was when he saw the Confederate reinforcements being crowded into the fort. It was on February 14. He telegraphed Halleck: 'Floyd arrived at Donelson to-day with 4,000 men. Generals Johnson, Buckner, Floyd and Pillow are said to be there. I have but one gunboat to-day. We have had considerable skirmishing, losing some 10 or 12 killed and about 120 wounded. Rebel loss probably much heavier. I am hourly looking for more gunboats and reinforcements.' But as if to recall the impression this might make, that same evening he telegraphed again: 'Our troops now invest the works at Fort Donelson. The enemy have been driven into their works at every point. A heavy abatis all around prevents carrying the works by storm, at present. I feel every confidence of success and the best feeling prevails among the men.'

But there is no reason to criticise Halleck's efforts to furnish troops and supplies. In this he was always diligent. Ever since the campaign up the Tennessee River opened, he had been looking in every direction for reinforcements and sending them forward as fast as he could. He made every other purpose bend to this. On February 7 he wrote Buell: 'Fort Henry must be held at all hazards. I am sending there every man I can get hold of, without regard to the consequences of abandoning posts in this state. If the rebels rise, I will put them down afterwards. Grant's force is small—only 15,000.' And he added: 'I hope you will help us all you can.' Again and again this request was repeated to Buell, but without avail. The sequel will show that no help came from Buell, though he was as near as Louisville with about 100,000 men. But it was not so with Halleck. On February 5 he telegraphed the Assistant Secretary of War, then at Indianapolis: 'I want all the infantry regiments at Cairo you can possibly send me there, in order to reinforce the column now moving up the Tennessee River.' He wrote repeatedly to McClellan urging more troops for Grant. All sufficiently show Halleck's fidelity to the work of procuring and forwarding reinforcements.

On February 14, and while Grant was still in front of Donelson, a new military district was created, known as the District of West Tennessee. Halleck assigned Grant to this command, and Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman was placed over the District of Cairo. Though Sherman out-ranked Grant, he offered to go in person to Grant's assistance and waive his rank and serve under him. But Grant not desiring this, Sherman went to Smithland, at the mouth of the Cumberland River, where he remained, forwarding the reinforcements as fast as they could be had. But he did more than this. He encouraged Grant. 'Every boat that came up with supplies and

reinforcements,' wrote Grant, 'brought a note of encouragement from Sherman, asking me to call upon him for any assistance he could render.'

These powerful aids all contributed to forward the movement. And soon troops came pouring in from many directions. Regiments came, most of them raw recruits, from Nebraska, Missouri, Iowa, Illinois, and from Kentucky and Ohio, giving Grant a decided preponderance in numbers and making it appear appallingly so to the Confederates, who witnessed the arrivals. So that if Johnston was vigorously supporting the fort, the whole power of the Federal Government seemed to be no less vigorously supporting Grant.

Fort Donelson lay about two miles below the village of Dover on the Cumberland River. It enclosed about one hundred acres. On the east it fronted on the river. To the north lay Hickman's Creek, a small stream, at the time of the siege rendered impassable by backwater. On the south, and so between the fort and Dover, there was another small stream, Indian Creek. It was also formidable from backwater caused by the high river. The fort stood on ground about a hundred feet above the river and was a bastioned earthwork. Lying on the outer side of a sweeping bend of the river, it had a command of the stream, both up and down, as far as its guns would carry. On the slope of the bluff on which the fort stood, and between the earthworks and the river, two water batteries were excavated. A 10-inch columbiad and nine 32-pound guns constituted the armament of the lower battery; a rifled gun, carrying a conical ball of 126 pounds, and two 32-pound carronades, the armament of the one farthest up stream. They were both thirty feet above the water. There were eight other heavy guns in the fort and a number of field batteries. The river was here only about five hundred feet wide and the current rapid.

Around the fort, except on the river side, and enclosing also the village of Dover, there was a line of rifle-pits. It was two miles back from the river at the farthest point and ran along the crest of a ridge. But in one place between Dover and the fort it crossed the valley of Indian Creek. It came out almost to the river on the south and rested on Hickman's Creek on the north. The ground where the Union troops took their position and between that and the Confederate rifle-pits was generally covered with timber. Outside the line of rifle-pits the timber had been felled so that the tops lay outward from the entrenchments. The limbs had been trimmed and, thus pointed, formed an abatis in front of the greater part of the lines very difficult to pass. The rifle-pits proper were formed of logs rolled together lengthwise and piled up; and a trench was dug behind and the dirt thrown over these logs. It is unnecessary to add that the whole work made a formidable fortification, and it afforded ample protection to the army that lay behind it.

As the Union troops came up, McClernand was ordered with the first division to take position to the south of the road from Fort Henry to Dover. He pressed his advance out almost to the river, and his line from that back to the road lay along the crest of a ridge fronting that occupied by the Confederate rifle-pits. He thus covered the

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roads from Dover leading to the south and south-west. General Smith with the second division took a similar position on the north of the Fort Henry Road, and so faced the Confederate line from there to Hickman's Creek. His command covered the road leading to the landing-place of the Union troops as they came up the river. General Grant established his headquarters behind Smith's division. The Union army of 15,000 men, when it came up, confronted a Confederate army of 21,000 behind strong works. These positions were taken on the evening of February 12.

As the lines were pushed out on either side of the road, the Union troops, through the intervening timber, could catch an occasional glimpse of the white tents and glistening guns of the Confederates on the opposite ridge. The whistle of bullets, cutting their way through the overhanging branches, told of the presence of sharpshooters. And a puff of smoke and the boom of a cannon, sometimes from an eminence almost overhead, revealed the location of a hostile battery. Occasionally an advancing Union battery wheeled a gun into a temporary position and an answering shot admonished them that there would be two sides to the struggle. A stray picket killed here and there, or a man on the skirmish line in advance, told that death was lurking in these erstwhile haunts of the birds and squirrels. It was a weird experience for raw troops, most of whom had never been under fire before and many of whom were hurried to the field from recruiting stations, hastily equipped and still in citizens' clothes. But they silently felt their way to positions in the gloaming of that winter night, and sank to rest without shelter, without fires and some of them without covering, for many had thrown away their blankets and overcoats during the march of the day.

Seeing the need of more troops to cover his long line, Grant on the morning of the next day sent back to Fort Henry for General Lew Wallace to bring up the 2,500 men under his command. They arrived on the morning of the 14th, and with the six regiments of Colonel Thayer, that had come around from Fort Henry on transports, were formed into a third division under Wallace. This was assigned to a position between McClernand and Smith. The Union lines were not entrenched. But they occupied generally the top of a ridge, and by taking position behind its crest the men had this natural protection. The batteries were distributed along the line in commanding positions and were protected by being sunk in the ground. So far there had been little resistance to the Union forces in taking position. Skirmish lines had been met and pushed in and squadrons of cavalry had been encountered and driven back, but each with little resistance and small loss of life.

The fighting before the fort gathered around three engagements, viz., first, an assault ordered by McClernand upon Maney's Confederate battery, the battery being supported by 1,600 troops; second, the attack of Grant's fleet upon the water batteries on the afternoon of the 14th; third, the assault of the Confederates under Pillow and Buckner on the part of the Union line that was under McClernand, in an attempt to cut their way out of the fort. This occurred on the 15th. And it was followed by a counter assault by Smith's division

on the opposite end of the Confederate line of rifle-pits, which resulted in the surrender of the fort on the morning of the next day, Sunday, February 16. Keeping these events in mind, the reader will be enabled to get a clear idea of the siege.

During the forenoon of the 13th, while General McClernand was still working his men into position, he was seriously annoyed by Maney's battery. It occupied an eminence, one of the most commanding on the Confederate line and close to the centre of McClernand's front. Thinking to get rid of it, some Union batteries had been trained that way, and by a raking fire from two directions had succeeded in silencing it. During this engagement, one of the Confederate gunners had both his hands shot off while in the act of inserting a friction primer in one of the guns. McClernand now encouraged, and thinking to capture the position, ordered an assault by three regiments, the 17th, 48th and 49th Illinois. Colonel William R. Morrison with the 49th assaulted on the left face and Colonel J. N. Haynie with the 17th and 48th on the right. Both deployed in line of battle and advanced deliberately up the hill, working their way through the brush of the timber and then the abatis of the entrenchment, withholding their fire till they could see the Confederates. When within forty yards of the works, the Confederates opened a murderous fire of musketry, grape and shell in the very faces of Morrison's men. They returned the fire. Morrison was struck in the right hip by a musket-ball and knocked out of his saddle, and was carried from the field. A fourth regiment was sent to support his men. And they held their place for an hour, alternately rising to fire, shrinking to load and striving to evade the fire from in front. But they were at last compelled to yield.

On the right face, Haynie advanced up the hill, and when within a short distance of the works he too met a well-directed fire of shell and canister. He saw that he was confronted by a battery of six guns, supported by regiments, and that the position was swept by other batteries to the west and north. The men could not stand the fire. And under orders from Haynie the whole line retired forty paces down the hill, in good order, and there rested, while he reported the situation to McClernand. He received orders to retire. And so the attempt to take the position ended.

During the action the dead leaves on the hill were fired. And after the assault had ended they blazed up and some of the Union wounded were burned to death, notwithstanding efforts were made by the Confederates to save them. The Union loss in the assault was 40 killed and 200 wounded; the Confederate 10 killed and 30 wounded. So this assault failed.

Let us turn next to the work of the fleet. During the morning of the 13th, the *Carondelet*, having arrived from Fort Henry, was ordered by Grant to advance on the water batteries. It did so, throwing shells into them and some even into the fort. One ball entered the lower water battery, dismantling a 32-pound gun, killing the local engineer officer of the fort and wounding two or three privates. The *Carondelet*, however, received a shot through one of her port-holes, disabling her machinery. And she withdrew down

the river. During the whole day the sharpshooters on both sides were busy along the line. The position occupied by the Confederates was the more open, and wherever their men appeared they were warned by flying bullets to keep under cover. The guns of the batteries of each army were busy developing the locations and strong places of the opposite side. Even the Confederates, who had tents and huts, were obliged to keep in the trenches. The weather being cold, both sides suffered from exposure. At dusk of the 13th it commenced raining, and in a short time turned cold and the storm changed to snow and sleet. The morning of the 14th came with the thermometer twenty degrees below freezing. The Confederates had occupied the night in strengthening their works and the Union men lay with guns in their hands in line of battle, unable to build fires for fear of attracting shots from the fort.

Three more Union gunboats had arrived during the night and brought up some reinforcements. On the 14th Grant ordered Flag-Officer Foote to make an attack upon the Confederate works. About 3 P.M., from a position on the shore, he watched the fleet advance, the four ironclads abreast, in front, with the two wooden gunboats a little behind. A terrific fight ensued. The ironclads had advanced to within four hundred yards and the fire of the water-batteries had slackened, when after an engagement of an hour and a half the men were seen retreating from the batteries. Foote had hopes of a victory. But at this point a shot through the pilot-house of the *St. Louis*, the flag-ship, carried away her wheel, killed her pilot and wounded Foote. Another ball cut away the tiller ropes of another vessel. And both boats, now unmanageable, drifted helplessly down the river. The two remaining ironclads were also damaged. Seeing the condition of the boats, the Confederates returned to their batteries and opened fire with renewed vigour. And the whole fleet then gave way and retired. Fifty-four of Foote's men were either killed or wounded. His flag-ship alone had received fifty-nine shots. While the Confederates in the water batteries were protected and all escaped without serious injury.

Grant from his position on the shore had only been able to see the advance, for the smoke of the battle soon obscured those engaged. But when he saw the boats falling back, one after another, disabled, he felt deeply disappointed. The sun went down, on the evening of the 14th, leaving the army sadly uncomfortable. To add to the discomfort, the weather had become intensely cold and the men suffered greatly. Grant retired fearing that he would have to entrench and bring up tents or build huts under the cover of the hills for the protection of the men during a siege.

On the morning of the 15th, before it was yet quite light, a messenger from Foote handed Grant a note, saying he had been wounded so that he could not come, and asking Grant to go to him on board the *St. Louis* for a conference. Grant directed his division commanders to do nothing to bring on an engagement during his absence, and left at once. He went on horseback, for the ship was anchored in the river four miles below. The ground was frozen hard and the road, having been previously cut up by the teams, was very

rough. The horse could only make his way slowly and required time. But on reaching the landing, Grant found a boat waiting to row him out to the ship. Foote explained the condition of his iron-clads and the necessity of taking them to Mound City for repairs, saying he could be back in ten days, and suggested that the army entrench and await his return. Grant could see no alternative and so agreed and started on his return.

When he reached the shore he was met by one of his staff, white with fear for the safety of the army. During Grant's absence the Confederates had come out of their trenches, in full force, before McClernand, three or four miles up the line, and attacked him vigorously and driven him back on the centre. The aide reported the division in full retreat. When Grant left he had no thought that there would be any engagement, unless he brought it on, and this he had been careful to provide against. But the Confederates had taken the initiative, while he was seven or eight miles away. He hurried back as fast as he could over the rough road. And when he reached the nearest end of his line, Smith's division, there was no evidence of excitement. As he advanced farther, he came to Wallace's division. Here too the line was firm and the men in good spirits. For they had, on the farther end, taken part in the conflict and had held the Confederates in check. But beyond that the line was in confusion. And the explanation was easy.

The Confederates from within their entrenchments had watched the investment of their position and each day saw the Union line drawing closer. From the heights at the end of the line nearest the landing-place of the Union troops they had seen reinforcements constantly coming to Grant. The Union line on the Dover end had been strengthened and pushed out till it occupied a height commanding the approach by the river from the south. Batteries had been planted so as to command the river and cut off communication in the only direction from which supplies and reinforcements could be brought. Grant's army being more or less concealed by the timber, the Confederates could not accurately judge of the number of his troops. But from the persistency and vigour of his movements, and the reinforcements they had seen arriving, they concluded his army must be about 50,000 strong, about double what it was in reality. Under this impression, Generals Floyd, Pillow and Buckner met in council, soon after dark on the evening of February 14. And it was determined that they could not continue to hold the fort. They decided to assault McClernand's position next the river at five o'clock the next morning, hoping it would end in defeating Grant, or if not, in driving McClernand back so as to open a way to withdraw the army. This being decided upon, the brigade commanders were sent for, and their positions assigned, and the plan of attack explained. Pillow was to advance against McClernand's right next the river and Buckner against his right centre. Only a few regiments were to be left to guard the entrenchments.

At five the next morning, a brisk fire was opened upon McClernand's right. This was responded to by his men. But then a body of troops under General B. R. Johnson moved out of the

Confederate trenches and around the river-side of the hill to flank McClernand. The assault was made and firmly resisted. But the familiar military proposition was presented of bringing the greater number of troops to bear upon a given point, and with the usual result. The comparatively thin end of McClernand's line was set upon by approximately half the Confederate army. The assault, though firmly resisted, nevertheless succeeded, and about 9.30, McClernand's line, under this pressure, began slowly to retire, but in good order. The Confederates pressed it strongly. Cavalry was brought up and charged with effect, pushing it still farther back and capturing six guns.

The retiring line was doubled back on the position in front of Buckner. Here the Confederates met with greater resistance. Buckner, according to order, had opened fire on the Union line with his artillery and had followed it by an assault with two of his best regiments. But they had been repulsed and driven back to their entrenchments and were demoralised. He could not persuade his men to make another assault. The consequence to Pillow was that here in front of Buckner he met new troops flushed with victory and the old line driven back till it had become strong. The Union line had also been reformed so as to front the Confederates. And batteries had been planted and were now pouring canister into their thinning ranks.

Buckner, with the aid of Pillow, who had gone there to learn why assistance was not being given, succeeded in persuading the men to make another assault. Thus attacked in front by Pillow and on flank by Buckner, the Union line wavered again. Its ammunition was becoming exhausted. McClernand had sent two messengers to Grant for assistance and learned of his absence. He then turned to Wallace and Smith, but they hesitated, for they had been ordered to hold their positions and prevent the enemy from escaping in their directions, in other words, to remain where they were and repel any sally from the fort. But upon receipt of a second message from McClernand, saying that the Confederates had turned his flank and were endangering his whole command, Wallace ordered Colonel Cruft, nearest him, to move his brigade to the right, and report to General McClernand. And later Colonel Thayer with his brigade was sent. They found McClernand retiring slowly and out of ammunition. These fresh troops were thrust in between the exhausted regiments of McClernand and the Confederates. And after a vigorous effort, the latter, now tired and exhausted, their dead from the raking fire of the Union batteries lying everywhere about them, found themselves confronted with strong reinforcements of fresh men. The troops of McClernand had only retired out of reach of the Confederate bullets, and now, having refilled their cartridge-boxes, they too returned to the support of Cruft and Thayer. Thus out-matched, the Confederates began to retire. And soon, upon an order from Pillow, they sought their entrenchments. Just here, it was afterwards insisted, was the greatest mistake of the Confederates. It was urged that, having opened a way for retreat by pushing back McClernand to this point, they should have been ordered to continue their retreat,

and thus have saved most of the army. This pre-supposes that Grant and his victorious army would not have followed them. They might have saved some. But, however this may have been, it was not done.

At this point, about 1.30 P.M., Grant reached the scene. Seeing the Confederates in retreat, he turned to Colonel Webster, one of his staff, and said: 'Some of our men are pretty badly demoralised, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way out and has fallen back; the one who attacks first now, will be victorious. And the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me.' He at once determined to assault on his left. It was clear that the Confederates had started to march out with their entire force, except a few pickets. And if he could attack on the farthest end of their line before they could redistribute their forces, he would meet with little resistance. He directed Webster to ride with him and call out to the men as he passed: 'Fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line. The enemy is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so.'

The men only wanted some one to give them this order. And they quickly obeyed. He directed his right to recover the ground it had lost. While he rode rapidly back to his left and found General Smith. He explained the situation to him and ordered him to charge the Confederate works in front of his division. The order was at once obeyed. And quickly Smith carried the north end of the rifle-pits line, drove the Confederates out and encamped for the night within their works. McClelland pressed back and retook the position he had held in the morning. And he and Wallace in some places advanced and took some advantageous points which they had not previously held.

McClelland estimated that out of 8,000 men brought into action by him to repel this assault, 1,519 were killed, wounded or missing, making a percentage of nearly every fifth man. The missing were only 74. On the other hand, the loss of the enemy engaging his command, admittedly large, he thought was probably even greater.

The situation of the Confederates was now hopeless. Their attempt to cut their way out had been gallantly made, but had failed. They were both surrounded and discouraged. The Union army had made a lodgement within their works, and only waited the dawn of the next day to sweep their position and capture the garrison. What was to be done? That night Floyd, Pillow and Buckner held a council. It was agreed that further resistance would only result in a slaughter. Floyd, who as Secretary of War in Buchanan's Cabinet had betrayed his trust by continuing in office while working for the establishment of a Confederacy within the Federal domain, and was now fearing a prosecution for treason, felt that it would not be safe for him to fall into Grant's hands. He said *he* would never surrender, that he would die first. Pillow had been a major-general in the Mexican War, and probably felt that his apostasy would be met with proportionate punishment. He agreed that no two men were more wanted than he and Floyd. Buckner said, if the command devolved on him, he would surrender. Floyd then remarked: 'General Pillow, I turn over the command.' Pillow immediately

replied, 'I pass it.' And Buckner said, 'I assume it.' And he immediately seated himself at a table and commenced to write orders preparatory to a capitulation.

That night the steamer *Gen. Anderson* and another small boat came down the river with 400 raw troops for the fort. They were debarked. And Floyd loaded the boats with some of his own troops, and going on board himself, crossed the river and went to Clarksville. Pillow escaped in a row boat, and Forrest marched out along the river bank with about 500 of his cavalry, crossed the back-water, saddle-skirt deep, and escaped. Soon all three found their way within the Confederate lines.

The next morning, Sunday, February 16, before it was light, Smith brought Grant a letter from Buckner, saying, 'In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until twelve o'clock to-day.' To this Grant replied, and the reply is characteristic of the nervous energy of the man, 'Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.' To this he received an answer accepting these terms, though they were characterised by Buckner as 'ungenerous and unchivalrous.' White flags had been displayed at intervals along the rifle-pits. And the Union army now moved in and took possession of the fort.

Grant estimated that the Confederates had on the day before the surrender 21,000 men, and that he had 27,000. There were 14,623 prisoners taken to Cairo. The loss of the Union army in killed, wounded and missing he reported at 2,832. This covered the whole siege. Pillow estimated the loss of the Confederates in killed and wounded at 2,000. Grant captured 60 guns, though he had only 8 batteries, probably 48 guns, himself.

After the surrender, Buckner asked Grant for permission to bury his dead that had fallen outside their lines in the action of the 15th. Grant gave orders that his permit to pass the lines should be respected. The privilege was probably abused, some taking this means to escape. Others came to Grant and asked permission to go home, saying they were tired of the war and would not go into the ranks again, and he let them go. Many escaped in other ways. Among these was Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson, who it will be remembered at one time commanded the fort. In his report, by way of apology for his position, he described his escape. 'By Tuesday,' he said, February 18, the troops of my command had been separated from me, having been sent down the river on board steamers; and I concluded that it was unlikely that I could be of any more service to them. I however formed no purpose or plan of escape. In the afternoon, towards sunset of February 18, I walked out with a Confederate officer and took my course towards the rifle-pits on the hill

formerly occupied by Colonel Heiman, and finding no sentinel to obstruct me, I passed on and was soon beyond the Federal encampments.' And he added, 'I have not learned that a single one who attempted to escape met with any obstacle.' That many who were actually surrendered never found their way to Cairo was owing to this looseness in the detention of the prisoners. It was afterwards a cause of complaint. But those enumerated made the greatest number of prisoners ever, till then, taken in one battle on this continent.

The news of the capture caused great rejoicing in the North. Grant and all three of his division commanders were made major-generals. And the colonels who had commanded brigades were made brigadier-generals. But Grant was the popular hero. His brilliant victory, after encountering so many obstacles, gave him an assured place in the estimation of the people. Playing upon the initials of his name and the terms he had fixed, he was admirably dubbed 'Unconditional Surrender' Grant.

But if the news was joyful to the North, it was correspondingly depressing to the South. Duke in his 'History of Morgan's Cavalry' says, 'No subsequent reverse, although fraught with far more real calamity, ever created the shame, sorrow and wild consternation that swept over the South with the news of the surrender of Fort Donelson. To some in the South these reverses were harbingers of the defeat and overthrow of the Confederacy.' President Davis ordered Floyd and Pillow to be relieved. And their conduct became the subject of an investigation by the Confederate Congress. It was complained that they had failed to give timely notice of the insufficiency of the garrison, had not attempted to save the army by evacuating the fort when it was found untenable, and that they had abandoned their commands. They made every effort to vindicate their conduct. But in vain. Neither ever recovered his prestige with the Confederacy again.

The fall of the fort was felt with most depressing effect in that part of the South which lay west of the Alleghany Mountains. Grant believed that, with the troops then there, an enterprising commander could have taken Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis and Vicksburg, names later fraught with memories of blood. But some of the men then in high command in the West were not such as Grant described. For example, notwithstanding all the efforts that were made to procure troops from Buell to reinforce the army before Donelson, none arrived till February 24. Then two brigades appeared under General Nelson. But Grant had no use for them then. And as he knew that Buell was advancing on Nashville, he thought they would be needed there, and they were, therefore, ordered on without even being debarked at Donelson. Of course with such commanders as Buell, such movements as Grant indicated were not taken. The men in control were too slow.

But other results did flow from the fall of this fort. Anticipating such movements as Grant indicated, General A. S. Johnston with his troops left Bowling Green on February 14, 1862, and the next morning the advance of Buell's army moved in without finding an enemy. Buell took a large supply of corn and other stores, such as boxes of

boots and shoes, sugar, coffee and tents. Johnston had already distributed among the poor of the city a considerable quantity of flour and beef. And an attempt had been made to burn the corn, but it was only partially successful. Johnston's rear guard crossed the Cumberland River at Nashville on the 18th and, without attempting to hold this important place, he proceeded on to Murfreesborough, thirty miles farther south. The purpose was to reach a place of security, remote from the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, where he could gain time to recruit his army. His hope was that he would then be strong enough to drive both Grant and Buell back.

The day after he left Nashville, General Smith's division, convoyed by Foote's gunboats, steamed up the Cumberland and without resistance took Clarksville. Here they found a considerable supply of flour and bacon that had been accumulated for the use of the Confederate army. The two brigades under Nelson that had been sent on up the river by Grant were the first troops to enter Nashville. They arrived on February 25. But the advance of Buell's army had reached Edgefield, on the opposite side of the river, the evening before. This city also had been made a depot of supplies, and thirty-nine guns and a large amount of provisions in the warehouses fell into Buell's hands. General Johnston had undertaken to save them. And to Floyd, with the small infantry force he had saved, and Forrest, with his cavalry, also from Donelson, Johnston confided the work of saving these stores. But this proved a work of some difficulty amid the confusion incident to the abandonment of the city. The rough element had gathered about the storehouses and were destroying and carrying away the goods. This indiscriminate loot was stopped by Floyd, and the work of removing them was prosecuted as fast as the railroads could carry them away. And this continued till the evening of the 20th. But then, for fear of Buell's advance, Floyd caused the railroad and suspension bridges to Edgefield to be destroyed and followed Johnston to Murfreesborough. The stores could not all be taken, and what was left, estimated at about a million dollars in value, fell into the hands of the Union army.

Just here an incident occurred that might have materially changed Grant's career. After Nelson had started up the river, feeling responsible for his movement and not having heard of Buell's arrival, Grant telegraphed department headquarters that he would go to Nashville himself on the 28th if he received no direction to the contrary. Hearing nothing, he went. But he returned the same day, for he found Buell at Nashville. Fearing the return of Johnston to attack him, Buell had also ordered up Smith's division from Clarksville. And it too went to Nashville. But some more of Buell's troops coming in the same day, Smith's were permitted to return. Out of these apparently innocent movements, a serious misunderstanding between Grant and Halleck and the authorities at Washington was narrowly averted. The telegraph lines were not completed to Donelson and the means of communication were inadequate. An unfaithful operator intervened, whose sympathies soon after led him to join the Confederacy. And he did not forward some of

the dispatches. Though Grant had been sending messages to department headquarters daily since leaving Cairo, some of them did not get through. McClellan was complaining of not being sufficiently informed of the movements of the armies. He telegraphed Buell, February 21, 'Neither Halleck nor yourself give as much detailed information as is necessary for me. This is the critical period, and I must be constantly informed of the condition of your affairs.' And to Halleck the same day, 'You do not report either often or fully enough. Unless you keep me fully advised, you must not expect me to abandon my own plans for yours.'

To this Halleck answered, 'I have had no communication with General Grant for more than a week. He left his command without my authority and went to Nashville. His army seems to be as much demoralised by the victory of Fort Donelson as was that of the Potomac by the defeat of Bull Run. It is hard to censure a successful general immediately after a victory, but I think he richly deserves it. I can get no returns, no reports, no information of any kind from him. Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it without any regard for the future. I am worn out and tired of this neglect and inefficiency. C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the emergency.'

To this McClellan answered the same day: 'The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once, if the good of the service requires it, and place C. F. Smith in command. You are at liberty to regard this as a positive order if it will smooth your way.'

The next day Halleck telegraphed McClellan: 'A rumour has just reached me that since the taking of Fort Donelson, General Grant has resumed his former bad habits. If so it will account for his neglect of my often-repeated orders. I do not deem it advisable to arrest him at present, but have placed General Smith in command of the expedition up the Tennessee. I think Smith will restore order and discipline.'

All this correspondence had taken place without the knowledge of Grant. Indeed, he never learned the whole of it until after the war closed. But on March 2 he received an order from Halleck to move his command back to Fort Henry. This order was promptly obeyed. And that same day he was back on the Tennessee. But here on March 4 he received an order to place Smith in command of an expedition against Eastport, Miss., and another against Paris, Tenn., and to remain himself at Fort Henry. To this order Halleck added: 'Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command?' Grant was surprised. On March 1 Halleck telegraphed General Cullum at Cairo: 'Who sent Smith's division to Nashville? I ordered them across to the Tennessee, where they are wanted immediately. Order them back. What is the reason no one down there can obey my orders?' And on the 6th he wrote Grant: 'Your going to Nashville without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of serious complaint at Washington, so much

so that I was advised to arrest you on your return.' Grant was surprised again. He understood that he had the same kind of permission to go to Nashville that he had to take Fort Donelson. He had told Halleck he would do both and there was no objection to either. But nevertheless he turned the command of the expeditions now ordered over to Smith and, for himself, asked to be relieved. He was now, without explanation and without knowledge of the cause, within three weeks after his victory at Donelson, virtually under arrest and without a command.

But other authorities now took the matter in hand. Adjutant-General Thomas on the 10th telegraphed Halleck from Washington : ' It has been reported that soon after the battle of Fort Donelson Brigadier-General Grant left his command without leave. By direction of the President, the Secretary of War desires you to ascertain and report whether General Grant left his command at any time without proper authority, and if so, for how long ; whether he made to you proper reports and returns of his force, whether he has committed any acts which were unauthorised, or not in accordance with military subordination or propriety, and if so what.' This was a shot from an unexpected direction.

Halleck now found he was getting into deeper water than he anticipated. The President and his Secretary of War were evidently determined that an officer, who had proved himself so satisfactory to them as Grant, should receive fair treatment. Halleck saw that, however matters of military subordination might be viewed by him and McClellan, they might be carried too far. To add to his other troubles, Smith had fallen sick and was in bed. Accordingly Grant was restored to his command. And a few days later Halleck wrote the Adjutant-General : ' In accordance with your instructions of the 10th instant, I report that General Grant and several officers of high rank in his command, immediately after the battle of Fort Donelson, went to Nashville without my authority or knowledge. I am satisfied, however, from investigation, that General Grant did this from good intentions and from a desire to subserve the public interests. Not being advised of General Buell's movements and learning that General Buell had ordered Smith's division of his (Grant's) command to Nashville, he deemed it his duty to go there in person. . . . General Grant has made the proper explanations and has been directed to resume his command in the field. As he acted from a praiseworthy, although mistaken, zeal for the public service, in going to Nashville and leaving his command, I respectfully recommend that no further notice be taken of it.'

A copy of this letter, but not of the others, Halleck sent to Grant. And so the incident closed. But the whole shows how narrowly Grant escaped. Under the eye of a Secretary less penetrating than Stanton, his great career might have then been nipped in the bud.

On receipt of the order restoring him to command, Grant went to Savannah, a hundred miles up the Tennessee, to which point the troops had now advanced. And Smith, who had all the time been unhesitating in his criticism of this injustice, and as ignorant of the cause of it as Grant himself, willingly turned over the command.

Smith was suffering from an injury to his leg, caused by jumping into a yawl. The injury, apparently insignificant at first, developed into a sickness that a few weeks later caused his death. This was a distinct loss to the service. For he was an accomplished officer. He had also been Grant's preceptor at West Point and they had served together in Mexico. Thus the latter had formed a high estimate of Smith's ability as a soldier and his exalted character as a man. Grant felt severely the loss of his wise counsel and his unfailing friendship just now when in the midst of this trying campaign. 'I can bear honest testimony to his great worth as a soldier and friend,' he wrote his widow. And to this he added: 'When the entire nation condoles with you, no one can do so with more heartfelt grief than myself.' Grant had not then formed his intimacy with Sherman, and had Smith lived, he would doubtless have been an important figure in the war. He might have filled Sherman's place in history. Such are the freaks of fortune.

The assignment to Smith's place now removed Grant entirely from Forts Henry and Donelson. As we have already seen how Clarksville, Bowling Green and Nashville were abandoned to the Union arms, it remains to speak of Columbus, the only other Confederate post in the rear. Two days after the fall of Fort Donelson General Beauregard, who was in command of Columbus though sick and temporarily in Jackson, Tenn., telegraphed the authorities at Richmond that Columbus must meet the fate of Donelson, with the loss of the entire garrison if it was not withdrawn, that all ways of retreat by rail and river could be cut off by the superior forces under Grant. He, therefore, asked them to decide whether to hold this fort to the last extremity with about 3,500 men, withdrawing the others, or evacuate the place entirely and take a new position below. To this application the Confederate Secretary of War, under instructions from President Davis, replied that evacuation had been decided on, that a new defensive position should be selected, and to look to the safety of the artillery and munitions. The Secretary also telegraphed General Polk, who was at Columbus, to act as promptly as possible under this order and to use every endeavour to save the cannon and munitions, that they could not afford to lose them because they could not be replaced. Thus Columbus also was to be abandoned, without resistance.

It is interesting to note that this movement, as well as the abandonment of Bowling Green and Nashville, was the result of a conference held at Beauregard's rooms in Bowling Green on the day after the fall of Fort Henry. At this conference, Johnston, Beauregard and Hardee were present. And it was decided that Fort Henry having fallen, and the Union army being in possession of the Tennessee, navigable for gunboats and transports to Florence, Ala., that the forces at Columbus and Bowling Green, separated by this stream, could no longer support each other. Having possession of the river, Grant could concentrate rapidly, by means of transports, all his forces on any point along its banks and cut off the communications of Nashville or Columbus with the South. It was, therefore, decided that all three of these posts must ultimately be abandoned, that a small

force might be left in the strong works at Columbus to sell it to a besieging army as dearly as possible, or the garrison there might be entirely withdrawn. Hence Beauregard had now telegraphed for instructions. And he was told to abandon it entirely.

Acting under his instructions, General Polk, commanding at Columbus, selected a new position, sixty miles south, on the Mississippi River, embracing Island No. 10, the mainland in Madrid Bend on the Tennessee shore and New Madrid, in Missouri. At the latter places works had been thrown up during the previous autumn. And measures were already in progress for increasing their strength by the construction of heavy batteries.

On February 25 Polk issued orders for the removal of the sick and the commissary, quartermaster and ordnance stores and then the heavy guns. Two of his divisions went to reinforce Beauregard's army at Jackson and the others to Island No. 10. And by March 1 they were all gone except the cavalry, which remained with Polk till the following day, to complete the work of removal. And this being done, the quarters and other buildings erected for the shelter of the troops were consigned to the flames.

Polk then telegraphed the Secretary of War with an apparent tinge of both sadness and relief—of sadness over the abandonment of works on which had been expended the labour of months, of relief that his responsibility for the removal was ended. 'The work,' he said, 'is done. Columbus gone. Self and staff move in half an hour. Everything secured.' It was the last message of so many anxious ones that had been sent from this 'Gibraltar of the West.' And while it was being penned, the cannon of Commander Phelps' mortar-boats, on an armed reconnaissance, were thundering at the parapets. And the news of an approaching squadron of cavalry, on the land side, hurried Polk's retreat. The fires were also smoking under the boilers of Foote's fleet, equipped and loaded with a brigade of Sherman's troops for the reduction of the fort.

Polk turned his face, with his small remnant of the army, to follow the retiring troops. He went himself to Jackson, General Beauregard's headquarters, leaving General John P. McCown to the command at Island No. 10. And the Union cavalry marched the next day into Columbus. The fleet came the day after. Of guns, they found two thirty-two pounders, the only ones of value, and three or four small carronades in remote out-works. They had all been spiked. There were also some shot and gun-carriages and anchors and the remnant of a large chain that had been stretched across the river. These all fell into the hands of the Union troops. What appeared to be a magazine smoking at both ends was discovered in the fort. But the trains were cut and so no lives were lost.

The works were of immense strength, consisting of tier upon tier of batteries on the river front, and a strong parapet and ditch covered by a thick abatis on the land side. The cavalry and some regiments of infantry were left under General Sherman to garrison the work. And an immediate movement against Island No. 10 was discussed. But Foote feared he was not sufficiently prepared. And so this movement, for the present, was abandoned and the fleet returned to Cairo.

CHAPTER XVII

The Siege and Capture of Island No. 10—The Union Army goes to reinforce Halleck at Corinth—Confederate Losses.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN POPE was called to St. Louis from Central Missouri on February 14, 1862, to take command of the expedition for the capture of New Madrid and Island No. 10. Halleck explained the situation of the works and directed him to organise a force for their reduction. The next day Pope left St. Louis for Cairo. This place was then believed to be threatened from Columbus. And Pope was ordered to assume command there in case any movement was made against it, but as soon as the apprehension of this was at an end, to proceed with his operations against New Madrid. On the 21st, finding that all fear of a movement against Cairo was groundless, Pope left there on a steamboat, with a guard of a hundred and forty men, and landed at Commerce on the Missouri shore, thirty miles above. This was the end of the high ground on that side of the Mississippi. A dismal and impracticable swamp extended all the way from there to New Madrid. The whole country for thirty miles west was then under water, from one to ten feet deep. An old embankment, upon which a corduroy road had been built, extended part of the way to New Madrid, but as it had not been repaired for some years, it was then almost impassable.

Landing at Commerce with his small escort, Pope had rapidly sent him regiments from St. Louis, Cairo and Cincinnati, most of them entirely raw troops. Few of the men had ever served at all, and as they had never been brigaded, a complete organisation of the army had to be made. It was formed with five divisions of infantry, under Stanley, Hamilton, Palmer, Paine and Plummer, one division of cavalry under Granger and another of artillery under Lothrop. Pope and his division commanders and also many of his other officers were graduates of West Point. So that the men had an unusual opportunity to learn the duties and life of a soldier. This they quickly did. And the organisation then made became the nucleus of the corps afterwards designated as the Army of the Mississippi. It became widely known and was distinguished for its discipline and efficiency, as well as for the soldierly good feeling that characterised both officers and men.

The campaign upon which they now entered was one of the most interesting from a professional standpoint of any in the war. Its thrilling incidents, running the Confederate batteries by gunboats, in nights darkened by overhanging storms, driving in pickets and marking out rifle-pits and locating batteries under cover of darkness,

digging a ship canal for the successful passage of transports and floating batteries, crossing the troops over a great river in the face of frowning forts and the final rounding up and capture of a large army, with great stores of artillery and garrison equipments, and this too without any appreciable loss of life, made it one of the most picturesque passages in the history of the war. It was a campaign of incredible toil, exposure and hardship. But all were endured with the utmost devotion and with results which justified the sacrifice. And so these experiences were remembered afterwards by both officers and men with emotions which, though they did not find expression in the matter of fact reports of the campaign, were always recalled with pardonable pride.

Within a week from the day Pope landed at Commerce, he began his march for New Madrid over the dilapidated corduroy road. The weather was cold and a drizzling rain fell from the time the march commenced till New Madrid was reached. Probably from a belief among the Confederates that the road was impracticable, the march met no opposition. Here, however, was their great mistake. They could have seriously impeded and perhaps prevented Pope's passage. But they did neither, and so lost their opportunity.

The advance reached New Madrid on March 3 and found it occupied by five regiments of infantry and some companies of cavalry and artillery. One bastioned earthwork, mounting fourteen heavy guns, about half a mile below, and another irregular work at the upper end, mounting seven pieces of artillery, together with lines of entrenchments between them, constituted the defensive works. Six gunboats, carrying from four to eight heavy guns each, were anchored along the shore. The country was perfectly level for miles around. And as the river was high the guns of these gunboats looked directly over the banks and commanded the approach to the town. Hence, though the entrenchments could have been carried with heavy loss, they could not have been held against the destructive fire of these boats. As there was no immediate hope of assistance from the Union fleet, it became necessary to bring down a few heavy guns by land to operate against those of the Confederates. They were accordingly sent for, and the army went into camp about two miles back from the river. It was determined to occupy the time, while awaiting the arrival of the guns, in taking up positions farther down, so as to blockade the river and prevent transports from carrying supplies and reinforcements to the Confederates.

To understand the importance of locations, it is necessary to keep in mind the topography of the neighbourhood. Island No. 10 lay in a great bend in the Mississippi River on the line between the states of Kentucky and Tennessee. The river after flowing southward here made a sweeping bend and flowed north-west to New Madrid, where it made another great bend and flowed south again to Tiptonville. Its meanderings thus described a letter N, making two long narrow promontories. From Island No. 8, near the north-east corner of the letter, across the first promontory to New Madrid, is five miles, while by the river it is fifteen; so the distance from Island No. 10 to Tiptonville, which is across the second promontory, and near the

south-west corner of the letter, is five miles, while by the river it is twenty-seven. A great swamp lay to the east of the river from above Island No. 10 to Tiptonville, leaving between it and the river a strip of dry ground and making the western promontory in reality an island, for this swamp, deepening into what was Reelfoot Lake at one part, discharged its waters by Reelfoot River into the Mississippi below Tiptonville.

There was a good road on this promontory from Island No. 10 to Tiptonville. The Confederates occupied this promontory and Island No. 10 to the east of it, and New Madrid to the north. When the river was blockaded at New Madrid, supplies and reinforcements were landed at Tiptonville and conveyed up and across the peninsula to the Confederate works. There was no communication with the country east of Reelfoot Lake, except by a small flatboat, which plied across the lake, a distance of two miles, and that by an opening cut through cypress swamps for the purpose. By interrupting the navigation of the river and commanding by heavy artillery the lowest point of dry ground near Tiptonville, the Confederates would be cut off from supplies and prevented from escaping. To accomplish this purpose was the first work of the Union army.

General Pope accordingly, upon reaching New Madrid, sent Colonel Plummer, with three regiments of infantry, three companies of cavalry and a field battery of rifled ten-pound guns, to make a lodgement at Point Pleasant, twelve miles below. He was to line the bank of the river with rifle-pits for a thousand men and establish his artillery in sunken batteries of single pieces, between the rifle-pits. All were to be put down so as to prevent the fire of the Confederates from reaching the men or the guns. Plummer's work was well done. The lodgement was effected on the night of March 6. And notwithstanding repeated efforts of the Confederate gunboats, Plummer's men were never driven out. From their position, they could rake the river with their batteries and prevent the passage of transports. They could also compel the gunboats to keep to the other side of the river, though the Union guns were too light to sink them there.

On March 11 the heavy siege guns that had been sent for were delivered at Cairo. They reached New Madrid the next evening at sunset. And during that night the Confederate pickets were driven in and the guns were planted in sunken batteries; and trenches were dug and manned with infantry to support them. By daylight the next morning, just thirty-four hours after the guns were delivered at Cairo, they opened fire upon the land batteries and the fleet at New Madrid. They continued it the whole of that day. And the result of their work was that three of the Confederate heavy guns were dismounted and several of the gunboats were disabled. At the same time the trenches were pushed forward toward the river, so as to give the guns a better command of the fleet; and a demonstration was made against the works on Pope's left. The next evening, during a furious thunderstorm, the Confederates, seeing that resistance was hopeless, abandoned New Madrid and escaped over the river, leaving their supplies untouched and their dead unburied. Thirty-three field and siege guns with their magazines full of ammunition, several

thousand stand of small arms, horses, mules and wagons and tents for an army of ten thousand men fell into the hands of Pope's army. These captured guns were at once distributed in batteries, along the river bank below, at prominent points, the lowest just beyond Tiptonville so as to command the exit from the promontory occupied by the Confederates.

These batteries, to evade the fire of the Confederate gunboats, were in every instance established in the night. And to make them and the gunners safe they were sunk so as to be beyond the reach of the guns on the river. Seeing that they must be dislodged, or the navigation of the river, their only means of supply and reinforcement, be abandoned, the Confederates made a furious attack on the lowest battery, consisting of two twenty-four pound siege guns and two ten-inch Parrots, manned by a detachment of regular army infantry, and supported by Palmer's division in the rifle-pits. Five gunboats ran up to within thirty yards of the battery and cannonaded it for an hour and a half. But the assailants were repulsed with one gunboat sunk, several damaged and many of the men shot down by sharpshooters. No further attempt was made against the battery and all communication from below was cut off save that occasionally, during a dark night, a gunboat would steal up along the opposite shore. But this was always at such risk that it was seldom undertaken.

Pope having thus acquired undisputed possession of the west bank and control of the river itself, and having the Confederate army beleagured, the problem now was how to reach the other shore with forces to reduce the works on Island No. 10 and the east bank above and below. Troops he had in abundance, and guns. But the river was broad and deep and could not be crossed without transports. And they could not be brought down past the Confederate batteries. The Union gunboats under Flag Officer Foote had come down from Cairo. And they had bombarded the Confederate works on March 15, 16 and 17. But this was without success. On the 17th Pope suggested to Foote that he run the batteries with one of his boats. But Foote declined to attempt this, thinking it impracticable. General Hamilton then suggested that a canal be cut through the swamps of the eastern peninsula, and thus light draught boats be brought to New Madrid and so turn the batteries at Island No. 10. This was believed upon examination to be practicable. And the work was at once commenced. It proved an undertaking of incredible toil and hardship. But it was continued for nineteen days and until the work was finished. An avenue fifty feet wide was made by sawing off trees of large size four and a half feet under water and dragging them out of the channel. The canal with its windings was twelve miles long and six of them were through very heavy timber. It was completed on April 4.

As the work progressed, heavy coal barges were brought into the upper end of the canal, and there made into floating batteries. Each battery consisted of three barges lashed together and bolted fast with iron. The middle one was bulk-headed all around so as to give four feet of solid timber at the sides and ends. Three heavy

guns were mounted on it, protected by traverses of sandbags. It also carried eighty sharpshooters. The outside barges had first a layer in the bottom of empty water-tight barrels securely lashed, then layers of dry cotton-wood rails and cotton bales, closely packed. This was all floored over to keep everything in place and was so made to prevent the battery being sunk by a shot through the outside. These floating batteries, when they got through the canal, were to be pushed over the river and cut loose and allowed to float down to the point selected for the landing of the troops, and there anchored. They were then to silence the Confederate guns in front of them. And the transports, loaded with troops, were then to follow these floating batteries.

On April 5 the batteries and transports were brought to the mouth of the canal at New Madrid and anchored there out of sight of the Confederate gunboats. Thus far the canal succeeded. But the floating batteries were really to supply the place of the Union gunboats. If the gunboats could be had, there was no need for the batteries. And it was now felt that they were by no means a substitute for the gunboats, that the latter would be more safe for the men and more efficient for the work. So Foote, seeing the great need of the gunboats and knowing now that it would be impossible to bring them through the canal on account of their draught, allowed Commander Walke, who volunteered for the purpose, to attempt to run the Confederate batteries with his gunboat, the *Carondelet*. The attempt was to be made with only this one. For if all were taken, Foote feared that they would be sunk and lost, or, what was worse, disabled and captured and then turned against St. Louis, Cairo and Louisville, for whose protection they were primarily constructed, and that, with nothing to oppose them, they might, in Confederate hands, do incalculable damage along the Ohio and Upper Mississippi. With all the urgency of Pope, Foote till now had been unwilling to take the risk of sending even one. But it was argued that heavy guns could not be trained with sufficient accuracy to strike a boat moving in the darkness of night. And so at last Foote yielded so far as to let the experiment be tried.

The night chosen was dark and a storm threatened. The machinery was protected by chains and the pilot house by an eleven-inch hawser wound around as high as the windows, cord-wood was piled around the boilers, a coal-barge loaded with hay was lashed to the side nearest the hostile batteries. This was as a protection against shot. And the steam pipes were made to escape through the boat to prevent the noise. At dark twenty sharpshooters were brought on deck and stationed there to aid the crew in case an attempt was made to board her.

‘If you successfully perform the duty assigned you, which you so willingly undertake,’ wrote Foote to Walke, ‘it will reflect the highest credit upon you and all belonging to your vessel.’ Then he commended them all ‘to the care and protection of God, who rules the world and directs all things.’ And in a parting word he directed Walke, if he met with disaster, as a last resort, to destroy the machinery and set fire to the boat or sink her, so that she would not fall into the

hands of the enemy. It was apparent that the risk was great and that Foote was foreboding disaster. He felt the weight of his responsibility. But the lights were to be kept secreted in the hold. The men were not to speak above a whisper and then only on duty. Not a gun was to be fired. Every precaution was to be used to prevent the enemy from suspecting that they were dropping below the batteries.

Thus after the most careful preparation and instruction, at ten o'clock at night, the boat glided noiselessly out into the darkness and was soon invisible to those on shore. But scarcely had she proceeded a mile, when the soot in her smoke stacks caught fire, and the blaze shot up five feet above their tops. The flue caps were opened and it subsided. But the soot, not being moistened by the escaping steam, became very inflammable. And just as she passed the upper battery, the flames burst forth again. At once the Confederates knew she was passing and guessed the purpose. Sentries fired, the guard turned out, rockets were sent up to signal the other batteries, and the heavy guns opened fire. At the same time the storm broke and there were flashes of lightning and the roll of thunder above, while there was the belching and roar of cannon below. There could be no concealment now. It was only a question whether the boat could survive the best efforts of the Confederate gunners to sink her. But the lightning flashes, so fitful and blinding, aided the pilot to direct his course more than they did the gunners to aim their pieces. The latter were compelled to fire almost at random. And one after another the batteries were passed and the boat was still afloat. Impeded by the barge lashed to her side, her progress was necessarily slow, and the minutes to the men seemed hours. But at last they recognised, by its lights, the floating battery anchored off the lower end of the island. Then they knew they had only this one danger more to pass. It proved less dangerous than they feared. For the battery had been somewhat disabled and driven from its moorings by the fire of the fleet the day before. It discharged only a few guns, as if conceding defeat. And then the boat passed on and the news was signalled back that she was safe. She had gone through undamaged and even untouched. At midnight a signal gun also announced her arrival to the army at New Madrid. And the next morning her commander reported to General Pope for duty.

He was ordered to run down the river as far as Tiptonville, taking with him General Granger and Colonel Smith of the 43rd Ohio, both West Pointers, and Captain Marshall of Pope's staff. They were to make a reconnaissance and ascertain the character of the banks and learn where favourable landings could be made, and the number and positions of the Confederate batteries. They started at once and the reconnaissance occupied the day. The bank was found to be lined, at intervals for fifteen miles, with batteries, with entrenchments for infantry between. The boat was under fire almost constantly. But while returning it silenced a battery opposite Point Pleasant, and Captain Marshall with a small infantry force landed and spiked the guns.

Having been encouraged by the success of the *Carondelet* in running

the batteries, Foote ordered the *Pittsburg* to make the attempt. She started on the night of the 6th and arrived the next morning, like her predecessor, untouched. The two, on the morning of the 7th, were ordered, under Commander Walke, to silence the battery at Watson's Landing, the one on the east bank nearest New Madrid, and where it had been decided to land the troops. The Union battery, on the opposite shore, opened upon it at daylight, and soon the two gunboats joined in the action. By noon the battery was silenced and Walke signalled to Polk. Paine's division was already on steamers that had been brought through the canal, and the crossing commenced. Before they were all over, a scout brought the information to Pope that the Confederates were already evacuating their position along the river near Island No. 10 and were marching toward Tiptonville. Paine was ordered to land and push on rapidly after them. By eight o'clock that night the force on the island had surrendered, and Paine had pushed on to Tiptonville, followed by other troops that had been crossed over. At daylight the next morning Brigadier-General W. W. Mackall, who had succeeded General McCown, surrendered the whole army, hemmed in between the waters of the swamp, shoulder deep, and the troops of Paine at Tiptonville. Only a few got away. They had escaped on the little flatboat plying over Reelfoot Lake.

The artillery, ammunition and supplies, comprising, with what had already been taken at New Madrid, the whole of that which had been saved from Columbus and what had previously been collected here, fell into Pope's hands. The capture was large. It comprised 158 pieces of artillery, 7,000 of small arms, tents for 12,000 men, several wharf-boats loaded with provisions, and many hundred horses, mules and wagons. The gunboats, except one that had been sunk, escaped. The army taken comprised three generals, 273 field and company officers and 6,700 privates. General McCown had taken away under orders from Jackson, Tenn., six regiments and six guns. They were carried to Fort Pillow and went from there to reinforce Johnston's army at Corinth and Shiloh.

The losses in killed and wounded on both sides had been small. In the whole campaign Pope lost only eight killed, twenty-one wounded and three missing, an aggregate of thirty-two. He had crossed his forces over the river and made the capture without an accident and without the loss of a single man. This was a remarkable showing, considering the nature and extent of the campaign, for he had in his army 28,400 men. There was no report of the Confederate losses, but in killed and wounded they probably exceeded Pope's.

On April 12 Pope and his command, embarked on transports, under convoy of Foote's fleet, proceeded down the Mississippi to Fort Pillow, where they arrived on the 14th. Pope was then ordered to return to Cairo. Leaving the gunboats with two of his regiments, without debarking the rest of his troops, he returned to Cairo, and from there went by the Tennessee to reinforce Halleck's army in its operations against Corinth.

Foote continued in front of Fort Pillow until May 9. The wound

received in his ankle at Fort Donelson was in the meantime causing him so much suffering that he then relinquished his command. He died the following year, and thus closed a life of patriotic and conscientious service. He was born and reared at New Haven, Conn. His father, a United States senator from that state, was the author of the famous Foote Resolutions, upon which Webster made his speech in reply to Hayne. The son entered the navy in 1822. But his advancement was slow. He did not become a commander till 1852. And so his promotions were well earned. But he secured at last an enduring place in history by his good work in the early years of the war. He was succeeded by Captain Chas. H. Davis, who from this time had charge of the gunboat operations on the Upper Mississippi.

It is worth while to pause here and reflect upon the extent of the Confederate losses in the West. In detail they have been given, and the items need not, therefore, be repeated. But when Mill Springs, Forts Henry and Donelson, Clarksville, Nashville and Island No. 10 are recalled, it will be remembered that in the short space of three months the Confederacy had lost an immense quantity of munitions of war, artillery, small arms, ammunition, supplies of clothing and provisions for the men, and provender for the horses and mules, as well as the animals themselves, with wagons for transportation. When there is a simple mention made of such losses, the reader is apt to pass them hastily by as mere incidents of a battle or surrender and so of little significance. But this should not be done. It should rather be remembered that every gun or pair of shoes or suit of clothes, every sack of flour or piece of bacon, every horse, mule or wagon, had to be purchased and paid for, and that the price to the Confederacy was not less than it would have been to a private individual. Hence here was a great loss of property absolutely necessary to the conduct of their campaigns. If gone, it would have to be replaced.

It generally happens that the rival gains and losses of each side pretty nearly counterbalance one another. But this was not so in the West. For these losses had all fallen upon the Confederates. The Union had escaped. It had been uniformly victorious and was therefore the one that had profited.

And this was not the only discouraging feature of the picture. The Confederacy was not prepared to stand such drafts upon its resources. Its credit was poor. It had no property at the beginning, except what had been obtained by the process of loans and the seizure of United States forts and arsenals and mints. Since then the taxes it had undertaken to collect had come in slowly. The people were engaged in war and not making money with which to pay them. There were many delinquents. In attempting to ease the situation the Confederacy had resorted to the issue of a paper currency. But this Confederate money was soon heavily discounted and unwillingly received. The paper could be no better than the stability of the Government which placed it in circulation. And constantly recurring disasters reminded everyone that this Government might not last long. It is almost pathetic to read in the correspondence, now preserved in official records, of the straits they were in for means to carry on their struggle. It was in sad contrast with the situation

of the North, whose property was ample, whose loans were good and whose credit was abundant.

But there was still another aggravation of the Confederate situation. If they had the money or the credit, they could not replace much of this property. They did not have the gun factories. When the war commenced theirs was an agricultural district. The factories were in the North. And so when their guns were captured the Confederates could not make more to replace them. Neither could they get them from abroad. For their ports were closed by a blockade. Hence we have seen the anxiety of the Confederate Secretary of War to save the armament of Columbus, and the reason he gave for it, that those guns if lost could not be replaced. Even the guns that were taken showed the straits they were in for supplies. At Mill Springs, the small arms captured were largely flint-locks, that did poor service and contributed greatly to their defeat. For the priming becoming wet with the rain, the guns would not fire and the men retreated. And discouraged they went even further, they deserted to their homes. In some of the other battles, the only arms many of the men had were shot-guns that did no service except at close range. Hence in battle these men threw away their own and seized those of the Union dead and used them. The rifles of the North, being of the most improved patterns, carried a heavy ball and did execution at long range.

The Confederate guns that were captured were immediately turned against them. The flint-locks were refitted for percussion caps and so made serviceable. And the heavy guns taken, as at New Madrid, were at once distributed to Union batteries. The provisions captured were consumed by the Union armies. While Grant was in Western Tennessee, he sent out an expedition and captured 100,000 pounds of bacon that was stored for the use of the Confederate army. And when brought in, he at once distributed it to his own divisions. Before he left Forts Henry and Donelson, he dismantled both and sent what guns he did not need in the campaign up the Tennessee to the depots of supplies at Cairo and Paducah. Thence they went to meet the wants of the Union armies at other points. Some of the siege guns went to Columbus to arm the heavy works there and thus guard against the return of the Confederates to the Upper Mississippi.

These losses seriously crippled the Confederacy at the very beginning of the war. They were never fully recovered from in the West. Things went from bad to worse until she was whipped. In the East, Lee had better success in maintaining his side of the account and with correspondingly better success in continuing the struggle for disunion.

CHAPTER XVIII

Re-arrangement of Departments—Halleck placed over Buell—Grant advances to Shiloh—Delay of Buell.

ON March 11, 1862, President Lincoln issued his War Order No. 3, whereby the two departments then under the command of Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under Buell as lay west of a north and south line drawn through Knoxville, Tenn., were consolidated and designated the Department of the Mississippi. Halleck was placed in command. McClellan, who had been in general command at Washington, was deprived of his supervision over all, but was continued in command of the Department of the Potomac. A new district, comprising the country between these two, was created, called the Mountain Department. And Fremont was placed over it. This re-arrangement disposed of one of the pestering difficulties in the West, the want of co-operation between Halleck and Buell. Each had held independent commands, and notwithstanding all the efforts of the President, supplemented by Stanton and Grant, co-operation could not be had. With 101,000 men in his command Buell had been doing little service for the country. He could never be got ready to move. He seemed possessed with the idea that his only work was to keep Kentucky safe in the Union. Though Kentucky was now as safe as Ohio. A change was needed. And there was to be but one head, Halleck. And he was to command all the troops. He had for some time been plying the authorities at Washington with suggestions and arguments for this change, but had always been opposed by McClellan, who was the friend of Buell.

Halleck assumed command of the new department on March 13. He continued Buell, subject to his own orders, over the part of the department that had been before under his command. Buell had already been asked to reinforce Savannah, Ky., as strongly as possible. The Confederates had assumed a new line of defence from the Mississippi through Corinth to Chattanooga. The design now was to pierce this line at or near Corinth. Halleck was anxious that Buell should move promptly to Grant's support and not come in too late as he had at Donelson. The other troops were being massed at Savannah. General Hurlbut went up from Fort Henry on March 7 with his division. The next day Sherman followed him with 7,829 men, infantry, and one battery of artillery. These were mostly raw troops that had been gathered under Sherman at Paducah. Brigadier-General B. M. Prentiss reported for duty on the 26th, and was assigned to the command of some unattached troops. The new regiments as they arrived were to be brigaded and then united in a division under his command.

The plan was to leave only a fragment of a regiment at Fort Henry and the same at Donelson, withdraw from Clarksville entirely and send the other troops up the Tennessee. 'As soon as these things are arranged,' wrote Halleck to Grant, 'you will hold yourself in readiness to take command. There will probably be some desperate fighting in that vicinity, and we must be prepared.'

However impatient Halleck might be with Grant for his failure to make returns of the number of his troops, and for not preventing the theft of captured property, it is apparent how he turned to him when there was hard fighting to do. There was probably some cause for the complaints and Grant sought to remedy them. He made special orders, assigning the work of collecting, consolidating and forwarding returns of the troops to different members of his staff and investigated the thefts, and required brigade commanders to detail a special guard under commissioned officers to take charge of property as soon as captured and prevent its loss. But Grant never was a methodical man. The only place, he once said, that he ever found where he could put a paper and be able to find it again was in his side coat-pocket. But he was a man of cool head, of stubborn purpose, and, under a very quiet exterior, of restless activity, ready to seize and use to the utmost the means at hand and, if anything better appeared, to turn quickly to that. These were traits that Halleck already appreciated, for they had brought promotion to them both.

Grant had now 35,147 infantry, 3,169 cavalry, and twelve batteries, aggregating 54 pieces. The Confederate forces opposed to him were estimated at 40,000. They were at Decatur, Huntsville, Corinth, Jackson and Humboldt, near the great southern bend of the Tennessee River and along the Memphis and Charleston and the Mobile and Ohio Railroads, ready to mass at Corinth. Every effort was being made to increase their number. The Governors of the states of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana had been urged to furnish additional troops. And some regiments were sent from New Orleans and a corps from Mobile and Pensacola, the latter under Major-General Bragg.

The purpose of Halleck was to take Corinth, which being situated at the crossing of these railroads was an important point. If captured, the Confederate lines of communication over these trunk roads would be broken, and a base of operations, east, west, north and south would be acquired. Realising its importance, Johnston and Beauregard, the Confederate commanders, had anticipated Halleck and taken possession of Corinth, and were engaged in fortifying it. Halleck was determined to wrest it from them. It was apparent that a decisive battle must be fought somewhere in this neighbourhood. Johnston, who was in supreme command of this Confederate army, had another purpose in view. He was extremely anxious to turn back the tide of victory that had been sweeping over his department from Mill Springs to Donelson and threatened to engulf both him and his army.

Grant, knowing that he had already occupied Corinth, ordered Sherman on March 14 to operate between there and Eastport, and attempt to cut the Memphis and Charleston Railroad near Burnsville.

So that same day Sherman embarked his division at Savannah on nineteen steamboats, under the convoy of the gunboat *Tyler*, Commander Gwyn, and proceeded up the Tennessee. As he started, Sherman suggested that another gunboat with an additional division move up to Pittsburg Landing, and there await his return. He feared that the Confederates might occupy this point and attempt to cut off his return. Pittsburg was a little hamlet with only two houses and lay twenty-three miles north-east of Corinth. About the last of February, Beauregard had sent a field battery and two regiments to occupy the bluff back of the landing. And Commander Gwyn, now convoying Sherman's troops, had driven them away with two gunboats. It was feared they might return and that a single gunboat would not be able to dislodge them. Hurlbut's division with another gunboat was accordingly ordered to follow Sherman to Pittsburg and there await his return.

Sherman passed on up the river to Tyler's Landing, eighteen miles above Pittsburg, and there debarked. Six companies of the 5th Ohio Cavalry were pushed out, at eleven o'clock that night, towards Burnsville. They were followed by two brigades of infantry. This was in an attempt to destroy a trestle-work and cut the railroad. But the night was stormy. A heavy rain had fallen all day. And though about the time of debarkation the storm seemed to break away, it however gathered again and poured down mingled torrents of rain and snow the remainder of the night. Sherman kept up communication with the cavalry. But it was found by the next morning that it was impossible for them to proceed. The water in the streams was rising at the rate of six inches every hour. The Tennessee River had risen fifteen feet in eleven hours. Bridges had been washed away and their approaches were under water. The men found the streams everywhere impassable and could with difficulty return. One battery, that had been sent out with the troops, could not be brought back by the road, and was taken apart and carried on rafts down to the steamboats. As the whole country was picketed with bands of Confederate cavalry, it was now seen that the object of the expedition could not be accomplished. It was, therefore, abandoned, and the troops returned to Pittsburg on the forenoon of the 16th. Here they met Hurlbut's division and reported to Savannah.

Still, however, loath to give up the purpose of the expedition, Sherman sent out his cavalry from Pittsburg on the night of the 16th, in another attempt to cut the railroad. And they encountered a Confederate infantry force which they attacked and drove away. But finding it impossible to reach the railroad, they also returned unsuccessful. Sherman reported that every road and path was occupied by hostile cavalry and that the bridges and trestles of the railroads were carefully guarded, that probably 30,000 troops were distributed between Corinth and Iuka, that five regiments were at Purdy, two more at Pea Ridge and 3,000 or 4,000 men were occupying a fortification at Chickasaw. He was satisfied that he could not reach the railroad without a considerable engagement. And this his instructions forbade.

Under a later order, received on the 16th, he occupied Pittsburg with his own and Hurlbut's divisions and extended his pickets so as to include a semi-circle of three miles. Three days later they went into camp two miles back from the Landing near a log church, known in the neighbourhood as Shiloh. They stationed their brigades so as to command the roads leading thence to Purdy, Hamburg and Corinth. And here they continued in camp, drilling the raw troops and reconnoitring the country, the army being constantly increased by fresh arrivals, until they were attacked by Johnston. Thus the field was chosen, and here was fought one of the bloodiest encounters of the war, the battle of Shiloh.

Grant had never seen the position. But after a reconnaissance towards Corinth and Purdy on the 17th, Sherman reported that he was strongly impressed with the importance of the location, both for its land advantages and its strategic position, that the ground admitted of easy defence by a small command and yet afforded admirable camping-ground for 100,000 men, that to advance on Corinth in force they could make use of several routes and avoid their troops dragging out too long on a single country road, that from Hamburg and Tyler's Landing, immediately above, and Crump's Landing, just below, troops could move concentrically on Corinth; that the only drawback was that the space for landing, at the existing stage of the river, was contracted too much. From this description it will be seen that the position was not chosen with the expectation that it would become a battle-ground upon which 100,000 men would be engaged for two days in a life and death struggle, but rather for its advantages as a camp and a base from which the Union army could advance against Corinth.

Of course, the Confederates knew of the landing. On the day that Sherman returned from up the river, Brigadier-General Ruggles, commanding at Corinth, notified Johnston at Decatur and Brigadier-Generals Chalmers at Iuka and Walker at Tusculum that a landing had been made in force at Pittsburg and that scouts estimated the number at 30,000. Ruggles was himself subject to the orders of Johnston, but he suggested that Chalmers and Walker hold their forces ready to move whenever ordered. The estimate of the Union force was, of course, excessive, in fact about double what it was in reality.

Grant, arriving at Savannah on March 17, ordered all troops there to report to Sherman at Pittsburg, except McClernand's division. He directed Sherman to organise the new regiments into brigades and attach them to divisions as he might deem best. Lew Wallace's division had already been sent to occupy Crump's Landing. On the 20th McClernand was ordered up, and by the 22nd all the troops were gone from Savannah but one regiment. On the 19th Grant reported to Halleck that he had just returned from Pittsburg and Crump's Landing, and that, so far as he could find, these were the only two positions where a landing on the west bank could be effected. He continued his headquarters at Savannah, but went to Pittsburg each day, returning in the evening.

All the efforts of Halleck and Grant were now directed to getting forward reinforcements. They both felt that their forces were not

sufficient to meet the united Confederate armies. New regiments were sent up from St. Louis, Cairo and Paducah as fast as they arrived. But their numbers were comparatively small. Buell commanded a large army that could supply all wants. He had now 50,000 of his men at Nashville, only a hundred miles away. And he was ordered to move forward promptly. Halleck suggested that he move his troops down the Cumberland and Ohio and up the Tennessee. This would secure their prompt arrival. But Buell answered that he could reach Savannah almost, if not quite, as soon by marching across. And Halleck wrote him on March 17, a week later: 'Push forward your troops as rapidly as possible.' And again the same day: 'Move on as ordered to-day and reinforce Smith. Savannah is now the strategic point. Don't fail to carry out my instructions.' And still again on the 26th: 'I think all your available forces, not necessary to hold your positions on the railroad, should be concentrated on the Tennessee in the vicinity of Savannah and Eastport.'

Grant wrote him on the 19th: 'Feeling a little anxious to learn your whereabouts and as much as possible of your present movements, I send two scouts, Breckinridge and Carson, to you. Any information you will send by them I will be glad to learn. I am massing troops at Pittsburg, Tenn. There is every reason to suppose that the rebels have a large force at Corinth, Miss., and many other points on the road to Decatur.'

But this anxiety seems to have had little effect in hastening Buell. He was still in Nashville himself, and did not leave there until a week later. He sent forward some of his divisions, and by leisurely marches over bad roads they reached Columbia on the 18th, only to find the bridge over Duck River in flames. They were delayed for two weeks in rebuilding it. Buell did not arrive to assist until the 26th. And on the evening of his arrival, General Nelson, who had reached Donelson with his troops after its surrender and had thereby received a lesson on promptness, had become impatient at the slow progress on the bridge, and asked leave to ford the river with his troops. The leave was granted, and the men stripped off their clothes and hanging them on their bayonets to keep them dry, with horses stationed in the stream to mark the ford and break the current, they waded over and marched on to Savannah. They were delayed for a night and half a day there for want of orders, but they reached Pittsburg in time, nevertheless, to have two regiments, the 6th Ohio and 36th Indiana, take part in the first day's battle. Grant knew they were at hand before the battle opened, and the inspiration of knowing that powerful aid was near was worth more than their assistance.

The bridge over Duck River was finished on the 29th, and the army commenced crossing. Buell left one division at Fayetteville, a brigade at Murfreesboro, another at Franklin and a force at Columbia, to hold the country about these places. The sequel shows they were entirely useless there. For all the Confederate troops had been withdrawn to Corinth. Buell only purposed to bring 35,000 to Savannah. So he left Columbia with the rear of his army at 9 P.M. of April 3, and proceeded to Savannah by easy marches.

During all this time Grant had been impatiently awaiting his arrival. He was anxious to move forward. He had designed an

advance on March 20. And his troops at Pittsburg and Crump's Landing were placed under marching orders, with three days' rations in their haversacks, and the teams were provided with five days' forage. But the next day he had certain information that thirteen trains of cars, twenty cars to each train, and all loaded with troops, had arrived at Corinth the day before. This showed that the place could not be taken without a general engagement. And Halleck's instructions forbade this. So he determined not to move without further orders.

On the 23rd, he issued an order for a reconnaissance on Pea Ridge, ten miles towards Corinth, with the idea of partially fortifying a position there. 'I am clearly of the opinion,' he wrote, 'that the enemy are gathering strength at Corinth quite as rapidly as we are here, and the sooner we attack them, the easier will be the task of taking the place.' Sherman took two brigades by the Corinth and Bark roads respectively. They were to rendezvous at eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th at 'a shoemaker's named Heath, where we left a wounded man on our first expedition,' as Sherman expressed it.

He must have been thinking of the hazards of a soldier's life, when he wrote that morning to his old friend General Strong, then in command at Cairo: 'I am on the point of mounting my horse to start on a strong reconnaissance to Pea Ridge, halfway to Corinth—the new Manassas of this region. . . . Most assuredly our cause has received a tremendous lift since we paced the piazza of Benton Barracks. . . . We all play our parts, and whilst I have in my heart a memory of many, very many, kind and courteous acts of families in Louisiana, I dream that I may still some day sit by their firesides and hear them admit that their rebellion was the result of bad counsels and want of information. I hope we may meet in Memphis. Here we are on its latitude and you have its longitude. Draw our parallels, and we breakfast at the "Gayosa," whither let us God speed, and then rejoice once more at the progress of our cause.'

The expedition upon which he was starting was full of dangers, for he found the path everywhere obstructed by detachments of Confederate troops. It was impossible to effect a lodgement. And so Sherman returned, again unsuccessful. Drilling the troops and reconnoitring to the front were once more resumed.

On the 31st, Grant ordered Sherman to make a reconnaissance up the river. He took two guns and a detachment of cavalry and another of infantry and went under convoy of three gunboats, proceeding cautiously as far as Chickasaw, shelling the points where, on former visits, batteries had been found. But all were abandoned now. Scouts were sent out from Eastport, and they found Confederate cavalry watching the road two miles back in the direction of Iuka. Still another expedition was sent up on April 3, with a like result. Grant reported to Halleck that there would be no difficulty in going anywhere to cut the railroad with the army which he had, but that a battle, which was forbidden, would necessarily ensue, and that from Eastport the path of the Union army would be along a ravine with abrupt hills on either side, affording numerous positions which could be defended by a small force and thus afford time for a concentration from Corinth, in an hour by railroad, with an overwhelming force.

Thus Grant's time was employed in fruitless reconnaissances. And so he impatiently waited for Buell. Day by day he saw the enemy reinforced from all directions. Halleck would not let him fight with what troops he had, and Buell, his only hope of substantial reinforcement, could not be got forward. 'It is reported,' wrote Halleck on March 24, in a letter sent to both Grant and Buell, 'that Jackson and Humboldt have been evacuated and that the enemy has concentrated his forces at Corinth with the intention to give battle. A battle should be avoided for the present and until we can concentrate a larger army against him.' And again to Buell on the 26th: 'I am inclined to believe the enemy will make his stand at or near Corinth. . . . I propose to join you as soon as you reach the Tennessee.' These letters disclose Halleck's plan of campaign. Risk no battle; unite Buell's army with Grant's. As soon as the two forces are together, I will come up to Pittsburg, assume command, advance on Corinth and, with my overwhelming combination, crush the Confederates.

But this plan assumed that the enemy would stay quietly where he was and wait until Halleck was ready to strike. The enemy had already waited a long time; for Grant had now been at the front for a week, and his army had been there two weeks more. But this delay on the part of the Confederates was not to give Halleck time to gather together his forces and then come to the front himself; but rather to collect all their forces within reach and then crush Grant before Buell would arrive.

By April 1, the united forces of Johnston and Beauregard were concentrated along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, from Bethel to Corinth, and on the Memphis and Charleston, from Corinth to Iuka. Buell's advance had been carefully watched, and they believed that Grant could be beaten back to the river or captured and then their army fall back to its entrenchments at Corinth, with the spoils of victory, before the Union armies could unite.

The separation of the Confederate armies under Johnston and Beauregard, by the opening of the Tennessee River at Fort Henry and the fall of Donelson, had opened a splendid opportunity for the destruction of each army in detail, by the united commands of Halleck and Buell. The opportunity had been allowed to escape by the divided ambition and slowness of Halleck and Buell, with a mutual jealousy of Grant. The latter had seen it when he declared that one energetic general in command of these troops could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis and Vicksburg. Now the tables were turned. Grant's army was at Pittsburg and Buell's scattered along between Columbia and Savannah. The two commands were divided by the Tennessee River. And Johnston and Beauregard, now united, were determined to beat them in detail before they could be concentrated.

Accordingly, at one o'clock on the morning of April 3, the order was issued for a general movement of the Confederate armies against Grant at Pittsburg. It was expected that they would be able to reach his line in time to attack him early on the 5th. The men, however, were unused to marching and the roads were narrow and through a wooded country and, owing to a severe rainstorm on the

night of the 4th, had become miry. So they did not reach the intersection of the roads from Pittsburg and Hamburg, in the immediate vicinity of the Union army, until late in the afternoon of the 5th. It was then decided that an attack could not be made until the next day, Sunday, the 6th.

It is almost inconceivable that an army of 40,000 men could march by easy stages to within two miles of one of similar size and the movement not be known. Yet such was the case here. The presence of the Confederate army was entirely unknown to the Union commanders until the initial attack was actually made. The testimony upon this point is conclusive. 'All is quiet along my lines now,' wrote Sherman to Grant, on April 5. 'The enemy has cavalry in our front, and I think there are two regiments of infantry and one battery of artillery about two miles out.' And again, the same day, 'I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day more than some picket firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday, and will not press our pickets far. I will not be drawn out far unless with certainty of advantage, and I do not apprehend anything like an attack on our position.' And that same day, the very day before the battle, Grant wrote Halleck: 'The main force of the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at different points east, also at Bethel, Jackson and Humboldt are small garrisons.' This was not true. The main force of the enemy was not at Corinth. It was in front of his own army. And the garrisons at Bethel, Jackson and Humboldt had been drawn in to add to this force, leaving at these points only a guard. Grant himself was at Savannah, nine miles away, when the attack was made that opened the battle. And this fact of itself is conclusive evidence that he did not expect a battle or know of the presence of an enemy on his front.

This was a mistake of Grant's. He permitted the enemy to come down to his front without knowing it. If the Confederates were in too great force to permit reconnaissances to be made without an engagement, by the proper use of scouts, with the assistance of residents who were in sympathy with the Union cause, and the records prove there were such in that neighbourhood, information of the movement of Johnston's army might have been had. Grant did not make the proper effort. And in his Memoirs he gives the reason: 'I regarded the campaign we were engaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy would leave strong entrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he would be attacked where he was if he remained.' But in this explanation he ignores the fact that he had only 33,000 men and was waiting for Buell to come up with 35,000 more, and that if Johnston made the attack now he would have only half their aggregate force to meet. In reality Grant had made the same mistake as Halleck. He relied too implicitly on Johnston remaining where he was until they were ready to fight. And before they knew it, Johnston had literally 'stolen a march' on them and was now at the front in full force, ready to make an assault upon one part of the divided army.

The inquiry naturally suggests itself: What would have been its effect upon Grant's career if Johnston had succeeded?

CHAPTER XIX

The Battle of Shiloh—Death of General A. S. Johnston—Capture of Prentiss' Division—Buell and Lew Wallace reach the Field—Confederates in retreat.

THE little log church called Shiloh, which stood near the centre of the advance line of the Union army, gave the name to the battle. The field lay between Lick Creek, which entered the river three miles above the Landing, and Snake Creek, which entered it a mile below. The valleys of these streams extended westward, and their branches converging just beyond the church enclosed between them and the river a tract of about four square miles. It consisted of an undulating tableland, elevated eighty or a hundred feet above the river. To the east, and therefore along the river, it breaks into abrupt ravines. On the south, and so along Lick Creek, it rises into a range of hills of some height, whose slopes are gradual towards the affluents of Snake Creek, but somewhat abrupt on the Lick Creek side. Generally the face of the field was covered by woods through which troops could easily pass, though occasionally the undergrowth was dense. Cultivated fields of from twenty to eighty acres occurred here and there. Snake Creek divided about half a mile from the river, and a branch called Owl Creek continued up in a south-west direction for a mile or more, and then again dividing, the run known as Oak Creek extended thence to the south-east. A branch of Lick Creek continued north-west towards the head of Oak Creek. The two streams thus headed within a quarter of a mile of each other. And two roads, the Corinth passing Shiloh Church and Sherman's division and the Bark commanded by Prentiss, followed the general course of the dividing ridge. These were the natural approaches for the Confederate army and the only ones not impeded by the ravines just mentioned. The latter were narrow, their sides abrupt and covered with timber, in which there was a thick undergrowth of brush and briars so as to make their passage difficult and obscure the view from one side to the other. Both Lick and Snake Creeks were impassable near their mouths by reason of back-water from a flood in the river. But farther up they were fordable. And the battlefield they enclosed was in the form of a triangle, its sides formed by the river and the ravines. On the east lay the river; on the north-west Snake and its affluent Owl Creek; and on the south-west Oak, a branch of Owl Creek and the fork of Lick Creek. The hardest fighting was on this last side.

Across the ravines formed by Oak and Lick Creeks, as the Confederates advanced, were encamped the 5th and 6th Divisions of

the Union army, commanded respectively by Sherman and Prentiss. All the regiments of these divisions were raw troops. They had never been under fire before. Yet they constituted the advance line of the Union army. Sherman's division was divided. He had sent a brigade of three regiments under Colonel David Stewart a mile and a half to the south-east of Shiloh Church, near the river, to guard the approach to the field by the Hamburg Road, which crossed Lick Creek there. This brigade formed the extreme left of the Union line. The left of Sherman's other brigades rested on the Corinth Road at Shiloh Church and extended thence north-west along Oak Creek. Prentiss was encamped about midway between Shiloh Church and Stewart's position, though separated some distance from each. A half-mile to the rear of Sherman lay McClelland's division, and a mile behind Prentiss lay Hurlbut's. The only other division on the field at the opening of the battle was that of W. H. L. Wallace. It was encamped more than a mile to the rear of McClelland, behind Brier Creek, an affluent of Snake Creek. These three divisions were all seasoned troops that had united in the siege and capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, and some of them in the battle of Belmont. And the five divisions with some slight assistance, late in the evening, of two regiments of Nelson's division of Buell's army, fought the battle of the first day. Grant fixed the effective strength of the five divisions at 33,000. As the Confederate general fixed his strength at 40,000, it will be seen that Grant was considerably outnumbered on the first day.

Though the Union army had been on this field for three weeks, it was not entrenched. General Halleck had suggested the subject to Grant two weeks before, when he wrote: 'Don't let the enemy draw you into an engagement. Wait till you are properly fortified.' And Grant had directed his engineer to run the lines for such work. But the engineer reported that the only available line of entrenchment would be farther back than the advance and where water would not be accessible for the troops. Grant had accordingly allowed the camp to remain unentrenched, preferring to employ the time in drilling the troops. He considered the drill and discipline worth more than the fortifications.

This was another mistake. The means of constructing a hasty defence were at hand. There was an abundance of timber standing on the field. And with an army of 33,000 men and their horses labour was abundant. In a day or two the timber could have been cut and dragged together so as to form a rude but effective protection. And if constructed back of the advance line it would have afforded a place of retreat where a stand could have been made to repel the assault and prolong the battle till Buell arrived. It would certainly have saved much of the terrible loss of Grant's army on the first day.

As it was, the men were left to secure such protection as they could behind logs or standing trees or in the sunken road to which Prentiss retired soon after the battle opened. In the natural entrenchment of this road, Prentiss' division held the weight of the Confederate attack in check and defied all efforts to drive him from it for more than seven hours. This probably saved Grant's army.

But most of the troops fought in the open, without protection of any kind, save as they were sometimes screened from sight by the bushes that lined the ravine in their front or grew in the woods about them.

But such a large and independent command as he now exercised was new to Grant. And the same may be said of Halleck and Buell. The delay of Buell in leaving Nashville, getting across Duck River and coming up to Savannah, the easy disposition which Halleck showed in permitting this delay and in forbidding Grant to risk an engagement in his reconnaissances to obtain a lodgement in front where he could have secured information of the Confederate movement, and Grant's neglect to keep a more watchful eye on his antagonist and to have an entrenchment or protection of logs to resist his advance, were all mistakes which, in the pregnant phrase of Grant applied to Lew Wallace's failure to get his division up for the first day's fight, they 'would not have made later in the war.' They were all now receiving some of the most impressive lessons of their lives. Fortunately no one of these mistakes was fatal. And all were in some measure counterbalanced by those of the other side.

At daybreak, Sunday morning, April 6, 1862, Johnston's army was deployed in three lines of battle reaching from Owl Creek on his left to Lick Creek on the right, a distance of about three miles. The first line was under the command of Major-General W. J. Hardee and the second, about five hundred yards to the rear, under Major-General Braxton Bragg. The corps of Major-General Leonidas Polk followed the second line at a distance of about eight hundred yards, in brigades deployed. The reserve, under Brigadier-General Jno. C. Breckinridge, followed closely the third line. The corps of Polk and Breckinridge were to support the two lines in front according to the exigencies of the battle. The army was under the command of General Albert Sidney Johnston. And his second in command was General P. G. T. Beauregard. Johnston's career ended with this battle. But the others all became familiar figures in the later history of the war. Beauregard had already fought at Bull Run.

The army had been marched into position on Saturday evening. And after posting an adequate guard, arms were stacked and the troops bivouacked on their lines of battle. The night was clear, the air cool and bracing, and the dawn ushered in a morning of remarkable brilliancy. The storm on Friday had cleared the atmosphere and the sky was cloudless. It was one of those gorgeous mornings of the early springtime when nature seemed to delight in showing how bright a face she could display after the surly frowns of winter. At four o'clock the men were aroused without fife or drum. And silently but promptly they resumed their arms ready for the order to move forward. This was soon received, and was obeyed with alacrity.

The first detailed order of movement was issued on April 3. It simply provided for an advance of the line of battle against the Union army as it occupied its position at Shiloh. But a subsequent order, issued the same day, modified this somewhat, by directing in detail how the defeat of Grant was to be accomplished. 'In approaching the battle, every effort,' it read, 'shall be made to turn the left flank of the enemy so as to cut off his line of retreat to the Tennessee River

and throw him back on Owl Creek, when he will be obliged to surrender. Every precaution must also be taken on our part to prevent unnecessary exposure of our men to the enemy's gunboats.' This was the order pursued in the battle, first, a general advance against the whole Union front, then a combined effort to turn the Union left next the river and crowd it back and away from the Tennessee upon Owl Creek so as to surround and capture the army. But before the battle could be opened on this plan an unexpected skirmish took place between the advance guards of the two armies.

On the evening of April 5, Major A. B. Hardcastle, commanding the 3rd Miss. Inf. Battalion, occupied a post of picket with a body of his troops. He was about four hundred yards in front of his brigade, Wood's of Hardee's corps. He had a hundred and ninety men, eight flankers on the right and twenty-two on the left. An advance party of seven men was posted two hundred yards in front of his centre, and another party of eight, a hundred yards still farther in front, all deployed. Still in front of them there were some cavalry vedettes.

On the same evening Brigadier-General Prentiss, commanding the 6th Division of the Union army, sent out five companies of the 25th and five more of the 21st Missouri under Colonel David Moore. They returned about seven o'clock, reporting some activity in front,—an evident reconnaissance by cavalry. Upon this information Prentiss strengthened the guard stationed on the Corinth Road, extending the picket line to the front a mile and a half and doubling the lines of the grand guard. These troops consisted of four companies of the 16th Wisconsin and two more of the 21st Missouri, and were under the command of Captain Donnelly of the staff of Colonel Peabody, commanding Prentiss' 1st Brigade. At dawn the next morning a part of this force discovered the Confederate vedettes some distance to the front. At 3 A.M. Colonel Peabody had sent Major Powell with three companies of the 25th Missouri on a reconnaissance up the road in front of the Union camp. They joined the pickets, and while advancing upon the vedettes, which were retiring, they came upon the first line of Hardcastle's pickets concealed behind a fence. The Confederates had been aroused 'by the singular beat of their drum' and saw their line, which seemed about 1,000 in number. And they suffered them to approach within ninety yards and then fired. These were the first shots of the battle. Two of the pickets, Captain Saxe and Sergeant Williams of Company A, 16th Wisconsin, were killed and others wounded. The first line of Hardcastle's pickets fell back and joined their battalion. And the Union troops, still advancing, came upon the second line. It received them with their fire at a hundred yards and then it too fell back, followed by the Union troops with 'a heavy fire.' Hardcastle's force was now united. It lay 'on a rise of ground, men kneeling.' And here they returned the fire.

Major Powell sent back for reinforcements, and Prentiss sent Colonel Moore with five companies of the 21st Missouri to his support. Moore met the pickets retreating and bringing in their wounded. And learning that the enemy was advancing in force, he sent for the remaining five companies of his regiment. And they having joined him, he ordered an advance. A sharp fire was opened upon them

from the whole front of four or five regiments forming the advance of the enemy. This he withstood for thirty minutes and then communicated the situation to General Prentiss. About this time, Moore was wounded and he was obliged to retire, leaving Colonel Woodyard in command. Woodyard formed the regiment in line of battle on the brow of a hill and held the position for half an hour, holding the enemy in check. But discovering at last that they were trying to outflank him and being joined by four companies of the 16th Wisconsin, he fell back and took a new position behind a small incline, thus enabling his men to load and be out of range of the enemy's fire. The position proved a strong one. And he managed to hold it for upwards of an hour. Finding that they could not dislodge him, the enemy again sought to outflank him and deal a cross-fire. Then he fell back in good order, firing as he went, to the next hill.

When Moore sent back for reinforcements, Prentiss had notified Wallace and Hurlbut, commanding the 2nd and 4th Divisions, that an attack in force had been made. And Prentiss then ordered his entire division into line. The remaining regiments of Peabody's, all the troops thus far engaged having been of his command, were advanced well to the front. And here they met Woodyard's troops, when they fell back the last time. Shortly after six o'clock the entire line of Prentiss' division was under fire, receiving the assault of the full force of the enemy advancing in three columns upon his left, centre and right.

When the firing was first heard, General Johnston, commanding the Confederate army, was seated with his staff at breakfast in his tent. Turning to his son Preston and Captain Munford, he directed them to note the time. It was exactly fourteen minutes after five. Johnston then arose and gave the order for a general advance of his army.

The point where the Union troops had encountered the Confederates was a short distance in front of Sherman's position at Shiloh Church. On the day previous the enemy's cavalry had been very bold, coming well down to Sherman's front. He said he 'did not believe that they designed anything but a strong demonstration.' But on Sunday morning, hearing the firing continue and his advance guard being driven in, he ordered his division under arms and sent word to McClelland to come up between him and Prentiss and to Hurlbut asking him to support Prentiss. By seven o'clock Sherman had his division under arms, with two batteries posted, one at Shiloh Church and the other on a ridge to the left, both with a front fire, over open ground, commanding the approach by the Corinth Road. Shortly after, as he rode with his staff by this point, the Confederate pickets opened fire upon his party, killing his orderly. The fire came from the bushes lining the banks of Oak Creek, which ran along his front. The ravine afforded the Confederates a partial concealment but gave his men a good fire at them as they crossed and ascended its bank to his front. About eight o'clock he 'saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry to his left front, in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to, and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined attack upon the whole camp.'

Grant, at his headquarters in Savannah, had risen earlier than usual that morning, and on coming downstairs had busied himself in his private office, reading his mail and conversing with Brigadier-General Cook, till breakfast was announced. On the arrival of Buell, who was expected that morning, the headquarters were to be removed to Pittsburg, and the Assistant Adjutant-General, John A. Rawlins, was occupied in making arrangements accordingly. While at breakfast, about 6 A.M., they were informed, by a soldier on guard at headquarters, of artillery firing in the direction of Pittsburg. Grant had already ordered the horses to be in readiness to ride out to meet General Buell. Nelson's division had reached Savannah the evening before. And Grant, supposing Buell to be near, had determined to save time by meeting him on the road. Buell had in fact arrived in Savannah the night before, but Grant did not know it. When the firing was heard, breakfast was left unfinished and the horses were sent on board the steamer *Tigress*, used for Grant's headquarters boat and on which steam was always kept up, for his convenience in going to and from Pittsburg.

Delaying only long enough to write an order for Nelson to move his division by the road from Savannah to the river landing opposite Pittsburg and a note to Buell informing him of the condition of affairs at the front, Grant with his staff hurried on board the *Tigress* and started up the river. As he passed Crump's Landing, about halfway up, where the division of Lew Wallace was stationed, the *Tigress* ran close alongside the boat on which Wallace had his headquarters. And Grant directed him to have his division ready to move, on receipt of orders. The reply of Wallace was that he was then ready. So Grant steamed on and reached Pittsburg about eight o'clock. Riding towards the front, about half a mile from the river he met W. H. L. Wallace, and from him ascertained the particulars of the attack and how matters then stood. Grant promptly sent one of his staff back on the *Tigress* to Crump's Landing with an order to Lew Wallace to bring forward his division by the River Road and to form in column in the rear of W. H. L. Wallace and there await further orders. Grant then went on to the front, and was continuously engaged the remainder of the day in passing from one part of the field to another, giving directions to division commanders.

He found Sherman in position, with a brigade on each side of Shiloh Church, and another to the north-west, covering the approach by the Purdy Road and the bridge over Owl Creek. All three of these brigades fronted on Oak Creek. McClernand was in position on Sherman's left, also fronting on Oak Creek. Next to him was Prentiss. And on the extreme left was Stuart's brigade of Sherman's division, fronting on the fork of Lick Creek and guarding the approach, by the Hamburg Road, from the south. Stuart was thus widely separated from his division commander, Sherman. And so, being unable to receive orders from him, he acted independently all day. The position of the Union troops thus made a continuous line from Lick Creek on the left to Owl Creek on the right. Hurlbut was in the rear of Prentiss, massed and in reserve, and W. H. L. Wallace to the right of Prentiss, also in reserve. The Confederates had attacked

along the whole front. Their assaults were made with such a disregard of losses that the Union line was soon pushed back and the camps of Sherman, Prentiss and Stuart fell into their hands. Here some of their men fell out of line to pillage the camps. The comparative safety of the tents and the unconsumed breakfasts of the Union soldiers had more attractions for them than the firing line. And here a good many of them remained. And later with other stragglers they found even greater safety still farther to the rear. But the far larger number, encouraged by this initial advantage, pressed on to the front to still greater success.

Sherman had posted Hildebrand's brigade, composed of the 17th, 53rd and 57th Ohio, to the left of the Corinth Road, its right resting on Shiloh Church. As the Corinth Road was the easiest means of access to their line, Grant and Sherman regarded Shiloh Church as the key to the Union position. They were correspondingly anxious to hold it. Hence Sherman had posted Taylor's battery at the church and Waterhouse's on a ridge to the left, commanding the approach to it. He had asked McClelland for support, and three Illinois regiments were sent. They were posted to protect Waterhouse's battery and the left flank of his position. When all his regiments were in line of battle and at their proper posts, Sherman rode to the colonel of the 53rd Ohio and ordered him to hold his ground at all hazards, as he had the left flank of the division's first line, informing him that he had a good battery on his right and strong supports to his rear.

But when the battle opened and a Confederate battery in front began throwing shells into Sherman's camp the colonel failed to obey. Sherman's batteries answered the Confederates. Their infantry appeared in large force, advancing across the field, on the left of the Corinth Road, towards the Union line. The advance wore a dark uniform, that was mistaken for blue, and carried a flag that was supposed to be a Union flag. The troops hesitated to fire for fear they were Union troops. But they were followed by others that soon came into view wearing a uniform that was not to be mistaken. Two of Waterhouse's guns that had been thrown farther in advance than the others were drawn back before them to a position occupied by the rest of the battery. And as soon as the character of the troops was ascertained, the whole battery opened fire. Taylor's battery also opened upon them from the front of Shiloh Church. The Confederates recoiled and sought shelter in the timber, under cover of which they advanced to within a hundred and fifty yards of the guns, when they opened a sharp fire of musketry accompanied by their familiar 'yell.' Advancing, they were met by the fire of the Union line and recoiled; advancing again, they met another fire and again fell back. But here the colonel of the 53rd gave the command: 'Fall back and save yourselves!' And his regiment fell back in disorder behind one of the Illinois regiments. Here they were partially rallied by the lieutenant-colonel and company officers. Then the colonel again appeared and moved them to a position to the left of the church, where they were exposed to a fire that could not be returned without endangering the regiment in front, which was now hotly engaged. Then the colonel gave the order again:

'Fall back and save yourselves!' And promptly he disappeared. Two companies remained and joined one of the Illinois regiments and only fell back fighting when they were compelled to yield. The remaining eight companies disappeared from the front. But later in the day, under their lieutenant-colonel, they supported a battery and did some service.

When the 53rd broke in disorder and left its position in the line it was followed by fugitives from the 57th. And then the Confederates pressed forwards on Waterhouse's battery, which was thereby exposed. The three Illinois regiments supporting this battery stood for some time. But the advance was so vigorous and the fire so severe that when Colonel Raith, commanding one of the regiments, was wounded and fell from his horse, all were thrown into confusion and the Confederates captured three of the guns. The Union left was turned. But Sherman deemed the position so important that he still held on, renewing his orders to the remaining regiments to hold their ground. And they did hold on till about ten o'clock, when the Confederates got their artillery to the rear of Sherman's left flank and a change became absolutely necessary.

Two regiments, the 53rd and 57th, and the 3rd, Hildebrand's own, were in disorder, when Sherman gave the order for his whole line to fall back to the Hamburg and Purdy Road and adopt that as their new position. McDowell's brigade, that had been posted to command the approach by the Purdy Road and the bridge over Owl Creek, was brought back to this new position and with it Behr's battery. Sherman ordered the battery to unlimber and come into action. But Captain Behr was almost immediately killed. And then his drivers and gunners fled, abandoning five of their six guns without firing a shot. So that Sherman was now left with only two brigades, Buckland's and McDowell's, for Hildebrand's as a separate organisation had entirely disappeared.

When Sherman's line fell back from Shiloh Church, McClelland was exposed to a combined attack, and he too was obliged to retire. He took a new position across the Corinth Road, half a mile to the rear of Sherman's camp, and in front of his own headquarters. Here he posted Burrows' Ohio battery, with Schwartz's battery to the right, covering Sherman's new position, and McAllister's battery to the left, commanding the approach across a field. While this position was being taken the Confederates were advancing against him at all points, supported by several batteries. The whole line was soon engaged and the conflict became desperate. Burrows' battery opened a brisk fire from its position at the centre. But by the near approach of the Confederates and the sharp fire opened upon it, both by infantry and artillery, all seeming to concentrate upon this new resistance to their progress by the Corinth Road, it was soon swept away. The battery was lost, and Captain Burrows (later a Judge of the Circuit Court of Ohio) and a number of his officers and men were wounded. McAllister's battery to the left held the Confederates in check, and also Schwartz's to the right. And Sherman, seeing McClelland hard pressed, moved McDowell's brigade directly against the Confederate left and forced it back some distance, and then directed his

men to avail themselves of every cover—trees, fallen timber, and a wooded valley to his right. Here Sherman and McClelland held their position for four hours, sometimes gaining and at other times losing ground, both acting in perfect concert and struggling to maintain this line. McClelland's camp was lost and recaptured, and then lost and captured again. Trees of considerable size were cut off by the batteries. Within a radius of two hundred yards of his headquarters the ground was almost covered with dead bodies.

About four o'clock it was believed that the other divisions had been driven back towards the Landing, and knowing that Lew Wallace was coming up from Crump's with reinforcements, Sherman and McClelland, on consultation, agreed to select a new line of defence, with its right covering the bridge over Snake Creek. This was on the road over which Wallace would approach. They fell back as well as they could, gathering, in addition to their own, such scattered forces as they could find to form a new line. During this change they were charged by the Confederate cavalry, but it was repulsed. The 5th Ohio battery came up and rendered good service in holding the Confederates in check. Major Taylor also came up with a new battery and got into position in time to have a good flanking fire upon some columns that were pressing McClelland's right. It checked their advance. And McClelland's division then made a charge and drove them back into the ravines to the Union front and right. In this new position Sherman had a clear field about two hundred yards wide in his front, and contented himself, during the rest of the day, in keeping the Confederate infantry at that distance. And here, a mile and a half to the rear of their positions in the morning, these two hungry, exhausted and badly shattered divisions bivouacked for the night.

It is necessary now to turn to the other side of the field. While Sherman and McClelland were co-operating around and to the rear of Shiloh Church, Prentiss, with W. H. L. Wallace on his right, and Hurlbut on his left, were united in a terrific struggle with the larger part of Johnston's army on the side next to the river. It will be remembered that Johnston's order was that the Union army be attacked and driven back from the river front upon Owl Creek, where he hoped to defeat and capture it. But the actual progress of the battle had reversed this plan. It had followed the line of least resistance, and when Sherman and McClelland gave way and fell back and Prentiss, Wallace and Hurlbut held firm, the progress had been made, not on the river front, as Johnston designed, but on the side of the field next to Owl Creek.

While Prentiss' division was composed of raw troops, they proved to be of excellent material. It has been humorously said, and the record of this battle seems to illustrate its truth, that raw troops can always be depended on to do one of two things, 'either to run like the dev-l or fight like h—l.' Prentiss' troops here chose the latter part. It was the smallest of all the divisions on the field. But it was supported by an admirably served battery, the 5th Ohio, commanded by Captain Andrew Hickenlooper, later Lieutenant-Governor of Ohio.

It was also supported on the right by one of the largest divisions, that of W. H. L. Wallace. Sherman's was the largest, reporting on the day before the battle 8,830 men present for duty ; while Wallace's was next, reporting 8,708. But Wallace reported twenty-four pieces of artillery, while Sherman had only sixteen. Wallace's division was composed of seasoned troops that had seen service at Forts Henry and Donelson. It had previously been commanded by General C. F. Smith, and its present commander, W. H. L. Wallace, was an excellent officer, who had seen a year's service in the Mexican War.

On his left, Prentiss was supported by the division of Brigadier-General S. A. Hurlbut. This was also a strong division, numbering 7,302 men, with ten pieces of artillery, and was next to Wallace's in strength. It had also seen service. The troops of these two divisions, like Prentiss', were of excellent material. They were mostly from what were then frontier states—Iowa, Illinois and Missouri—with a sprinkling from Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio and Kentucky. One brigade of Wallace's division, Tuttle's, was composed exclusively of Western troops, the 2nd, 7th, 12th and 14th Iowa regiments. It was known as the 'Iowa Brigade.' And there were no better troops on the field that day. Of the three divisions it could be said that they were recruited from the hardy pioneers of the West, who had marched in the van of civilisation to the frontiers, had broken up the prairies with their ploughs and built homes for themselves and their children. In these far-away haunts they had been inured to toil, privation and hardship, and had developed the homely virtues of endurance and self-reliance. Dangers they did not fear, and death they knew how to meet. Taken all in all, they were troops that could be depended on for hard fighting and heroic endurance.

When Sherman was attacked in front of Shiloh Church, he noted that 'other heavy masses of the enemy's forces kept passing across the field to his left, and directing their course on General Prentiss. . . . Very soon the sound of musketry and artillery announced that Prentiss was engaged.' These troops had first struck Peabody's brigade, which had been pushed well out to the front and right to meet the retiring pickets. The approaching masses were encountered with coolness and determination, and after a conflict of half an hour the Confederates were driven back. General Johnston, seeing his men falling back, rallied them himself. And under this renewed assault Peabody gave way. Gradually falling back, he took a position within a quarter of a mile of his camp, where the fighting became very hard and his brigade was badly handled.

When they came in the Confederates followed. And still bearing to the left, they struck the right flank of Prentiss' other troops. When Prentiss perceived that they were flanking him, he ordered his division to retire to the colour line of his encampment, at the same time sending word to Wallace and Hurlbut and asking them for reinforcements. Here he was heavily attacked by Gladden's Confederate brigade. General Gladden, commanding, in advance of his brigade, received a severe wound from a cannon shot, and he had to be carried from the field. The wound afterwards proved mortal. Colonel Daniel W. Adams succeeded to the command. And finding that Prentiss was

pouring a destructive fire upon them, he ordered a rapid advance to drive him from his position. As he advanced the fire became so severe that he found the whole brigade began to falter, and finally to fall back. Fearing the worst consequences, he rode to the colour bearer of his own regiment, and seizing the battle flag and placing himself in front of the brigade, he called upon the troops to follow him. And leading them close to Prentiss' line, he ordered a charge. Prentiss' line again gave way and retreated through his camp, a Confederate battery cutting gashes in his ranks as he went.

Here Colonel Peabody was killed, and with him went out the life of a brave soldier and a good man. To his vigilance on the evening preceding and that morning, in disposing the picket guard from his brigade, the Union army owed the first intelligence it had of the presence of Johnston's army. And here Major Powell, who had been sent out by Peabody with three companies of the 25th Missouri at three o'clock that morning on a reconnaissance up the road in front of the Union camp, also fell. The colour bearer of the regiment was also killed. And when he fell he clung to the staff of his flag so tightly that it had to be disengaged from his grasp by the colour sergeant who took his place. The regiment was fearfully shattered.

When Prentiss fell back, he ordered his men to take a new position in an open space that had been left between Hurlbut and Wallace. Here at nine o'clock he reformed his line. At this time he was joined by another regiment, the 23rd Missouri, which had just arrived at the front, and when disembarked from the transport was ordered to join his division. It was placed in position on his left, next to Hurlbut. Prentiss arranged his other regiments between it and the line of General Wallace. His left was near the extreme southern end of a ravine, the head of Brier Creek, and his line extended thence to the right, almost to the Bark Road that led from Corinth to Pittsburg Landing. It was formed along an old road whose bed had been washed out, leaving the track sunken below the adjoining sides so as to form a natural entrenchment. He ordered his men to lie down in this cut, and use its side for a defence and fire from behind it. And here they were also protected from sight by the bushes that lined the roadside. They were near the summit of a ridge, and to the rear was a dense thicket. To the front was an open field over which the Confederates must approach. Prentiss placed Hickenlooper's battery to the right of the Bark Road, near its intersection with the one in which his troops lay. This was at the union of his own line with that of Wallace. The two lines here formed an angle. Prentiss' line ran north-west, while Wallace's ran almost due north. The position of the battery at this angle was such as to give it an enfilading fire down the front of each line. Finding his command reduced by killed and wounded, and the falling back of some to the Landing, panic-stricken by being exposed at the very first to so hot a fire, Prentiss appealed to Wallace for assistance, and the 8th Iowa, Colonel James L. Geddes, already on the right of his line, was sent him. This regiment was placed across the Bark Road where it would be immediately behind and supporting Hickenlooper's battery. And Geddes was instructed to defend it to the last.

About ten o'clock General Grant appeared upon the line, and

Prentiss showed him the disposition of his forces. The position was very strong. And Grant, realising its importance, gave Prentiss his final order—to hold it at all hazards. And this order was obeyed. Time and again Prentiss was assaulted by successive brigades, but he repelled every attack and held the position till near the close of the day.

The Confederates had not immediately pursued Prentiss as he retreated from his camp, having met with such severe treatment there themselves. But after a short rest, skirmishers were sent out to locate the Union line. It was now concealed from view by the bushes in the edge of the timber. Following the skirmishers came Gladden's brigade, now supported by Chalmers' and Jackson's. The advance came forward with the peculiar 'rebel yell,' as it was called. And as they advanced the Confederates continued to fire incessantly into the bushes at the concealed position of Prentiss. Most of their balls, however, went harmlessly over the heads of his men, now lying in the sunken road. But those of Prentiss, whose men were now firing at rest, from behind their entrenchment, upon the Confederates, advancing in the open, told with great effect. The Confederates fell back and threw their forces more to Prentiss' left, and came up again, but with the same result as before. The groans and shrieks in the bushes where they found refuge told the story. About two o'clock they made a movement to outflank Prentiss, Hurlbut's line on his left having fallen back at right angles to his position. Prentiss was still stubbornly holding his own. But a determined rush was made to drive him away. His men were killed at the guns, the horses were shot in the harness. But the Confederates dared not venture over the bushes to take or spike the guns, for Prentiss' men were pouring into them a deadly fire. They retired again. And Prentiss' men brought the guns in by hand, and placing them back of the line of battle, opened a way for Hickenlooper to pour canister into their retreating ranks. They rallied and came back again; and again were sent in retreat.

The fire of this battery was supervised by Prentiss in person. It had made havoc in the advancing columns. And it therefore became an object of the greatest importance to take it. The Confederates concentrated and hurled column after column upon it, charging gallantly up to the muzzles of the guns. It was a desperate struggle for the retention and the possession of the battery. It thinned the ranks of Geddes' supporting regiment; for in this struggle he lost a hundred men. But he saved the battery from capture. And later he had the satisfaction of seeing the guns carried to the rear in safety.

Wallace placed two of his brigades in line to the right of the position of Prentiss. His third brigade had been divided. Two regiments went to support Stuart's brigade on the extreme left of the Union line, where Hurlbut was in control. The remainder of the brigade went to guard the bridge over Snake Creek on the Crump's Landing Road, by which Lew Wallace must approach. The other two brigades on the right of Prentiss were posted, Tuttle's a hundred yards north of the Bark Road and, therefore, next to Geddes; and Sweeney's

between Tuttle's right and a deep ravine farther north, another head of Brier Creek. This ravine was a deep, impassable gorge, filled with impenetrable thickets. Along its sides Wallace posted sharpshooters, to prevent surprise on his right and rear. On the front of Tuttle's and Sweeney's brigades there was an open field sloping down towards the Confederate line.

Soon after ten o'clock General A. J. Stewart, of Polk's corps of Johnston's army, led his brigade, to which had been added that of General Hindman, who had been wounded, against Wallace's front. He was driven back; returned to the assault, and was again hurled back; but still rallying, he came on a third time, to be again driven back. General Bragg, who had been directing the Confederate advance, seeing that this command 'was unequal to the heavy task,' moved farther to the right and brought up the first brigade (Gibson's) of Ruggles' division, and threw it forward to attack this same point. But the sharp fire of Wallace's line, supported by the enfilading battery, mowed them down; and he fell back discomfited. Gibson asked to have artillery sent to his support. But none was at hand, and he was ordered to charge again. The colonels of his regiments thought it hopeless. But they obeyed. They swept up the slope again, but only to meet the same fate. Four times Gibson charged; and four times he was driven back. Colonel Allen of the 4th La. went again to Bragg, to ask for artillery support. But Bragg answered, 'Colonel Allen, I want no faltering now.' Stung by this answer, he returned to his regiment, and led it forward in a desperate attempt to take the position. But this effort, more persistent and more daring than any of the others, was only the more disastrous. His noble regiment fell back, slaughtered, leaving most of its men upon the field. General Bragg, in making his report, described the conclusion he then reached: 'Finding that nothing could be done here, after hours of severe exertion and heavy losses, . . . the troops were so posted as to hold this position; and leaving a competent staff-officer to direct them in my name, I moved rapidly to the extreme right.' The Confederates afterwards gave the name of 'hornets' nest' to this fatal slope.

General Ruggles, commanding the division to which Gibson's brigade belonged—the other divisions of the same corps comprising Gladden's, Chalmers', and Jackson's brigades—seeing the havoc which Hickenlooper's battery, supported by Prentiss and Wallace, had made among these troops, and exasperated at his unsuccessful attempts to break this line, being now in Bragg's absence the ranking officer, about 2 P.M. directed his staff officers to bring forward all the field guns they could find, as rapidly as possible. They collected ten batteries and one section of the eleventh. They were, 1st, Trabue's, Ky.; 2nd, Burns, Miss.; 3rd, Sweet's, Miss.; 4th, Trigg's, Ark.; 5th, Roberts', Ark.; 6th, Rutledge's, Ala.; 7th, Robertson's, Ala.; 8th, Stanford's, Miss.; 9th, Bankhead's, Tenn.; 10th, Hodgson's Washington Artillery, La.; and 11th, Lieutenant Thrall's section of Hubbard's, Ark. They were arranged, in succession, in a position overlooking the broken slope occupied by Prentiss and Wallace.

While they were being collected, Hurlbut's division on the left

of Prentiss gave way. General Johnston had been before Hurlbut, superintending in person the execution of his order to turn the left of the Union line next to the river. Hurlbut's division, supported by Stuart's brigade and the two regiments of Wallace, that had been sent under General McArthur, had made a stubborn resistance. Chalmers' and Jackson's Confederate brigades had been withdrawn from the front of Prentiss and Wallace, after their unsuccessful efforts to break those lines, and had been carried around to the front of Hurlbut. Having rested they were ordered to the assault. It was made. But they were driven back. Johnston, seeing this stubborn resistance, and eager to crush the Union line, called up Bowen's and Stratham's brigades of Breckinridge's reserve corps, and pushed them forward against Hurlbut's left. But the 41st Ill. occupied this position, and Hurlbut had moved up the 32nd Ill. to its support. And on reaching the front of the two Illinois regiments, the brigades broke before the withering fire and fell back. One regiment, Battle's, Tenn., protected somewhat by the slope of the hill, alone maintained its position. Lytle's, Tenn., three times advanced and as often fell back. The 45th Tenn. could not be urged up the slope. Squads would run up and fire and fall back. But as a whole it could not be got forward.

General Breckinridge, irritated, rode to General Johnston and complained that he had a Tennessee regiment that would not fight. Governor Harris of Tennessee was with Johnston, and remonstrated against this reflection upon the troops of his state. He rode to the front of the regiment and appealed to it to obey the order, but in vain. General Johnston then rode to the front of the brigade with which the regiment was now standing in line. And passing slowly down its front, he appealed to the men to come on and he would lead them. Aroused to enthusiasm by this appeal from their General, the men responded. And so Johnston, Harris and Breckinridge started up the slope, followed by the brigade. Advancing in this order, they reached and charged upon the two Illinois regiments. Before their advance the two regiments gave way, retiring sullenly, firing as they went. One of these parting shots hit General Johnston in the hip. The wound was not necessarily fatal. And he kept his seat on his horse, still advancing, till finally, too weak from loss of blood to proceed, he was helped from the saddle and carried to a ravine in the rear. Here a few minutes later he expired, no physician being near. His body was carried by his staff beyond the reach of the contending lines, and thence to Corinth.

His death occurred at half-past two o'clock. And the news finding its way to his troops, caused a lull in the battle for about an hour—precious time that was lost at a critical stage in the battle. Johnston was an able general, by some accounted the ablest in the Confederate service, and to his death at this critical stage of the battle, and the consequent loss of time, the Confederates attributed their failure to sweep the field on that day.

Whether they were right in this claim may be questioned. His death was certainly a misfortune to his army. He was greatly beloved by the troops, and his personal presence on the field was inspiring

increased exertions. He had been in touch with this important part of the field the greater portion of the day. Progress would probably have been made during the hour that was lost. And seeing the situation he might have prolonged the battle to a later hour than it was when his successor recalled the troops. But on the other hand, his own conduct proves that he by no means felt assured of success. When he started up that fatal slope, he must have realised that the chances of a victory were desperate and required a desperate effort. And so he threw his own life into the balance. The sun was already declining and darkness would soon close the short April day. Then the fighting must cease. Reinforcements were already at hand. And in a little more than an hour after Johnston's death Nelson's division of Buell's army was marching up the bank at Pittsburg Landing and taking its place in Grant's line of battle. These fresh troops, eager for the fight, with the help of the batteries above the Landing, would certainly have prolonged the battle. Could Johnston, under these circumstances, have accomplished the defeat of Grant on that day? It seems certain that he could not.

During the night and the next morning, reinforcements came to Grant, as the Confederates themselves concede, in overwhelming numbers. Then success was hopeless.

It was certainly a mistake for the commanding general to recklessly expose his life in front of a brigade while leading it into an engagement. His death was a very natural result of the position he assumed. And he should have considered the effect that this would have on the issue of the battle. It was certainly a handicap to this army on that day. But it was by no means final, though the mistake went far to off-set any of Grant's, or Buell's, or Halleck's.

It was relieved of some of the otherwise natural consequences by the fact that Johnston had a second in command on the field. General Beauregard was in charge of the headquarters, which had been established near Shiloh Church. And on being informed of Johnston's death he at once assumed command. And the troops, now refreshed by the rest they had obtained, pressed the assault with new vigour.

When the battle was renewed General Ruggles had his eleven batteries in position before Prentiss and Wallace. They all opened fire, between three and four o'clock, upon these devoted divisions. The storm was terrific. The two lines and Hickenlooper's battery were thrown into confusion, and were soon obliged to look for a new position. To add to the horrors of the situation, Ruggles' batteries were enfilading Prentiss' line.

When Bragg heard of Johnston's death he was superintending the advance in front of Prentiss and Wallace. He at once went to the extreme right where Johnston had fallen. And here, he tells us, he found a strong force, consisting of three parts without a common head, Breckinridge with his reserve division pressing Hurlbut, Withers with his division greatly exhausted and taking a temporary rest, and Cheatham with his division of Polk's corps to their left and rear. He assumed command of them all. These troops were soon formed and the command given: 'Forward! Let every order be forward!'

Hurlbut, seeing the preparation for this movement, had moved Lehman's brigade to the left to fill up the gap made by the retreat of the two Illinois regiments before Johnston. He posted a battery near the Hamburg Road, and brought up Willard's battery and two guns of Cavender's artillery. And aided by the rapid fire of these guns, and that of his brigade, he checked the first advance. Taking advantage of the lull, after notifying Prentiss that he was obliged to give way, he retired. Bragg's lines advancing again, Hurlbut attempted to make another stand. But he was unable to do so, and continued to retire. He took up a position on the next ridge, to the rear of some reserved artillery, that had been parked on the brow of the hill above the Landing. Here, by direction of General Grant, Hurlbut assumed command of all the troops that came up—refugees, broken regiments, and disordered battalions, the general fragments of a retiring army. They all came into line gradually upon his division. Major Cavender posted six of his twenty-pounder pieces on Hurlbut's right. And Hurlbut sent his aide to post all the light artillery that could be found on his left.

Bragg's troops, with Hurlbut's resistance swept away from their front, crowded up on to the plateau to the rear of the position that had been held since morning by Prentiss and Wallace. This was about four o'clock. On the other side of the field Hardee's troops had just withdrawn from their advance against Sherman and McClelland. And they too turned and, crossing the ravine of Brier Creek, advanced on the same plateau from the other side. Thus the two lines of Bragg and Hardee were drawing together to complete a circle around Prentiss and Wallace. The latter, seeing themselves being surrounded, took counsel together as to what they should do. They were now informed for the first time that all the other divisions had fallen back. They decided that it was their duty to hold their position to the end, according to the order of General Grant, and endeavour to save the army from destruction.

When they were almost encircled, Wallace, feeling that he was in danger of being captured, gave the command to his division to cut their way out through the gauntlet now formed between Bragg on the one side and Hardee on the other. The 2nd and 7th Iowa, led by Tuttle, advanced into the rapidly closing space and fought their way out, through a severe fire from both sides. The other two regiments of Tuttle's brigade, the 12th and 14th Iowa, lingering to protect the retreat of Hickenlooper's battery, were too late. *They* were walled in; and though the battery escaped, they were captured. Some of the troops of Wallace's other brigade also escaped. But two regiments, the 8th Iowa and 48th Ill., were securely surrounded. In passing through the cross-fire of the troops of Hardee and Bragg, Wallace fell, mortally wounded, and so closed his life on this field of his memorable defence. And this was the greatest loss.

Colonel Tuttle now became the ranking officer of this division, and assumed command. He rallied the two regiments of his brigade, the 2nd and 7th Iowa. And he was joined by the 13th Iowa, the 9th and 12th Ill., and some fragments of other regiments. He formed them in line on the Bark Road and held the Confederates in check,

while Hurlbut was forming the line behind the reserve artillery to resist the last charge of the day.

General Prentiss, seeing that he was about to be surrounded, dispatched his aide for reinforcements, and turned to attack the troops that had passed between him and the river. Charging upon them with his whole force, he found troops advancing against him from all sides. He realised that nothing remained for him but to harass them, so as to retard their progress as long as possible, with the hope of relief. This he continued to do until nearly six o'clock. He then saw that further resistance might result in the slaughter of every man of his command. And having held his position to the last, and having lost everything but honour, he surrendered himself and 2,200 rank and file, many of them wounded. This included the remnant of Wallace's division. At the time of the surrender the bulk of the Confederate army had united in the effort to crush him. In his front was Polk ; to the left and rear, Bragg and Breckinridge ; and to the right, Hardee—every corps commander of the Confederate army. In the effort to reach him, the commander-in-chief, General Johnston, had also fallen. But Prentiss' heroic resistance, supported by Wallace on one side and Hurlbut on the other, had prolonged the fight till the shades of evening were falling, and then the Union army was safe.

It would seem that this heroic defence was worthy of some recognition. But none ever came. Prentiss was released from captivity, by exchange, some five months later. He was then placed in command of the post at Helena, Ark., an assignment that was almost equivalent to retirement. But here he made a gallant and successful defence against a well-organised attempt by the Confederate Lieut.-General Holmes, with 7,646 men, about twice the strength of the garrison, to recover it. But receiving no further assignment, Prentiss later resigned and retired from the service.

From its position on Prentiss' line, Hickenlooper's battery passed to the front of Sherman's division. Here it assisted in repelling the last assault on that front. It had been a busy day for Hickenlooper and his men. And they had acquitted themselves well.

But we have a different story to relate of the 13th Ohio battery. It can be briefly told. When Hurlbut formed his line that morning, he placed this battery in front of the right of his infantry, in an open grove of large trees. The position was easy to retire from, as there were but a hundred yards of open woods to pass over, before it would reach a good road protected by his line. The battery was protected by a cross-fire of two others a short distance to the left, and by the fire of one of the brigades lying immediately behind it. Hurlbut ordered it to come into position on the reverse slope of a crest of ground, where there was cover for the horses and caissons, and as little exposure as there could be for men in action. But the captain, in endeavouring to place his guns, pushed them a little too far forward, and so lost the protection of the slope. And when the Confederate battery in front opened, a single shot struck in the 13th. And then officers and men, with a common impulse, abandoned the entire battery—horses, caissons and guns—and fled. And they were not seen again

by Hurlbut until the following Tuesday, when all danger was past and rations were needed. Neither of the supporting regiments yielded until many hours later. And the field men of other batteries brought in the horses of the 13th and sent them to the rear, and spiked the guns. The conduct of the battery was disgraceful. And Hurlbut, in his report, recommended that the officers be mustered out of the service. And in accordance with this recommendation, by order of the War Department, the captain was dismissed from the service with his first and second lieutenants, the men were transferred to other organisations, and the battery disbanded. And so the 13th was blotted out, and on Ohio's roster its place remained a blank throughout the war.

As soon as his troops recovered from the confusion arising from the surrender of Prentiss, Bragg ordered them to move forward at all points, and sweep the Federals from the field. The sun was fast disappearing, so that little time remained. And the troops were greatly exhausted by the twelve hours of incessant fighting they had just passed through without food. Many were scattering off to the rear. And the crowd of fugitives that had gathered about the captured Union camps and near Beauregard's headquarters at Shiloh Church had greatly increased. But notwithstanding this, many responded to Bragg's order. And the movement forward commenced, as he thought, with an apparent prospect of success. The troops thus assembled swept on down the ridge towards Pittsburg Landing.

But on the southern brow of the hill back of the Landing they encountered a new obstruction. Here the reserve artillery of the Union army—Major Cavender's six twenty-pounders, Silversparre's twenty-pound Parrotts, heavy siege guns brought up to be used against the fortifications of Corinth, and some light batteries—had been parked when the camp was established. When the Union lines were seen drifting towards the Landing, Colonel Webster, of Grant's staff, gathered about this reserve artillery all the field batteries he could collect. He succeeded in getting together and in line on the brow of the hill a frowning front of from thirty-five to fifty guns, and was prepared to dispute every inch of ground. Immediately in their rear, Hurlbut had gathered a supporting force of infantry, estimated at 4,000, a substantial division.

The ground in their front sloped down rapidly to the south into a deep and wide ravine, which opened into the river a short distance above the Landing. For some distance from the river this ravine was impassable, by reason of slough and backwater. But above, in front of the batteries, though soft, it could be crossed by infantry. As the slope leading up to Webster's batteries was all within half a mile of the river, it was also within range of the Union gunboats.

Wither's two brigades, commanded by Jackson and Chalmers, had received Bragg's order to advance. And they moved forward. When they reached the ravine, they crowded in and started up the slope before Webster's frowning guns. They encountered the sweeping fire. Jackson's troops recoiled; and he started back to get an order to retire. He met an officer from General Beauregard, who informed

him that the troops had all been ordered to retire out of range of the Union guns. He accordingly withdrew his brigade. As neither Bragg nor Withers had received this order, they were surprised to see Jackson's troops withdraw and march away. But Chalmers, not having received the order, continued to advance and was struggling on in a fruitless effort to mount the slope. The guns in front were mowing his men down, and the cross-fire of heavy shells from the gunboats *Lexington* and *Tyler* was sweeping over them from the river. Gage's battery was brought up to their support, but it was quickly knocked to pieces by Webster's heavier guns. And the prospect seemed gloomy.

While Jackson and Chalmers were making this last assault, Grant sat on his horse behind Hurlbut's line. He appeared quiet, thoughtful, almost stolid. Someone asked him: 'Does not the prospect begin to look gloomy?' 'Not at all!' was the prompt reply. 'They can't force our lines around these batteries to-night—it is too late. Delay counts everything with us. To-morrow we shall attack them with fresh troops—and drive them, of course.' Grant knew the whereabouts of Buell's army when he spoke.

But when Beauregard issued the order for his troops to retire for the day, he did not. He was calculating that he still had another day to finish his work. In his report of the battle he says when he issued this order it was six o'clock, darkness was at hand, and he was 'hoping from news received by special dispatch, that delays had been encountered by General Buell in his march from Columbia, and that his main force, therefore, could not reach the field of battle in time to save General Grant's shattered, fugitive forces from capture or destruction on the following day.' Beauregard little thought when he was issuing the order, that the advance of Buell's army had already been on the field for an hour. The fact was a whole brigade, Ammen's, was then taking part in the battle. Buell himself was there, and one of his division commanders, Nelson. The remainder of this division was within sound of the guns, and three others were close at hand, and were being hurried forward as fast as possible. And before the 'following day,' on which Beauregard counted, these troops were all on the field.

The first of Colonel Ammen's regiments to arrive, the 36th Ind., when it mounted the bluff from the river, was directed by Grant to support a battery a hundred yards to the left of the road. The next, the 6th Ohio, was placed on its left. Both were protected by the crest of the hill. Five minutes after they were in position, Chalmers' men assaulted them. As they appeared above the crest, Ammen's regiment fired. The Confederate line was shaken and fell back; advanced again, and was again driven back. Each line was behind the slope of the hill from the other, and, firing before they depressed their pieces, the balls went too high and, therefore, little execution was done by either. But Ammen lost one man killed and another wounded. And while he was forming his line another man was killed. His other regiment, the 24th Ohio, was ordered by Grant to ascertain, if possible, the Confederate line to the right. It scoured the woods for half a mile to the front, but found none.

And later in the evening it was ordered back to the brigade. Chalmers' men struggled vainly to ascend the hill, which was very steep, making charge after charge, but without success. They continued their efforts till darkness fell and closed the day. Chalmers then withdrew about half a mile to the rear and bivouacked for the night. His brigade thus camped nearest of all the Confederates to the Union line.

It is well to pause here and reflect upon the result of this day's work. The controlling events had occurred in the afternoon and on the side of the field next the river. First, General Johnston had fallen, and his army was now disorganised by the death of this trusted commander. His mind had organised the movement, ordered the advance and continued it, in the face of questioning counsels that would have converted it into an armed reconnaissance, and in the battle he had inspired his men to tremendous exertions. Second, General Prentiss had surrendered, and with him went an entire division of the Union army. But this did not occur till it had caused the loss of thousands, and held back the Confederates till evening. Third, Webster's artillery, supported by Hurlbut, had effectually stopped the Confederate advance, and saved the Union supplies and fugitives at the Landing from capture.

The Union army at all points had been driven back nearly a mile, and it now occupied a position a little to the front of, but in general direction with, the road from Crump's to Pittsburg Landing. But it still held its compact line, with the divisions of Nelson, Hurlbut, McClernand and Sherman ready to resist any attempt to break it. The Confederates had failed in their supreme purpose of driving the Union army away, or crowding it back from the river upon Owl Creek, where it could be captured. As Grant's army went back, however, it lost many guns and small arms and four of its camps, with their supplies and equipments. But this property had not been removed. It still remained where it was left, awaiting the battle of the next day to determine its ownership. The one exception to this general statement was the exchange by some Confederate troops of their obsolete arms for the improved weapons that had been captured in the hands of Prentiss' men. These they appropriated, and when they retreated they carried them back to Corinth, leaving their own.

The conduct of the two armies was not unlike. Actual experience in such fighting was wanting to both. And the officers upon each side, in their reports, complained of desertion and cowardice. Many, Union and Confederate alike, left the firing-line and drifted to the rear, to find greater security and relate the same easy story that 'the regiment was all cut up.' Individuals slipped out of the ranks, batteries went, and in some instances whole regiments were led from the field. In the case of the Union army, these stragglers had generally collected under the hill about the Landing, where the number was variously estimated at from 4,000 to 10,000. It was probably much nearer the former figure than the latter. And while the Confederate stragglers were not so much congregated in one place, but were distributed among the captured camps and in the rear, *their* number, as judged from the reports, was fully equal to the other.

The conduct of these stragglers was not creditable to either side. But the doggerel was applicable to both :

He who shirks and runs away,
Will live to fight another day.

Many of these troops, ashamed of their conduct in this battle, afterwards became as brave soldiers as any, and did good service on other fields. Efforts were made to induce the fugitives at the Landing to return to the front. Grant's army, outnumbered as it was, needed their help. But all such efforts were fruitless. 'Panic-stricken,' as Grant said, 'most of them would have been shot where they lay without any resistance, before they would have taken muskets and marched to the front to defend themselves.'

But with night this condition was materially changed. Reinforcements came. And in the morning many of these same men returned to their place in the ranks, and little complaint about straggling appears in the Union reports of the next day. At dark, Lew Wallace arrived with his division from Crump's Landing. When at eleven o'clock the order to march to Pittsburg reached him, he started with his division from Crump's Landing to join Sherman's line. But before he reached Snake Creek he was overtaken by word that Sherman had been driven back. It then became necessary for him to counter-march to the River Road, by which he could reach Sherman's new position. The circuitous route thus followed was fifteen miles. And before the field was reached the battle of Sunday was closed. He brought 5,000 men. At nine o'clock, the rest of Nelson's division of Buell's army joined Ammen's brigade on the field. About the same time Crittenden's division arrived, and was placed to the right of Nelson. McCook's division arrived at five o'clock the next morning, and was assigned to a position to the right of Crittenden. Buell's army thus formed a line from the river to the Bark Road. It was the left wing of the Union army. To the right of this road came Hurlbut, McClernand, Sherman, and Lew Wallace, in succession, Grant's old command. And it formed the right wing. Including Lew Wallace's 5,000, Grant now had 25,000 fresh troops on the field, with five new batteries, Buell having brought three and Wallace two. At noon two brigades of Wood's division of Buell's army also arrived, bringing 4,000 more.

During Sunday evening Grant and Buell visited Sherman in his tent. He had been wounded twice, in the shoulder slightly, and in the hand. A ball had passed through his hat and he had several horses shot under him. But he kept his place at the head of his division. Upon consultation, it was decided to make a general advance at dawn the next day and drive the Confederates from the field. Grant was to take command on the right and Buell on the left, thus giving each immediate control of his own men. With this understanding, they separated for the night. At eleven o'clock a heavy storm of rain set in, which continued till morning. The Union troops were exposed without shelter. Grant took refuge under a tree a few hundred yards back from the river. He was suffering from a bruised ankle, caused by his horse falling on it the Friday previous.

Sometime after midnight, the storm and the pain from this ankle caused him to seek shelter in a log house near by. But this had been taken for a hospital. And the wounded were being brought in and their wounds dressed, an arm or a leg amputated, and everything done to save life and alleviate suffering. The sight was more unendurable than the pain of his ankle or the storm. And so he returned to his shelter under the tree.

The situation of the Confederate troops was hardly more comfortable. Some of them occupied the tents of the captured Union camps. But as the storm of battle had passed over them and through them, and in some instances more than once, they afforded little protection. Most of the men lay on their arms in the open air. All night long, at intervals of fifteen minutes, the Union gunboats dropped shells on their side of the field. Thus with the noise and danger combined, sleep became impossible. Brigadier-General Anderson described his experience, and it is probably a fair sample of that of others. With a saddle for a seat and a blanket thrown over his head, he sat all night at the foot of an apple-tree exposed to the storm. It hardly abated till dawn. And so the men on both sides found cold comfort and little rest after the excitement and fatigues of the day.

But as soon as morning broke the battle commenced again. Anxious to take the initiative, the Union line advanced, with Nelson on the extreme left and Lew Wallace on the right. Nelson moved forward his entire division across the ravine in front of the reserve artillery, and pushing on to the south encountered the remnants of Gladden's, Jackson's, and Johnson's brigades, and drove them back. Here he halted to allow Crittenden's division to come up on his right. Then Nelson advanced again and came upon Wither's division, supported by three batteries. Having no artillery, Nelson was obliged to yield and fall back. But Buell sent Mendenhall's battery to his assistance. And it soon silenced the central Confederate battery. And Hazen's brigade then charged and captured it. But in so doing, Hazen came upon Bowen's brigade, and was in turn driven back. The division here lost 90 killed and 588 wounded. Ferrell's battery, of four twelve-pounders and two ten-pounders, Parrotts, was ordered by Buell to Nelson's relief. It dashed to the front. But it was soon compelled to retire before the united efforts of the remaining batteries and Bowen's line. Firing as it retired, it kept the Confederates, now attempting to charge, at a distance. But soon the remnants of W. H. L. Wallace's division, under Colonel Tuttle, came up, and uniting with Nelson they drove them in retreat.

Crittenden's division, with Smith's brigade next to Nelson, and McCook's division on its right, had advanced its skirmishers and developed a Confederate line in its front supported by a battery. Bartlett's Union battery swept it away. And Crittenden's troops charged and drove the Confederates back and captured the battery. After an hour of quiet, a furious attack was made on Smith's brigade, and his line was driven back. But the division rallied to his support and advanced and recaptured the Confederate battery which had been lost when Smith retired. Crittenden held it despite repeated efforts to capture it.

McCook's division had advanced against Beauregard's central camp in front of Shiloh Church, where the Confederates had assembled in greatest force. They had gathered there as a central point the evening before, and, as it controlled their natural line of retreat, if they retired to Corinth, it became desirable to hold this position to the last. Ruggles' and Cheatham's divisions, and Wood's and Trabue's brigades were there, and were later supported by Russell and A. P. Stewart. On the other side, Kirk's, Gibson's, and Veach's brigades came up to the support of McCook. Rousseau's brigade of McCook's division advanced across a ravine to some rising ground a few hundred yards beyond. Their skirmishers were driven in, but their assailants were promptly forced back by the well-directed fire of Rousseau's men. Trabue's regiments rallied, and quickly returned this assault with greater vigour than before. But Rousseau drove them back. And after a desperate struggle, Trabue gave way, Rousseau taking two guns and recapturing McClelland's headquarters. In this engagement Rousseau proved the merit of the troops he had enlisted among the Union men of Kentucky, when Lincoln was endeavouring to hold that state for the North. The reports speak in the highest terms of their conduct.

Sherman and Lew Wallace were on the right waiting. And hearing the advance of McCook, they moved forward slowly but steadily, facing south under a heavy fire. The conflict about Shiloh Church now raged with fury. But the Union line, curved and contracting about Beauregard's devoted remnant, here making its last stand, was too strong. Grant's men, supported by five new batteries, were thinning the rapidly disappearing ranks with canister and shrapnell. The line was pressed closer and the fire became hotter. The Confederates had three batteries. But the opposition was too strong. Wood's brigade of Beauregard's army charged, but was quickly knocked to pieces by Rousseau's fire. When it retired, McCook's whole division pushed forward. Grant called up two regiments and led them in person in a charge on McCook's front. It completed the break in the Confederate line. And Beauregard, seeing his men beginning to fag, made ineffectual efforts to restore the line and return the charge. But the failure was apparent. And his aide urged him to desist. It was now three o'clock. His men were exhausted with the long struggle of two days. They could stand no longer against the assaults of fresh troops and the renewed vigour of the others, now animated with apparent prospects of success and the odds of numbers. Beauregard, two hours before, had sent word to his right to retire; and he now began gradually to withdraw here, still fighting as he went. He posted a battery and a brigade on an eminence south of Oak Creek, so as to sweep the ground round about Shiloh Church. And withdrawing his exhausted troops behind them, he quietly commenced the retreat to Corinth. Breckinridge was placed in the rear to protect this movement.

The advance of the Union line ceased at four o'clock. Wood's division of Buell's army, arriving too late to take part in the battle, pushed to the front, and engaging the skirmishers that protected the retreat, drove them in and encountered Breckinridge's rear-guard.

This turned savagely upon Wood and drove him back to the Union line. But soon Breckinridge, knowing too well that the check could only be temporary, was in retreat again. And here the pursuit really ended, though there were some desultory efforts the next day. Sherman's, McClelland's, Hurlbut's, and W. H. L. Wallace's troops resumed their former camps. Nelson rested in front of Stuart's former camp, Crittenden's, Wood's and McCook's divisions bivouacked near Prentiss' camp, and Lew Wallace camped to the right of Sherman on the Purdy Road.

And so ended the battle of Shiloh. The Union army had recovered all its former ground, and had recaptured as much property as it had lost the day before. The Confederate army, broken and disheartened, was in retreat, and two days later reached its entrenchments about Corinth. The loss in killed and wounded was appalling. Shiloh was the bloodiest battle in the West. Beauregard's report gives his loss as 1,728 killed, 8,012 wounded and 959 missing. The official report of the Union loss was, in Grant's army, 1,437 killed, 5,679 wounded and 2,934 missing; and in Buell's army, 263 killed, 1,816 wounded and 88 missing. The total of the Confederate loss was 10,699. The total Union loss was 12,217. Grant thought Beauregard's estimate incorrect, and gives a good reason for this opinion. The killed of both sides were all buried by the men detailed for this purpose from the Union army. The burial parties were instructed to count the number buried. This count was not in all cases made. But in front of Sherman and McClelland it was. And Grant says that by actual count more Confederates were buried in front of Sherman's and McClelland's camps alone than were reported dead by Beauregard. He says 4,000 was the estimate of the burial parties for the whole field.

However this may be, the fatalities were certainly large. Grant says he saw an open field in possession of the Union army on the second day, 'over which the Confederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground.' On the Union side of the field, National and Confederate troops were mingled together in about equal proportions. But on the Confederate side nearly all were their troops. This shows that on Monday, when the Confederates had been driven beyond the line of the Union camps, the fatalities were nearly all in their army.

We have in a former chapter remarked on the extent of the Confederate losses in *property* at Fort Henry, Donelson, and Island No. 10. Such losses, we then said, the Confederacy was not prepared to meet. The same remark applies to the loss of *troops*. The number of killed, wounded and captured at Donelson was 16,623; at Shiloh, 10,699, according to Beauregard; at Island No. 10, 7,000; making a total of 34,322. This loss was a serious handicap to the Confederacy, especially in the West. It crippled the South at the very beginning. Her population was so much smaller than that of the North, that she had difficulty in finding men in sufficient numbers to meet the invading army. She had already been obliged to resort to a draft

to fill her ranks. For volunteers were not offered in sufficient numbers. And so great a loss, under such circumstances, was irreparable. The South had not the men to replace it. She no longer had the means to place an army in the field that could successfully, and upon equal terms, confront Grant's. And the South never, in the West, was able to recover from this position. The blow was a crushing one.

The battle of Shiloh was, therefore, one of the decisive battles of the war. If Johnston had succeeded in crushing Grant on the first day, and had then turned on Buell, he would probably have succeeded there too. The consequences could hardly have been estimated. What would have prevented the Confederates from recovering Nashville then, and making the Ohio River the new line? Would this not have carried Kentucky into the Confederacy? And would it not have caused the loss of all that had been so far gained in the West? These were questions that easily suggested themselves. The almost superhuman efforts of Johnston to turn back the tide of invasion had failed. The success of the Union arms had been reasserted. And omens of final victory had again appeared.

In commemoration of the battle the field has been made a National Military Park. Three thousand acres have been purchased, and as it is mostly in timber, and has been cleared up and preserved, its cool and grateful shade during many months of the year makes it, perhaps, the most attractive of all these Parks. The bluff overlooking the river has been made a National Cemetery. The pretty little cove at the Landing has been converted into an attractive lawn, running down with its green grass to the water's edge. The road to Corinth has been improved and made a U.S. Mail Route. And its hacks, though the distance is twenty-three miles, are daily loaded with passengers.

The writer once visited this field. And among many objects of interest he met one of Grant's old soldiers, fifty years after the battle, living on a small plot of six acres that he had purchased near Shiloh Church. He was born in Ohio, had served through the war in an Ohio regiment, had then floated off to the West, but later had found his way back and settled at last on this field of his young manhood's pride. Though his snow-white hair and beard told that he was no longer a young man, his stalwart figure, still erect, his broad shoulders unbent, and his eye undimmed, told the story of a well-spent life. He was swinging his axe with a will at the wood-pile near his cottage when the writer found him. But he paused long enough to answer some casual inquiries. And then, finding that his visitor too was from the North, he confided to him his simple story, and expressed the wish to end his days there. Designs it appeared, had once been formed to take his little plot for the Park. But through the influence of a friend, the plan had been put aside, and he had been assured that he would not be disturbed while he lived. And may he long remain to tell his modest story, and remind others of the part he took 'in saving the country.' Something had happened there worthy of remembrance, and in which he, too, could justly feel a pride.

CHAPTER XX

Halleck advances on Corinth—Beauregard quietly withdraws—Sheridan in Pursuit—The Mississippi opened to Memphis—Destruction of Confederate Fleet.

WHEN the Confederate army, depleted by losses, reached its entrenchments at Corinth, it again sought reinforcements. Van Dorn was brought from Arkansas with 17,000 troops. Some new recruits were obtained. And these additions, with some small detachments, that were drawn in from outlying posts, gave Beauregard an army of 53,000 men. His muster rolls showed more than double this number. But his ranks were depleted by sickness and absenteeism, both of which were very prevalent. His position was a strong one. And fighting behind entrenchments, the force he had should have been sufficient to resist an assailing army of double its size. But he was afraid to trust it. For his men were demoralised by their recent defeats. And it would take time and care to recruit them.

The Union army still lay at Pittsburg Landing. It had been increased by Buell's command. And Halleck reached the front on April 11. Ten days later Pope came with his army of 20,000 men, flushed with their success at Island No. 10. These substantial additions, with the new regiments that came in from the recruiting stations and some seasoned troops that were brought from Missouri, increased the Union army to 100,000 or more; Grant says 120,000.

Halleck, upon his arrival, assumed command and proceeded to reorganise the army. It was divided into a right wing, which included all the Army of the Tennessee save McClelland's and Lew Wallace's divisions; a reserve composed of these two divisions; the centre composed of the Army of the Ohio, save the division of General Thomas, which was transferred to the right wing; and the left wing, which was composed of the Army of the Mississippi. Thomas was placed in command of the right; McClelland, of the reserves; Buell, of the centre; and Pope, of the left. Grant was made second in command. But as Halleck was chief, and issued all orders directly to the corps commanders, Grant was really without any duties. His position, therefore, became irksome, and he asked to be relieved. But the request was not granted, and he was later persuaded by Sherman to content himself for the time with things as they were. He had already come to appreciate Sherman's advice. And this was well, for Sherman had a clear head as well as a cool one, and an honest heart. His brother, John Sherman, was one of the safest counsellors the Republican party ever had, and maintained his place as such at Washington for more than forty years.

The lines of the camp at Pittsburg were extended. After the arduous work of the advance and the battle of Shiloh, the army was not ready for an immediate movement to the front. Besides the large number of wounded, the exposure and hard campaigning, with camp food and bad water and equally bad air, had made another army of sick. The surroundings of a camp that has been recently a great battle field are necessarily unwholesome. And here the troops were living in the open air, under frequent cold, drenching rains, having to carry their provisions some two miles from the river, through miry camps and over roads so muddy as to be difficult even for horses. Dysentery of a threatening type prevailed, and other sickness, due to exposure, was common. Hospital tents were spread on the bluffs, near the Landing, where the ground was highest and the drainage best. The little village of Savannah, eight miles away, was converted into a hospital. There were only two houses at Pittsburg. And so there could be no homelike accommodations there. Boats were coming up the Tennessee, bringing numberless physicians and nurses, with hospital supplies and comforts to relieve the disabled. And they were returning, carrying back to more comfortable surroundings those who, though wounded and sick, were able to be removed.

Halleck was always thoughtful of the health and comfort of his men. And he was also one of the ablest strategists in the Union army. But the sequel showed that he was unfitted for command in the field. He was over-cautious and timid, so slow that the advantages before him were usually gone before he was ready to seize and turn them to account. It was April 30 before he was ready to move. In making the advance, his army was strung out between the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, on the north, and the Memphis and Charleston, on the east. And as he approached Corinth, he had Thomas on the one and Pope on the other. The progress was very slow. Troops were thrown out to the front, the line moved up and entrenched. Then a new advance was made. And it was followed by the line and another entrenchment. New roads were constructed and old ones corduroyed. Cross roads were opened to enable one line to support another, in case of an assault. Engagements with Confederate detachments were forbidden. Officers were instructed that it was better to retreat than to fight, for fear of bringing on a general engagement. Halleck maintained his headquarters with the right. And Pope, on the extreme left, twice got in advance of the other corps and was twice ordered back to conform to the rest of the line, instead of the rest being ordered up to conform to his. And this seems the more surprising when it appears that on each advance Pope encountered Confederate troops and defeated and drove them back. This sort of movement was so slow that the month of May was consumed before the army reached Corinth, though the distance was, as we have said, only twenty-three miles. The march should have been made in three days. And Beauregard even then would probably have retired as soon as Halleck appeared.

Sherman's division constructed seven distinct entrenched camps during the advance. Hardly had he finished one before he was called on to move forward and build another. The entrenchments

were substantially built, and when finished were as strong as those of the Confederates. On May 10 Sherman was ordered by Halleck to take a position at Russell's house. This was about two miles from the Confederate entrenchments. He drove back a brigade that occupied this ground and advanced his division and threw up entrenchments. It was on a commanding point on the ridge leading down to Corinth.

The Confederates occupied a high plateau between two branches of Bridge Creek. This plateau was concealed from the view of the Union army by a fringe of timber that covered the steep descent to the creek on that side. The Confederate entrenchments were about four miles long and occupied the top of the descent. The position was protected in front of Pope by the creek and a swamp, difficult of passage for both artillery and troops. This swamp disappeared higher up, in front of Thomas, where the dividing ridge, between the streams on either side of Corinth, continued down to the Confederate front. Grant suggested that, by withdrawing troops from Pope, whose position could be held by detachments, protected as it was by the swamp, and doubling the line of Thomas, making the assault along the ridge, the Confederate entrenchments could be carried. But this suggestion was too daring for one of Halleck's cautious temper, and so was rejected.

Sherman remained at Russell's house till May 27. The position was a good one, with open fields in front. But to guard against surprise his pickets were thrown out a mile in the direction of Corinth. On the southern edge of a large field, three hundred yards wide and five hundred long, there stood a double log building. The Confederates had taken possession of it. And by taking out the chinks between the logs and removing the roof they converted it into an excellent block-house, from which, with perfect security to themselves, they could pick off Sherman's pickets on the opposite side of the field. One could not show himself without attracting a shot. The annoyance became intolerable. And Sherman obtained Halleck's consent to drive the occupants out. He sent some troops with two twenty-pound rifled guns, under cover of the timber that lined the farther side of the field, to gain the rear of the building. Here there was a heavy growth of oaks and underbrush covering a ridge back of the house. When the guns were moved silently behind the crest, they were unlimbered and pushed by hand to the top of the ridge. And from there a dozen shots, well directed, demolished the house and emptied it of its occupants. Then Sherman's troops at a concerted signal dashed across the field and drove a supporting brigade away. It attempted to rally and return, but was again driven off; and then Sherman threw out pickets still farther to the front, ran lines off and during the night threw up substantial entrenchments. The next day his division with the siege train was brought forward.

This position was so near the Confederate line that Sherman's men could distinctly hear the sound of the enemy's drums and sometimes voices in command. The lines, in fact, were only thirteen hundred yards apart, though Sherman did not know it, for the intervening timber cut off the view. For some days trains had been

heard arriving and departing. But the night of the 29th their noises were more frequent than usual. At six A.M. of the 30th a curious explosion, something like a volley of large siege pieces, followed by others in twos and threes, was heard. And soon after a large smoke arose from the direction of Corinth. Halleck ordered Sherman to advance his division and ascertain the cause. He pushed forward and entered the Confederate works without opposition. The Confederates were gone. Instead of real cannon, Sherman found 'Quaker guns,' logs of wood about the size of ordinary guns, mounted on the wheels of farm wagons. The Confederate artillery, ammunition and stores were substantially all gone. Many houses were still burning, and the wreck and ruin of warehouses, the work of exploded trains, was apparent. Beauregard had not even relieved his pickets that morning and many of them were captured. They had not received an intimation of the purpose to retire.

Beauregard had ordered the retirement on May 26. All the sick and wounded and most of the armament were sent away by rail on the two following days. The troops were to move on the 29th, but the time was extended to the morning of the 30th. They had commenced their march at ten o'clock of the previous night. And the rear guard, as it left the town, fired the trains and caused the explosions and conflagration that gave notice that Corinth was evacuated. The purpose was to destroy whatever stores they had not been able to send away. And on the last night, the railroads were still making removals of stores; and the troops were ordered to cheer at each arrival of a train as if welcoming reinforcements. Pope who was nearest the point of arrival, heard the cheers and understood them as intended. But some of the men did not. They had worked on railroads before the war and insisted that they could tell by placing their ears to the iron rail of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, near which they were, that the cars that came in were empty and that those that went out were loaded. They had insisted so for some time, and argued that the Confederates were evacuating. But they were not believed, though the sequel showed they were right.

Of course there was some dissatisfaction expressed at the Confederates being allowed to get away so easily. Many of the Union soldiers, at least, felt that the war could not be ended by allowing armies to march from one position to another when they should be captured or defeated. But there was at least the satisfaction of knowing that an important strategic position had been taken. And it was so important to the Confederates, that a determined effort was made a few months later to recapture it. But in this, we shall see, they were defeated. Another advantage of perhaps still greater importance to the army was the discipline it gave the men. Sherman remarked their great improvement on the march, the absence of that straggling which is so common in the volunteer service, and still more their improved character on picket and as skirmishers. They also learned how to build bridges, make roads and construct entrenchments. At Shiloh they acquired a severe experience in battle, in loading and firing while in action, in meeting and resisting, in holding their ground against odds, and finally in pressing their advantage

when success was within reach. But at Corinth the advance was like the investment of a fortress. As Sherman described it, an army with 100,000 bayonets moved upon the citadel 'with pick and shovel.' But even this had its lessons. It disciplined the army.

Beauregard when he retreated went some thirty miles farther south on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to Baldwin, where he drew up in an inaccessible position, protected by swamp and jungle. He extended his line to the north-west to Blackland. Before his retreat, an attempt had been made by Halleck to cut this road. A cavalry brigade was sent from Pope's command, to proceed by some secluded route to a point on the railroad at least forty miles south of Corinth, with instructions to destroy the railroad, trestle-works, telegraph wires, etc. Colonel W. L. Elliot was in command of the brigade. And under him was the 2nd Iowa Cavalry, Lieut.-Colonel Hatch, and the 2nd Mich. Cavalry under Colonel Phil. H. Sheridan. They left camp at midnight on May 27, and reached Boonville, near Blackland, at two o'clock of the morning of the 30th. Hatch, with part of the 2nd Iowa, was sent to cut the telegraph wires and take possession of all property in Boonville. And Sheridan, with a part of the 2nd Mich., was to destroy the railroad farther south. Hatch moved into the town, cut the telegraph wires and tore up the railroad. He found on the track a disabled locomotive and twenty-six cars loaded with arms and ammunition, three mounted field-pieces, four mortars and a lot of horse equipments, all intended for Beauregard's army. The depot was filled with commissary stores and arms. And a camp of about a thousand sick Confederate soldiers was near by. The sick were removed to a safe distance. Then the cars were run up to the depot. And the building and cars, with their contents, were all burned. Sheridan destroyed a section of the railroad by tearing up the track, burning the ties and bending the rails. He also captured about 500 Confederates, 100 of whom had good percussion muskets, the others having thrown their guns away. They made no resistance. And after breaking up their guns, which he could not be burdened with on his rapid return, Sheridan turned the men loose. The expedition returned to camp on the morning of the 31st, bringing in thirty or forty mounted prisoners.

This is our first glimpse of Sheridan. He afterwards became one of the leading figures of the war. It was one of the whims of fortune that the first year of the war he was entirely unnoticed, though he had received a military education, had always continued in the army, and was now of the mature age of thirty years. He was the son of Irish emigrants and was born in Albany, N.Y., the year after his parents landed. They were very poor, and finding the conditions of life too hard for them there, the year after Phil's birth they removed to Perry County, Ohio, where the father, after having unsuccessfully tried contracting on roads and canals, finally settled on a small farm, where he spent the rest of his life. Phil, compelled to shift for himself, became a clerk in a store. From this, on his own application, he procured an appointment to West Point. His career at the Academy was uneventful, except for an assault committed, in hasty temper, over a fancied grievance. The trouble started when his

company was forming for parade. Sheridan was ordered, in what he considered an improper tone, to dress in a certain direction. He believed he was properly dressed, and made toward the cadet sergeant, who gave the order, with lowered bayonet. But before reaching the officer he recalled himself. He was, however, reported by the sergeant for the offence. And when they next met, Sheridan attacked him in a fisticuff. For this he was suspended for a year, and probably escaped expulsion only by reason of his previous good conduct. At the expiration of his suspension he returned to the Academy, and a year later graduated, thirty-fourth in a class of fifty-two. James B. McPherson stood at the head, and Schofield, Sill and Hood, all well-known generals, on one side or the other, of the Civil War, were members of the class. After graduation Sheridan served at frontier posts in Texas and on the Pacific Coast. And at the opening of the war he was a captain stationed on the Yamhill, one of the tributaries of the Columbia River, in Oregon. He did not reach the East till November of '61. And he was then assigned to clerical and commissary duty. Not till after the battle of Shiloh, and then only at his own urgent solicitation, was he sent to the front. Once there, however, his promotion was rapid. The Governor had appointed him colonel of the 2nd Michigan on May 25, 1862. And he became the greatest cavalry leader of the war, commanded an army in the Shenandoah Valley, and led under Grant the pursuit of Lee from Petersburg to Appomattox. After the war he succeeded Grant and Sherman as head of the U.S. Army, with the rank of general—a rank which these three alone had enjoyed up to that time. Great as this promotion was, Sheridan had no influential friend to recommend him. It was won by merit. He was a hard fighter and had wonderful talent for leadership. He went ahead and carried his men with him. Fruitful of resources, brave almost to the point of audacity, having once gained an advantage, he pursued it with relentless thoroughness. This peculiarity came out somewhat in his short raid against Beauregard's communications, when he went farther into the enemy's country than any other, destroyed property to the full, as ordered, made captures almost equal to the number of his own men, and yet, so rapid were his movements, that he escaped without appreciable loss.

When Halleck discovered that Beauregard had escaped him, he sent Pope in pursuit. When overtaken at Blackland, Pope issued an order for an attack. But Buell came up and suspended the order. And then Beauregard retreated to Tupelo, twenty miles farther south, on the Mobile and Ohio. And here he sought to augment his forces for further operations, if an opportunity would offer. But this was difficult to do. The woods along his line of retreat were full of stragglers, showing that even the men he had were losing heart.

An amusing circumstance grew out of this condition of affairs. General Granger, who commanded the cavalry in pursuit, estimated the number of these stragglers at 10,000, and added in his report to Pope, who was at Danville, detained by illness, that they would come in and surrender. Pope made this report to Halleck. But Halleck, anxious to make as much as possible of his already too barren success, telegraphed the War Department that Pope had reported

10,000 prisoners actually captured, with 15,000 small arms. This dispatch made a great sensation in the North, accompanied as it was by the statement of Halleck that they had deserted from Beauregard, and that 'thousands of the enemy were throwing away their arms.' Beauregard, naturally incensed at such a statement, in his report characterised it as 'disgracefully untrue.' And the fact was that the expectation that the 10,000 would come in and surrender was never realised. Only a few prisoners were actually taken, and a small quantity of arms; and the latter, moreover, were of little value. So when the truth was known there was bitter disappointment felt. But another strange fact was that it was Pope that was censured, though he had neither made nor authorised such a report.

On this retreat Beauregard did suffer a loss of five trains, three of them loaded with valuable stores, which were being removed from Corinth. Their destruction was due to an oversight. The bridges over the Hatchie River were ordered to be destroyed at a designated hour, on the morning of the 30th. And this order was carried out to the letter. The purpose was, of course, to prevent the use of the railroad by Halleck. But these trains, that were expected to pass the bridges before the time for their destruction, were delayed. And being thus cut off, they had to be destroyed, with their much-needed freight, to prevent all from falling into Halleck's hands. What was destroyed included considerable valuable subsistence, of which Beauregard's army was greatly in need.

By June 10, Pope's pursuing column was back in Corinth. And Halleck, then giving up the pursuit, proceeded to fortify Corinth on a large scale. All commanding positions, two or three miles to the south, south-east and south-west, were strongly fortified. The works thus constructed would have required, to man them fully, an army of 100,000 men. It is needless to say that such works were never needed. Later others on a much smaller scale were constructed, suitable for holding the place with less force. And they answered every purpose.

The fall of Corinth was followed by some other results of consequence. The Confederate works on the Upper Mississippi were now completely turned, and were, of course, no longer tenable. Flag Officer Davis had remained in front of Fort Pillow after the departure of Pope's army, and occupied his time in bombarding the fort. Upon the fall of Corinth, arrangements were made to assault the work. But between one and two o'clock of the morning of June 5 it was evacuated and the guns and commissary stores destroyed. That same day the brigade of Pope's army that had been left there to co-operate with the fleet moved in and took possession.

About this time the Union fleet was augmented by six tugs that had been hastily converted into steam rams, under the direction of Chas. Ellet, jun., an engineer of some ability. They were strong river boats, built for towing coal, with powerful engines and of good speed. They were remodelled, their upper cabins removed and their bows strengthened by heavy timbers within, and protected by heavy plates of iron without, so as to be used for rams. Their purpose was to rush at full speed against a hostile craft and crush in its hull

by a single blow of the iron prow. The whole incident is interesting and worthy of preservation, as illustrating one phase of Stanton's character.

Application had been made by Ellet to the Secretary of the Navy for authority to fit out such a fleet. But the Secretary's attention was then directed to other schemes for using his appropriation, and the application was accordingly rejected. Nothing daunted, Ellet then turned to the Secretary of War. Stanton, who was reared on the Ohio, and was familiar with its boats, quickly saw the possibilities of the suggestion. And on March 27, 1862, he gave Ellet an order for the work. And Ellet entered upon it with a will. He purchased the boats from their owners at Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and New Albany, on the Upper Ohio. He was aided in the selection by a Committee, appointed at the instance of Stanton by the Board of Trade of Cincinnati. Ellet had them finished and ready for operations before Fort Pillow on May 25. They were changed as little as possible from their original condition, so as to be sold and returned to the coal trade, if not destroyed in the service. It would hardly be expected that they would be received kindly by Flag Officer Davis. And in the short time that they served together more than one complaint of Davis was made by Ellet—of his refusal to give him the protection of his gunboats, or permit any of his force to volunteer with him, or even to allow him to attack the enemy's fleet.

After the evacuation of Fort Pillow the fleet steamed twelve miles farther down the river to a point opposite Fort Randolph. This it found also dismantled and abandoned. The fleet then went on, and at nine o'clock on the night of June 5 anchored a mile and a half above Memphis. Ellet tied up some eight miles above, and ran down the next morning. When day broke, Davis discovered the Confederate fleet of eight rams and gunboats lying at the Memphis levee. He started down, and they came out to meet him.

The engagement opened at 5.30 A.M. with a vigorous fire from the Confederate fleet. Ellet had received no notice that a fight was expected. And his first information was from a shot that passed over the bow of his boat, the *Queen*. But he had four of his most powerful rams at hand and ready for the emergency. And he immediately ordered the lines to be cast, gave orders to the *Monarch*, commanded by his brother, whose place was next in order, to follow, and then hoisted the flag which was the signal for going into action, on his own boat the *Queen*, rounded to with head down stream and, passing between the Union gunboats, which were now engaged with the enemy, bore down upon the latter. All the Confederate gunboats were rams, armed with guns. They were headed boldly up stream. Ellet directed his attack upon the two which were about the middle of the river, very close together and supported by a third, a little in their rear. The two held their way steadily; but as the distance became less, they apparently quailed before the approaching collision, began first to back and then to turn, thus presenting their broadsides to Ellet, and throwing one boat a little in advance of the other. He selected the first. And directing the prow of the *Queen* against her broadside, he struck her at full speed just forward of the wheel-house.

The crash was terrific. Everything about the *Queen*, tables, pantry-ware, and a half-eaten breakfast, was overthrown and scattered by the shock. The hull of the rebel steamer was crushed in, her chimneys surged over as if about to fall, and many of her crew leaped overboard. Yet the wreck, in consequence of the continued motion of the *Queen*, still clung to her bow. Before the collision the Confederate made a feeble effort to use her guns. She succeeded in firing a charge of grape and canister, which, however, was lost in the water. In less than half a minute after the ram, and before the *Queen* could clear herself from the wreck, she was herself struck by another Confederate steamer on her larboard wheel-house. This blow broke her tiller-rope, crushed in her wheel and a portion of her hull, and left her nearly helpless. The steamer struck by the *Queen* sank, leaving the surface of the river strewn with fragments of her wreck. And the disabled *Queen*, with only one wheel and without a rudder, worked herself to the Arkansas shore, where she grounded. The moment his vessel was struck, Ellet left the pilot-house, where he had taken his station at the opening of the action, to direct the movements of the *Queen*. And passing out on deck, he was almost instantly disabled by a wound in the leg. This was from one of a number of shots fired from the steamer that had struck his own. He was immediately carried below.

While these things were occurring, the *Monarch*, having followed the *Queen*, passed below the Union gunboats and directed her shock upon the Confederate ram that followed the one struck by the *Queen*. The blow was so severe that pieces of furniture were thrown from the Confederate steamer upon the forecastle of the *Monarch*, where they were found after the action. The *Monarch* was in turn struck by one of the Confederates, but was not seriously injured. She then pushed on and struck the *Beauregard*, which was simultaneously hit by a shot from a Union gunboat. The *Beauregard's* side was crushed in and her boiler exploded. She then took fire and was burned and sunk. The *Monarch* then pushed at the *Little Rebel*, the Confederate flag-ship. But now having no headway, she could only crowd her to the shore. Here the Confederate commodore and his crew escaped. All was now confusion. Shot followed shot and there was crash after crash. The river was covered with wreckage and the air was darkened with smoke. Of the other Confederate gunboats, the *General Price* had one wheel carried away. The *Jeff Thompson* was set on fire by a shell, and, her magazine exploding, she was burned and blown up; and the *Sumpter* was cut in pieces with shot. Only one of the fleet escaped, the *Van Dorn*. Seeing the wreck and ruin of her sister ships, she turned and fled. She was pursued down the river by the *Monarch* and the *Switzerland* of Ellet's fleet. But the *Van Dorn's* speed was too great and she escaped.

By seven o'clock the fight was over. In an hour and a half the famous 'River Defence Fleet' of the Confederacy had been scattered. The *General Price*, the *Sumpter* and *Little Rebel* were disabled and captured; the *Beauregard* was a hopeless wreck in shoal water; and the *General Bragg*, the *Colonel Lovell*, and the *Jeff Thompson* were sunk.

The levee at Memphis was lined with spectators, who had come

out to witness the engagement. Their own and the fortunes of the city depended on it. And among the spectators was General Jeff Thompson, who was in command of the post. Though his troops had been sent away the day previous, he witnessed a large part of the engagement. And when the last hope of a Confederate victory was gone, he too turned and fled. In making his report to General Beauregard, he naively wrote: 'It is impossible now to report the casualties, *as we were hurried in our own retirement from Memphis.*' In further frankness, he added: 'I am under the painful necessity of reporting to you the almost entire destruction of the River Defence Fleet. . . . The enemy's rams did most of the execution and were handled more adroitly than ours.' If he could not, however, tell the extent of their loss, his want of information was supplied by General Strong of the Union army, who fixed it at 100 killed and 4 prisoners. Strong further reported: 'None hurt on our side but Colonel Ellet, of ram-fleet, slightly.'

But the Union loss turned out to be greater than Strong knew. For the brave man who had entered into the work of fitting up the ram-fleet so fully, and had crowned its career with a signal success, lingered two weeks longer, suffering from his wound, and then died. The detailed report of his engagement was commenced, but he was obliged by weakness to lay it aside, and was never after able to resume it. And so we are obliged to gather the details of his part in the victory from the brief telegraphic dispatches to Stanton, and the reports of others.

The stern Secretary, to whom all these reports were made, in acknowledging receipt of the news, returned the thanks of himself and his Department, and added that their joy was only dampened by the information of his personal injury. In concluding, Stanton further wrote, and it shows the tenderness of the heart of one whose rough exterior has been perhaps too much dwelt upon: 'I went in the evening to your house and, as carefully as I could, communicated to Mrs. Ellet your injury. She was, of course, deeply affected, but bore the information with as much spirit and courage as could be expected. It is her design to proceed immediately to join you. I have furnished her with a pass and free passage, and she will be accompanied by your daughter. I hope you will keep me advised of your state of health and everything you want.'

The whole incident of this ram-fleet furnishes an interesting view of Stanton. It illustrates his readiness to grasp the means nearest at hand for the accomplishment of a purpose. He had little regard for the customary and formal way of getting his work done, and just as little care for how his hastily constructed rams would strike the circumspect eye of a naval expert. It was execution he sought. The Confederacy had placed on the Mississippi a fleet of rams, armed as gunboats, with which they proposed to sweep the river, and then enter the Ohio and thus invade the North. This fleet must be destroyed. Island No. 10 had been a laboured proposition for the army, in the early stages of that campaign, as we have seen, for want of some support of its own on the river. Could he take the powerful coal boats already in existence and promptly convert them into

engines of destruction ? Having settled this question, after a thoughtful examination of it with Ellet, he gave him the order, furnished the means, and urged him to complete the work in twenty days. Thus it was execution he sought. And the work was finished.

With the same directness the fleet was manned. Ellet asked Stanton to name his brother, Captain Alfred W. Ellet, already in the service with his company in the 59th Illinois, as second in command. Stanton promptly appointed Ellet himself colonel, and his brother lieutenant-colonel, of staff. They were made staff-officers so that he might save the time and trouble of having the Senate confirm the appointments. The brother was directed to bring a limited number of men of his own selection from his regiment. And the others were chosen by Colonel Ellet himself. They were all to receive extra pay and promotion according to their merit, as shown by the reports of achievements. And their reports were to be made directly to Stanton. Thus the whole was under Stanton's eye. And the result we have seen in the destruction of the Confederate fleet.

The Union troops moved in and took possession of Memphis and hoisted their flags over the post-office and custom-house. The mayor and council called upon the commanding officer the same day, and promised their aid in preserving the peace and protecting the lives and property of the citizens, as well as the maintenance of the United States laws. Two weeks later Grant, who had thus far remained at Corinth, little more than an idle spectator, requested leave to remove his headquarters to Memphis. This was granted. And he went there and assumed the command, and continued to hold it until July 11, when Halleck was appointed commander-in-chief of all the armies, with headquarters in Washington. And then Grant was recalled to Corinth to assume command there. But there was no more trouble with Memphis. It remained in Union hands, and became an important depot of supplies in the subsequent operations along the Lower Mississippi. The Confederate garrisons from it, as well as from Forts Pillow and Randolph, went a hundred miles farther south to Grenada.

CHAPTER XXI

The Capture of New Orleans—Farragut passes the Forts—Turns City over to General Butler—Butler's Administration.

THE administration at Washington, very early in the war, felt a deep interest in opening the Mississippi River. Arkansas, Louisiana, and the great state of Texas lay beyond it and contributed materially to the support of the Confederacy. If the river were opened and patrolled by Union gunboats, these states would be isolated, and, perhaps, restored to the Union. But the river itself was of more importance than these states. It was the water highway and the natural outlet of the North-West territory ceded to the Government by Virginia, and of the Louisiana territory acquired by purchase from France. This was approximately one-half of the whole territory of the United States. The control of this outlet, at the opening of the war, had been considered of such importance that Jefferson Davis believed it would eventually bring to the support of the Confederacy the great North-Western country that lay along the tributaries of the river. Whether the Confederacy was to succeed or not, in its dream of independence, it was of the first importance to the Union, either as a whole or as dismembered, to recover the free use of this river. A part of it had been already opened, and attention was naturally directed to the rest.

The city of New Orleans lay upon the east bank of the Mississippi and one hundred and five miles from its mouth. It was the largest city of the South and the greatest cotton market of the world, Liverpool alone excepted. Seventy-five miles below the city there were two forts, St. Philip, on the east shore, and Fort Jackson, half a mile lower down, on the west. The former had a water battery on each side, and the latter, one on the south. Each fort was surrounded by a ditch with water six feet deep. Fort St. Philip was the older work, it having been built by the Spaniards during their occupation of the country. It was finished to its present outlines in 1812-15. The forts were situated on a bend of the river. And as one ascended Fort Jackson lay around the curve, concealed from view by timber fringing the river on that side. But Fort St. Philip, on the other side, faced down stream and had an unobstructed view for a long distance. Neither stood boldly out of the water, presenting faces of frowning masonry. They were both low-lying, Fort Jackson being only twenty-five, and St. Philip only nineteen, feet high. With the surrounding ditches neatly sodded and their slopes carefully trimmed, the passing traveller saw only green turf, rising low above

the water, surmounted by modest brick walls, an altogether unpretentious work, little calculated to attract attention. But a closer view revealed many guns peering over the walls, and, a little lower, embrasures presenting the mouths of bristling cannon.

Together the forts mounted one hundred and twenty guns, three 8-in. columbiads, a rifled 42-pounder, five 10-in. sea-coast mortars, recently obtained from Pensacola, together with two rifled 7-in. guns borrowed from the naval authorities in New Orleans. The others were ordinary 24- and 32-pounders, such as had been in use for many years. As the forts were located, the guns commanded the river for about three and a half miles, and an assaulting fleet would be for that distance under fire. Against the current of the river, this distance could not be traversed in less than half an hour. With the hot shot that might be thrown, the passage by daylight, when the aim would be more accurate, was deemed too hazardous for wooden ships. And, therefore, the attempt must be made under cover of darkness. But it was hoped that the passage having been completed by ships bearing 100 to 200 guns, supported by 10,000 troops on land, the city could be taken and held. This being done, the forts would soon have to capitulate, for want of support, even though not taken at the passage of the fleet.

The forts were garrisoned by 1,500 men under Brigadier-General Johnson K. Duncan, commanding the Confederate coast defences. Subject to him, Lieut.-Colonel Edward Higgins was in immediate command. Both had been officers in the Union army, the former educated at West Point. It is unnecessary to add that the forts were ably commanded. The men were mostly foreigners, or of Northern birth, who, though they fought well, later proved to be unruly and turbulent, and in consequence their loyalty to the Confederate cause has been questioned.

A little below Fort Jackson an obstruction had been placed across the river, consisting of a line of schooners at intervals, anchored with bows up stream. They were carefully chained together amidships, as well as stem and stern. The rigging, ratlins and cables were left to trail astern of the schooners, as an additional impediment, to tangle in the propeller wheels of the Union fleet, if it attempted to pass them.

Above the forts were seven steamers of the Confederate River Fleet, protected and to some extent made shot-proof. They had cotton bulkheads and prepared iron prows, so as to be used as rams. They were to co-operate in defending New Orleans with their guns, and ram such vessels of the Union fleet as might succeed in passing the forts. Besides these, there was the Confederate steam-ram *Manassas*, still unfinished. These ships were all kept with steam up, so as to act against the Union flotilla as occasion should require. A large number of fire-barges, prepared from long river scows, filled with fire logs, which were very combustible, were tied to the banks above both forts, ready to be towed into the current and against an enemy. They were for the double purpose of firing his ships and of lighting up the river by night, so as to show the presence of an enemy, and secure accuracy of fire by the forts. To control the direction of

these fire-barges, small river tugs were supplied to propel them where they were desired.

It will thus be seen that the defences consisted of three parts, viz., first, the chain and schooner obstruction across the river; second, the two forts, Jackson and St. Philip; and third, the Confederate fleet and fire-barges above the forts. Altogether these defences were formidable barriers to the capture of New Orleans. And the confidence of the Confederates in them was complete. But we shall see that even they were insufficient as against the daring genius of the commander of the Union fleet. There were weak places even in these defences, as he soon pointed out. Nevertheless, to pass them and capture New Orleans was one of the crowning naval victories of modern times.

A plan for the reduction of the works and the capture of the city had been for some time taking shape. It found its inspiration largely in the nautical skill and experience of Gustavus V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who was a native of Lowell, Mass., and a schoolmate of General Butler. By an active service of many years in the navy, and later as the captain of a vessel in the merchant coasting trade, he had acquired a fund of practical knowledge that is rarely found in a department official. When Commander David D. Porter, of the U.S. Navy, came to Washington, in November 1861, from his service on the blockading squadron operating in the Gulf, he brought the latest information, obtainable through spies and contrabands, of the nature of the fortifications near New Orleans. A conference was held with General McClellan at his residence in Washington. President Lincoln, Secretary of the Navy Welles, and his assistant, Fox, and Commander Porter were present. The purpose was to agree on a plan to capture the city. McClellan had recently been appointed General-in-Chief, and the plan was new to him. But it had been under consideration by the others for some time.

It was proposed that New Orleans should be taken by a fleet that would first force the passage of the forts. McClellan was asked to furnish 10,000 troops to support the fleet and occupy the city when taken. As 2,500 were already on Ship Island, in the Gulf, only 7,500 more would be needed. And McClellan agreed to furnish them. Porter asked that a mortar fleet be added, to disable the forts, before their passage was attempted. And it was agreed that this should be furnished. There was a discussion as to the nature and extent of the rest of the fleet, but it was felt that only a general plan could be talked of, and that the details would have to be left till a commander had been selected.

Who should command the fleet was a question of some difficulty and of great importance. It was agreed that he should be a man of commanding ability and of large experience, to whom such responsibility could be trusted. And upon this question Porter's knowledge of the men in the Navy was brought into requisition. He recommended Captain David G. Farragut. And upon him, some two months later, the choice finally fell.

Farragut was then sixty years of age. He was born near Knoxville, Tenn. But from his youth he was surrounded by traditions

of the sea. His father and an elder brother were officers in the navy. And when eleven years old David was made a midshipman. He became a lieutenant at twenty-four, a commander at forty, and a captain at fifty-four. This long period of sea-going had given him a large and varied experience. But it was not the opportunity only that was his. He loved the sea and had an aptitude for its traditions.

He was a lad upon the deck of the *Essex*, commanded by Captain David Porter, father of the present commander, in the War of 1812, when she encountered the two British ships *Phæbe* and *Cherub*, sent out expressly to overhaul and 'fight her double.' The *Essex* was in the harbour of Valparaiso, in South America. In the fight that ensued the lad bore his part so as to attract attention, though, as his commander regretfully put it, he was 'too young for promotion.' But he was old enough to profit by the observation of the manœuvring, of the thunder-bursts of cannon, of the noise and din, as well as the bloodshed and victory of that brilliant naval war. The elder Porter became his faithful mentor through life. And a few years later, another friend, Charles Folsom, the chaplain of the ship, secured him leave of absence to attend him as Consul at Tunis, so that he might continue his studies with him. This wise and loving interest aided still further to set the seal of a good man upon his life. But he soon returned to the sea. At twenty-two, as an executive officer in the West Indies, he fought the pirates and obtained a small command, that of the *Ferret*, where his experience was enlarged. At twenty-four he conveyed La Fayette to France. And in 1833 he was ordered to South Carolina to suppress the Nullification outbreak. There he imbibed some anti-secession convictions that later served him well. In the Mexican War he laid before the Secretary of the Navy a plan to take the castle of San Juan de Ulloa. And though it was then rejected as visionary by the Secretary, it succeeded twenty years later at New Orleans.

At the outbreak of the rebellion Farragut was living at Norfolk, Va. He was a Southerner by birth, and was united to Virginia by two marriages. But his mind was made up; and when Virginia passed the Ordinance of Secession he freely expressed his dissatisfaction. When told that a person of his sentiment could not live in Norfolk, he promptly replied: 'Then I can live somewhere else.' And he added: 'Take my word for it, you fellows will catch the d—l before you get through with this business.' He left Norfolk that evening by a steamer for the North, with his family, and arrived in Baltimore just after the mob had assaulted the 6th Massachusetts. He made his way to Philadelphia on a canal boat, and soon after was domiciled with his family at a small village on the Hudson, near New York.

It is strange, but nevertheless true, that the greatest sea-captain of the war, indeed, the greatest of the world since Nelson, should remain in obscurity during the first nine months of the heat and turmoil of the rebellion. But fame had always come to Farragut slowly. And he bided his time. By devotion to his work he had laid deep and broad the foundations of success. So that when his opportunity did come, it found him prepared. His fifty years of sea-going had not

been wasted when, on January 9, 1862, he was called to Washington and confidentially informed of the work he was chosen to do. He entered heartily into the plans suggested; and declared that he might not come back, but that the city would be taken. To his wife he wrote: 'I am to have a flag in the Gulf, and the rest depends upon myself.' And here was the secret of his success—work. A quiet, modest, God-fearing man! Though past middle life, his correct habits had left him still young in heart and vigorous in mind, alert in climbing to the mast-head, quick in getting into a boat and capable of long-continued and severe exertion. He was a man of few words, did his work with the minimum amount of fuss. But though he was quiet, he was hopeful, courageous, capable of inspiring the confidence of both his officers and men, careful in his preparation, even to the smallest details, a stubborn fighter, with a brave, honest heart, that could not be dismayed by phantoms, and with a stern determination to do his duty to the utmost. Thus he felt full confidence in the result.

He went to work promptly to organise his fleet. And on February 3, 1862, he sailed from Hampton Roads on the *Hartford*, the vessel he had chosen for his flag-ship. She was a steamship of 1,900 tons burden, capable, under combined sail and steam, of a speed of eleven knots. She carried 25 guns, and was swift, strong, and of beautiful proportions. She seemed as graceful in movement and as sure in direction as the sweep of a hawk. And the admiration he bestowed on her lends a tinge of romance to the achievements by which he carried her name into history. His fleet was composed of 17 battleships with 142 guns, Porter's 19 mortar-boats, and 6 armed steamships for guard and towing purposes.

It was the last fleet of wooden ships. And the spirits of the past seemed to gather about the old captain as he left the port on his victorious cruise. When he entered the navy, men who had seen Nelson were still alive. And the traditions of Nelson's career down to its triumphant close at Trafalgar had become familiar to Farragut when he was still a lad on board the *Essex*. He could name and locate every one of his battles. The fighting was done then on wooden decks. And so it had been thus far in Farragut's career. And the latter was never quite able to overcome his prejudice against iron ships. 'Give me hearts of iron in ships of oak!' he once exclaimed. And he was soon to prove that wooden ships, when well manned, were still equal to the passage of armed forts and the capture of great cities.

After a prosperous voyage, the fleet arrived at Ship Island, off the Mississippi coast, about midway between Mobile and New Orleans. This island is a long, narrow strip, about seven miles in length and three-fourths of a mile wide, thrown up by the washing of the sea. It lay so low that it was all overflowed in times of extraordinary storms. At the eastern end it widened out in a triangular shape, embracing about a square mile. And this was covered with a low growth of pines and scrub-oaks. At the western end, where the harbour lay, it consisted of hummocks of pure white sand, interspersed with sedgy spots of water. The harbour was a superior one, admitting the largest vessels and holding them safe from all winds.

The island had seen a varied history. Here the English soldiers landed in 1815, after their defeat at New Orleans, and fished and idled away several weeks in camp. At the opening of the Civil War the Government was constructing a fortification upon it. But the work was abandoned, leaving the fort unfinished. The island was soon occupied by the Confederates. But in a few months they grew tired of it. And having destroyed the lantern of the lighthouse and burnt the houses and damaged the half-finished fort, they too abandoned the place. It was again occupied by the North as a part of the system of blockades, and proved so useful for this purpose that the Confederates resolved to retake it. And in a sudden descent they did take it again. But they in turn abandoned it, in alarm, at rumours of an attempted recapture. Though Brigadier-General Phelps, who preceded General Benj. F. Butler with the troops to the island, was impressed with its inhospitable appearance, and declared that it was in no respects suitable for a camp, a little longer stay showed that he was mistaken. Aside from its excellent harbour, the climate in winter was as salubrious as that of Newport in summer. A barrel, sunk three feet deep, immediately filled with water, pure from the natural filter of the sand. Oysters could be had by wading for them, fish abounded, and even coons could be found in the timber.

Phelps landed on December 3, with 1,908 men. They found the partially finished fort occupied by about 170 U.S. sailors and marines, with several large calibre Dahlgren guns in position. This was the nucleus of the expedition against New Orleans. Other troops came at intervals. And on March 25 Butler, who had been appointed to command the land forces, arrived with 1,400 men, making 13,700 in all, exclusive of the fleet. Excepting three well-drilled Western regiments, these troops had all just been enlisted by Butler, in New England, under special authority from the Secretary of War, after several clashes with the state authorities. But, as usual, Butler's energy and pugnacity prevailed, and the troops were collected and sent South. And he followed them. They went into camp near the fort. And soon the low-lying camp on the white sand looked, from the distance, like tents on the sea.

Among the troops was Lieutenant Godfrey Weitzel, who had been stationed at St. Philip for two years, as an engineer entrusted with some work on that fort. While there he had been over the adjacent country duck-hunting, and had thus gained an intimate knowledge of surroundings. The day after Butler arrived a council was held between the commanders of the fleet and the army, to which Weitzel was invited. He assured them that an approach could be had to the rear of St. Philip through Isle Au Breton Sound, and that the troops thus landed could attack the fort from that side. The plan was formed that the mortar fleet should move up the river as near the forts as practicable without coming unnecessarily close to the range of their guns, and here reduce the forts if possible. Farragut, with his battleships, was to remain within supporting distance. When the mortar fleet had reduced the fort, or this was found to be impracticable, then Farragut with the battleships was to attempt the passage, and getting above the forts, was to clear the river of the

enemy's fleet, and so isolate them from the city. Then the forts could be attacked from the river side by the fleet and from the rear by Butler's troops. And being without support, their fall could only be a question of time.

With this plan agreed on, Butler set about fitting up 6,000 men, who were to be embarked on transports in seven days, and Farragut sailed with his fleet to the mouths of the river. Beyond the Union authorities, it was not known whether Mobile, New Orleans, or a lodgement on the coast of Texas, with the hope of recovering that state, was the object of the expedition. But the appearance of the fleet at the mouths of the Mississippi, attempting to cross the bar, solved this question for the Confederates.

Here unexpected difficulties were encountered. Owing to high winds and low tides, Farragut was not able to get his ships over the bar until April 15. Notice was then given to Butler. His troops, which had already been embarked and then disembarked, owing to the delay of the fleet, were again ordered on board. And so the fleet proceeded up the river and anchored 2,500 to 4,000 yards below Fort Jackson. The Confederates cut fire-barges adrift that night, and sent them down the river, with the hope of burning the Union ships. But they were so mismanaged that they drifted against the bank just under the forts and destroyed the wharves, thus lighting up the forts but obscuring the fleet and, of course, doing Farragut no damage.

The next day he sent gunboats repeatedly around the point below Fort Jackson for purposes of observation. When fired on they retired. In the evening, about four o'clock, a gunboat ran out and opened on the fort. Under this cover, an hour later, two of the mortar-boats came out and opened fire, so as to get the distance. After continuing for an hour and a half, they too retired, under the fire of the fort.

At four o'clock the next morning a fire-barge was sent down by the Confederates. It drifted among Farragut's ships, blazing and roaring, causing a sudden slipping of cables, in the efforts to escape damage. One of the battleships fired some shells into it for fear it concealed torpedoes. But nothing of the kind being developed, a boat from another tackled it, and, fixing three grappling-hooks in the leeward end, towed it ashore, where it burned itself harmlessly away. During the day six of the Confederate fleet came in succession below the chain and schooner obstruction across the river, which they could open so as to permit passage. They exchanged shots with the Union gunboats and then retired. Again ineffectual efforts were made to throw fire-barges against the Union fleet. Preparations were now made for their reception. Each boat of the fleet was supplied with axes, ropes and grappling-hooks.

And that same evening they had an opportunity to test their skill. A dense column of black smoke bursting into flames was seen coming down the river. Signal lights were hoisted on the mast of the flag-ship. And instantly a hundred boats shot out of the gloom toward the blazing mass. Two or three gunboats ran up, and one of them opened her steam valves upon the raft, the current making the sparks fly and driving the flames back. She then turned on a stream

of water from her hose. Then the smaller boats quickly pulled alongside, and casting their grappling-hooks into the raft, turned and pulled it away from the anchored vessels. It was made fast to the farther shore, where it was soon consumed. The Confederates were now persuaded that fire-rafts as agencies of destruction would not avail. They were only of use for lighting up the river, nothing more.

The next morning, April 18, the bombardment began. Six of the mortar-boats, two and three-fourths miles below St. Philip, commencing at the eastern bank, were anchored in succession out into the river. They were in full view of both forts. The other thirteen were posted near the western bank, parallel with it, and behind the timber, a mile and three-fourths below Fort Jackson. The order to all was to concentrate their fire upon Fort Jackson, which was the nearest. If it could be reduced the other must fall. Before all the mortar-boats were in position, Fort Jackson opened fire. But her balls fell into the water, a hundred yards short of the mark. Then the low thunder of the first boom of the Union fleet was heard. And a huge black ball, two hundred and fifteen pounds of iron and powder, rose high in the air and, curving slowly down, fell and exploded in the swamp at the rear of the fort. Others followed.

At first they were fired slowly, Porter observing the effect of the shots and giving direction as to the elevation of the gun, the weight of the charge and the length of the fuse. The firing continued until 7 P.M. And, by the count of the commander of the fort, 2,997 shells were thrown by the fleet at the fort. The quarters within were fired and burnt early in the day, as well as the quarters without the fort. The citadel was fired several times and extinguished, but it too was finally consumed. Many of the men and most of the officers lost their bedding and clothes. Some of their best guns were disabled. On the Union side, not a man was hurt except those who were sickened by the concussion which followed every shot. Though the men stood on tip-toe and with open mouth to lessen the effect, it was terrific. Many fish were killed in the river, and the bees came in from the timber. Only two of the Union ships were struck, and the damage to them was slight. This comparatively little damage was partly owing to the inferiority of the guns and powder of the Confederates. During the night Porter withdrew his six mortar-boats from the eastern shore for fear of loss, although this seemed an excess of caution. Two launches were that night sent up to examine the nature of the chain and schooner barrier across the river.

The shelling continued the second and third days. And Fort Jackson's terreplain, parade-plain, parapets and platforms were cut up and some damage done to its casemates. The magazines were threatened, and one shell went through into the casemate containing fixed ammunition. But this was not known on board the fleet. For there it was only seen that the fort was still holding out. In the evening of the third day Farragut called a council of his captains. And it was then decided to attempt to force a passage. The first step would be to cut the chain cable. For this purpose the *Pinola* and *Itaska*, two battleships, were sent up that night, between eleven

and twelve o'clock, under cover of the heaviest shelling. The *Pinola* ran up to the end of the cable near the western shore and a petard was thrown on one of the schooners, but it was to be exploded by means of a wire, and while it was being thrown, the engines of the gunboat were stopped, and a gale blowing from the north, the boat was whirled away down stream, and the wire snapped, before the operator could discharge the spark. The attempt was a failure. But the *Itaska* steamed up to the next schooner to the eastward, and making fast to the side, her men jumped on board and with chisel and sledge, under a rain of fire from both forts, which had now discovered them, in half an hour they severed the chain and slipped the cables by which the boat was anchored. Then the great hull, still chained to the nearer shore, swung resistlessly around under flood and wind. But it carried the *Itaska*, still lashed to its side, with it. Both went fast aground. The *Itaska* was cut loose and her engines started. But it was in vain; she could not be moved. She was within range of both forts. Their balls were flying over her. And the situation was perilous. But the *Pinola*, now having recovered control of herself, came back; and after an hour of earnest tugging and the parting of two 5-inch hawsers, finally, with an 11-inch cable and the help of the current and her own engines, the *Itaska* was dragged into deep water and escaped.

Fortunately, in the darkness, both boats and men escaped injury. After the removal of the schooner, the ones on each side, deprived of her support, swung away so as to make the opening wider. And now several ships could pass through abreast. Two nights later a boat's crew from the *Itaska* pulled up and sounded the channel and found no further obstruction. So the obstruction of the chain raft was now removed.

❧ This chain raft has been criticised, and perhaps with justice. It was so quickly disposed of that it seemed a piece of folly. But the criticism that could probably be made with justice against it was that it was in the wrong location. It was below the forts, whereas it should have been above. Being below, the men coming to examine and cut it always had the raft itself to shield them from view and from danger. If above, it would have been otherwise. Ships, in approaching the forts to attempt the passage, had the same protection of the rafts. And this gave them a better opportunity coolly to steer their way through the opening made in it. If above, it would have detained the ships under fire of the Confederate forts, and have made the passage necessarily slower, by reason of the still partial obstruction of the river by the rest of the raft.

All day, April 21, and the night following, the bombardment continued. An effort was made to draw the fire away from Fort Jackson by the use of Fort Philip's guns. But it was all to no purpose. Porter doggedly persisted in battering Fort Jackson. During the night the Confederates brought down the iron-clad hull of the *Louisiana*, the partially finished warship under construction at New Orleans. For want of machinery it could not propel itself, so that it was in reality only a floating battery. But it had sixteen guns of the heaviest calibre. It was anchored just above St. Philip. The next day General Duncan asked that it be moved to a position below the chain

raft, where it could enfilade Porter's mortar-boats along the other shore. But the commander of the Confederate naval forces, Captain John K. Mitchell, declined. It was probably well that he did, for while he would have had an enfilading fire as they stood, the mortar-boats could have changed position. And his boat then never could have withstood the concentrated fire of the Union fleet.

The *Louisiana* was hardly an asset to the Confederates. Her guns were among the best they had, one, a rifled 7-inch navy gun, had already been placed in position in Fort Jackson, where it was more than a mile nearer the mortar fleet than it was on the *Louisiana*. But it had been borrowed from the naval authorities at New Orleans, and they ordered it back. And against the protest of the commander of the fort, it went. During the bombardment of the first day, this gun, one of the longest range, might have done execution upon the six mortar-boats that had been stationed on the east side of the river in full view of the fort. But it had been taken away. And throughout the whole bombardment it was silent on the *Louisiana*. The same may be said of her other guns. They did no such execution as they might have done in the forts.

On April 23, Farragut, now fully convinced that the forts could not be reduced by the mortar-boats, and that a passage must be attempted, set about making his preparations. It was decided to make the attempt the next morning. So during that day the fire of the mortar fleet was relaxed. The Confederates construed this as meaning that an attempt to pass was near at hand. The commander of the forts again asked that the *Louisiana* be stationed below them. But he was again refused. He also asked that the river be kept well lighted up that night with fire-rafts, warning the commander of the boats that an attack might be expected at any time. But we shall see this precaution was also neglected. The 23rd was balmy and cloudless, a delightful spring day. And the entire garrison of Fort Jackson was turned out to repair the damages of the bombardment. This fatigue duty was a relief to the men after their long pent-up life in the wet and chilly casemates.

On board the fleet, all preparations were soon completed. The mortar-boats were to cover the advance with their heaviest fire. The small steamers *Harriet Lane*, *Westfield*, *Owasco*, *Clinton*, *Miami* and *Jackson* were to engage the water battery below Fort Jackson, and silence it, but go no farther. Captain Bailey with the *Cayuga*, *Pensacola*, *Mississippi*, *Oneida*, *Varuna*, *Katahdin*, *Kineo* and *Wissahickon* were to be the first to attempt the passage. They were to hug the eastern bank, each vessel as it passed Fort St. Philip to pour into it a broadside of grape and canister. Farragut was to follow and hug the western bank, with the *Hartford*, *Richmond* and *Brooklyn*, likewise giving a broadside of grape and canister to Fort Jackson. Captain Bell was to come last with the *Scioto*, *Iroquois*, *Pinola*, *Winona*, *Itaska* and *Kennebec*, keep to the middle of the river, disregarding the forts and making his attack on the Confederate fleet above.

There was little sleep for the men that night. They turned in early. But they were all thinking of the coming fight. The dim light thrown by the lamps around every vessel seemed like the soft shadows of the chamber of death. There were only occasional

discharges of the mortars. And they now seemed like minute-guns in the night. There were no warm tints to the picture. All were sombre and gloomy, crossed by hard lines of duty. At eleven o'clock it was signalled from the *Itaska* that the opening made in the chain raft was still unclosed, and at one all hands were called. The men responded quickly. And at two A.M. the signal to weigh anchor was given. Farragut was ready to advance. But Bailey, who was to take the lead, had more ships and lay farther down stream, and did not get to his position till an hour later. Then all started forward in order as arranged.

The north wind of the last few days had died away and a gentle breeze from the south had succeeded. A light haze lay upon the water and enveloped the shore. The moon did not rise till three, and would not get above the trees on the bank so as to light the river till four. By that time it was hoped that the fleet would be beyond danger. During the first few moments of the advance there was a deathlike stillness, relieved only by a faint hiss of steam. Even the mortars seemed to hold their breath; though for so long they had thundered and roared, that their silence now seemed painful. But at last they spoke. Everything had been arranged for the most rapid fire possible. The men who had been discouraged at their hard work in handling the heavy booms and the strain of the terrific concussions, and at last dissatisfied with the idleness of the great ships, now as they saw them quietly start forward to run the gauntlet of fire, redoubled their exertions and surpassed all previous records. The booms, shrieking and blazing, mounted upward with fearful velocity. There were never less than five, and sometimes eight, nine, ten and even eleven in the air at the same time. The thunder, the smoke, the crash of falling timber in the woods, the dull thud and the explosion, accompanied by the crashing of the materials of the fort or the flying dirt and stones as the heavy balls sank into the ground and exploded, were a fearful prelude to the battle that was to follow.

Captain Bailey on the eastern shore caught the first fire. As his ship, the *Cayuga*, was emerging from the opening in the schooner-raft she was sighted by the forts. They opened on her with every available gun. Their balls flew all around, but fortunately were mostly above her. The firing was too high, and she was seldom hit. Refusing to reveal her whereabouts in the enveloping smoke, she made no answer, but steamed ahead. The gunners in the fort could see nothing, and shot wildly into the darkness. While Bailey, guided by the flashes of the guns of St. Philip, steered close in under the shore, relying for safety on the disposition which gunners have to shoot too high. At last, after three-fourths of a mile under fire, without a shot in reply, the *Cayuga* was abreast St. Philip. Then she slackened her speed and gave them a broadside of grape and canister. The *Pensacola*, the *Mississippi* and the *Varuna* followed closely, each slowing up to pour into the fort a broadside as it passed. All the division passed with little damage.

But now a new danger was encountered. The Confederate gunboats lay in order of battle just above St. Philip. And Captain Bailey was in the midst of them before he was aware. It was a moment of

anxiety. So far as he could distinguish in the darkness, his ship, the *Cayuga*, was alone. The gunboats ran at him full tilt. But he skilfully avoided their blows. And putting in 11-inch shot he succeeded in sinking three of them. But here the *Varuna*, Captain Boggs, and the *Oneida*, Commander Lee, came butting in, the *Varuna* ahead, dealing her fire starboard and port at everything she passed. The first gunboat on her starboard caught her fire. And her boiler exploded, and she drifted ashore. Three others were driven ashore in flames, where they blew up. The *Varuna* was then attacked by the Confederate *Morgan*, iron-clad about the prow, commanded by a former U.S. naval officer, Beverly Kennon. The *Morgan* raked the *Varuna* along the port gangway, killing four and wounding nine of the crew, butting her on the quarter and then on the starboard side. But the *Varuna* got three 8-inch shells into her behind her armour and several shots from her after rifled gun. She then dropped out of the action, partially disabled, and soon after surrendered. The *Varuna* then engaged another ironclad with her prow under the water. The *Varuna* was struck in the port gangway with considerable damage, while her shot only glanced from the Confederate's bow. The latter backed off for another blow and struck again in the same place, crushing in the *Varuna*'s side. But the Confederate was going ahead fast and the concussion drew her around in such a position that the *Varuna* while alongside was able to give her five 8-inch shells back of her armour. This drove her ashore in flames. Finding the *Varuna* was sinking, Captain Boggs ran her ashore also, and tied up to the trees. But he still directed his guns at his antagonist, the *Morgan*, now feebly attempting to get up stream. This fire was kept up till the water was over the guntruck of the *Varuna*. And then her plucky captain rescued the survivors of his crew, several of them wounded, as his ship settled down on the bed of the river. But she had sold herself well, for she had sent six of the Confederate fleet before her, and had so crippled the *Morgan* that she soon surrendered.

During this time the middle division under Captain Bell was meeting with difficulties. In passing the forts, being in the middle of the river, the vessels came within range of the guns trained to strike where the forts assumed their enemy would be. The *Iroquois*, as she steamed up, saw a Confederate gunboat lying close in to the eastern shore. 'Don't fire! We surrender!' was heard from on board, as the *Iroquois* drew near. The call was doubtless unauthorised. For when the *Iroquois* had passed, the Confederate sent a broadside of grape and langrel after her. The fire was returned. And it mortally wounded, among others, her commander, Thos. G. Huger, who had only a few months before been the first-lieutenant of the *Iroquois*, serving with her present officers and crew. He had quit this ship, that had now killed him, to join the Confederacy.

The *Iroquois* was not harmed. And quickly by went both the *Pinola* and *Scioto*. But the other half of Bell's ships were not so fortunate. The *Itaska*, when directly in front of St. Philip, received a broadside of shot, one of which pierced her boiler, and she drifted helplessly down the river. The *Winona* recoiled, when she witnessed the *Itaska*'s fate, and also went back. The *Kennebec* became entangled

in the schooner-raft, and when disentangled lost her way in the darkness and finally returned to her anchorage below the forts.

Farragut, from his place in the fore-rigging of the *Hartford*, with his night-glass, peered into the darkness on either side and went steadily forward. When within a mile and a quarter of Fort Jackson, he received a shot. But he continued on, only replying with two guns which he had mounted on the forecastle. When within half-a-mile, he sheered and gave the fort a broadside of grape and canister. It drove the men to cover. But those within the casemates continued to use their guns. And his vessel was struck several times, though without serious injury. The *Richmond* followed and gave her broadsides. The *Brooklyn*, like the *Kennebec*, lost her way in the darkness, and became entangled in the schooner-raft. But, unlike the *Kennebec*, as soon as she became extricated, she turned her head up-stream. And a few minutes later the Confederate ram *Manassas* butted into her gangway, first firing when within ten feet. But fortunately the shot entered about five feet above the water-line and lodged in the sandbags which protected the *Brooklyn's* steam drum. When the *Manassas* made her appearance the second time, they were so close that she could not get up full speed, and her glancing blow slid off the chain armour of the *Brooklyn*. Then the *Manassas* disappeared in the darkness. While still under the fire of Fort Jackson, the *Brooklyn* was attacked by a Confederate schooner. But with a broadside, at only fifty or sixty yards, the schooner was disabled and fired. Still groping her way in the darkness, the *Brooklyn* found herself abreast St. Philip, and the leadsman was calling the sounding, 'Thirteen feet, sir.' This was too close to the shore, and Captain Craven veered. And as he did so he poured his broadside of grape and canister into the fort, so that his men in the tops witnessed, in the flashes of the guns, the men of the fort running to shelter.

Farragut had now escaped Fort Jackson, and was well past St. Philip, when suddenly a fierce blaze broke out above him, revealing a Confederate ram pushing a fire-raft upon his ship. In attempting to escape, the *Hartford* was run ashore and the raft came crashing alongside. In a moment Farragut's ship was all ablaze on her port side, and half-way up to her main mizzen tops. It was a perilous moment. 'My God!' Farragut exclaimed. 'Is it to end in this way?' Fortunately it was only the dry paint that was yet ablaze, and the well organised fire department of the *Hartford* was soon able to extinguish the fires, and the ship to back herself off the shore. Luckily, too, St. Philip, though the peril of the *Hartford* was apparent, could not open upon her, because one of its columbiads had been previously dismounted, and the other could not be brought to bear. And the men, too, were busy with other vessels passing. The 24-pounder in the salient of the upper water battery, bearing directly upon the *Hartford*, had also been broken in two near the trunnions. But Farragut could not know this. And he shot his shells into both fort and battery. And if a Confederate steamer came under his fire, he gave it too a shot. But at length, still going forward, the fire slackened and the smoky darkness gave place to light. And Farragut found himself above the forts, and in the presence of the Confederate gun-

boats. But they were now *hors de combat* after the encounter with Bailey's ships.

To those on board the fleet, this passage was an experience that was never forgotten. There was the hurly-burly and the thrilling succession of perils, the horrible din of battle, 20 mortars, 142 guns of the fleet, 128 more of the forts and 39 of the Confederate ships, all working at once. There were the explosions of boilers and magazines of burning ships, the shouts of command and the cries and shrieks of scalded and wounded and drowning and dying men. The dense darkness gave way, in turn, to blinding flashes of death-dealing guns. And all were crowded into an incredibly short time. For the forts were passed, the Confederate fleet was destroyed, and the Union ships were out of danger in an hour and a half after they had left their anchorage. But it was an awful hour, an experience that one who lived through it could never forget—a veritable passage through 'the valley of the shadow of death.'

From the side of the Confederates three things had contributed to the Union victory. First, a failure on the part of Captain Mitchell to light up the river. General Duncan had warned him that the passage must be expected, and had urged that the river be kept well lighted up that night. But notwithstanding this warning, no fire-raft appeared, save the one that was thrust at the *Hartford*. Second, a want of co-operation on the part of the Confederate fleet with the forts. The River Defence Fleet claimed to be independent of the Confederate navy. Both the fleet and the ironclad *Louisiana* failed to give a cordial co-operation to the forts. Third, the inferiority of the Confederate guns, both on the ships and in the forts. These all contributed to the successful passage. But after all it was the splendid courage and discipline and power of the Union fleet that had triumphed.

The *Cayuga* had been struck forty-two times. But Captain Bailey still maintained the lead. In the grey light of the April morning he passed on up the river, and at the quarantine station, five miles above the forts, found a camp of Confederates. They fled at his approach, but afterwards returned and surrendered. As he could not stop to care for them, they were paroled not to take up arms again, and then turned loose. His ship came to anchor at the quarantine. And as each succeeding vessel came up, it dropped in line along the shore and was roundly cheered. The dead, of whom there were twenty-four, they buried on the river's bank. And here they cared for the wounded, eighty-six in number. The Confederate loss was not so large. Fort Jackson, from April 18 to 25, had nine killed and thirty-five wounded, and St. Philip two killed and four wounded.

Captain Boggs of the *Varuna* was hailed by his comrades as the hero of the passage, though he was the only one who had lost his ship. He was selected to carry the dispatches announcing the success of the fleet to Butler and Porter. And after twenty-six hours in an open boat, on the river, the canals and the bayous, he reached his destination. The message was: 'We had a tough time of it. But, thank God, the number of killed and wounded was very small, considering. . . . We have destroyed all but two of the gunboats. And these will have to surrender

with the forts. I intend to follow up my success and push on to New Orleans.'

Leaving two gunboats at quarantine to take care of the two Confederates that had escaped the fleet, Farragut pushed on, and at ten o'clock was at Chalmette Batteries, three miles below the city. In ten minutes they were silenced. Then the fleet cautiously rounded the bend in the Mississippi, and the city of New Orleans lay helpless under the smoking stacks and still heated guns of the Union ships. It required no argument to convince her 150,000 people of the power of that fleet. Its appearance there after the obstacles it had encountered was enough.

But here another scene opened itself to view. As far as his eye could reach, for miles along the levee, Farragut saw black columns of smoke. Fifteen thousand bales of cotton, a dozen large river steamboats, as many more ships, some laden with cotton, a great floating battery, several unfinished gunboats, the half-built ironclad *Mississippi* and the docks on the other side of the river were all ablaze. Their destruction was ordered by Major-General Mansfield Lovell, acting under instructions from the Confederate Secretary of War. Farragut pronounced it 'awful.' And perhaps no other word could better describe it. To offer to the flames such an accumulation of property, most of it belonging to individuals, when the people were already impoverished and now menaced by starvation, was the crowning folly of the hour. The city had been dragooned into secession. And after such experience, it can readily be surmised that, when at last comfortably back in the Union, with the better element in control, there was little disposition to return to the Confederacy. In pursuance of the same policy, and for fear of its falling into the hands of the Union authorities, all the cotton and tobacco belonging to planters in the exposed interior was also ordered to be destroyed.

General Lovell had been in command of the Confederate troops in the city. They numbered about 3,000. But after a conference with the Mayor, it was decided that it would be better for them to withdraw than, by remaining and attempting a defence, to invite a bombardment of the city. He had, therefore, hastily removed such guns and supplies as he could and sent away the troops. The city was thus defenceless, except as its own people might choose to attempt one.

The time for the choice was short. For when Farragut dropped anchor a boat's crew at once pulled off from the flag-ship and directed its way to the shore. In the boat sat Captain Bailey and Lieutenant Perkins. They bore no white flag, and they carried no arms. Their mission was to the Mayor of the city to demand its surrender. The streets, notwithstanding rain was falling, were crowded with excited men, representing the worst elements of the city. To send Captain Bailey among them seemed like an imprudent exposure of the officer who had led the way in the passage of the forts. But having landed, he and his companion passed undaunted a dozen blocks or more down to the City Hall. They were followed by this motley rout, cheering for Jefferson Davis, etc. But none dared molest them. And this seemed rather remarkable. When it was apparent that the least untoward incident might have kindled a flame. But the presence of

Farragut's ships was enough. It was a memorable illustration of the majesty of the law.

'I have been sent,' said the Captain to the Mayor, 'by the Commander of the United States Fleet to demand the surrender of this city, and the elevation of the flag of the United States on the Custom House, Mint, Post-Office, and City Hall.' The Mayor answered that he was not the military commander of the city, though there was one, and that he would send for him and let him receive and reply to the demand. General Lovell was accordingly summoned, for with his staff he still remained in the city, though his troops were gone. And when he appeared, he replied that he would not surrender the city, but that as his troops were gone, he would follow them and allow the city authorities to pursue what course they deemed proper. Accordingly, the officers returned to the ship, and the next morning the Mayor and Council answered that they could make no defence, and would offer no obstruction to the flag being raised on the buildings named.

Captain Morris of the *Pensacola*, whose ship lay nearest the Mint, was ordered to send a boat to hoist the flag. And by eight o'clock it floated over the Mint. But no detail was left to guard it, though the bystanders were warned that the guns of the *Pensacola* would open fire if anyone was seen molesting it. Two howitzers in the main-top of the *Pensacola* were loaded with grape and trained on the spot, and the guard was ordered to fire on any one that attempted to haul the flag down.

At eleven o'clock, while the crew was assembled on the deck for prayers, it being Sunday, all were startled by the discharge of one of the howitzers. Every eye sought the flag, and four men were seen carrying it away. The leader was one Mumford. Farragut naturally resented this indignity to his flag, and warned the Mayor that the fire of the fleet might be drawn upon the city and result in great damage to innocent people. The Mayor, though not approving the act, was still not willing to encounter this rebellious spirit, especially while the newspapers were applauding it. But Farragut was privately assured that the act was unauthorised, and chargeable solely to a few unthinking individuals. On the next day a hundred marines landed and hauled down the Confederate flags from the Mint and Custom House, and hoisted again the flags of the Union. And then they remained. Farragut's possession of the city was now undisputed. New Orleans was captured.

Let us now return to the forts. Farragut had left them behind. And they were still flying the Confederate flag. Porter, under a flag of truce, demanded their surrender. But they refused. And the bombardment by the mortar fleet was then renewed. Butler also went down the river to join his command.

The brigade of General Phelps was to remain on the river ready to make an assault on the front. While that of General Williams was to reach the rear of Fort St. Philip. The latter started on transports for Sable Island, twelve miles to the rear of St. Philip. And here the 26th Mass. and some companies of the 4th Wis. and the 21st Ind. were placed on board the *Miami*, a light-draught boat. They felt their way cautiously in the shallow waters of the bayou toward St. Philip.

But when still six miles off, the *Miami* grounded. Thirty boats were then filled with troops, and four miles of vigorous rowing brought them to Manuel's Canal. Here the swiftness of the current prevented further progress with the oars. And the men had to get out and wade in water, sometimes breast-deep, and draw the boats another mile to a landing-place, some distance above the fort. Thus two hundred troops were landed without opposition on the evening of April 26. Others came the next day, and some crossed over the river. And thus both forts were invested.

During the bombardment and the night of the passage of the fleet, the garrisons had remained faithful to their work. But during the following day they got word that the city was in Farragut's hands. Then there was a reaction. Being mostly foreign enlistments, the men were naturally without any great interest in the success of the Confederacy. Everything, however, remained quiet in appearance till midnight of the 27th. Then the garrison of Fort Jackson arose in rebellion, seized the guard and posterns, reversed the guns commanding the gates, spiked those bearing up the river, and fired on the officers upon the ramparts, who attempted to stop the uprising. They commenced to leave the fort with their arms and refused to fight any longer. Every effort was made to bring them to order, but without success. And so the officers had no alternative but to submit. They allowed those to go who wished. And about half the garrison left. Some of them were men who had been conspicuous for bravery and good conduct when the fort was under fire.

It was also evident that there was no further fight in the men that were left behind. All were demoralised. When morning came, a boat was sent to St. Philip. And it was discovered that the officers there had lost confidence in their men too, though none of them had yet left or openly revolted. Under these humiliating circumstances, with the Union forces threatening on all sides, there was no alternative left. A flag of truce was sent to Porter to propose a capitulation. This brought up the Captain, and the terms were drawn up and signed. The forts were surrendered with their armament and all public property. The officers and men were to go on parole, the former to retain their side-arms, and both their private property.

As soon as the surrender, which also included the two gunboats which had escaped Farragut's fleet, was complete, Butler proceeded to New Orleans. And on May 1 Farragut turned over to him control of the city. To one class of her people, his coming was an occasion of unmixed joy. It had been a joyful trip up the river with everywhere the demonstrative welcome of capering negroes. And when he reached the levee of the city the mulatto women with baskets of cakes and oranges, and the black nurses who had ventured farther from home than usual with their little charges, though less noisy in their welcome, were not less sincere. The coloured people were his friends.

But there was another class that occupied the levee and witnessed his coming with different feelings. As the transports reached the shore, this turbulent crowd could be heard calling for 'Pickayune Butler,' etc. But a company of the 31st Mass. marched out and

slowly pressed back the crowd. Following, came two regiments. They formed on the levee and started on their march, down the levee to Poydras Street, on Poydras to St. Charles, down St. Charles, past the famous hotel of that name, now closed, to Canal Street, and on Canal to the Custom House. The crowd surged along the pavements with cries of 'Bull Run!' 'Shiloh!' 'Hurrah for Beauregard!' But no violence was attempted, and the troops reached their destination in safety. They took up their quarters for the night on the second floor of the vast unfinished Custom House. A guard was posted and artillery was planted so as to command the adjoining streets. Butler then returned to his ships. But in the twilight General Phelps walked about the city unattended and unmolested. People he spoke to answered his inquiries with politeness, notwithstanding he wore the uniform of a Union soldier.

The next day Butler issued a proclamation declaring martial law. It was to continue so long as necessary. He declared the rights of property inviolable, requested the people to continue their vocations, that places of amusement be kept open and services be continued in the churches. He required keepers of saloons to report their names and receive a licence. And they were notified that they would be held responsible for all disorder arising in their places. His purpose was to leave the municipal government in full authority and confine himself to maintaining the supremacy of the Union. But he gave notice that, while it was desired to exercise his authority mildly, it must be remembered that it would be rigorously and firmly administered if occasion required.

He asked one of the daily papers to print his proclamation. The request was refused. And a file of soldiers was sent to the office, some of them printers, who took possession and printed it themselves. The paper the next day commenting unfavourably upon this apparent determination to subject it to supervision, Butler ordered its publication suspended. The proprietors, however, promising compliance, obtained permission the next day to resume. A few days later the proclamation appeared in its columns. And the other newspapers quietly took the hint.

There was no bluster, but order was strictly maintained and troops were distributed to different points. Workshops and stores were closed at his coming. And their employees, dependent upon their earnings for support, were thus left idle. The St. Charles Hotel, which had housed, approximately, five hundred people the day before, was audaciously closed on his entrance into the city. And Butler ordered it opened. It was a well-known hostelry, famous for scenes of social revelry, where the beautiful women of the Creole City had danced in other days. Its rotunda and bar-room had witnessed many 'difficulties' adjusted and some chivalric encounters. In its slave-mart, countless tears of separation had been shed. But here Butler established his headquarters. His soldiers did duty in the dining-room and kitchen. Their tramp as they came and went might be heard all day. And at night, instead of maid and porter slipping quietly and respectfully about in the long halls, there was the measured tread of sentinels pacing to and fro on their solitary beats.

One of the problems that confronted Butler was how to feed the poor that were out of employment. The city had been in a state of siege for some days, and the planters along the river, who had been accustomed to bring supplies, were afraid to send in their sloops for fear they would be captured and confiscated. Provisions could hardly be had at any price. An examination made showed that there was not in the city enough food to sustain the population for more than a few days. A part of this was what Lovell had left when, with his troops, he evacuated the city.

The first thing Butler did was to distribute among the poor the provisions left by the Confederates. Then learning that there was a stock of flour at Mobile that had been purchased by the city to feed its starving population, he commanded this to be brought in. A similar stock was at the junction of the Red River with the Mississippi, and he brought this down. He contributed money himself to buy provisions, and encouraged his brother, who was with the army, to embark in the business of buying and bringing cattle from Texas to sell. When stores arrived from New York for his troops, he obtained leave to sell a part of them to supply the public want. A railroad from Algiers, across the river, ran a hundred miles to the north-west through a very fertile country. And this was one of the city's chief sources of supply. He required this railroad to run trains for the purpose of bringing in food.

But starvation was not the only enemy the city had to fear. The time for the annual scourge of yellow fever was approaching. It was a disease that was not indigenous, but being brought in was likely to become prevalent, especially if unsanitary conditions existed. It had been predicted that this fever would prove fatal to the Union troops. But Butler was determined that it would not. He called the Mayor's attention to the condition of the streets and sewers. And nothing was done. Butler then displaced him and proposed to the city council the employment of two thousand men for twenty days to put the city in condition, requiring all who were employed to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, giving preference to men with families, and paying each man fifty cents a day from the city's revenues and issuing to him on the part of the army the rations of a U.S. soldier. This proposition was accepted.

As soon as an officer was appointed to take charge of the work he was flooded with letters calling attention to unhealthy conditions. The people thus showed their appreciation and became self-appointed inspectors. Butler proceeded to wage war against nuisances, tore down shanties, filled up pools, purged canals, repaired the levees, cleaned the streets, and with gangs of twenty-five men, each under an overseer, continued to keep them clean. He even reclaimed some land created by deposits of silt in times of flood in the river. And this was so skilfully done that it was estimated that the land so reclaimed was worth a million dollars. Thus the work became a source of wealth to the city.

But Butler did not allow it to become a source of expense to his Government. He evidently believed that those who fomented rebellion should bear a part of the consequences. When it came to

his knowledge that a subscription of \$1,250,000 had been made by some corporations, partnerships and private individuals for the purpose of defending the city against the Union army and navy, he procured a list of the subscribers and required them to pay one-fourth as much for the relief of their destitute and starving neighbours. He raised in this way \$312,000. A list of cotton brokers having published in the newspapers a notice advising the planters not to bring their produce to the city for sale, he assessed fines on them in sums varying from \$100 to \$500, thus raising \$29,000. He appointed one of his lieutenants a financial clerk with an office in the Custom House, and ordered these assessments to be paid there, by a fixed day, or in default that the property of the delinquent be seized and sold, or the party be imprisoned till the amount was paid. Thus he provided means to pay for the work in hand. And then he raised the wages of the men employed in cleaning the streets to \$1.50 per day, and discontinued issuing them rations.

By these means the poor were fed, the city was cleaned and Butler was enabled to return to the Secretary of the Treasury \$25,000 that had been placed at his disposal for these purposes. The results of his work became apparent in the improved health of the community. That summer there was an almost entire exemption from the scourge of yellow fever. The mortality returns showed New Orleans to be 'the most healthy city in the United States.' In one of Butler's regiments, a thousand strong, quartered in the Custom House, only one man was lost during July and August.

He exercised a general authority. And his rule sometimes extended to small things. One of his acts still provokes a smile. Jackson Square was geographically the centre of the city. It was the Place d'Armes or parade-ground of two centuries before, fronted by the St. Louis Cathedral, one of the most interesting churches in America, supported as it is on one side by the beautiful Presbytère, or house of the Capuchin Priests, and on the other by the equally beautiful Cabildo, where the laws were made and the executive offices were located, when Louisiana was a province of Spain. Only a little removed, on the other side of the square, is the old French Market, a famous resort of tourists. In this square, the centre of so much interest, stood a handsome equestrian statue of Andrew Jackson, mounted on a granite pedestal some twenty feet in height. On this pedestal Butler caused to be cut the well-known sentiment, proposed by Jackson at the Jefferson Banquet in 1830: 'Our Federal Union, it must be preserved.' And there these words remain, not only to teach their lesson of patriotism, but also to remind the present and future generations of the rugged rule of this stern old son of New England.

Two of Butler's acts have been the subjects of criticism. And with the mention of these, his administration may be dismissed. One was the hanging of Mumford, the leader of those who tore the Union flag down, that had been hoisted by Farragut on the Mint. It appears that the flag, after being taken down, was carried out of the building and trailed in the mud, then mounted on a furniture van and paraded, thus besmattered with dirt and water, about the streets attended by a fife and drum, and that at last the flag was torn up and the pieces

distributed among the bystanders. Mumford, who is said to have been a gambler, continued to boast on the streets of his part in this affair. And even after Butler assumed command he continued to do this, and apparently defied the United States authorities to attempt to punish him. The fleet had then retired, the number of Butler's troops was small, it was apparent that no licence should be extended to rebellious conduct like this, for fear of encouraging a general outburst, which could not be suppressed. Mumford was accordingly arrested and tried before a military commission and sentenced to be hung. Butler refused to interfere, and he was hung, from a scaffold erected in front of the Mint, in the presence of a large assembly. No apology can be made for Mumford's conduct or for the outraged sense of propriety that it naturally caused. But to us, in our quieter time, it does seem that the penalty was too great for the offence, and that deportation from the city and imprisonment would have been better.

The other act for which Butler has been criticised is his 'woman order.' His soldiers had been greatly annoyed. Observing the rule of offering no physical injury, some of the women of the city still went to the limit in constant exhibitions of petty annoyances toward the soldiers. They would use opprobrious language concerning them. They would get up and leave a street-car or pew in a church if one entered. They would draw aside their skirts and pass to the extreme edge of the sidewalk in passing them. They would leave the pavement and walk in the street to avoid passing under a Union flag hung over the sidewalk. Female teachers had their pupils sing Confederate songs. And in their parlours others would play such airs on their pianos if they saw Union soldiers passing. The purpose, of course, was to show contempt. The climax was reached, in this kind of conduct, one day when a woman spat in the faces of two officers who happened to be passing her on the street.

It was this breach that finally determined Butler to stop such conduct. It was fast reaching a point where, if not stopped, it might provoke retaliation and perhaps cause a general outbreak. Therefore on May 15 he issued this order: 'As the officers and soldiers of the United States have been subject to repeated insults from the women (calling themselves ladies) of New Orleans, in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on our part, it is ordered that hereafter, when any female shall by word, gesture or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation.' This was the whole of it.

The order was written with care. The question with Butler was, how to end this insulting conduct. It would not do to arrest the women. For arrests they would have courted as a means of showing their Confederate sympathies, and of enlisting the men in efforts to retaliate. Southern men have always shown a chivalrous attention to women. And the arrest of one well-dressed and otherwise conducting herself properly, on one of the crowded streets of the city, by soldiers, might have led to an outbreak. And it was manifestly important to remove every occasion for trouble.

The order did accomplish its purpose. The unseemly demonstra-

tions, having been noticed in this way, the women quickly realised how unbecoming such conduct was, and desisted. The better element, the real ladies, prevailed at last, as they usually do. One observer wrote, that 'the first twenty-four hours after its promulgation witnessed a complete, and it seemed to us who were there, an almost miraculous change.' And he not unnaturally added, 'If success is the test of merit, then was it one of the most meritorious acts of the war.'

It was soon apparent, however, that this order was to be made a pretext for a hue and cry against Butler. The next day the Mayor addressed him a letter, understood to have been inspired by Soulé, who was advising him: 'Your General Order No. 28 is of a character so extraordinary and astonishing that I cannot, holding the office of chief magistrate of this city, chargeable with its peace and dignity, suffer it to be promulgated in our presence without protesting against the threat it contains. . . . To give a licence to the officers and soldiers of your command to commit outrages such as are indicated in your order, upon defenceless women is, in my judgment, a reproach to the civilisation, not to say the Christianity, of the age.'

The relations with the Mayor had already been strained. We have noticed his failure to clean up the city. And he was chargeable with the straitened supply of provisions, to the extent, at least, of having sent food to feed the Confederate troops that had left the city. His constant tone in communication with the citizens was that New Orleans had not been conquered, but only overcome by brute force. To add to all this, a French vessel had lately appeared in port as the precursor of a fleet of her navy. The friendly disposition of France towards the Confederacy was well understood. And under these circumstances the common council had passed a resolution, tendering the freedom and hospitality of the city, through the commander of this vessel, to the French fleet. And a committee of the council was appointed to act with the Mayor in making this tender. The influence of the Mayor and Soulé, who was of French birth, was again in evidence. But here the whole proceeding was halted by Butler, in a communication declaring this action an insult both to the United States and to France. The offer of the freedom of a captured city by the captives was an anomaly. It could only be an invitation to the French to imprisonment or hostility. For the United States was the only power capable of making such a tender. And Butler, therefore, told them that this action would have to be revised.

Following upon this came the Mayor's insulting protest against Butler's order. Butler's patience was exhausted. And the consequence was that the Mayor was arrested and sent to Fort Jackson as a prisoner, and was later removed to Fort Pickens at Pensacola, Fla. While Soulé, who had been his adviser, was sent to Fort Warren, in Boston harbour. A military officer was assigned to discharge the duties of Mayor till such time as the citizens should elect a loyal man to the office. A provost-marshal was named to discharge the duties of chief of police, and a judge to hear and determine complaints for violations of the ordinances of the city. The whole incident thus resulted in a substantial improvement of the civil affairs.

The Governor of Louisiana took Butler's order up next in much the same way as the Mayor had done. And more than seven months after its issue, probably in the hope of promoting foreign intervention, President Davis made it one of his specifications in a proclamation against Butler wherein he declared him and all commissioned officers in his command to be 'felons' and 'criminals,' 'deserving death,' and directing the officers in command of the forces that might capture them, immediately to execute Butler by hanging and reserve the others for future execution. The reason Davis gave for this fulmination against Butler was that he invited and encouraged his soldiers by this order to insult and outrage women. But the sufficient answer to this charge is that Butler's order did not read so. He simply said 'when any female shall by word, gesture or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation.' There are two ways to 'treat' a 'woman of the town,' One is to accept her as she advertises herself and yield to her embraces, and the other is to avoid and shun her as unworthy and unfit to be associated with. The former, Butler had strictly forbidden when he enjoined upon his soldiers the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy towards women. And the latter he here enjoined. In other words, having found out by her conduct that such a woman must be taken as a woman of the town, she must be shunned and avoided by all virtuous men, as he cautioned his troops they must be.

There is a further answer, however, to Davis that is conclusive. His proclamation was issued after Butler was recalled. And yet there is in this proclamation no mention of a single instance of a woman in New Orleans being outraged by a Union soldier while Butler was in command. And why? Because no such thing had occurred. Davis did complain of many other things as having occurred—the arrest and imprisonment of non-combatants, and of paroled Confederate soldiers, the plunder and confiscation of property, that women and children were refused egress from the city, and were driven from their homes and left to starve in the streets, that he liberated some slaves and compelled others to work, that he issued an order which, if executed, would have condemned to starvation a quarter of a million human beings and incited slaves to servile war, etc. He thus attributed to Butler almost every crime in the code, except rape and assault with intent to rape. But there is no mention of these two crimes upon a scathing review of Butler's administration after it had closed. So that Davis himself showed that his charge was really groundless, as his others contained in the proclamation also were.

But this hue and cry did not stop with the U.S. shores. Blockade running had become both profitable and popular. And engaged in it were many men of Great Britain of large wealth and corresponding influence. They had become firm friends of the Confederacy. The titled classes of England were generally so. And Lord Palmerston, at the time Prime Minister, showed his bent when, in a speech in the House of Lords, referring to Butler's order, he declared that 'an Englishman must blush to think that such an act had been committed

by one belonging to the Anglo-Saxon race.' And these words were cheered by the House at the time of their delivery. And *Punch*, which had so often made a sorry figure when touching upon the Civil War, took it up with a jeering song. The English were fresh from their excitement over the removal of the Confederate emissaries, Mason and Slidell, from the British ship in which they had taken passage on their way to London. And Butler had intruded himself between the city officials and the French fleet on its recent visit to New Orleans. Both nations, therefore, feeling that they had a grievance, were ready to put the same construction on Butler's order as Davis had done. The Prime Minister of England hastened to take it up with the American Ambassador. But Mr. Adams did not appreciate all this noise about so small a matter. And a sharp correspondence followed. Lincoln and Seward, however, felt that they could not afford to let such a thing influence the important question of intervention which was now threatened from both France and England. And the outcome of the whole matter was that Butler was recalled.

He had made a strong ruler. In a city where gamblers and vicious elements did notoriously abound, he had made law and order to prevail. He had caused justice to be administered so impartially that when the provost-judge that he appointed retired, the lawyers presented him with a testimonial, and accompanied it with a unanimous expression of esteem and good-will. He had given the people greater freedom of election than they had ever enjoyed before. Two unconditional Union men had been elected by the city to the U.S. Congress. And the votes polled at the election had exceeded by a thousand the whole number cast in the city for secession. He had shown an interest in the substantial welfare of the city. Other rulers it had known, perhaps too often, whose thoughts were of the rich and powerful, but his work had carried blessings to the cottage of the poor and the cabin of the slave. This was now appreciated. And when he took his departure on December 24, 1862, there was a large gathering on the levee, which spontaneously showed the good-will of the city. He was rowed out to Farragut's flag-ship, the *Hartford*. Here he spent an hour, and then passed to the ship that was to carry him home. And as it glided down the river quietly from its moorings, the great guns of the *Hartford* mingled with those of a battery on shore to thunder out a last farewell.

CHAPTER XXII

Farragut sails up the Mississippi and attacks Vicksburg—Finds it too strong — Returns — Army holds Baton Rouge — Halleck divides Western Army—Van Dorn attacks Corinth—Is defeated.

THE piercing of its exterior line of defence at the central and strongest point on the Gulf, by the capture of New Orleans, quickly caused the abandonment of the remaining fortified places in that neighbourhood. This included Forts Pike and Macomb, which guarded the approach by way of Lake Pontchartrain, Fort Livingston on Barrataria Bay, Fort Berwick on Berwick Bay, and some smaller works. The guns were taken to Vicksburg, which had become the next point for defence on the Mississippi. Commander Porter, who after the surrender of the forts below New Orleans had gone with his mortar fleet to the entrance of Mobile Bay, at an early hour in the morning of May 10, noticed a bright light in the direction of Pensacola. He directed his fleet thither, and arrived at daylight. He found the place evacuated and at once took possession. The light had been caused by the destruction of the Navy-yard and Hospital, preparatory to leaving. Thus one of the finest harbours on the Gulf became available for a naval station for the United States. The fall of New Orleans and the losses of the battle of Shiloh had made it necessary to dismantle this post and send its guns to fortify Vicksburg and its troops to fill up the ranks of Beauregard's army.

Seeing New Orleans secure in Butler's hands, Farragut had passed on up the river with his fleet. Baton Rouge and Natchez surrendered without resistance. And on May 22 he demanded the surrender of Vicksburg. But here he met with a prompt refusal. The defences were even thus early very formidable. There were one 9-inch, three 8-inch, and one 18-pounder rifled gun mounted in a battery on the highest point of the bluff, where they could deliver a plunging fire and still be beyond the reach of the guns of the fleet. Near by was a battery of 24-pounders, two of them rifled, and a half mile below the town was a water battery with four 42-pounders and two rifled 32-pounders, commanded by Captain Todd, a brother-in-law of President Lincoln. Besides these there were scattered along the bluff for a distance of three miles, two 10-inch, one 8-inch, one 42-pounder, five 32-pounders, and two rifled 12-pounders. At Grand Gulf, twenty-five miles farther down the river, a battery of rifled guns had been lately thrown up, and here two of Farragut's ships had been attacked as they passed up the river.

At 3 A.M. of June 28 Farragut got under way to pass the batteries of Vicksburg. His squadron was in two columns, the *Richmond*,

Hartford and *Brooklyn* on the starboard side nearest the batteries, while the port column consisted of the *Iroquois* and the *Oneida*, which were to steam ahead of the *Richmond*, keeping off her port bow, the *Wissahickon* and the *Scioto* between the *Richmond* and the *Hartford*, the *Winona* and *Katahdin* on the port quarter of the *Brooklyn*. As they drew in range of the batteries, Porter's mortar flotilla opened a heavy fire, and the mortar steamers moved up the river on the *Hartford's* starboard quarter, taking a position 1,400 yards from the water battery. Here they kept up a rapid fire till the fleet was beyond reach of the guns of the batteries. By six o'clock all the vessels had passed and anchored above Vicksburg, except the *Brooklyn*, *Kennebec*, and *Katahdin*. They had reached the batteries, remained two hours under fire assisting the bombardment, and then, owing to a misunderstanding of orders, had retired below. The fleet lost seven killed and thirty wounded. The mortar steamer *Clifton* received a shot through her boiler and the escaping steam killed eight of her men. The total Union loss was thus fifteen killed and thirty wounded. The Confederates escaped without injury to their men and without serious damage to their works. Two days later the fleet was joined by the flotilla of the Upper Mississippi, under Captain Chas. H. Davis. And all anchored a short distance below the mouth of the Yazoo River, which entered the Mississippi nine miles above Vicksburg.

Having learned that the Confederates were completing the ram *Arkansas* up the Yazoo, Captain Davis ordered the *Carondelet*, the *Tyler*, and the ram *Queen of the West* to ascend that stream and capture the vessel. She was designed for a sea-going ship, 180 feet long, with 30-foot beam, her wooden casemates, inclined at the bow and stern, protected by railroad iron, dovetailed together so as to form a mass of iron 3 inches thick, the space between the ports filled with compressed cotton bales, sheathed in wood to prevent danger from fire, and her bow armed with a sharp iron beak so that she could operate as a ram. She carried two 8-inch columbiads, four 6.4-inch rifled guns, two 32-pounders, and two 9-inch Dahlgren shell guns. She was a twin-screw ship. But her weak point was her engines, which were insufficient for her size and weight. She was commanded by Isaac Napoleon Brown, formerly an officer in the U.S. Navy.

The Union ships got under way at four o'clock on the morning of July 15. But they had hardly proceeded up the Yazoo six miles when they met the *Arkansas* coming down. This was more than they expected. They supposed she was in dock at Yazoo City, still unfinished. The Union ships were a mile apart, with the *Queen* in the lead and the *Carondelet* in the rear. No one of them was fit to cope with the big Confederate. The *Queen* gave her a vigorous discharge and then fled to give the alarm. When she reached the *Tyler*, the two faced about to give the adversary a reception. One of their shots struck the pilot-house, killed her chief pilot, wounded another, and injured Commander Brown. But continuing at his post, Brown was soon after grazed on the temple with a musket-ball and fell insensible on the deck. Still his ship came steadily on, the Union vessels retreating before her, both sides keeping up their fire. The *Carondelet* had her wheel-rope cut and received thirteen shots. In passing an

island, the Confederate went to one side in pursuit of the *Tyler*, while the *Carondelet* passed to the other and so fell in the rear of both. The Confederate continued on to the Mississippi in pursuit of the *Tyler*.

The fleet heard the guns and soon saw the *Queen* and the *Tyler* fleeing down, pursued by the *Arkansas*. But there was only a single vessel of the fleet that had steam up, the *General Bragg*. And her captain, of course, had no order to pursue the Confederate. And strangely enough, feeling that he could not do so without, he did not give chase. Admiral Farragut expressed his disgust at such conduct by saying: 'Every man has one chance. And he has had his and lost it.' So on went the Confederate, firing right and left. While the Union vessels responded as she went by, most of their missiles glanced harmlessly from the mailed sides. But her smoke stack was riddled, and two 11-inch shells pierced her armour and exploded, one of them killing and wounding sixteen of her men and setting fire to the cotton lining of her inside bulwark. Still, the flame was quickly extinguished. But an 11-inch shot broke through immediately above the port, bringing with it a shower of iron and splinters, which struck down every man at the gun. And the ball passing across the deck and through the smoke stack, killed eight and wounded seven more men. Had she been long subjected to this treatment, she must have been sunk. But the Union ships could not follow. And she soon passed beyond their range and under the protection of the guns of Vicksburg.

Annoyed that he had been thus caught napping, and determined that the Confederate should not get off so easily, Farragut immediately began preparations for following the *Arkansas* and destroying her where she lay. His plan was to run the batteries and have each of his ships give her a broadside as it passed. Late that afternoon Captain Davis moved his vessels down, and by way of diversion began to bombard the upper battery. At dark Farragut's fleet started. Anticipating this move, under cover of darkness the position of the *Arkansas* was changed. But Farragut discovered the change, and as his ships went by they delivered an effective fire. Her casemates were shattered and one shot went through, killing and wounding several men.

Failing, however, to sink her, the *Essex*, with the *Queen*, on the morning of July 22, ran down and attacked the *Arkansas*, while the *Benton*, *Cincinnati*, and *Louisville* engaged the batteries from above. The *Essex* put a shot through a casemate which split upon the breech of one of the *Arkansas*' guns and killed and wounded six of her men. She then attempted to ram her, but the *Arkansas* deftly slackened her forward moorings, so that her head swung out into the stream, presenting her sharp iron prow to the square bow of her enemy coming at full speed. And seeing that to strike that was certain destruction, the *Essex* sought to change her course. But in doing this she ran aground just astern of the *Arkansas*, where she remained fully ten minutes, exposed to a heavy fire. She then got afloat and ran on down. The *Queen* gave the Confederate a heavy blow, and backing off, struck her again. But her iron-bound hull still remained intact. In the meantime, the *Queen* was repeatedly struck and so much disabled that it was with difficulty that she returned above to the fleet.

With all their efforts, the *Arkansas* still remained afloat. In the various efforts to destroy her, Farragut lost five killed and sixteen wounded, and Davis thirteen killed, thirty-four wounded and ten missing. The loss of the *Arkansas* was only ten killed and fifteen wounded. None of Farragut's ships that then passed the batteries came up the river again.

He had brought with him, when he came, four regiments, about 3,000 troops, under Brigadier-General Thos. Williams. And while the fleet had been thus occupied, General Williams had undertaken to relieve the river of the obstruction of the batteries at Vicksburg, by cutting a canal through the tongue of land on the opposite bank, so as to change the course of the stream, leaving the city a couple of miles to the north-east. The same thing had been attempted many years before by Louisiana, in a controversy with the State of Mississippi, over their boundary. And substantially the same location was adopted now for the canal. The river here flowed first to the north-east four or more miles, and then, striking the bluff, was deflected and, with a sweeping turn, flowed back again to the south-west an equal distance, leaving between a tongue of low silt, of an average width of a mile. The city of Vicksburg stood on the bluff at this bend of the river. Despairing of being able to capture it with the fleet and his small force, General Williams had gathered 1,200 negroes from the neighbouring plantations to his aid, and set to work to dig the canal. He had dug it ten to twelve feet wide, about that deep, and a mile long. His hope was that the current being started through, would widen it out and enlarge it, so that it would become the bed of the river or, at least, a navigable channel. But both ends of the canal were in eddies of the river. And so the action of the water was only to fill the ditch with mud, without doing any cutting. So the work had to be abandoned.

After a month spent, Farragut and Williams, realising the hopelessness of the task of capturing Vicksburg with the means at their command, re-embarked on July 24 and sailed down the river. Williams landed his troops at Baton Rouge, and Farragut went on to New Orleans. Shortly after, Davis took his fleet to Helena. Thus Vicksburg was abandoned to the Confederates. And the river continued in their hands for another year, from Vicksburg to Port Hudson, a distance of 200 miles. 'We have passed their batteries with our ships,' wrote Farragut to the Secretary of the Navy, 'and we can do so again as often as required. But we cannot reach them with our guns, and so cannot capture Vicksburg without the co-operation of an army of twelve to fifteen thousand men.' This Halleck felt he could not furnish just then. And so the purpose of the expedition failed.

The Confederates were much encouraged at this discomfiture of their enemy. And Major-General John C. Breckinridge was sent with 6,000 troops to attack the garrison at Baton Rouge. He was to be supported from the river by the *Arkansas* and two small gunboats, sent down from Vicksburg for this purpose. General Williams was in command of the garrison at Baton Rouge, numbering about 5,000. Each side, however, was depleted by sickness. The attack was made

at daybreak of August 5, and lasted for six hours. And at the end of this time the Confederates retreated, having lost 84 killed, 307 wounded and 56 captured. Among the killed were two generals and two colonels commanding brigades. The Union loss was 90 killed and 250 wounded. At the close of the battle, when the 21st Ind. was making its last charge, it lost its last field officer. General Williams, seeing its predicament, and eager to use the strength of the regiment, placed himself at its head and called out: 'Your field officers are all killed; I will lead you.' And taking his place at their front he did lead them in the last charge. But in the moment of victory the commander of the Union forces was shot through the breast and fell dead. It was a noble sacrifice. But the field was won.

The fleets had taken little part. The Union ships *Kineo*, *Katahdin*, *Essex*, *Cayuga* and *Sumpter* threw some shells over the heads of the troops at the enemy, nearly two miles away. But, as might be expected, they had little effect. And the *Arkansas* was prevented from participating for the Confederates by her engine on the starboard side breaking down. Her other threw her around and fast aground. This happened after she had already cleared for action. While in this position, her old enemy, the *Essex*, with some scores to square, appeared against her. But she was no longer able to defend herself. And her crew, fully appreciating the situation, set her on fire and escaped to the shore. She soon blew up, and thus ended her career.

The *Arkansas* illustrates pretty well the fortunes of the Confederacy, even at this early day. No serious criticism can be made of the conduct of her officers and crew. They all fought well. When they saw there was no safety at Yazoo City, they boldly struck out and fought their way to the Mississippi, and having given the Union ships as good as they got, they deftly took a position under the batteries of Vicksburg, where they could do the most good and, at the same time, have the protection of its guns. And here, too, they acquitted themselves well. But what chance had the *Arkansas* from the start? With a score or more Union ships on the river, all her equals and fully equipped, and herself all alone, there could be but one issue to the struggle. She must go down. And this she did at Baton Rouge.

When General Breckinridge saw that his attempt to capture the garrison was a failure, he turned in search of some other adventure. And with admirable judgment he seized and fortified the bluff on the Mississippi at Port Hudson, twenty-five miles farther north. Here he left a garrison. And then with the rest of his troops he joined General Van Dorn at Jackson, Miss.

While these things were transpiring on the Mississippi, there was one interested spectator whose name has not been mentioned. This was Grant. The purpose of the whole movement up the Tennessee had been to take the Confederates in reverse and compel them to release their hold on the river. Thus the Mississippi had been opened from Cairo to Memphis. And Grant believed that the way to take Vicksburg was by a movement parallel to the river through the interior of the state. But he was not consulted. He had not yet become the military authority that he was later. And just now,

as after the capture of Fort Donelson, he was virtually in retirement. After the battle of Shiloh it will be remembered that Halleck had come to the front and assumed command, leaving Grant his second, but assigning him to no active duty. This Grant did not relish, and so he went to Memphis, where he still remained.

The Confederates had evacuated Corinth on May 30, 1862. And Halleck then commanded the largest army ever organised west of the Alleghany Mountains. It had a total effective strength of 137,000, about two-thirds of whom were at Corinth and the balance in Arkansas, or scattered along the Tennessee River. To confront this army, Beauregard had 105,000. In the returns his strength appeared considerably greater. But the sick and absentees had to be deducted to ascertain the real strength of either army. And there was a factor that did not appear in numbers, and yet had to be considered. This was that the Union army was now flushed with success and full of confidence, while the Confederate was depressed and disheartened by defeat, and disposed just now to evade another trial of strength.

So the question before Halleck was how to employ his great army. He has been very much criticised for the dispositions he made. It has been customary to represent them as the worst possible that could have been made. It has been argued that he should have kept his army together and projected it on Beauregard or Vicksburg, with the apparent certainty of crushing the one or capturing the other, perhaps both. What did he do?

On June 3, McClelland was sent with his own and Wallace's divisions to Bolivar. On the 4th, Pope's division was ordered into camp at Rienzi. On the 9th, Sherman was sent with his own and Hurlbut's division to Memphis. And on the same day, Buell was ordered eastward to Chattanooga. On the 10th, the previous designations of the armies was resumed. And Buell, Grant and Pope were assigned to the command of the armies of the Ohio, the Tennessee, and the Mississippi respectively, with their previous territorial limits. Halleck then went to Washington, on July 16, to take his new position as General-in-Chief. And Pope was soon after ordered east to take command of the Army of Virginia. Rosecrans then took Pope's place in the west. But his army was soon after united to Grant's. And thus Grant and Buell resumed their former positions.

But each was hampered by the work that was assigned him. Buell was to proceed eastward on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, repairing it as he went. This repair was a work of no little labour. For the railroad measured 217 miles from Corinth to Chattanooga, and lay through the debatable land between the North and the South. Hence it was subject to constant raids and interruptions. Buell was also to seize and hold Chattanooga. This, too, proved a difficult task. And with all this, his hands soon were more than full. For General Braxton Bragg, having succeeded Beauregard in command, quickly seized Chattanooga, and pushing northward, reinforced by Lieut.-General Edmund Kirby Smith, from East Tennessee, he led Buell a stern chase for Louisville in one of the most daring and successful raids of the war.

Grant, on the other hand, was to reinforce Buell if necessary.

And this was a necessity that soon required three divisions of Grant's army, leaving him with only 42,000 men. With this small force he was to keep possession of the Mississippi from Cairo to Memphis, and protect Western Tennessee and Kentucky from invasion. In other words, he was to hold all that had been gained in the West during the past year. As he was also to guard the railroad from Memphis to Decatur, he stationed his troops at Memphis, Corinth, and Tusculumbia, with small detachments at Boliver and Jackson, Tenn., commanding points in the rear, whence they could be used to support the others. As Lieut.-General Earl Van Dorn, with an army of 20,000 men, and Major-General Sterling Price, with an army of 16,000 more, confronted him, it is apparent that Grant was solely on the defensive. He could make no aggressive movements.

But was Halleck to be held answerable for this dispersion of the army? Let us see. Beauregard had gone to Virginia. And McClellan, always magnifying his difficulties, was of the opinion that a part of his army had gone with him. So McClellan was urging that a part of Halleck's army be sent to him. To remove any considerable part of the Western army would have necessitated the abandonment of the fruits of its hard-won victories. To scatter it was to remove the temptation for its removal. The purpose was to keep the troops in the West where they were needed, and in positions where, though not all together, they could nevertheless be quickly concentrated if occasion so required.

Dispersion also relieved the difficulty of provisioning the army. This difficulty had already become acute. Supplies had been brought up the Tennessee. But the summer drouth and the fall of the river were compelling a resort to the railroads as a substitute for the river. And the long lines of railroads across the States of Kentucky and Tennessee were hard to maintain. For they were often cut by successful cavalry raids. And as they were liable to indefinite interruption at any time, then starvation would menace the army.

But aside from all this, the movement of the whole army against Vicksburg would leave Chattanooga, Nashville and Louisville open to Bragg. And *vice versa*, the movement of the army against Chattanooga would leave Western Tennessee and Kentucky open to Van Dorn. The one could have gone to the mouth of the Ohio and seized Memphis and Columbus and the other northward to recapture Nashville and perhaps take Louisville. The separation of the Confederate army necessitated the division of Halleck's. So that there was really much reason after all for the dispositions he had made.

But there was another consideration that Halleck could not overlook. President Lincoln was the Commander-in-Chief of the army. The Constitution made him so. He had not ordered—he seldom did that—but he did repeatedly urge, some movement for the relief of the suffering Union men of East Tennessee. They were hardy mountaineers, backwoodsmen and small farmers, in whom the spirit of liberty was strong, who rarely owned slaves, were of moderate wealth, and had always been rather ignored by the rich planters of the adjoining states. The stern fight which 'Parson' Brownlow was making at Knoxville and Andrew Johnson at Washington would not let their

situation be forgotten. Treason to the Confederacy there, often brought the penalty of death without trial. Free speech led to imprisonment of indeterminate length. If caught burning a railroad bridge they were to be summarily hung. But oppression never suppressed them. And before the war closed, mostly from their ranks in Tennessee, though a member of the Confederacy, a slave state, and surrounded by slave states, were recruited 35,000 white troops, as brave as any that followed the Union flag. It was their homes that Lincoln now sought to protect. To his repeated suggestions of a movement for their relief, Halleck had thus far answered that such an effort was then inopportune, but could be looked to later. But as new movements were being considered now, the subject came up again. And so at last Buell was ordered to Chattanooga, the gateway to this country.

This city derived an additional importance from its railroads. It had one north and south road, running thence to Atlanta and Savannah, through the heart of the South, and northward reaching to Nashville. It was on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and at the point where it separated, one branch reaching to Richmond, Va., and the other to Charleston, S.C. It must be remembered that there were few railroads in the South then. The only other east and west trunk line was that passing through Vicksburg and Montgomery to Savannah. The way by water through the Mississippi and the Gulf was now closed. And it was important for the Confederacy to retain its railroads. For it had now no substitute for them. It must have them to transfer troops and supplies. Its rivers were all small and ran in inconvenient directions.

In Grant's district there were similar strategic points—Memphis, on the Mississippi Central Railroad, running to New Orleans in one direction and to Columbus and Louisville in the other, and Corinth, at the crossing of the Memphis and Charleston, by the Mobile and Ohio. We have seen the jealousy with which each was guarded, and the battles that were necessary by the North to wrest them away from the South. The bloody battle of Shiloh was fought by the Confederates in defence of Corinth. Thus the importance of the railroads explains the determination which each side showed to reach and hold these points of intersection.

Grant was having trouble to retain those already in his hands. Van Dorn, one of the ablest and most enterprising Confederate commanders in the West, had been left by Bragg to guard the Mississippi River and the Mississippi Central Railroad. Price was to protect the Mobile and Ohio, south of Corinth. Each had about 16,000 men. Van Dorn's were scattered along the railroad from Holly Springs southward, with a garrison at Vicksburg, and another at Port Hudson. The most of Price's force was at Tupelo. Bragg soon telegraphed Price that he had Buell in full retreat upon Louisville, and to watch Rosecrans and not let him get to Buell's assistance, and that if he started, to follow him. Acting upon this advice, Price advanced to Iuka on September 13, 1862, and driving away a small force, entered the town. Grant had been watching this movement. Anticipating an attack on Corinth, he had concentrated his forces at Memphis,

Boliver and Corinth, so that they could be brought together quickly if occasion required.

Seeing Price advance to Iuka, Grant ordered Rosecrans to move to Rienzi and Jacinto, and leaving small detachments at each place, to prevent a surprise of Corinth, to take the balance of his force, about 9,000, and advance upon Price at Iuka from the south, and in doing so to cover the Jacinto and Fulton roads. These were the main roads leading southward from Iuka. He directed Ord with 6,000 men to make an attack upon Price from the north. Grant himself went with Ord. The attacks were to be made simultaneously at 4.30 A.M. of September 19. But the night before, Rosecrans sent word that he had been delayed and could not reach Iuka till afternoon. Grant gave up the attack for that day. But Rosecrans pushed forward, and when within two miles of Iuka, on the Jacinto road, he was attacked by a division of Price's army, under Brigadier-General Henry Little, sent out to meet him.

Hamilton's division was quickly deployed by Rosecrans across the road in line of battle. The fight was mainly between these two, and was warmly contested. It was only ended by darkness, and then both sides were still on the field. Grant knew nothing of it till late in the night. And then he hurried up Ord's division as soon as it was light the next day. But Rosecrans had failed to cover the Fulton road as ordered. And during the night Price, finding this way of escape open, quietly withdrew his troops. And when morning came he was gone. Grant was disappointed that the opportunity to crush him had been lost. There was some pursuit by Rosecrans. But Price having got well away did not allow his pursuers to overtake him. Rosecrans lost 144 killed, 568 wounded and 40 missing. Of this total loss of 752, nearly 700 were from Hamilton's division, which had only 2,800 men engaged. It had really fought the battle and had suffered terribly. On the Confederate side, General Little, who was in command of the division that fought on that side, was killed in the first onset. And the loss was 86 killed, 408 wounded and 361 missing or prisoners.

Price retreated to Baldwyn, and notified Van Dorn at Holly Springs, to whom he had already proposed a union of their forces. Grant withdrew to Corinth, and soon after took up his headquarters at Jackson, Tenn. Van Dorn had already concentrated his troops, leaving only small garrisons at Vicksburg and Port Hudson. And he sent word to Price to meet him at Ripley. And there the two forces were united, Van Dorn assuming command by priority of rank. This gave him an army of about 22,000 men. Grant's forces confronting him were 7,000 under Sherman at Memphis; 23,000 under Rosecrans at Corinth; 12,000 under Ord at Boliver; and 6,000 more were at Jackson, where Grant had his headquarters. Memphis and Corinth were on the Charleston and Memphis Railroad, 93 miles apart. And Boliver was 23 and Jackson 30 miles north of Grand Junction, which was the half-way point between the other two places, Memphis and Corinth.

Van Dorn felt that he could now safely attack one of Grant's forces while they were thus separated. The question was, which

one? Van Dorn, in a very able report of the battle of Corinth, has told us how he solved this question. To take Memphis, he thought, would necessitate the destruction of an immense amount of property belonging to Confederate citizens, without any adequate military advantage. For the place could probably not be held against the Union guns on land and river, in the absence of heavy guns. And these the Confederacy could not furnish. The taking of Boliver presented this difficulty: the line of the Union fortifications there was intersected by the Hatchie River, which made it impossible to take that place by a quick assault, and this would be necessary if the reinforcements which could be thrown in quickly by the railroad from Jackson were to be anticipated. Besides Boliver was in the re-entrant angle of the three fortified places. And an advance upon it would throw both his flanks, as well as his rear, open to attacks from Memphis and Corinth. While if Corinth could be successfully attacked from the west and north-west, and Rosecrans driven back on the Tennessee, and his force captured or destroyed, Boliver and Jackson would quickly fall. And then with 15,000 Confederate prisoners, that had recently been released by exchange, and were now in Mississippi ready to be armed, once more in the ranks, Western Tennessee would be again theirs, and the fruits of the last year's campaign of the Union army would be taken back. This work, if undertaken, would have to be done quickly. For Grant was being reinforced daily by new levies and the return of convalescents. Van Dorn hoped to be able to surprise and carry Corinth before it could be reinforced from the outlying posts. Thus while Grant had some reasons for dividing his force, it will be seen that Van Dorn was planning to take advantage of it by attacking one of the parts while thus separated. It must be confessed that Van Dorn's plan was good. And if it had succeeded, Grant would probably have been driven back to the Ohio River, as Buell was by Bragg.

Van Dorn started northward from Ripley on September 29. His troops were in fine spirits, eager to emulate the campaigns of Bragg and Lee, both of whom had recently contributed to place the star of the Confederacy in the ascendant. Van Dorn informs us that 'no army ever marched to battle with prouder steps, more hopeful countenances or with more courage' than did his to Corinth. The ground was well known to the commander, and required no study to determine where to make his attack. He marched twenty miles straight in the direction of Boliver, threatening that place, so that Grant might not be able to tell where the blow would fall. Then he turned sharply to the south-east, crossed the Hatchie and Tuscumbia Rivers, and bivouacked on the night of October 2 at Chewallah, ten miles from Corinth. At daybreak of the 3rd the march was resumed, and at ten o'clock the Union skirmishers at Corinth were driven in and the two armies were in line of battle. The attack was commenced on the Confederate right by Lovell's division, and extended gradually to the left. A belt of fallen timber four hundred yards wide extended along the whole front. This was crossed. And the line swept firmly forward. By 1.30 the outer entrenchments had been carried. This was the line that had been constructed by Beauregard, after the

battle of Shiloh, to ward off Grant's army. It was captured with several pieces of artillery. The Union army was driven back slowly, fighting stubbornly at every point of advantage, till the interior line of entrenchments was reached. Here Van Dorn regretfully saw the sun sink as the Union army fell back into this last ditch.

He had hoped that one day's work would end the battle in his favour. But a march of ten miles over a parched country, on dusty roads, without water, with the heroic resistance of Rosecrans' army, were too much. And his army sank to rest on their arms within six hundred yards of the Union works.

During the night three batteries were placed on the ridge overlooking the town from the west. At four o'clock they opened. General Hébert on the left was to attack at daybreak with his whole force. Lovell, on the right, was to feel his way slowly with sharpshooters, till Hébert was seen to be heavily engaged, and then to move rapidly to the assault on the south-west. The centre, under Maury, was to move at the same time quickly to the front and directly at the town.

But daylight came and there was no attack on the left. A staff officer was sent to find Hébert and learn why. But Hébert could not be found. Another messenger, and still another, were sent. Finally, about seven o'clock, Hébert came, but reported sick. Brigadier-General Green was ordered to take his place. But before proper dispositions could be made it was nine o'clock, and the centre had become engaged and then the right. The whole plan was disarranged. One brigade after another went into action and pushed forward. Some reached as far as the town in a hand-to-hand encounter. One brigade even went to the square in front of the Union commander's headquarters. Here it was met by a storm of grape from a battery, which was soon reinforced, first by one regiment and then by another. The odds were too strong against it, and the brigade, after an heroic effort, started back. The centre rallied and re-took a battery, into which the storming column had penetrated. And the Union right swept with its artillery the Confederate left, when it at last advanced. By noon the battle was ended. The broken fragments of Van Dorn's army fell back into the timber. And that night the sad and discomfited host bivouacked again at Chewallah, whence it had gone forth in such high hopes two days before.

Van Dorn had made one serious mistake. He under-estimated the strength of his adversary. He supposed that Rosecrans had only 15,000 men, when in fact he had 23,000. He understood, when he went into battle, that he outnumbered his enemy by 7,000 men, when in reality his enemy outnumbered him by 1,000. But this was a mistake that is very common. It is a matter of history that Grant usually *under-estimated* the force opposed to him. And it is just as true that McClellan almost uniformly *over-estimated* one against him. In war, a general cannot count the number of men in his enemy's camp. He must rely on estimates, and the estimates too of scouts and spies, whose calculations are as variable as the minds of men. This Van Dorn did. He hoped by a quick advance and prompt attack before Rosecrans could be reinforced to drive him out of his

entrenchments and capture or scatter his army. But he miscalculated. He found numbers greater than his own, behind entrenchments. Yet he drove them from the first line of their works and penetrated into the second. Here the numbers of the Union men and the strength of their works were too great, and he failed, after one of the most heroic efforts on the part of himself and his men that the history of the war records.

The pursuit was not well managed. It was not started till the next day, though the battle ended at noon. It was conducted in four divisions on parallel roads. But, by want of direction, all the divisions came together seven miles from Corinth, causing further delay. From Chewallah, Van Dorn's army the same morning pursued its retreat in the direction of Pocahontas, intending to cross the Hatchie at the Davis Bridge. Anticipating that Grant's force at Boliver would come out and dispute the passage, it pushed on rapidly. But it soon learned from couriers stationed at the bridge that the army would reach there too late. Nevertheless, Price was sent to engage Ord, who was in command of the Union force that had already come up to the bridge. Price was to occupy the hill beyond the bridge and hold Ord in check till the Confederate trains and artillery could be got off on another road. The trains were immediately ordered southward by a road that would cross the Hatchie at Crum's Mill, six miles above. And Price hurried to meet Ord. He crossed the Davis Bridge with a brigade and two batteries and engaged him. But he was soon compelled to withdraw to the east side, where with two more brigades and four more batteries he took up a position on the heights commanding the crossing, whence he could sweep Ord's column as it approached on the narrow and winding road and up the steep ascent to his front. Here, with a murderous fire of shell and grape at short range, Price stopped Ord's advance. And then Price quietly fell back to take up his line of retreat, in the rear of Van Dorn's column, on the road to Crum's Mill. Ord's loss in this affair was 50 killed, 493 wounded and 17 missing, a total of 560. But what was even more unfortunate, he was compelled to desist from the pursuit to care for his wounded and bury the dead. Van Dorn was not molested again during his retreat to Ripley, or from thence to Holly Springs. His total loss in the advance, the several conflicts and the retreat was reported at 594 killed, 2,162 wounded and 2,102 missing or captured. Rosecrans reported his loss at 315 killed, 1,812 wounded and 232 missing or prisoners. This was in the battle alone. In proportion to the numbers engaged it was one of the bloodiest battles of the war. But it settled the fate of Corinth. For the town was ever after under Union control.

Van Dorn was severely criticised for his conduct of the campaign. One of his brigade commanders, Bowen, filed charges against him, on the ground that he had undertaken an important expedition, against a strongly fortified enemy fully prepared for resistance, without due consideration; that he had marched his troops in hastily and hurled them upon the enemy in apparent attempts to take them by surprise after skirmishing for thirty-six hours; that he had delayed the attack upon the inner line of entrenchments till morning of the

second day, and when defeated had adopted a circuitous route of retreat. Generals Price, Tilghman and Maury were detailed as a court to try these charges.

It must have cost this sensitive officer a pang to face these accusations. 'I have been a soldier,' he said in addressing the court, 'for nearly a quarter of a century, and this is the first time I have been called upon to defend myself against accusations of any kind, though my career has been an eventful one.' (He was born in Tennessee, graduated at West Point and then, entering the service, rose to the rank of captain in the U.S. Army.) 'I have accumulated nothing of this world's wealth, having devoted my whole time and energies to the service of my country. And, therefore, my reputation is all that belongs to me. And without this, life to me were as valueless as the crisp and faded leaf of autumn. As a personal favour, I ask that the investigation on which you are about to enter shall be thorough and complete. I invoke the fullest scrutiny on your part into my conduct as the only adequate means of securing my exoneration from the charges which so nearly touch a soldier's reputation.'

The court, after examining the accuser and his witnesses, unanimously reported that the evidence fully disproved every allegation in the charge. And this report was subsequently approved and the court dissolved.

But Corinth was Van Dorn's last battle. Ten days later he was removed from the command of the army and Major-General John C. Pemberton appointed in his stead. This too was a bitter experience. 'The attempt at Corinth,' he wrote, 'has failed, and in consequence I am condemned and have been superseded in my command. In my zeal for my country I may have ventured too far with inadequate means. And I bow to the opinion of the people whom I serve. Yet I feel that if the spirits of the gallant dead, who now lie beneath the batteries of Corinth, can see and judge the motives of man, they do not rebuke me.' He was given command of a division. And two months later, at Holly Springs, on a brilliant cavalry raid, he cut Grant's communications and captured an immense store of provisions. This compelled Grant to withdraw from his advance on Vicksburg by that line. Van Dorn then passed to Bragg's army, and within six months he was dead, killed in a private quarrel by a doctor in Maury County, Tennessee. And so closed this brave, impetuous life! He had left the Union army and gone over to the Confederacy. From the rank of captain he had been made a lieutenant-general. But what had it brought him at last? Nothing but bitter disappointment!

CHAPTER XXIII

Morgan's Raid into Kentucky—Bragg advances against Louisville and Kirby Smith against Cincinnati—Battle of Perryville—Bragg escapes—Buell relieved.

WHILE Grant was occupied with Van Dorn and Buell with Bragg, both were greatly annoyed by raids of Confederate cavalry. The Union armies in the West were deficient in this branch. They could yet boast no such cavalry leaders as Morgan and Forrest, and no such mounted troops as followed these daring and brilliant soldiers.

John H. Morgan was born in Kentucky thirty-six years before the war opened. He had been a lieutenant of cavalry in Mexico. And when the Civil War came he promptly volunteered on the side of the South and was given command of a squadron of cavalry. This small force he soon increased to 2,000 in number. And he procured for himself the rank of brigadier-general. With these means, he quickly became the *Preux Chevalier* of the western army. While he was never a great general according to the standards established by the war, he was undoubtedly superior as a leader of cavalry to anyone the Confederates had in the West. He was rapid in movement, fertile in expedients and brilliant in execution. And his reckless bravery cost him his life before the war closed.

Forrest was more practical. He was apt to achieve more substantial results, but was less brilliant. He was a self-made man, sprung from the poorer class in the then new state of Tennessee, the son of a blacksmith. His father had eleven children. And the mother, a woman of strong physique, by a subsequent marriage, had four more. This son, Nathan B., early thrown upon his own resources, developed an aptitude for business and soon acquired a plantation. This he was engaged in managing when at the age of thirty-seven the war came. He promptly enlisted, and at once became an enterprising leader and a hard fighter. It is unfortunate that some of his acts, notably the 'Fort Pillow massacre,' have left a stain upon his character as a soldier. He was one of the last to lay down his arms and survived the war twelve years.

The cavalry service had a peculiar attraction for the young men of Kentucky and Tennessee. They were descended from some of the best blood of the South. Their fathers, after years of toil on the hardy frontier, had bequeathed them a splendid inheritance of fertile soil and well-stocked barns, but what they appreciated still more, an abounding share of health and animal spirits. They were superb horsemen, crack shots and daring athletes, and delighted in the rough life of the border. On their thorough-bred horses it was really

surprising the distance these men, accustomed to life in the saddle, could cover in a day. A hundred miles was not impossible if they deemed it important.

From the reading of such books as Sir Walter Scott's they had imbibed the spirit of chivalry. The Waverley Novels had been immensely popular among them during the previous years. And 'Marmion' and 'The Lady of the Lake' were well-thumbed classics. These writings, much read generally over the South, exerted no little influence in precipitating hostilities. Their seed produced a generous crop of Waverleys and Ivanhoes. And like the knights of old, these young men of Tennessee and Kentucky thirsted for adventure, and were already prepared to be enticed abroad in search of it. Their lances were poised for any foe that might appear. And little they cared for the matter involved or its justness. Slavery would do as well as anything else. It was exactly suited to their taste to contemplate themselves as of a superior caste. And generally the smiles of beautiful women had a much greater influence than the frowns of conscience on the right to sell slaves. Soon too, it proved that to have followed Morgan was a quick and sure passport to social distinction. So statesmen might argue as much as they pleased over the 'inalienable rights' of man. What cared they? They were in the saddle to win. And this spirit of rollicking adventure became contagious and soon attracted many to this field of actual war.

Once enlisted they found persons in every neighbourhood ready to welcome them. The women of the towns fed them at public dinners and sent them on their way supplied with rations for two or three days. Farmers opened their barns to their horses, and even by times contributed a mount to help them along. But woe to those that proved unfriendly! The old Norse Vikings prayed not for wealth, but to be put in arm's length of the man who had it. Little sympathy had these troops for the men who were not of their side. Private rights lay lightly in times of war. And besides, was there not a freebooter's joy in serving a cause that overtopped all rights of property and permitted whatsoever needed to be taken wherever found? They carried their depredations more than once over the state of Kentucky, and, at last, as a natural consequence, wore out their welcome. But their chivalry never abated till the band was scattered and the leader killed.

In the early part of May, 1862, Morgan with 500 men appeared at Pulaski, Tenn., and captured a wagon train with 400 Federal troops, mostly convalescents, going north. Thence he went to Lebanon and proceeded to quarter his troops upon the town. But not for long, for here Brigadier-General Dumont, the next day, with a superior force, surprised and routed him, after a severe engagement, capturing 150 of his men. Morgan himself with the rest escaped and crossed the Cumberland River on a ferry. But five days later he reappeared near Cave City, Kentucky, with two new companies. Here he captured and burned a train of forty-eight freight cars. He also took a passenger train, hoping thereby to rescue his captured men. But in this he was disappointed, for they had been sent north by another route. So he then went to Chattanooga to recruit and refit. He was

there joined by two companies of Texans, commanded by Captains R. M. Gano and John Huffman, both natives of Kentucky. With his command thus raised to a full regiment, he went to Knoxville and was again reinforced, this time by Colonel A. A. Hunt of Georgia, with a regiment of 'Partisan Rangers.' But what is, perhaps, even more worthy of mention, it was at Knoxville that he obtained two mountain howitzers. And they served him so well that, when they were taken away some months later by Bragg's ordnance officer, Morgan's men felt so outraged that they almost raised a mutiny. But the trouble was soon composed, for within two months Bragg lost them. And it afforded Morgan some satisfaction to feel that if he himself did not have them, neither did Bragg. But for the time being, thus equipped and with 876 men, 200 of them unarmed, Morgan left Knoxville on July 4, 1862, on his first Kentucky raid.

Four days later he crossed the Cumberland by a ford not far from Tompkinsville, Ky. Here he was joined by two more companies. He learned that a detachment of 180 Federal troops had crossed the river that same day. But he learned also that a body of 380 or 400 cavalry was stationed at Tompkinsville. So he kept his eye on this larger game. Thinking that he might effect a surprise, he concealed his presence till night. And then at 10 P.M., starting from the river, he made a ride of twenty miles, and at five the next morning surrounded and, with his howitzers, shelled the Union camp. Following this, with a sudden dash, he scattered the camp, killed 22, wounded 30 or 40 and captured as many more, among the latter the commandant. Morgan then destroyed most of their equipment. But he carried away with him a train of 20 wagons and 50 mules with supplies of sugar and coffee and some 40 cavalry horses. None of his own men was killed. But Colonel Hunt, who led the charge, was mortally wounded and died soon after at Tompkinsville.

From here, Morgan moved on Glasgow. The few troops in garrison there fled at his approach, and thus he captured another supply of stores and guns. The guns went to arm his men and the stores were destroyed. He had brought with him a portable telegraph instrument. And as he advanced to Horse Cave he connected it with the local wires and intercepted a number of dispatches. And then commenced some curious pranks. In the name of the Provost-Marshal at Nashville, he telegraphed the Union officer at Louisville that General Forrest had attacked Murfreesboro and, routing the Union forces, was moving on Nashville, and that Morgan was hurrying to join him. Morgan knew of Forrest's intention to make a raid upon Murfreesboro. But as a matter of fact it did not occur till three days later. Then by an assault at four in the morning Forrest succeeded in killing or capturing the whole force, consisting of about 1,400 men, partly garrisoned in the town and partly encamped a short distance in the country, but both carelessly patrolled. Forrest also burned the railroad bridge, cut the telegraph wires, tore up a large section of the railroad track and burned several cars and the depot filled with stores. But Morgan had no intention of joining him. That part of the telegram was merely for the purpose of withdrawing attention from himself. From Horse Cave, following the

main Lexington road in the opposite direction, Morgan crossed the Big Barren River. Halting near by, as if intending to destroy the railroad bridge between Bowling Green and Woodsonville, he detached three companies to move forward rapidly and destroy the Salt River Bridge, so as to prevent the troops along the line of the railroad from being withdrawn to Louisville, whither he himself was heading. Thus he kept his own way clear.

His course now turned towards Lebanon. But at the Rolling Fork Bridge, late one night, he was attacked by a body of Federal troops. These he succeeded in dispersing. And then, relaying the floor of the bridge, which had been taken up to prevent his crossing, he hurried on amid continual skirmishing till he reached his destination. Lebanon he found was only feebly defended. Lieut.-Colonel Johnson, in command, had only 65 men. And these he promptly surrendered, seeing that resistance would be futile. They were promptly paroled by Morgan. He usually did this, not caring to encumber himself with prisoners. Johnson had warned him that the Home Guards would fire upon him from the houses if they entered the town. But a battalion led by Major Gano that night entered. And Morgan has graphically described what happened: 'The fire came not, the women waved their handkerchiefs and the place was ours.' He at once took possession of the telegraph-office. And here he soon intercepted a dispatch to Johnson informing him that a regiment had been ordered to his assistance. Though his men had already been in the saddle for twenty-four hours, Morgan now ordered Gano to take a company of the 'Texan Rangers' and destroy a railroad bridge five miles away, over which the regiment must approach. This order was promptly obeyed. And the arrival of the Union troops was thus prevented. And while Gano was gone Morgan himself destroyed a large amount of Government property, estimated at \$50,000 in value, designed for the Union army at Cumberland Gap. Among what was taken there were 5,000 stand of arms and 2,000 sabres. It was a piece of real good fortune for Morgan. He equipped his command with the best of them and loaded a wagon with others to give to recruits that he hoped would join him. He also took a wagon loaded with ammunition along. But the rest he destroyed.

At Lebanon he again aroused the consternation, and later the mirth, of his enemies. He sent misleading telegrams in every direction, signed by whatever names he chose to use. He ordered Federal troops at detached points forward and back, by telegrams purporting to be from distant commanders. He stopped conductors of trains bringing troops to capture him, by orders ostensibly signed by their superiors. He put his pursuers off the track by giving misleading accounts of where he was and the direction of his march. He directed one Union officer to find him where he was not, and another to change locations so as to clear his own path. His audacity mounted to its height when at one place he telegraphed Geo. W. Prentice, the editor of the *Louisville Journal*, who was vigorously opposing secession, that he was quietly watching the destruction of all Uncle Sam's property in Somerset, and that he expected to pay him a visit soon. Later he telegraphed General J. T. Boyle, the Federal commander

at Louisville, that he should destroy the telegraph, that it was only keeping Morgan posted, that he had copies of all the Federal orders for the past two weeks. And still again, he telegraphed the Hon. Geo. Dunlap, an ardent Union man, now an official at Washington, that he had completed his tour through Kentucky and regretted not finding him at home, that he had captured sixteen cities, destroyed millions of dollars worth of property, and paroled 1,500 Federal prisoners. And when leaving the state, as if to lecture the Union commander, he had the Superintendent of Telegraphs issue an order to every operator that, if positively informed that Morgan's troops were marching on his station, he was to destroy the telegraph instruments and all materials in his charge, so as to keep Morgan from getting them.

From Lebanon he went to Harrodsburg, where he met an encouraging reception. He wrote: 'The whole population appeared to turn out and vie with each other as to who should show us most attention.' At Georgetown, he was informed that a small force of Home Guards had been mustered to oppose him. He 'sent them word to surrender their arms and they should not be molested. But they fled.' And then he adds: 'The people of Georgetown also welcomed us with gladness and provided my troops with everything that they needed.' And so he spent two days in their midst, enjoying their hospitality and consuming their provisions, taking the precaution, however, while doing so to cut the railroad between Frankfort and Lexington in two places and also to destroy one of its stone bridges. Hearing that a company of Home Guards was in camp thirteen miles away, he sent a company to break it up; and this was done by burning their tents and stores and destroying their arms, besides taking fifteen of them prisoners.

At Cynthiana, Morgan reached his farthest point north. He was now within fifty miles of both Cincinnati and Louisville, and had good reason to fear that an attempt to approach nearer to either would bring disaster on himself. The Home Guards and regulars were gathering from all sides. And here he was met by a force of 700 Union troops under Colonel Landram, and though they were finally overcome, it was not until he had been severely handled. They fought from behind stone fences and buildings and retreated doggedly, killing eight of his men and wounding twenty-nine more. No alternative was left now but retreat. So he started southward, passing through Paris, Winchester and Richmond, and reaching Somerset on July 22, pursued by a considerable force under Brigadier-General Green Clay Smith. He crossed the Cumberland River at Stagall's Ferry and was soon out of Kentucky. And with this the pursuit ended.

In closing his report of the raid, he summed up the results thus: 'I left Knoxville on the 4th day of July with about 900 men, and returned to Livingston, Tenn., on the 28th instant with nearly 1,200, having been absent just twenty-four days. During this time I travelled over 1,000 miles, captured seventeen towns, destroyed all the Government supplies and arms in them, dispersed about 1,500 Home Guards and paroled nearly 1,200 regular troops. I lost in killed, wounded and missing, of the number I carried into Kentucky, about ninety.'

This was a record of hard riding and brilliant raiding. It attracted wide attention. For the achievements of each day were being published in the newspapers, and the narrative running with continual changes of scene, had the interest of a novel. But, after all, did it not do more harm than good? He could not be otherwise than disappointed that all this labour added only 300 men to his command. The towns he had taken were not garrisoned and, of course, returned to their former allegiance as soon as he left. True, he had destroyed a good deal of property. But such as belonged to the U.S. Government it could afford to lose, and the loss of the great part that belonged to private individuals and corporations stirred up a bitter feeling. The ladies might smile, but their smiles are often delusive. They probably felt that if their own men could not defend them, it was best to be diplomatic. But Morgan met Home Guards everywhere. And it is significant that the farther he advanced the more numerous they became.

But still the Confederates were not satisfied. For a long time they had felt encouraged to look for aid to the people of Kentucky. And they were not yet ready to give up their hope of this assistance. Another and greater invasion was already in preparation. And on August 19, less than a month after Morgan's return, Bragg crossed a column of 3,000 to 4,000 troops over the Tennessee River at Chattanooga and started northward through Central Tennessee. He was followed by the rest of his army. In this movement he was seconded by General Kirby Smith, who made a simultaneous march from Knoxville through Eastern Tennessee. They were to support one another, Bragg moving upon Louisville and Smith on Cincinnati. The combined armies thus set in motion numbered 47,000 men. Bragg had 35,000 and Smith 12,000. Bragg tersely expressed the purpose of the movement: 'The campaign,' he wrote, 'was predicated on a belief and the most positive assurances, that the people of this country would rise in mass to assert their independence.' This would furnish them an opportunity.

It was a plan of campaign that had been entertained by General A. S. Johnston when he advanced upon Shiloh. The South for a long time entertained the belief that, in the North, she had friends that would help her. The only impediment expected to be found in Johnston's way was Grant's army. The Ohio River being reached at these principal cities, an invasion of the Northern states of Indiana and Ohio would early follow. Generous enlistments, abundant supplies, and a general uprising in favour of the South were expected even north of the Ohio. But we have seen how Johnston's campaign miscarried. It remains to be shown what the fate of the same plan was when carried nearer to completion by Bragg.

When he crossed the Tennessee, Buell's army was scattered. The different divisions were at points near Nashville, with a view to preventing that city from falling into Bragg's hands. Thomas' was at McMinnville, Crittenden's and McCook's at Battle Creek, Wood's on the railroad between Nashville and Chattanooga and Rousseau's on that from Decatur to Columbia. Buell himself was at Murfreesboro. It was expected that Bragg would advance on Nashville, and Thomas

was to intercept and attack him on the way. Thus Bragg would be held in check till Buell could concentrate his army. But on August 30 Thomas captured a dispatch from Bragg to Van Dorn informing him that he intended to advance into Kentucky. So the purpose of Bragg being thus learned, Buell at once assembled his army at Murfreesboro to resist the invasion.

Advancing to Nashville, Buell left Thomas there with three divisions. This was to protect the city from capture. And with the rest of his army, six divisions, Buell started northward. He has been criticised for thus leaving his best general and one-third of his army behind, when by taking them along he would have out-numbered his adversary. But to hold Nashville was to hold Central Tennessee with its intersecting railroads and the advance line, as it had been established by hard fighting, along the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. The South still held the railroad from Chattanooga to Richmond, and by the withdrawal of Buell's troops the same road was now left unobstructed to Nashville. Buell might be defeated by Bragg. An effort might be made by a dash to seize Nashville. In such an event, an able general would be needed to guard against this misfortune. With three divisions behind entrenchments, such a commander as Thomas could hold the city against the whole of Bragg's army until relief could reach him.

Bragg crossed the Cumberland at Carthage and passed northward by way of Scottsville to Glasgow. Here his troops encamped on September 13. His advance had struck the Louisville and Nashville Railroad at Cave City. It proceeded to tear up the road, and also prepared to assail Buell's forces should they attempt to pass northward. Bragg determined to rest his jaded troops at Glasgow, where subsistence could be had. And he had accordingly gone into camp. But a day had hardly passed before he learned that his advance on the railroad had been repulsed with considerable loss by a fortified garrison at Munfordville. Unwilling to allow the impression of a disaster to exist in the minds of his men, he at once left his camp and renewed his march. This was on the evening of September 15. He had only a scanty store of provisions. His sudden departure had prevented him from accumulating a supply as he had expected to do. His army was in two wings, under the command of Hardee and Polk. And they approached the offending garrison at Munfordville from different directions. The next day they demanded its surrender. Colonel Wilder was in command of the post. And he was permitted to count the number of the enemy and their guns. Seeing that resistance would be useless with his little force of 4,200 against 25,000 and 45 cannon, Wilder discreetly surrendered. He was permitted to march out with the honours of war. And his men were immediately paroled. But where was Buell all this time? Quietly preparing to move, though he should have been hastening to the succour of these men that were disposed to stand and fight.

And yet Bragg was hardly less remiss. Here was his supreme opportunity. By calling Smith to his aid, who had offered to bring his army and serve under him, they would outnumber Buell and might fall upon and crush him before he could be reinforced. Buell had

reached Bowling Green, only forty miles south, and could easily be caught. But Bragg was not equal to his opportunity. He feared to risk an assault. And after waiting four days for Buell to attack him behind entrenchments, and no such attack being made, he drew off to Bardstown, fifty miles to the north-east. Thus the opportunity of the campaign to meet Buell when the odds were against him was allowed to escape. And with it went also Bragg's only chance to take Louisville. If he had defeated Buell then, he might by a rapid advance have taken the city. But he neglected this opportunity and it never returned.

When Bragg left Munfordville he was reduced to three days' rations. He ordered supplies for his army to be forwarded to Bardstown from a depot that had been established by Smith at Lexington. Smith had there accumulated some trains that had been captured conveying supplies to the Union garrison at Cumberland Gap, and some provisions that had been taken in the rich farming district, where he was now operating. Bragg also sent orders to Smith for a combined movement of the two armies to Shelbyville, fifty miles farther north and midway between Frankfort, the state capital, and Louisville. The intention was to operate immediately beyond Shelbyville with both forces against Louisville. But the necessity for promptness, if anything substantial was to be accomplished, had now become imperative. Buell by this time was pushing him closely and new troops were rapidly marshalling from Indiana and Ohio. So that Bragg realised, at last, that he was operating in the enemy's country. It had already proved a disappointment. And, as Bragg wrote, 'The loss of a battle would be eminently disastrous.'

But when Bragg arrived at Bardstown he found that Smith had sent his whole available force to try to intercept the command of General Geo. Morgan, which had been stationed at Cumberland Gap. Morgan, finding that Smith's advance from Knoxville interposed an army between him and his base, had abandoned his post and was endeavouring to save his little army by a rapid march down the valley of the Big Sandy to the Ohio. This route lay east of Smith's. And Morgan was now too far on his way to be overtaken. So Smith's army was gone. And Bragg could not get it for the purpose he had in mind. The delay resulting prevented a junction of their forces at the time. And this too was a critical time. For the object of the movement, the capture of Louisville, was now immediately and finally at stake. Bragg was worried and hardly knew where to turn. So leaving his jaded and footsore troops at Bardstown, to rest from their long march, he went on to Lexington to confer with Smith over the situation.

Smith's advance had not been less arduous than Bragg's. Leaving Knoxville, he had passed north through Barbourville and London over the poorer portion of Kentucky. He found supplies scarce and the roads hard. 'For several days and parts of the nights,' he wrote, 'through a country almost without water, over stony roads, with their almost bare feet, and with green corn and beef without salt as their only food, did these gallant men trudge along.' At Big Hill, some miles south of Richmond, his advance encountered Federal troops. They were discovered in force in his front and indicated a

determination to give battle. They proved to be some raw troops that General Nelson, who had been sent to Kentucky by Buell for this purpose, had organised at Lexington. As it was late in the afternoon, Smith made no attack that day. But early the next morning, August 30, he advanced and found a brigade, under Brig.-General Mahlon D. Manson, formed in line on each side of the road. Manson's left was heavily assaulted. This necessitated its being reinforced from the right. Then that part of the line, when pressed, gave way. And it was soon followed by the other. Both retreated. But they were rallied a mile in the rear. And here the first brigade was reinforced by a second under Brig.-General Chas. Cruft. Together they made another stand. But they were soon again driven, this time to the outskirts of Richmond. Here Nelson himself reached the field and assumed command. And now the hardest fighting of the day took place. But the Union forces were again routed. And this time they retreated in confusion. Under Smith there were 12,000 men, and under Nelson 7,000. Smith lost 900 in killed and wounded, and Nelson 825. But Nelson had also lost 4,000 in captured, and among them was General Manson, who had commanded the first brigade. Nelson himself was wounded twice. But he still was able to accompany the army on its retreat. His shattered force retired to Louisville. And Smith advanced to Lexington.

When Bragg had turned away from Munfordville, Buell concluded that his opportunity had now come. Bragg was out of his path. And so unhindered he could push forward to Louisville and interpose his army between the Confederate general and his prize. This he did. Buell's advance reached Louisville on September 25, and by the 29th the rear had arrived. So that when Bragg reached Lexington on Oct. 1, Louisville was safe. Bragg then sat down to consider what he could do. From Bardstown, seeing the inevitable, he had ordered the supplies at Lexington, accumulated by Smith's troops on their forays, to be transferred to a new depot at Bryantsville. This was twenty-two miles south of Lexington. Here was Bragg's first evidence of wavering. The order showed that he felt that he had gone far enough north and was ready to return. When he left Polk in command at Bardstown he directed him, if pursued by a force too large to justify him in giving battle, to fall back in the direction of Bryantsville. This was another evidence. It was retreat that now occupied his mind.

But when he reached Lexington he found something to which he could turn his hand. Richard Hawes was with his army. He was an old man, formerly a Member of Congress, but now nominally, by the appointment of President Davis at Richmond, the Confederate Provisional Governor of Kentucky. He had been invited to accompany Bragg for the purpose of promoting enlistments and procuring supplies. But he had never been installed in office. And Bragg now decided that his inauguration should take place at Frankfort, the capital of the state. This would give the stamp of official approval to the march through Kentucky, and also crown it with a semblance of success. So some of Smith's troops that had just returned from a movement threatening Cincinnati were immediately ordered to

Frankfort to take part in the ceremony. And Bragg and Smith, accompanied by Hawes, went also. Here, on October 1, the installation took place. 'The ceremony,' as Pollard says, 'was scarcely more than a pretentious farce.' For hardly was it completed, before Buell threatened Frankfort, and the newly installed Governor had to abandon his office and flee for his life. General Sill, who led this division of Buell's army, fixes the time with some exactness: 'They inaugurated Richard Hawes as Governor at twelve yesterday; at three P.M. they began to evacuate.'

Buell found in Louisville 22,000 raw troops to add to his army. And it was accordingly reorganised by mingling the new with the old without changing the existing organisations. There was an advantage in this method. The old troops, having had experience, imparted their soldierly qualities to the new men. And thus all, new and old, assumed the character of seasoned troops. No part of Buell's career showed his capacity for organisation better than when he thus prepared this new material for service in the shortest possible time. There were no better drilled men in the Union armies than his older troops. And the new were of excellent material and well officered. And the two, thus quickly cemented together, made one of the best army organisations of the Civil War.

Buell had now 58,000 men. He was ready to march against Bragg on September 30, the day after the arrival of his rear division. But here a new difficulty intervened. An order from Washington removed him from command and appointed General Thomas in his stead. Buell accordingly relinquished the command. But Thomas, while he was ambitious to hold an independent command, and was a great soldier, had a high sense of honour. He would have much preferred to reach the goal of his ambition by being placed at the head of a new organisation, to be expanded by further levies, as Buell's had been, rather than by wounding the feelings of a friend, with whom he had served many years, to seem to ambitiously desire his place. Prompted by feelings like these, Thomas telegraphed Halleck that Buell's preparation to move had been completed, and he therefore asked that he be retained. The request was granted and Buell was restored to his command. But it may be doubted whether this was a real kindness to Buell. Thus admonished, he should have quickened his pace and shown more zeal in the service. But this he seemed incapable of doing. And the kindness only delayed a little the removal, and transferred the command at last to less worthy hands than Thomas'. So in the end it injured Thomas.

It did at first seem that it would do good. For the very next day, October 1, the army marched to the front in five columns. The left, a division of McCook's corps, under Brigadier-General Sill, moved toward Frankfort, to hold in check the force of Kirby Smith, which was known to be there. The other columns, marching by different routes, finally fell respectively into the roads from Shepherdville, Mount Washington, Fairfield and Bloomfield, to Bardstown, where Bragg's army still remained. Skirmishing with his cavalry and artillery marked the movement of each column. And this became more stubborn and formidable as they approached Bardstown. The

last of Bragg's infantry retired eight hours before Buell's arrival. And then the pursuit and skirmishing continued toward Springfield.

Buell expected from the information he received that Bragg would concentrate his forces at Danville. And the First Corps under McCook was therefore ordered to move from Bloomfield to Harrodsburg. The Second, under Crittenden, moved on the Lebanon and Danville Road which passed four miles south of Perryville. General Thomas, who had been made second in command, having joined Buell with one of his divisions on the march from Nashville to Louisville, accompanied this corps. The Third, under Gilbert, moved in the centre on the direct road from Bardstown to Perryville. Buell himself went with this corps. After leaving Bardstown he learned that Smith was moving to concentrate at either Harrodsburg or Perryville, and not Danville as he had supposed. He therefore directed McCook to move to Perryville instead of Harrodsburg as originally ordered.

It was the dry season of the year and a drought prevailed. The roads were dusty and the men and animals suffered for want of water. As the centre corps approached Perryville, the Confederates appeared in force. And when within three miles of the town, the corps was drawn up in line of battle. And the advance guard, consisting of cavalry and artillery, supported towards evening by two regiments of infantry, pressed them back towards the town. The resistance was somewhat stubborn. In the bed of Doctor's Creek, about two and a half miles from Perryville, though the stream was not running, there were some pools of water, the sight of which excited the suffering troops. But the enemy showed a disposition to prevent an approach to them. At two o'clock on the following day, October 8, by order of General Buell, Colonel Dan. McCook advanced with three regiments and drove the Confederates back from the creek, and after a severe skirmish took possession of the heights beyond, and planted a battery there. The troops thus had access to the water, such as it was, while the possession of the heights gave them a commanding survey of the surrounding country. The enemy, seeing the importance of the position thus lost, and being reinforced, advanced to retake it. A battery was brought up and fire opened. But after a severe struggle for an hour, being compelled by McCook's battery to change position three times, the attempt was given up and firing for a while ceased.

But the Confederates soon began massing troops in a skirt of woods on the slope of a hill to the front, and the cavalry coming up and attempting to go towards Perryville, it was checked by this enemy in the woods. A portion of the cavalry dismounted. And supported by skirmishers from McCook's brigade, together they advanced into the timber and quickly became engaged. General Sheridan coming on the field, to whose division McCook's brigade belonged, ordered up two other regiments and sent them into the woods. Together these troops drove the Confederates out and across the open fields beyond and took possession of a wooded hill. This was the second ridge east of Doctor's Creek going forward on the line of the Springfield Road. The line here selected was an admirable one. And General Rousseau's division of Major-General Alex. McCook's corps, now arriving at the front, by the old Mackville Road, was formed upon a continuation of

this line. Soon afterwards, however, the Confederate batteries commencing to play upon Rousseau's division to the left, Sheridan ordered his troops back half a mile to the position on the ridge first carried in the morning by Colonel Dan. McCook. This was a mistake. It left Rousseau without support on his right and exposed his flank.

Thus opened the battle of Perryville. The line ran, north and south, about six miles. And the centre, the nearest point, was approximately a mile west of the village of Perryville, which gave the battle its name. The country is boldly undulating and traversed by two streams, Doctor's Creek, which flows north-east, and Chaplin River, running directly north. They unite two miles north of the village. Besides these, there were numerous intersecting rivulets and ravines. Chaplin River, little more than a good-sized creek, ran through the village. The field was in a region of fertile farms, dotted over with comfortable homes, surrounded by cornfields and meadows and all bordered by fine stretches of native forest. The hills, though rugged, were everywhere passable for troops, and in most places for horses and artillery. They were crossed by an occasional stone fence. The line of battle followed the ridges on either side of Doctor's Creek. To the north, it was on the west side of the creek, and to the south, on the east. The creek is crossed by three macadamised roads, running into Perryville. One from Springfield, by which Buell approached, crossed the creek by a bridge, where Colonel Dan. McCook drove the Confederates back from the water. Another from Mackville, by which General Alex. McCook approached, crossed the creek a mile to the north-east. His right division under Rousseau rested upon this point, which was near a barn and a white farmhouse owned by a man named Russell. This was considered by the Confederates the key to the Union position. More than three miles to the south of the Springfield Road was the Lebanon Pike, by which Thomas approached. There was also a fine macadamised road passing through the village and northward to Harrodsburg and Lexington. It was across Chaplin River from the battlefield, and furnished the avenue of retreat to the Confederates. It will thus be seen that the position had some tactical advantages.

When the Confederate army left Bardstown, the right wing under Polk moved to Harrodsburg and the left under Hardee to Perryville. Hardee had occupied the village for two days, his cavalry constantly skirmishing with the advance of Buell. On October 7 Hardee notified Bragg, who had now reached Harrodsburg, that Buell was moving in heavy force against his position and urged the concentration of the army at Perryville to inflict a decisive defeat upon the Federals, or at least press them back from their advance against the Confederate line of retreat towards Danville. Seeing the nearer approach of Buell, Hardee established a line of battle between Chaplin River and the Harrodsburg Pike, with his left at the village, the line running north and parallel with the river, but on the opposite side from the Union army. On the evening of October 7 General Polk was sent with a part of his wing to Perryville, and the next morning at ten Bragg arrived. It will be noticed that this was about the same time that McCook's corps reached the field, and some hours before the arrival of General Thomas with Crittenden's corps.

When Polk was sent, he was ordered by Bragg to 'give the enemy battle immediately; rout him, and then move to our (Bragg and Smith's) support.' And in this order it was added, 'No time should be lost in these movements.' Though Polk had reached Perryville with his troops before midnight, up to the time of Bragg's arrival no attack was made. If the attack had been made promptly, Polk would have found in his front only one-third of Buell's army, Gilbert's corps. When Bragg arrived, McCook had reached the field and added 12,000 to the 18,000 already there. After a hasty reconnaissance and consultation, however, Bragg decided to assume the offensive. The Confederate line was advanced about noon across the river so as to take position on the ground between the two streams, Chaplin River and Doctor's Creek. It extended on either side of the Mackville Road, with its left towards the Springfield Pike. The interval between its left and this pike was swept by a battery on a neighbouring hill.

General Buell had sent orders on October 7 to McCook and Crittenden to march at 3 A.M. of the 8th and take positions on the right and left of Gilbert, so as to make an attack that day if possible. This order did not reach McCook till 2.30 A.M. of the 8th. But two and a half hours later he was on the march. Crittenden had been obliged to go six miles out of his way to find water, and so the order did not reach him till late, and then found him so far away that he did not get into the battle at all. McCook took position on the north end of the Union line, Rousseau's division on the right, and Jackson's on the left, both on a commanding ridge, with Jackson's overlooking a wide sweep of the river, his left forming a crotchet to the rear, in order to occupy some high ground in that direction. Starkweather's brigade and two batteries of Rousseau's division were posted to the rear of Jackson's left, on commanding ground, and Webster's brigade of Jackson's division to the rear of the centre of Rousseau's line. To the right of Rousseau was Sheridan's and then Mitchell's division of Gilbert's corps. To the rear of Sheridan was Schoeff's division. All these were south of the Mackville Road and east of Doctor's Creek. Confronting McCook's corps was Hardee's wing of the Confederate army in two divisions, Buckner's and Anderson's, and Cheatham's division of Polk's wing, in all about 16,000 men. The whole of Buell's army, 58,000, was there or within supporting distance, except Sill's division. But as will be seen the battle was fought by a part of McCook's corps, about one-fourth of Buell's army. So that in fact the forces engaged were not unequally matched. Bragg was labouring under a misapprehension when he ordered the attack. He believed that Buell's 'right was near Lebanon, a corps in front of Perryville and his left (two entire corps) extending by way of Mackville to Frankfort, a line of at least sixty miles.' There were not two corps on the left, only one, McCook's. And a division of this corps, Sill's, had been detached and sent against Kirby Smith at Frankfort. The other two divisions, Rousseau's and Jackson's, were in front of Bragg, and had come from Mackville, seven miles away, that morning.

When the Union batteries had been moved into position, they soon opened fire at long range. No enemy was then visible in the direction of Perryville, though the booming of cannon was heard in

that direction as McCook came upon the field. But a few rounds opened Bragg's batteries. And then at intervals the sullen roar of hostile cannon continued for three hours, with the occasional rattle of musketry on the skirmish lines. About one o'clock, Cheatham's division crossed Doctor's Creek on the extreme Confederate right, and working around under cover of the woods, soon came in sight of Jackson's troops. No sooner did they appear than the direction of Jackson's artillery was changed and opened fire at short range, not exceeding ninety yards, on their flank. The charges of grape fell heavily. And the advancing line was checked. And after a few more rounds it turned and faced the battery which flanked the Union left. A regiment was ordered up in support of this battery. And advancing promptly, it fired a volley and then fell back. The Confederates answered it, and as the Union troops fell back, Jackson, who was standing on the left of the battery encouraging his men, fell dead, two bullets having entered his right breast. The Confederates pressed forward, captured the battery, and drove the Union troops still farther back, from the open ground on the knob, where it stood, into the skirt of the woods beyond. Here for three hours the battle raged with fury and with varied success for both sides. And here General Terrill fell, his left side and lung torn by a fragment of a shell. The fall of Jackson, their chief, much beloved and only a few months before carried into Congress on the Union ticket from the Second (Ky.) District by an overwhelming majority, had disorganised this raw and now overmatched brigade. And Terrill had gone down in his efforts to rally and steady it. The brigade gave way in utter panic. And the whole weight of the Confederate charge then fell on Rousseau. But he was ready to receive it.

Seeing Jackson go down and the capture of the battery, and the Confederates moving irresistibly down on his left, with the apparent purpose of turning it, driving the broken and disordered fragments of Terrill's brigade before them, Rousseau galloped around to Stark-weather's brigade and directed it to open its two batteries upon them. This order was promptly obeyed. And the aim was admirable. The supporting infantry was ordered to lie down under cover and wait their nearer approach. But the artillery, with the cross-fire which the nature of the ground gave, repulsed them again and again. But at last a fresh and overwhelming force of assailants, changing direction, moved straight forward on the guns. And the supporting infantry then raising up, poured into them a withering fire. But they came on unchecked. A portion of the infantry broke in confusion and fled. But the rest, cheered by the officers, stood to the work. The Confederates still advanced, but were driven back again and again, as they repeatedly came forward, with great loss, till the ammunition of the brigade was exhausted, and then it retired quietly, under orders, to the line of battle originally selected by McCook. And here getting a supply of ammunition it renewed the fight. Its two batteries had fallen back with the brigade, one of them after losing thirty-five horses. And they too at once renewed the conflict. And together they continued it till dark.

Rousseau's centre and right were held by the brigades of Harris

and Lytle. They fought bravely, but as the left retired they felt the want of its support. And finally a desperate charge on Lytle, who held the right, drove that back. And then the centre went too. Lytle, in his effort to stem the tide, fell, severely wounded. And, believing his wound to be mortal, he refused to be carried from the field and was captured.

McCook had remained with his left centre until he saw the Confederates checked by Starkweather's brigade. And then he galloped to the right of his line. Here he saw it turned by the large force of Hardee's troops. Rousseau's position was naturally strong. The slope of the ground and a few stone fences afforded some protection. But the front was enfiladed by batteries on his right and rear. His line went back sullenly, fighting as it went. The rush was stayed, but only temporarily. Supporting brigades assailed his centre, and some batteries well posted on high ground beyond Doctor's Creek, with a crushing fire partly enfiladed his line and struck Sheridan's beyond. The combined attacks, coming unexpectedly, were irresistible and swept Rousseau's line back. Officers heroically cheered their men, urging them to stand firm. Some, heroically obeying, died where they stood; others, slowly giving way, obstinately retired, fighting as they went. Many fell, friend and foe together, staining the grass thickly with the blood of the wounded and the dead. Taking advantage of the opening made by the withdrawal of Sheridan's troops on Rousseau's right, an attack was pressed at this point with overwhelming force. Sheridan's artillery poured a fire into their left and flank. But supporting forces of Confederates in turn assaulted him. Rousseau's right was turned and it fell back, but in excellent order.

McCook then riding up, ordered Colonel Webster to move forward his brigade, and if possible stop this entering wedge. The order was promptly obeyed. Webster's brigade moved forward at double quick into the bloody angle formed between Rousseau's right swinging around and the pursuing Confederates. And here, quickly forming and facing about so as to confront the advancing column, it poured a deadly volley into the faces of the Confederates. Confronted by this unexpected line, they were quickly halted. It stood firm and continued to hold the ground with volley after volley. The Confederate dead were found there the next morning in large numbers. Conspicuous in this brigade was the 98th Ohio, a new regiment, now for the first time under fire, recently enlisted in a country district of that state. It went into the fight with 822 men. And of these 35 were killed, 162 wounded and 32 missing, making a total loss of 229. No other regiment could show a greater on that field. Its Colonel, George Webster, that day commanding the brigade, was killed while leading his troops in repelling this assault. Four guns of a battery that had been left on the field were manned and served by these troops after they had been abandoned by the artillerists. Other guns were ordered up in their support, and all were well handled.

But at last this brigade too was compelled to yield. A Confederate battery in an open field near Bolton's barn, about eight hundred yards from the Russell house where Rousseau's right had held the ground, so raked the position that it could not be held. Loomis' battery, that

had earlier in the day exhausted all its long-range ammunition, had been retired to a commanding ridge about a hundred and fifty yards to the rear. It was supported by three companies of Michigan troops. And nearby its new position, on the left of the Mackville Road, stood three regiments, the 3rd and 10th Ohio and 15th Kentucky. They had held this ground till now. McCook ordered these guns to be loaded with canister and their fire to be reserved for close work, and the men to lie down. The heavy force, that McCook estimated at three to his one, having now swept aside all previous opposition, came steadily on till they were in full view over the turn of the hill. Then Loomis and his supporting companies and these three regiments were all ordered to fire. And a withering discharge followed. Still Hardee's troops came on, raked by the battery and terribly thinned. Their spirit was admirable. But the losses were not all on their side. For Loomis too was driven back, badly damaged.

Thus far the advantage had been with Hardee. And if left alone he would doubtless have over-matched McCook and driven him from the field—perhaps captured his corps. But just here some new troops appeared upon the field. Even before this, McCook, seeing the tide turning against him, had dispatched one of his staff to the nearest commander for aid. He met General Schoeff, of Gilbert's corps, who referred him to Gilbert, and he in turn to General Buell, two and a half miles away. No aid appearing, McCook sent another member of his staff, Captain Hoblitzell. And just as Loomis was driven back, McCook saw Hoblitzell returning with Gooding's brigade from Gilbert's corps, three fresh regiments and a battery. He ordered them against the enemy, and they drove them back beyond the Russell house. And then, as the dusk of evening gathered, General Steedman's brigade from Gilbert's corps also came forward, sent by General Buell. Two battalions of regulars under Major Townsend, with the 9th Ohio on their right, were posted in commanding positions to the rear and right of the Russell house and, with the artillery attached, opened upon the weary and now disheartened and outnumbered troops of Hardee.

United to this combination against his front, Hardee had also to sustain another upon his left and rear. His advance had exposed them to Sheridan. The latter had been attacked simultaneously with the heaviest assault on Rousseau by a Confederate brigade under Colonel Powell. Powell was firmly met, Sheridan calling upon Mitchell on the right for reinforcements. Mitchell promptly sent Carlin's brigade. Carlin immediately advanced. Leading his brigade through a skirt of timber to the brow of a hill in an open field, he discovered the enemy's assault on Sheridan, and immediately formed his brigade and charged at double quick. Under this impetuosity on both front and flank, Powell quickly gave way and fled in disorder to and through Perryville, a distance of two miles. He was closely pursued by Carlin, who captured an ammunition train of fifteen wagons and two caissons, with their horses and a guard of 141 officers and men. Sheridan did not join in this pursuit. He, seeing the enemy advancing against his left after having driven McCook, directed the fire of his artillery on this new danger and drove it away. This was the brigade of Brigadier-General Danl. W. Adams of Anderson's division that had advanced to

the support of Hardee. It was now dark and the firing ceased. And both sides settled to rest upon their arms.

And thus closed the battle of Perryville. McCook remained at the front till nine o'clock. And then riding to the left he found that the line there had been retired by Rousseau. Expecting that the enemy would renew the attack at daylight, he ordered him to throw his line back to its position before the battle. This was done about midnight. Rousseau had 7,000 troops on the field, Jackson 5,500 and Gooding 1,500, making 14,000. They had borne the brunt of the battle. But McCook wrote, 'The battle was principally fought by Rousseau's division, and if there are or ever were better soldiers than the old troops engaged, I have neither seen nor read of them. . . . It was also clearly perceptible that the resolution and obstinate resistance displayed by the old troops in the same brigade or in close proximity had a salutary effect in animating and encouraging the new troops.'

The Union loss was 845 killed, 2,851 wounded and 515 missing, a total of 4,211. Of this loss 3,299 were from McCook's corps. He gives the number of his troops engaged as 12,500. The loss, more than one out of every four, shows the frightful fatality. McCook spoke of it as 'the bloodiest battle of modern times.' There was no report in detail of the Confederate loss. Bragg estimated it at 2,500. In one Union division, Jackson's, the division and brigade commanders were all killed, while in the Confederate army Brigadier-Generals Wood, Cleburne and Brown were all wounded.

Buell supposed that the enemy would hold his position and renew the battle the next morning. He therefore ordered Gilbert's and Crittenden's corps, which had suffered least in the battle, to move forward at six o'clock the next morning and attack the Confederate left and front. But this movement quickly revealed the fact that Bragg had already gone. He went about midnight, quietly, without haste or disorder, but leaving his dead and many of his wounded on the field. A later reconnaissance showed that his whole force had fallen back on Harrodsburg and was there reinforced by Kirby Smith's command and Wither's division of Polk's wing that had been sent to support Smith at Frankfort.

Buell waited three days at Perryville. This was till Sill's division returned on the evening of October 11. Bragg's army was that morning two miles south of Harrodsburg. But that day it retired. And two days later it was in full retreat. Buell sent a force in pursuit, but whenever assailed Bragg retired, felling trees across the road to retard his pursuers. And as the country he had now entered was poor and he consumed all the forage along the route, all efforts to overhaul him were fruitless. The pursuit was abandoned at London. And Buell's forces were gathered at Bowling Green and Glasgow, while Bragg passed through Cumberland Gap between October 19 and 25, his troops, as he described them, 'jaded, hungry and ragged.'

In leaving Kentucky, his own brief report of the raid shows his disappointment. 'No people ever had so favourable an opportunity,' he says, 'to rise in mass to assert their independence. But I am distressed to add there is little or no disposition to avail of it. Willing perhaps to accept their independence, they are neither disposed nor

willing to risk their lives or their property in its achievement. With ample means to arm 20,000 men and a force with that fully to redeem the state, we have not yet issued half the arms left us by casualties incident to the campaign.'

This was a frank confession. His army instead of attracting recruits went out of the state smaller than when it entered. It came prepared to receive an accession of 20,000 to its numbers. It went away without enough to replace its losses. And we realise his estimate of this reception when we read further on what he wrote in a later and fuller report. The fertility of Kentucky's soil, the richness of its pastures, the wealth of its people, their herds and their crops, are all well known. Yet Bragg wrote, 'To evacuate the country in which we could no longer subsist, now became an imperative necessity.' In other words the people would not contribute to support a Confederate army. And his was not strong enough, with Buell on its trail, to capture what it needed. It had been driven to take refuge among the mountains and waste places of the state, where subsistence could not be had.

But much as the South was dissatisfied with the result of the campaign, the North was hardly less so. It is a singular fact that both were disappointed. The South felt that Bragg's failure to push on vigorously to the Ohio and capture Louisville, before the North could send in recruits to repel the invasion, was a fatal mistake. He was severely criticised also because he left behind 10,000 of his best troops, largely Kentuckians under the command of Breckinridge. They would have given him a decided superiority in numbers till Buell reached Louisville. On the other hand, the North felt that Buell should have fought and defeated Bragg before he crossed the Cumberland River. There were loud complaints in his army as it toilsomely followed Bragg to the north. His own soldiers were dissatisfied that he was not more aggressive, that he had not, for example, saved the little garrison at Munfordville after its heroic defence, that he preferred to slip around Bragg to Louisville rather than fight him at Bardstown, that he did not crush him at Perryville. Buell felt that Bragg outnumbered him two to one in the movement northward. But this was a mistake. Their numbers were substantially equal, there being only two or three thousand in Bragg's favour. Believing at Washington that Buell had shown his incompetency before he reached Louisville, he was removed. But Thomas asked to have him retained and he was accordingly reinstated.

But now when Bragg had been permitted to escape without one decisive battle, Buell was promptly called to account. On October 30 he was removed and Rosecrans given his place. Four days later Stanton ordered Halleck to organise a Commission to investigate Buell's conduct at Perryville, and in suffering Bragg to escape 'without loss or capture,' as well as his previous conduct of the campaign. This Commission, of which General Lew Wallace was President, held extended sessions, examined many witnesses and finally reported, criticising Buell for not attacking Bragg's army before it crossed the Cumberland, his conduct at the battle of Perryville, and for not pushing the Confederates more promptly and vigorously on their retreat.

However it reported no charges. And so the matter was allowed to drop. But Buell's career was ended.

As is often the case, popular accusation went further than the truth. Even Buell's loyalty was questioned. But of this there was no evidence. Indeed, on the contrary, he was a high-minded soldier. 'No one who knew him,' wrote Grant, who had known him well, both at West Point and in the old army, 'ever believed him capable of a dishonourable act, and nothing could be more dishonourable than to accept high rank and command in war and then betray the trust.' But Buell was slow—too slow. When ordered to Shiloh, he could not be got there till the battle was half over; when directed to occupy Chattanooga, repairing the railroad as he went, he spent weeks of precious time rebuilding and patrolling the road, so that Bragg was able to slip in and seize the prize before him; when Munfordville and its garrison might have been saved, he permitted Bragg again to anticipate him and capture it; when finally McCook had discomfited Bragg, he waited three days for the return of Sill and gave the Confederates a hopeless start in their race for the mountains. Everywhere it was the same. He was too slow. He lacked execution, ability to act quickly, initiation, force of character. He did not keep his troops in hand, as witness his failure to know during the whole day that one corps was fighting at death grips, while two others were left idle, at Perryville. It is a curious fact that Buell was two and a half miles from the front during this battle, was not on the field or along the line during the day, did not know of the attack on McCook till four o'clock that evening, and then, when appealed to for reinforcements, the troops ordered to McCook's support did not reach him till nearly dark. All this was unfortunate. Buell had done a good work in organising and disciplining the army. But when it was ready for serious work, some other hand must guide it and he be consigned to obscurity. For he had lost the confidence of his troops, as well as the respect of his superiors. And his removal then properly followed.

CHAPTER XXIV

Morgan sent to cut Rosecrans' Line—Destroys the Railroad and escapes
—Counter Raid—The Battle of Stone River—Bragg retreats.

THE order appointing Rosecrans also gave a new name to the army. It was to be known as the 'Fourteenth Army Corps.' The department was to comprise all of Tennessee east of the river of that name, and such parts of Georgia and Alabama as might be occupied by this army. It was to be designated the 'Department of the Cumberland.' Rosecrans assumed command on October 30, 1862. And seven days later he reorganised his command by dividing it into Right Wing, Centre and Left, to be commanded by Major-Generals Alex. McCook, Geo. H. Thomas and Thos. L. Crittenden, respectively. Thomas was one of the great figures of the war. McCook was a member of the well-known Ohio family of that name, friends of Stanton when he was a Steubenville lawyer. His brother had been Stanton's partner. Crittenden was a son of John J. Crittenden, the Kentucky statesman, who had done so much in the early days of the war to uphold the hands of Lincoln and keep Kentucky true to the Union. Major-General D. S. Stanley was placed in command of the 'dilapidated' cavalry, as Horace Greeley not inaptly called it.

The army according to its muster-roll was a hundred thousand strong. But there were 'absent by authority' 26,482, many of them, of course, in hospitals, but many also not. While 6,484 were 'absent without authority.' So that his army was in effective strength only about 65,000. But the cavalry was so notoriously defective that it was mere sport for such troopers as Morgan and Forrest to 'ride round it.' As it was Rosecrans' first duty to repair the railroad so he could occupy and hold Nashville, this proved a very serious handicap. The railroad could be torn up as fast as he could rebuild it. The tunnel a short distance south of Mitchellsville had been obstructed. So supplies for the troops in Nashville could be brought thus far from Louisville by rail. But here they had to be transferred to wagons and hauled thirty-five miles over bad roads to where they could be placed on the railroad again. This was slow and toilsome work. It required a large force several weeks to repair the tunnel. But by November 26 the road was opened, the troops had been forwarded to Nashville and supplies were being brought forward in sufficient quantities to relieve the army in case his line should be cut again, as Rosecrans had to expect it would be. And by December 26 sufficient supplies were collected to maintain the army for two months.

In the meantime Bragg had refitted his army in Eastern Tennessee and moved to Murfreesboro, thirty miles south-west of Nashville, on

the railroad to Chattanooga. So that he could now threaten the one place and hold the other. One of the grounds for the removal of Buell had been that he declined to follow Bragg into the Cumberland Mountains, where he thought a campaign could only end in disaster. He believed that it was Bragg's purpose to draw him away from Nashville so that he might, by a dash, capture the city himself. And Buell preferred to go directly to the support of Nashville and let Bragg follow him. Later events proved the correctness of Buell's judgment. Bragg had made the expected move. When he went to Murfreesboro he showed that his purpose was to take Nashville. But when he saw Rosecrans already there, he assumed that, as winter was near, he intended to spend it there, and that, unless the Confederates assumed the offensive, the armies would both go into winter quarters where they were. He planned accordingly. And as it would embarrass Rosecrans to cut his line of supply, the railroad to Louisville, Bragg gave Morgan an order on December 1 to do this work.

The order curiously illustrates the independence of all restraint which Morgan was allowed. Given, in general, the work which was to be done, he was allowed to take his own time, gather his own men, choose his own course, and use his own judgment. His was a free lance. 'When relieved from your present duties,' the order read, 'you will proceed with your whole command, by the most practicable route and with the least delay, to operate on the enemy's lines of communication in rear of Nashville. You will assail his guards when your relative force will justify it; capture and destroy his trains; burn his bridges, depots, trestle-works, etc. In fine, harass him in every conceivable way in your power. . . . You are authorised to increase your command to the extent of your captured arms and horses, assigning the men to your old regiments. . . . You are not limited in the extent of your operations, every confidence being reposed in your zeal, discretion and judgment. You will make weekly reports of your operations, sending with each a return of your command. It is reported that the enemy is obstructing the fords of the Cumberland.'

In this last sentence there was a suggestion: 'It is reported that the enemy is obstructing the fords of the Cumberland.' But it was only a suggestion. There was no command to do anything. But 'a hint to the wise is sufficient.' General Thomas had stationed a brigade under Colonel A. B. Moore, of the 104th Ill., at Hartville, a village a few miles east of Nashville. This was to serve as an outpost, and be at the same time at a place where it could watch Hart's Ford of the Cumberland River. It was in the natural path of any movement from Murfreesboro to Rosecrans' line of communication. On December 6, acting on the maxim of Lincoln, 'Do one thing at a time,' Morgan left his camp with some cavalry under Colonel Basil W. Duke—a kindred spirit, who, after sharing his campaigns, later became his historian—and a regiment of infantry under Colonel T. H. Hunt, and his two howitzers and two rifled Ellsworth guns. Morgan went with the infantry and artillery to Purier's Ferry on the Cumberland and sent the cavalry under Duke to a ford some miles below.

Before dawn, on the morning of the 7th, both detachments were within two miles of Moore's camp. Picketing the surrounding roads

so that no reinforcements could come to Moore without his knowledge, Morgan, at daybreak, fell upon the unsuspecting camp, insufficiently guarded, and drove the Union troops away from their first position. In attempting to take a new one, there was some confusion and the troops were crowded together, where Morgan's artillery did great execution. And here his infantry falling upon one flank and his cavalry, dismounted, upon the other, by a simultaneous advance they carried this position also. And Moore then surrendered. The Union loss was 58 killed, 204 wounded and 1,800 captured. The Confederates lost 21 killed, 104 wounded and 13 missing. Thus in an hour and a half, with 500 cavalry, 700 infantry and a small battery, Morgan stamped and captured three regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, with two rifled cannon; and then effected his escape, with sixteen wagons loaded with arms, ammunition and clothing from the captured camp. This all took place within nine miles of Castalian Springs, where two Union brigades were stationed. And they heard the noise of Moore's guns, started at once to his rescue and were within a mile and a half of his camp when they learned of his surrender.

This was an unseemly affair throughout, on Moore's part, and showed his incompetence. It probably provoked Rosecrans' resentment. For he, finding that some of his troops were surrendering without much pressure in order to be paroled and sent home, had fifty such dressed in fanciful costumes, with night-caps on their heads, and paraded them through the streets of Nashville to the music of the 'Rogue's March.' He then sent them to a parole camp in Indiana. The troublesome marauding of Bragg's cavalry among the Union outposts made such a step advisable. And the lesson thus administered had a wholesome effect upon the army.

Morgan, on his return to camp from the Hartsville affair, was the Confederate hero of the hour. And he received a consideration that bore substantial fruit. Jefferson Davis happened to be, at the time, in Bragg's camp. And he handed Morgan a commission as brigadier-general. Hardee would have made the rank still higher, that of major-general. But nothing was said. And the promotion given was fairly earned; and Morgan showed his appreciation by subsequent good service, thought he probably felt, like Hardee, that the rank should have been higher.

This foray being over, Morgan on the morning of December 22 left Alexandria, an outpost of Bragg's army, to cut Rosecrans' line. The popularity of his branch of the service had been attracting recruits, and he now had 3,100 men. As this was too large a number to be handled in one body, he divided his command into two brigades, the first under Colonel Duke, and the second under Colonel W. C. P. Breckinridge. And with this force he set out on his second raid. He carried seven guns, but little baggage, and only a small train. About dusk he crossed the Cumberland River by a ford and camped three or four miles beyond. The next night he was at Centreville, thirty miles farther north. And in the dusk of the evening of the following day, when within six miles of Glasgow, he encountered his first opposition. This was a battalion of the 2nd Mich. Cavalry, on the march from Gallatin to Munfordville. One of Morgan's men

was killed, two wounded and seven taken prisoners. While he captured twenty-two of the enemy and killed two more. The encounter was unexpected to both. But not knowing in what force they might be, Morgan discreetly fell back, and the path thus being cleared, they passed on and left him. After experiencing some difficulty in crossing Green River, Morgan reached Hammondsville at midnight on the 25th, and threw out one detachment towards Woodsonville and another toward Munfordville. Both were on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, which he was sent to destroy, and on opposite sides of Green River. The detachments were to give the impression that he intended to attack some nearby fortifications. But his real purpose was to divert attention from another object. This was to capture the stockades at Bacon Creek and Nolin, some miles farther north, where there were some bridges and trestles.

The next morning, in a driving storm of rain, which had continued all the previous night, making the roads almost impassable for artillery, he sent a regiment against Bacon Creek, while he went on to Upton, half-way to Nolin. Here he halted, and while awaiting the return of the regiment from Bacon Creek, he caused large fires to be built along the road for three or four miles so as to warp and destroy the iron rails. The clouds breaking away, the fires served also to warm and dry his discomforted troops. But the duration of the firing at Bacon Creek, in the meantime, had made him apprehensive of disaster there. And he turned to assist in the reduction of that stockade. The little garrison had held out pluckily. The barricade was built of logs ten or twelve feet long, planted in the ground. And it was loop-holed for rifles and surrounded by a trench. And even with a section of artillery, which it was not made to resist, Morgan's regiment had not been able to reduce it. But when Morgan appeared with his reinforcements and demanded a surrender, the commandant yielded. The prisoners marched out and were paroled, and the stockade and railroad trestle which it guarded were destroyed. Morgan then hurried on to Nolin. And here the stockade surrendered without resistance and the bridge and trestle which it guarded were also destroyed. And from there he pushed on north, still following the railroad.

On arriving within sight of Elizabethtown he was handed a note scrawled in pencil on the back of an envelope, signed by the commander of the U.S. forces in the town, informing him that he was surrounded and demanding his surrender. To this Morgan replied that their positions were exactly reversed, that he had him surrounded and demanded his surrender. Both demands were refused. The Union soldiers had taken possession of some brick houses on the outskirts of the town. And Morgan at once opened upon these houses with his artillery. After shelling them for thirty minutes they were riddled. And the town was then surrendered with 652 prisoners.

Morgan now turned to the left towards Bardstown as if leaving the railroad. But when four miles out he sent Colonel Breckinridge to attack the lower stockade, guarding the long trestle on the south side of Muldraugh's Hill, here crossed by the railroad. While he moved with Duke's brigade to the one on the north side. The destruction of these trestles was the principal object of the raid. Both stockades

were promptly attacked. And after two or three hours' shelling, both surrendered. And then the great trestles were burned. Each was 60 feet high and one 300 and the other 350 feet long. They were the largest and strongest, as well as the most costly, trestles on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. And neither had ever been destroyed before. Their loss entailed a great expense, as well as a long inconvenience, to the Union army. But Morgan now had the satisfaction of seeing the object of his raid accomplished. With the stockades he had captured 700 more prisoners, including 27 officers, and a large quantity of medical and quartermaster's stores. But, like the others, these prisoners were immediately paroled. He could not be troubled with carrying them along. And the next day he sent out one detachment to burn the bridge over the Rolling Fork of Salt River, and another to destroy the trestle at Boston, both on a branch of the railroad leading to Lebanon. While this was being done, he himself with the rest of his troops started to return to the main army.

But now difficulties began to threaten. As his rear regiments were crossing Rolling Fork, a Union force with some artillery under Colonel John M. Harlan, later for thirty-four years a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, came up and began to shell them at the ford. Couriers were at once dispatched to bring in the detachments. And Colonel Duke was ordered to hold Harlan in check. Later Breckinridge united with Duke, and together they placed seven companies in position and held five more in reserve. Here they several times repulsed Harlan and nearly succeeded in capturing two pieces of his artillery. But Duke at last fell from his horse, severely wounded by a shell. And Breckinridge then assumed command of this rear guard. It held the position till the detachment sent to burn the bridge over Rolling Fork returned. And then, the entire command having passed the ford, he too fell back in good order and without a further loss than three wounded. But Harlan had saved the bridge over the Rolling Fork by compelling the recall of the detachment sent to burn it, before that purpose was accomplished. His loss was three killed and one wounded. But he made no pursuit. His force of cavalry was not large enough to cope with Morgan's. And it was useless to attempt to overtake his cavalry with infantry.

In his rapid march of a week, Morgan had effectually laid waste Rosecrans' line of supply. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad and the telegraph line along it, from Munfordville to within eighteen miles of Louisville, a distance of sixty miles, were in ruins. They never had such a ripping up before or since. To repair them would require the labour of a large force for many weeks. And until the repairs were made, Rosecrans' army must subsist on the supplies it had and the little it could gather by forays or bring in by the river. Retreat seemed a more than probable result of the situation. This, with winter already well advanced and the prospect of bad roads and rough weather, gave a serious cast to the outlook. But Morgan, as he rubbed his hands with delight over these achievements, might well say that this was a question for Rosecrans and not for him. The only question for him was how to get back to Bragg's army.

On December 30 he reached Springfield after night. He here

learned that troops were being collected on every side to intercept him. Harlan was behind him with 3,000 men, Colonel Hoskins in front, at Lebanon, with 3,300, and Brigadier-General Reynolds had been dispatched from Glasgow to Burkesville with a division, estimated at 10,000. They were to cut him off before he could cross the Cumberland. But nothing daunted, Morgan's spirit rose to the occasion. Immediately, under cover of darkness, he sent two companies out on the road to Lebanon, only eight miles away. One was to drive the Union pickets off or keep them back; while the other was to build extended camp fires, to give the appearance of his whole force in position, waiting for daylight to make an attack. This work done, at eleven o'clock he started on a night's march to the south, leaving Lebanon to his left. It was dark and stormy and the by-roads travelled were rough and intricate. But Morgan's hardy troopers, inured to danger, picked their way after the guides. And dawn found them only eight miles from Springfield. But they were also within two and a half of Lebanon, where the Union troops lay. Nevertheless, by one o'clock that afternoon Morgan had reached the top of Muldraugh's Hill. This was a mountain range formation crossing the state from north-west to south-east, over which, farther north, as we have seen, the railroad crossed. From its top, now looking north-east, with the aid of a glass, Morgan saw Lebanon and the Union camp and, nearer at hand, in the valley of the Rolling Fork, skirmishers thrown out to waylay him. But these preparations were all too late, for he had already passed around and was now beyond their reach. So passing down into the Green River valley beyond, he was soon at Campbellsville. It was in the evening. But here his exhausted and hungry command found food and a night's rest. And in the evening of the next day he was at Columbia. And then by another all-night march he reached Burkesville, at daylight of January 2, 1863, where he halted a few hours to rest and feed. And then he crossed the Cumberland and was safe.

It was Morgan's most brilliant raid. He summed the results up thus: the destruction of the railroad from Munfordville to within eighteen miles of Louisville, the capture of 1,877 prisoners, including 62 commissioned officers, the destruction of \$2,000,000 worth of U.S. property and inflicting a large loss in killed and wounded. This was all accomplished with only a loss to his own command of 2 killed, 24 wounded and 64 missing.

But his report reveals one other significant fact. Only once is it said that he was favourably received by the people of Kentucky. And this was at the first town he entered after he left Tennessee. Nowhere else did he meet the kind reception that had attended his former trip across the state. He had evidently worn his welcome out. The countrymen who sympathised with slavery then and were willing to contribute a meal for his men and feed for their horses, evidently now felt that, if encouraged, he might come too often and prove troublesome. They might be compelled, before it was over, to stand by and see their winter's supplies consumed on the spot, or coolly loaded into wagons and hauled off to feed the Confederate armies. And so they could well feel that they had, once in their lives, embraced chivalry too promptly, and that they had better now

follow the example of others and have nothing more to do with it. Morgan saw the change and went back satisfied. He saw that Kentucky was no longer to be hoped for as a member of the Confederacy. She had taken a firm stand for the Union, and her people were no longer his friends. His old home was rich in supplies, but she could not be depended on to furnish them to the South. She was ranged in hostility. Retaliation was now in order.

On November 20, General Wright, commanding the Department of Ohio, which included Kentucky, sent Brigadier-General Carter with 980 men on a counter raid from the North. He was to cut the Memphis and East Tennessee Railroad. And he crossed the Cumberland Mountains at Crank's Gap, near Harlan in south-eastern Kentucky and reached Blountville, Tennessee, at daylight on the morning of the 30th. Without even waiting for all his troops to get up, he sent on what he had, and soon followed with the rest to destroy the railroad bridge over the Holston River. This was now only six miles away. The Confederate guard of the bridge, 130 strong, surrendered without resistance, and were paroled. Their joy at being captured seemed to Carter unbounded. A large number of them went on their way to their homes among the mountains of North Carolina, 'swearing they would never be exchanged.' Their stores and equipment were burned, and the bridge too, 600 feet long. As soon as the work of destroying the bridge was fairly under way, Carter dispatched 180 men, under Colonel Walker, to destroy another over the Watauga River, ten miles farther west. On the way this detachment captured a locomotive and took it along. The guard of this bridge, about the same number as their assailants, made a brief but firm resistance. And then they broke and fled, leaving the bridge in Walker's hands. It was 300 feet long, and was also destroyed. While it was being consumed, the throttle of the captured locomotive was opened and she was run into the river and wrecked, destroying in her fatal leap one of the piers of the bridge. After completing this work and a running fight with pursuing forces for thirty miles, Carter passed the mountains again at Crank's Gap, on January 2. And by easy marches he reached Richmond, Ky., on the 9th, thus completing a raid of 470 miles in three weeks. His total loss in killed, wounded and missing was only nineteen. Thus the two sides evened up each other's forays.

These raids were interesting episodes of the war. And they were sometimes full of thrilling adventures. But after all they really counted for little in the final result. They terrorised communities and disturbed the orderly life of non-combatants. But the amount of damage done was comparatively small. And perhaps the little they caused was more than counterbalanced by the bitterness engendered. So that we must agree, at last, that it was by the tremendous impact of large armies, in great battles, where the loss in killed and wounded was appalling, and the power of one side or the other to continue the struggle was seriously impaired, and not in raids or forays, that the fate of the war was actually determined.

Such a battle was fought about this time. While Morgan was passing Columbia on January 1, 1863, he heard the distant roar of

cannon, far to the south. It was the noise of the battle of Stone River, 115 miles away. Seeing that his line of supplies was interrupted, Rosecrans had decided that his only hope of holding Nashville lay in driving Bragg away. This he felt should be done before winter would make a campaign impracticable, and while his supplies still continued sufficient.

Rosecrans knew that a large cavalry force had been sent by Bragg into West Tennessee to annoy Grant, and that Morgan was in his own rear breaking up the railroad. In the absence of these forces, about 5,000 in number, and with adequate supplies for the present accumulated in Nashville, he considered the time opportune for this movement. He therefore made every preparation to crush Bragg and secure undisputed possession of Central Tennessee. Rosecrans occupied Nashville, with his right extending towards Franklin and his left towards Lebanon. And his plan was for McCook, in command of his right, with three divisions, to move by the Nolinsville pike to Triune; Thomas, with two divisions, to advance by the Franklin and Wilson pikes, threatening Hardee, who was in McCook's front, and then fall in by cross-roads to Nolinsville; while Crittenden, on his left, with three divisions, passed by the Murfreesboro pike to La Vergne. Bragg's centre was at Murfreesboro under Polk, his right at Readyville under Breckinridge, and his left at Triune and Eagleville under Hardee. With his forces thus distributed, in winter quarters as he supposed, Bragg learned on Friday, December 26, that Rosecrans had that morning left Nashville and was advancing on Murfreesboro.

McCook advanced, skirmishing all the way with Hardee's cavalry and artillery, and closed the first day with a brisk fight which gave him possession of Nolinsville and the hills a mile and a half in front. Thomas followed him on the right and Crittenden advanced to La Vergne, likewise meeting some resistance. Bragg, having decided to make a stand at Murfreesboro, drew back his right and left gradually to that place, leaving the cavalry and artillery, supported by a small body of infantry, to delay Rosecrans' advance.

Murfreesboro lies a mile beyond Stone River and, as we have said, thirty miles south-east of Nashville. Both river and town derived their names from early settlers in the neighbourhood. The town is a substantial little seat with its court-house, newspaper and stores, the surrounding country fertile, gently undulating and highly cultivated, a part of the great plateau that stretches from the foot of the Cumberland mountains westward, forming the watershed between the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. The Chattanooga Railroad, the chief line of communication between Tennessee and the South Atlantic States, passed by the town. And a half-dozen excellent turnpikes radiated from its centre. The river lay within low banks of limestone, its bed of the same material, its swift current making it ordinarily shallow and everywhere easily fordable. At the time of which we write, it was fordable for infantry everywhere, and at the usual fords was not more than ankle deep. It was liable to sudden rises, and then became a rushing torrent. But when the heavy rains ceased it quickly subsided, to murmur again over its

rocky bed. Its general course is to the northward, and it enters the Cumberland River a few miles east of Nashville. The Wilkinson turnpike leaves the Nashville pike three-fourths of a mile from the town. A little farther north the Nashville pike and the railroad pass over the river, and soon after cross each other at a very acute angle. Then stretching away to the north-west, as straight as a crow can fly, they lie only a short distance apart. The river, the turnpike and the railroad, the latter with its bed a ready-made rampart for the soldiers, all figured in the coming battle. The only other unusual feature in the field, which lay just west of the river, was the number of cedar brakes or thickets scattered over it. They were so dense as to furnish an excellent shelter for approaching infantry. They hid them from view and also concealed lines lying within them. The open fields between were easily swept by the fire of the troops that were fortunate enough to have this protection. In one sense these brakes operated as a barricade, for they were altogether impassable for artillery until roads were cut through them.

On Saturday, December 27, the Confederate troops were all beyond the river and the Federals were advancing slowly. That night McCook was at Triune, and Thomas joined Crittenden at Stewart's Creek, each within ten miles of Stone River. The next day, Sunday, the Union troops rested, except Rousseau's division, which was brought forward from Nolinsville to Stewartsburg; while Bragg moved his troops into line of battle on the farther side of the river. On Monday, Rosecrans continued to advance, and that night McCook was at Wilkinson's Cross Roads, and Crittenden and Thomas within three miles of Murfreesboro. At three o'clock that afternoon, Palmer, who had led the advance of Crittenden, signalled that he was in sight of Murfreesboro and that Bragg was retreating. Crittenden was directed to send a division to occupy the town. But when Harker's brigade crossed the river and drove in some of the outposts and captured others, Crittenden learned from the prisoners that Breckinridge was in force in his front. Harker, upon receiving this information, without waiting for orders, hastily recrossed the river.

Bragg the same day crossed over Hardee's and Polk's corps and drew them up in line of battle just west of and parallel with the course of the river, the former as his left wing, the latter as his centre, leaving Breckinridge, his right, on the east side and separated from the rest by the river. Late in the evening, fearing that Rosecrans was extending his right so as to flank the Confederate left, Bragg moved McCown's division to that flank and added it to General Hardee's command. Still beyond McCown was stationed the cavalry. In this way the Confederate left was made to overlap and outweigh in numbers McCook's corps on Rosecrans' right. Other Union troops were brought up and Thomas was posted in the centre and Crittenden on Rosecrans' left. Bragg had no reserve, but it was hoped that Breckinridge's command, not then threatened, could be used as such. Bragg thus had his ablest corps commander and his heaviest columns on his left, where Rosecrans was weakest. And the disposition being completed, Bragg ordered Hardee to open the battle at daylight on Wednesday, the 31st, the last day of the year 1862.

The attack, commencing on Bragg's extreme left, was to be taken up in succession by the brigades as they stood in line, proceeding toward the right, until they reached the river. The move was also to be made by a constant wheel to the right, with Polk's right flank, on the river, as a pivot. This would cause the rim of the wheel, Hardee's left, to travel far and fast, while Polk's right, the hub, was stationary. The object was to envelop and carry Rosecrans back to the river and, in doing so, cut off his line of communication with Nashville. With this in view, Wharton's and Buford's cavalry had been posted on the extreme Confederate left to carry around this end and check any Federal movement in that direction. And General Joe Wheeler was already operating in Rosecrans' rear, attacking his wagon trains, picking up stragglers, and generally obstructing his movements.

It is a curious fact that Rosecrans' plan of battle was an exact counterpart to that of Bragg. McCook was to receive the attack of Hardee, or, if that did not come, to himself attack sufficiently to hold all the force on his front; Thomas was to open with skirmishing and engage Bragg's centre as far as the river; while Crittenden was to cross at the ford and advance on Breckinridge, out-numbering him two to one. Thus Crittenden was to carry everything before him into Murfreesboro. Then Thomas, advancing with all his force on Polk, was to crush him and get in the rear and flank of Hardee and then unite with McCook to rout him. By a sweeping turn on McCook's position as a pivot, Rosecrans designed to cut off the retreat of Bragg's army, double it back on itself and destroy it.

Rosecrans called a meeting of his corps commanders at his headquarters on the evening before the battle. Thomas arrived early, received his instructions and retired. Crittenden, with whom Rosecrans had talked over his plan during the afternoon, was sent for but was excused, at the request of his chief of staff, who brought word that he was very much fatigued and was asleep. McCook arrived about nine o'clock, and it was explained to him that the plan of battle required for its success that he should hold his position three hours and, if necessary to recede at all, that he should do it slowly, steadily refusing his right. This would be drawing Bragg's left still into Rosecrans' net and furthering his plan. McCook informed Rosecrans that his line was facing strongly toward the east. Rosecrans answered that such a direction did not seem to him a proper one, that it ought to face south with Johnson's division in reserve, but that this matter must be confided to those who knew the ground and had fought over it. McCook was then asked: 'Can you hold your present position for three hours?' To which he replied: 'Yes, I think I can.' Rosecrans added: 'I don't like the facing so much to the east, but must confide that to you who know the ground. If you don't think your present the best position, change it. It is only necessary for you to make things sure.' The officers then separated, McCook returning to his command.

Hardee ordered Wharton, with 2,000 cavalry, at daybreak to make a detour and fall upon McCook's right and rear, while he with his 10,000 infantry moved upon his front. With the first gleam of light

Wharton was off at a gallop, and soon reached the Wilkinson turnpike, two and a half miles away. Falling upon McCook's rear, by repeated charges he took 1,500 prisoners and a complete battery. Then sweeping on towards the Nashville turnpike, he fell upon some Federal cavalry guarding a wagon train, and drove the cavalry off and captured several hundred wagons and some artillery, and more prisoners. At 6.22 A.M. Hardee, with his infantry in two lines, the first under McCown, the rear under Cleburne, advanced upon McCook's front.

The assault fell first upon the Union brigades of Willick and Kirk, and found them totally unprepared. Willick had gone to the headquarters of General R. W. Johnson, the commander of the division. These headquarters had been fixed a mile and a half in the rear. And there, far from the front, Johnson had also stationed his reserve brigade. On leaving, Willick had directed Colonel William H. Gibson to support the pickets, if anything occurred in their front. When the firing was first heard the brigade, then engaged in building fires to cook the morning meal, was ordered by Gibson under arms, and a staff officer was dispatched for Willick. He was found and started to his command. But his horse was shot under him and he was captured before giving an order. Kirk, the commander of the other brigade, was mortally wounded at the first fire and carried from the field. Captain Edgerton, commanding his battery, had sent his horses a hundred rods to the rear for water and his guns were not in position. At the first fire one man and twelve of his horses that had returned were killed. A number of his men were wounded. The assault was fierce and overwhelming, without any preliminary skirmishing. Edgerton, calling his cannoneers to their posts, wheeled his guns into position as best he could. But the infantry support gave way in disorder almost with the first volley. And 'not more than five minutes from the firing of the first shot,' his battery was taken and he was captured.

Hardee advanced with great rapidity. His left extending beyond McCook's right and enveloping it, he struck the Federal line to some extent obliquely and with great force. The assault fell upon all McCook's divisions in succession, from right to left, Johnson's, then Davis' and lastly Sheridan's.

Johnson's yielded at once. Much of his artillery was captured. What escaped was so closely pressed that the guns could not be placed in position to fire a shot. We have seen the result with Edgerton's battery. When the second was reached the horses of one gun were killed and the pole of another broken; and the two guns were left on the field. Hardee's troops, unchecked, rushed on and reached a third battery. The commanding officer was wounded and captured. His men defended themselves with their gun-swabs. But *their* pieces too were lost. The line of this division retired, rallying and fighting at every available point, to a cedar brake, where they had some protection and commanded an open field, then to an eminence, again to the cover of a fence and the bank of a creek. After thus rallying and checking the Confederates several times, Colonel Gibson having had two horses killed under him, his line still falling back, reached the

Wilkinson pike and here was charged by the Confederate cavalry. They all seemed in the enemy's power. Gibson's sword was demanded. But at that instant a detachment of Federal cavalry made a dash for the rescue of their imperilled comrades, and in the confusion Gibson and most of his men escaped.

The mortality was great on both sides. Colonel Burke of the 11th Texas, though mortally wounded, led and cheered his regiment until he fell exhausted at its head. The flag-bearer of the 10th, seeing a Federal flag-bearer before him endeavouring to rally his regiment, sprang forward and seized the standard. In this struggle between the lines both were killed. For a time panic prevailed among McCook's troops. Teams, ambulances, horsemen, footmen, attachees of the army, white and black, mounted on horses and mules, rushed to the rear, in wildest confusion. At last Colonel Walker, who had been guarding a train, was relieved there by General Thomas and ordered to the front. He promptly formed his brigade in line of battle and placed his artillery in position. With this assurance the tide of retreat was checked. Planting a strong guard of cavalry in the road, Colonel Walker moved his command to the front, compelling every able-bodied Union soldier to fall in and face to the front. And assisted by Colonel Gibson, many were thus returned to the fight.

The attacks upon Davis' and Sheridan's divisions had not succeeded so well as that upon Johnson's. They were more remote, and the surprise that had worked such havoc against Johnson only served as a warning to them. They were able and experienced officers and on the ground and ready when the clash came. Both were obliged to retire. But they went back in good order with their lines intact, fighting obstinately as they went. The falling back of Willick's and Kirk's brigades, with little or no resistance, left Davis' right brigade, under Colonel Sidney Post, exposed to a flank movement. Davis accordingly ordered it to fall back and partially change its front. Simultaneously with this movement, Hardee made a heavy and determined attack upon Davis' other brigades, Carlin's and Woodruff's. But they were prepared and the conflict was fierce and the losses heavy. Carlin, next to Post, ordered his troops to retire. And they went back slowly and in good order. But Woodruff, whose brigade joined Sheridan's division, succeeded in repulsing the Confederates and holding his position until the withdrawal of the troops on both his flanks compelled him to retire. Supported by the reserve brigade, Baldwin's of Johnson's division, which had been stationed at his headquarters so far in the rear of his line and had now been reached as the fighting moved in that direction, held the Confederates in check, observing Rosecrans' instructions that if they had to retire, to do it slowly, fighting obstinately. Thus Davis continued until his line had reached within a few hundred yards of the Nashville pike. And here he held on until he was relieved by the reserve forces moved to the front by Rosecrans' order.

Within an hour from the opening of the battle, a staff officer from McCook informed Rosecrans that his right was heavily pressed and needed assistance. But Rosecrans did not appreciate the gravity of the situation. He was not aware of the rout of Willick's and Kirk's

brigades or of the falling back of Davis. The message might be true, and still it was nothing more than he expected. And so no assistance was sent, but simply a word of encouragement to McCook, to hold on obstinately. But soon after a second messenger arrived, stating that the right was being driven, a fact that the rapid movement of the noise of battle made only too manifest. Rosecrans now began to realise the situation. He directed Thomas to send Rousseau's reserve division into the cedar brake to the right and rear of Sheridan. Here Rousseau struck the Confederates and drove them back. Crittenden was also ordered to suspend his movement across the river against Bragg's right, to cover the crossing with one of his divisions and move the other westward to the railroad. These were all fortunate steps. Sheridan was holding out heroically. After sustaining four successive attacks, he swung his right to the north-west and repulsed Hardee four times, losing General Sill, commanding his right, and Colonel Roberts, his left brigade. The conduct of their troops showed that these were valuable officers and could ill be spared. But their ammunition being exhausted, both Sheridan and Rousseau retired to the cedar brake, where Rousseau first struck Hardee. Here their empty cartridge boxes were refilled and they held their ground. All the Confederate attempts to advance on this new line were unsuccessful.

It was now past three o'clock. In their attempts, over the open ground, to drive the Federals back, the Confederates encountered a destructive enfilading fire of artillery. It fell on the right of Cleburne's division from batteries massed near the railroad embankment. Smith's brigade recoiled in confusion. Brigadier-Generals B. R. Johnson and Polk followed with their brigades. The whole division, Hardee's best, was driven back. It was rallied and reformed in the edge of the cedar woods, four hundred yards in the rear of the most advanced position it had reached.

Bragg's centre under Lieut.-General Polk had promptly followed Hardee's movement by an assault on Thomas. But the latter stood firm. Bragg, seeing by this time that no movement was threatened against his right, now ordered Breckinridge to leave two brigades on that side of the river and cross with the rest of his troops to the support of Polk. Thus reinforced Polk was ordered to throw his whole weight upon Thomas and Crittenden in an effort to carry their position. They had so far resisted successfully. They had artillery masked almost entirely from view. But it covered an open space in front, of several hundred yards. And it was supported on every side by heavy masses of infantry. After two unsuccessful attempts the purpose to move them was abandoned as impracticable. All the line in their front had been carried by the Confederates except this one position. They considered it the key of the field. It was called the 'Round Forest,' being a cedar brake which lay just east of the embankment of the railroad. And this they had to cross if they took it. But that they could not do. Thomas was a man that was hard to drive. And Polk was not equal to the task. For after the loss of one-third of his command in the attempt he was obliged to quit.

Giving up the hope of driving Thomas from the 'Round Forest,'

Polk directed Breckinridge to take his two brigades and advance down the Nashville pike till he encountered the enemy. They started. But when they reached the Cowan house opposite the Federal position they were met by a severe fire. Breckinridge saw that he was moving down the front with his line at right angles to the Federals and was exposed to an enfilading fire of artillery and infantry at short range. His ranks were being thinned. Many of his officers and men were killed. One brigade alone lost 155. Some were already falling back. And he rallied the others, and together they rushed across the intervening plane in front and entered the cedar glade to the north-west, where Hardee had already taken refuge.

The Confederate line was now parallel to the Nashville pike for two miles, stretching from the woods near the Cowan house towards Overall's Creek. There was a lull in the battle. Hardee sent for reinforcements. But Bragg answered that he had none. The Federals lay securely sheltered behind the railway embankment. Between the lines there were wide, open fields, which were swept by heavy artillery. It would have been folly and not valour, as Hardee said, to attempt to pass them. It was now past four o'clock and the shadows of the short December day were gathering. He therefore gave the order to his troops to bivouac in the timber where they were. This, as we have seen, was four hundred yards back of his most advanced position. The night was clear and cold. Here and there, where they could be with safety, fires were lighted. And the soldiers of each side sank to rest in the lines, now not more than five hundred yards apart.

Each side with its full numerical strength had put forth the most heroic efforts to gain a victory. But neither could yet claim it. For three miles in the rear of Hardee's corps, the dead and dying of both sides, with the wrecks of battle, lay scattered. Rosecrans summed up the day's work: 'We have lost heavily,' he said, 'in killed and wounded, and a considerable number in stragglers and prisoners, also twenty-eight pieces of artillery. . . . But the enemy has been roughly handled and badly damaged at all points.' Bragg claimed 4,000 prisoners, and described the conflict as 'rarely surpassed for its continued intensity and the heavy losses sustained.' One loss came peculiarly near to Rosecrans, the death of his Chief of Staff, Lieut.-Colonel Julius P. Garesché. He and Rosecrans were Catholics. Garesché was the only staff officer of that communion; and besides he was a noble, high-minded man. He was devoted, like Rosecrans, to his church. But when Breckinridge started down the front of the Federal line in obedience to Polk's order and reached the front of the 'Round Forest,' Rosecrans saw it and realised that he was supported by the fire of Hardee's line. Thinking this another charge in an attempt to take that coveted position, Rosecrans hurried thither with his staff to assist in repelling it. Here a cannon-ball passed within a few inches of Rosecrans and then carried off the head of his devoted aide. Nor was Garesché the only one. In this fearless ride Rosecrans had three mounted orderlies shot dead while following him. And as many more lost their horses.

But night, as it often does, gave time to these weary men for reflection. The army was badly cut up and some of Rosecrans'

officers were advising a retreat. One division commander, that afternoon, had announced to his subordinate generals, that if an anticipated assault was made and it resulted disastrously, he proposed to take his division and cut his way through to Nashville. The men were tired. They had been under a severe strain. What would the coming New Year day bring? Rosecrans' first thought was of retreat. But Thomas bluntly told him the army could not retreat. Rosecrans soon realised this. He then gave an order for the issue of all the spare ammunition. It was found that enough remained for another battle. So after some hesitation he decided to hold his ground and fight. The provision trains and fresh supplies of ammunition were ordered up from Nashville. Till they came he would not assume the offensive, but simply hold the ground he had. Thus his line of action was settled. But the next morning no renewal of the battle was made. And Crittenden was then ordered to occupy the point opposite the ford on his left with a brigade. Nothing further occurred till three o'clock the next day, Friday. Then a double line of skirmishers was seen coming from the woods in the south-east, followed by a heavy body of infantry, supported by three batteries. They advanced against the position held by Crittenden's troops under Van Cleve, across the river. A short and fierce fight ensued. And Van Cleve was obliged to retire. He was followed by the Confederates to the west side. Crittenden immediately disposed batteries and ordered up three brigades to meet them. The havoc was great. The Confederates retreated in confusion, leaving 2,000 dead upon the field, and among them their commander, Brigadier-General Hanson. The whole affair did not last more than forty minutes. And it ended in Crittenden's, with Davis' division, crossing the river and entrenching themselves on the crests on that side. This gave the Federals a position from which to enfilade with artillery the Confederate line on the west side. It was a situation which the latter were quick to appreciate. The Federal artillery had already proved the stumbling-block in the Confederate path to victory. And it might prove disastrous again.

Saturday came, a cold, wet, wintry day. From three o'clock in the morning the rain fell in torrents, flooding the ploughed ground so as to make it impassable for artillery, filling the trenches with water and soaking the clothes of the unsheltered troops. Bragg's men were already worn down by fatigue and exposure and want of food. For five days and nights they had been in line of battle, unable even to cook their own food. There is a limit to human endurance. And this had been reached here. Men were dropping out of the ranks sick. And absenteeism was becoming alarming. Rumours also had come that reinforcements had reached Rosecrans. Unequal to his army as it was, what could Bragg do with it when increased? At noon the rain was still falling. And it continued without intermission the remainder of the day. So Bragg issued an order for the movement of the trains and the necessary preparation of the troops. In the evening a council of his officers was held, and it was agreed that the losses they had sustained, and the condition of the troops, created an immediate necessity for retreat. So without waiting for the

return of Wheeler's cavalry from La Vergne, where it had been sent on outpost duty, at eleven o'clock, under cover of darkness, the movement southward commenced. And on Monday morning, January 5, the cavalry which had acted as the rear guard withdrew. Bragg retired to Tullahoma, thirty miles farther south and beyond Duck River, leaving 1,500 sick and wounded behind, most of his dead unburied, and Rosecrans in possession of the field.

It was a crushing blow to Bragg's army and one from which it never fully recovered. Supported by the veteran division of Longstreet, from Lee's army in Virginia, it made a brave stand at Chickamauga. But the rest of its career was a succession of defeats, until it was finally scattered by Thomas at Nashville.

Rosecrans fought the battle with 43,400 men. He lost in killed 1,533, wounded 7,245, and captured 2,800. The killed and wounded were one-fifth of his army. Bragg had 37,700 in battle, and he lost 1,294 killed, 7,945 wounded, and 1,027 captured. To the list of captured should be added the 1,500 sick and wounded that he left behind to fall into Rosecrans' hands. Bragg's killed and wounded were one-fourth of his army. The sanguinary character of this battle is apparent when the percentage of loss is considered. That one out of every four or five men engaged should have been killed or wounded makes the proportion very large. Hence Stone River has been accorded the distinction of being the bloodiest battle of the war.

General Hardee in his admirable report of the battle attributes the result to the superior artillery of the Federal army. 'It was only,' he said, 'when they massed heavy batteries, under cover of the railroad embankments, that we were repulsed. In every form of contest, in which mechanical instruments, requiring skill and heavy machinery to make them, can be used, the Federals are our superiors.' And the Federal artillery did exert a decisive influence in this battle. But he claimed for his own men superiority in 'manly courage, patient endurance and brave impulse.' Nor could anyone deny the courage and patient endurance of the Confederate army, and especially of Hardee's corps. These troops behaved admirably. They fought bravely and they endured heroically. But would anyone now deny the courage and the heroism of the men of both armies in the battle of Stone River? The furious assaults of Hardee, sustained in intensity and, we may add, with success through almost the whole of the first day, were admirable. They were hardly surpassed during the war. But what shall we say of the heroic resistance of Sheridan and Rousseau and Thomas? Against their firm ranks Hardee met stern resistance. Through the hours of the long day they held their own, and if, out-numbered on their right, they receded for a while, it was only after they had exacted an equal toll in killed and wounded. And before night fell, their line, strengthened and steadied, stood as firm as the rock-bound coast of the ocean. No impression could be made upon it, nor ever was.

Stone River marked the high tide of Rosecrans' success as a general. Here he was at his best. It is true there were faults in his conduct of this battle. He did not give personal attention to the location of McCook's line. From the description that was given of it by

McCook, Rosecrans thought it was facing too much to the east and not enough to the south to confront Hardee's line. But after having had this intimation, he left the matter entirely to McCook, instead of going to see for himself. The result was that no change was made, and when Hardee's assault came, it struck McCook's line obliquely, bringing the pressure to bear upon one part first, with a tendency to double it back upon itself.

Nor should he have allowed the Confederate line to overlap McCook's so as to attack it simultaneously on the front and flank. In fact he contributed to this himself. He caused fires to be built, to give Bragg the impression, the evening before the battle, that his line was longer in that direction than it really was, and that his troops were bivouacked where the fires were, though they were not. His purpose was to induce Bragg to weaken his right and strengthen his left, so as to make the crushing of Breckinridge, where he intended to strike, easier. Bragg did do this very thing. He transferred McCown from his right to his left, the evening before the battle. Rosecrans' plan might have proved good if he had struck first, on the morning of the battle. But his intended assault on Breckinridge was delayed until Bragg had thrown Hardee's heavier column on McCook. From that moment Rosecrans was on the defensive. An attack on Breckinridge was out of the question. And thus Rosecrans found it necessary to give up his own plan of battle in this effort to prevent the success of Bragg's.

Another serious fault of Rosecrans was in permitting Johnson to fix his headquarters, the night before the battle, a mile and a half from the front, and there surround himself with his reserve brigade, approximately one-third of his division. This reserve was too far back, and so was Johnson, to be effective. If the brigade had been near the front, it would have supported the line when pressed. And if Johnson had been there he would have assisted. And he would not have created a necessity for Willick to absent himself from his brigade at the front to consult him. Nor would Willick have been captured, while he was making this trip of three miles at a crisis, when time was so precious. It is not to be wondered that this division melted away. All its general officers were gone. They were at the rear, and soon the men were there too.

McCook or Rosecrans could have prevented this by proper care. True, Rosecrans could not be everywhere. But he should have given personal attention to a matter of so much importance as the placing of his troops. This was peculiarly his duty. He trusted, as the sequel showed, too much to McCook. While the latter was a graduate of West Point and had been very proficient as an instructor in the Academy, he had not the necessary experience as an independent commander of troops. In the battle of Shiloh he had displayed conspicuous bravery, and had managed his troops well. In this instance he was under the direction of his superior, and no sudden crisis calling for individual assertion was thrown upon him. At Perryville his deficiency appeared, but fortunately he was saved from the consequences by the coolness of his brigade commanders and the hard fighting of his men. But at Stone River the consequences appeared without these saving conditions. No one could question

McCook's courage or fidelity. They were commended by Rosecrans in his official report of the battle. After the disappearance of Johnson's division, he went over to Davis' and later to Sheridan's, fighting the whole day with conspicuous bravery. But nature had not endowed him with that quickness of mind that is always ready to meet a crisis with a check, that was so marked in such soldiers as Napoleon and Grant. He needed such a superior to tell him what to do and how to do it. It was a mistake to place him on the right. Thomas, who was always equal to such emergencies, would have been much better. Or if McCook was to be placed there, Rosecrans, as Grant would have done, should have stayed near and directed him.

But these faults of Rosecrans were more than compensated by his later merits. When the battle opened he quickly showed a determination that there should be no defeat for his army at Stone River. This was in commendable evidence to his subordinates and inspired them. He did not lose his presence of mind when he learned of the assault upon McCook and the disappearance of the right. He promptly sent Rousseau, one of his best generals, and then Thomas, a still greater, to supply the need of such men. And he recalled Crittenden from across the river. This prompt change of his plan to meet the new conditions that had been thrust upon him by Bragg's heavy stroke, and the successful movement of his troops to conform to this new and unexpected crisis, all accomplished under fire and amid the crashing tumult of the battle, showed a high quality of generalship. His exhibition of personal courage was admirable. The sight of him, in his light blue overcoat, with the blood of a slight wound on his face, riding coolly down the line, where death was reaping a plentiful harvest, inspired his soldiers to the utmost exertions and provoked cheer after cheer. Later, when one of his generals fell, he promptly took his place at the head of his division and personally led it in a successful charge. His example was again contagious. Another division commander, seeing the enthusiasm it evoked, asked leave to follow this charge by another. And the permission being granted, he made the dash and the two drove the enemy's line back and captured some prisoners. Rosecrans never once lost heart. When too intent on his work to seem to heed the fall of his dearest companion in arms, another of his staff, thinking he did not know it, said quietly: 'Garesché is dead.' 'I am *very* sorry,' was the quiet response, 'but we cannot help it.' When a little later some one erroneously said: 'McCook is killed.' 'We cannot help it,' was Rosecrans' stern reply; 'this battle must be *won*.' Till then, he would not quit the field. Every suggestion of retreat met his emphatic 'No!' And the battle was won. Bragg had tried him on every side and failed everywhere to break down his new dispositions. They stood firm to the end. And so the battle of Stone River was fought. And the importance of it is not to be overlooked. For Stone River was one of the great battles of the war, the impact of whose crushing lines shook the frail fabric of the new Confederacy to its foundation.

CHAPTER XXV

Vallandigham arrested for Treasonable Utterances—Tried by a Court-Martial and convicted—Sent within Confederate Lines—Escapes to Canada—Nominated for Governor of Ohio—Defeated.

UPON its retreat from Murfreesboro, Bragg's army was divided. One part went into winter quarters at Tullahoma and the other at Shelbyville. With the latter Bragg established his headquarters. It was while here that he received an unusual visit, one too that is worthy of mention. In order to appreciate it we must recall the circumstances.

The progress of the war thus far had not been very satisfactory to the North. So much money had been spent and so much blood shed, that it seemed as if there must somehow have been a waste of both. For still the war went on, with no apparent diminution of intensity, and in fact with doubtful chances of success. In the East there had been a succession of defeats, and in the West there were bloody battles. And the latter were so closely contested that the only evidence of success sometimes was that one side retained the field; while the other quietly withdrew, leaving its adversary too weak to make a pursuit. There were men in both political parties who doubted whether it would be possible to subdue the South. Generally the Republicans sustained Lincoln. But there was a formidable element in the Democratic Party of the North that denounced his course bitterly. The most pronounced representative of this element in Congress was Clement Laird Vallandigham, a member from Ohio. He was a native of the state, son of a Presbyterian clergyman. He had been educated in Pennsylvania, then read law. And upon commencing his practice, he had aided his small income by editing a newspaper. This naturally led him into politics. He was elected to the Legislature. And after one term there, he had been sent to Congress. This was on the eve of the war. Here he aspired to the leadership of his party. And thus naturally, perhaps, at Washington he developed a determined opposition to Lincoln's administration. He opposed the prosecution of the war, denounced the draft and the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, and when the administration found it necessary to suppress the expression of treasonable sentiments in the North, Vallandigham promptly denounced this too as a denial of the constitutional right of free speech.

In the fall of 1862, he was defeated by Robert C. Schenck, a Republican. And at the close of his term in Congress, Vallandigham went to Ohio, determined to secure the next Democratic nomination for Governor. Soon after this, General Burnside, who had been placed

in command of the military department including Ohio, published an order forbidding the declaration of sympathy for the Confederacy, and declaring that treason, expressed or implied, would not be tolerated in his department. Whether this was aimed at Vallandigham or not, it was seen that he would probably be one of the first to expose himself to the penalties of the order. Perhaps angered by it, he expressed his determination to set it at defiance. He insisted on discussing the measures of the administration in his own untrammelled way. And accordingly a few days later, at a Democratic mass-meeting held in Mount Vernon, where his party was in the majority, he declared that he did not ask Abraham Lincoln or Ambrose Burnside for the right to speak, that his right was higher than their order, that his warrant was the Constitution. He then proceeded to arraign the conduct of the war and the measures of the administration in a spirit of sweeping hostility to both.

Some of his intemperate remarks were reported to Burnside. And he dispatched a company of soldiers to arrest him at his house in Dayton. He was taken at night while in bed, and carried to Cincinnati. From the prison to which he was committed he issued an inflammatory address to the Democracy of Ohio, saying that his speeches, in denunciation of the usurpation of power, of infractions of the Constitution and laws, and against military despotism, were the cause of his arrest and imprisonment. He declared that he was a Democrat for Constitution and law, and that this was his only crime, and appealed to his friends to stand firm, and added that for himself he would adhere through imprisonment and life itself to every declaration that he had uttered from the beginning.

He was tried before a court-martial and sentenced to imprisonment at Fort Warren, in Boston harbour, till the war closed. This sentence was modified by President Lincoln, so as to require him to be conveyed through the military lines into the Confederacy to which he properly belonged and, in the event of his return, that the original sentence of imprisonment be executed. An effort was made to have him released on a writ of *habeas corpus* to be issued from the U.S. Court, but the writ was refused. So all efforts to procure his discharge having failed, he was conveyed by a special train under a guard of soldiers to Rosecrans' headquarters at Murfreesboro. Rosecrans seems to have been impressed by his apparent sincerity, but promptly, under a flag of truce, sent him through the lines to General Bragg at Shelbyville. Seeming to realise his ludicrous position, when thus set down in the midst of the Confederacy, Vallandigham after a few days procured permission from Bragg to go to Wilmington, North Carolina. He went, and from there passed on a blockade-runner to Nassau, an English port in the West Indies, and thence to Canada. Here he continued for a year to watch the course of events at home.

This arrest and summary punishment made a decided impression in the North. And a great meeting of Democrats was held at Albany, in the state of New York, where Seymour had lately been elected Governor, on a platform inveighing against this 'system of arbitrary arrests.' The meeting passed strong resolutions characterising the punishment as 'cruel and unusual,' and asking President Lincoln

‘to reverse the action of the military tribunal.’ After some deliberation, Lincoln made an answer as frank as it was courteous. He referred to Lee and Johnston, and Breckinridge and Magruder, ‘occupying the very highest places in the Rebel war service, yet all within the power of the Government since the Rebellion began, and nearly as well known to be traitors then as now and, if seized and held, the cause would have been much weaker,’ and then added, ‘I think the time not unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too many.’

Coming directly to the case of Vallandigham, he said: ‘He was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of this administration or the personal interests of the commanding General, but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence and vigour of which the life of the nation depended. He was warring upon the military; and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. . . . I understand the meeting, whose resolutions I am considering, to be in favour of suppressing the Rebellion by military force—by armies. Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertions shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires and the law and the Constitution sanction this punishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? . . . I think that in such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but withal a great mercy.’ Lincoln, therefore, refused to interfere.

During Vallandigham’s absence from the country under these circumstances he was nominated by the Democratic Convention for Governor of Ohio. A Committee was appointed by the Convention to address the President and ask the revocation of the order of banishment. To this address also, he made a reply. He said: ‘The military arrests and detentions, which have been made, including those of Mr. Vallandigham which are not different in principle from the others, have been for *prevention* and not for *punishment*—as injunctions to stay injury, as proceedings to keep the peace—and hence, like proceedings in such cases and for like reasons, they have not been accompanied with indictments or trials by juries, nor, in a single case, by any punishment whatever, beyond what is purely incidental to the prevention.’ And he, therefore, proposed that he would revoke the order in relation to Vallandigham, if each member of the Committee would subscribe to three propositions; ‘1st, that there was a rebellion and that the army was a constitutional means of suppressing it; 2nd, that none of them would do anything to injure the efficiency of the army while suppressing it; and 3rd, that each of them would do all he could to have the army, while so engaged, well provided for and supported.’ If they would subscribe to these propositions and permit the publication of them, so signed, he would revoke the order as to Vallandigham, without asking any pledge from him as to his future good conduct. ‘As to him and all others,’ he significantly added, ‘I must hereafter, as heretofore, do as much as the public service may seem to require.’ The Committee replied, controverting his propositions and repelling the imputation that they

or the party they represented would encourage desertions or resistance to the draft. But the members of the Committee declined to enter into any such contract for the release of Vallandigham as was asked. And so the incident ended.

Both Vallandigham and his friends had united in placing the Democratic party more clearly on record as opposed to the prosecution of the war. This issue entered into the campaign which followed. Was Ohio to stand by the Union in her efforts to suppress the uprising of the South? The campaign was one of unusual acrimony. And the result was that Vallandigham was beaten by John Brough, the Republican candidate, by more than 100,000. Brough's majority was the largest that had ever been given for a candidate in the state. Ohio had ranged herself on Lincoln's side. And the decisive way in which she did it was a great help to his Administration.

Vallandigham was not present during the campaign and was not again a factor in politics. He continued in Canada till the middle of the following year, and then returned to Ohio and was permitted to remain. His last appearance in politics was as a delegate to the Democratic State Convention held in Columbus in 1871. Here, as chairman of the committee on resolutions, he procured the adoption of a platform pledging his party to the support of the recent Amendments to the Constitution, abolishing slavery, giving coloured people the right to vote and securing beyond question the payment of the national debt, contracted in suppressing the Rebellion. He died a week or two later, as he had lived, sensationally. He had gone from his home to an adjoining county to defend a man charged with murder. In his room at the hotel he was showing how the deceased might have killed himself, by way of showing that it was not done by his client. The pistol was accidentally discharged and the bullet entered his side. And so he died, accidentally, but by his own hand.

Though not large, Vallandigham was a handsomely proportioned man, scrupulously neat in his dress, meeting people easily, with a pleasant smile and yet with dignity and self-possession. In private or around the domestic circle his intercourse was charming. On the hustings or in conventions he passed quickly from one friend to another with an easy grace that would attract the eye of a stranger. On the stump he was an earnest and forceful speaker, with a pleasant voice that was apt to carry conviction. When Rosecrans met him with the caution that if his sentiments were known in the army, the soldiers would tear him in pieces, he quickly replied that if they were drawn up about him he would soon convince them he was right and have them cheering for him. And Rosecrans himself, before he left camp, was obliged to admit the charm of his manner. Though opposed to the war, Vallandigham did have a sincere love for his country. But in his zeal for office and party leadership, he had been betrayed into a false position that ruined him politically. After the war, time modified somewhat the feeling against him. And had he lived, for he was only fifty years old when he died, he would probably have worn away the hostility he had aroused. And he might ultimately have returned to public life.

But his career was one of the worries of Lincoln's position. The latter felt that if the war was to be successful and the Union saved, the North must be united. The expression of such sentiments as Vallandigham's had become too common. They were withdrawing the support of the people. Like the platform of the Democratic Convention in New York, if persisted in, they might defeat the North and establish the Confederacy. Yet all who thus offended could not be punished. The best course was to select one of the principal offenders and make of him an example. By Burnside's action, this choice had fallen on Vallandigham, one of the most courageous and defiant and, at the same time, one of the most conspicuous offenders. The punishment inflicted was not severe. It was, as finally fixed by Lincoln, exactly suited to the case. And yet it was such as would deter others. And it did have a wholesome influence. While such infractions were not entirely cured, the resort to that punishment was not again required.

The Vallandigham case gives us another view of Lincoln's character. He was not arbitrary in insisting upon the extreme penalty, was willing to hear complaints, showed even a disposition to conciliate. But he was wise and firm. While he was patient and merciful, he would abate nothing of the essential principle involved. Vallandigham had offended and must be punished. And yet there was shown in the punishment actually meted out a keen sense of the ludicrous. The high-sounding offender was made ridiculous.

CHAPTER XXVI

Union and Confederate Raids: Streight's, Forrest's and Van Dorn's—
The Initial Movements against Vicksburg—Capture of Arkansas
Post—William T. Sherman—Grant's Impetuosity.

LINCOLN just now had many cares. And some of them that developed in Rosecrans' camp, though not so much talked of as the Vallandigham case, caused him much more anxiety.

The battle of Stone River and the retreat of Bragg had left Rosecrans badly crippled. His army after the battle was not for some time in condition to take the field. Its supplies were exhausted, its line of communication was interrupted, its hospitals were filled with sick and wounded, and all these conditions must have the attention of the commander. And Rosecrans himself was almost in as bad condition as his army. He had narrowly escaped defeat and was only saved by the heroic endurance of such master-spirits as Thomas and Sheridan. No one knew this better than himself. And he was now in such a condition of nervous indecision that he was afraid to make another move for fear that he would not again meet with the same good fortune. But gathering himself up he turned to the repair of the railroads. His troops must have food. The trestles at Muldraugh's Hill were rebuilt, the tunnel at Mitchellsville was dug out, the track where torn up was relaid. Save that at Barren River and four smaller ones, all the bridges had been destroyed. And they were rebuilt. Thus in two months the line was in operation again to Louisville.

In the meantime, Fort Henry and Fort Donelson were assumed by Rosecrans to be in his department, and he therefore took control of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. These were secondary lines of supply. And so food and forage became plenty. But this done, and it was all accomplished within a few weeks, still the army was permitted to lie almost idle till June 23. In this period of six months he did not make one movement of consequence, though his army of 100,000 men had to be paid and fed and clothed. And, as Lincoln and his Cabinet knew, the money with which to do it was hard to raise.

The cavalry made some raids. But aside from the forage brought in, the results were small. This branch of the army was still inferior to Bragg's. And Rosecrans, seeing the danger of having his long line again interrupted, made efforts to increase the number. But having appealed to Washington for more horses and for arms suited to this service, and his request not being granted, he did the best he could. He organised a nondescript brigade, called 'mounted infantry,' which pretty well supplied this want.

One of their raids is, perhaps, worthy of mention. Early in April, Colonel A. D. Streight was sent, with a brigade organised in this way, to enter the country south of Bragg and cut the railroads and destroy depots and manufactories of military supplies. They were to go to Fort Henry on the Tennessee River and along the way gather up horses and so mount themselves. But this district had already been visited by Forrest, and good horses were scarce. However, Streight did the best he could. He found some indifferent horses and some mules and took both. And with as many of his men thus mounted as could be, he reached Fort Henry. Here they were embarked on a steamboat and conveyed up the Tennessee River to Eastport, Miss., where they landed and were joined by an infantry force under General G. M. Dodge.

Thus united the two forces passed into Northern Alabama and captured Tusculum, inflicting some loss upon the Confederates. Dodge then made a sweeping raid through that section and returned in safety to his headquarters at Corinth. But Streight struck out for Georgia, hoping to reach and destroy some large magazines and factories at Rome and Atlanta. He passed through Moulton and reached Blountsville on April 30. But here he found Forrest on his trail. And in passing over some high ground, he halted his command, divided his men on each side of the road, and gave Forrest a warm reception, killing several, capturing some horses, and driving the rest of his command back. Then followed a running fight for a hundred miles. At Blount's farm, while feeding his horses at noon, Streight was attacked by Forrest, and another hard fight occurred, in which Colonel Hathaway, one of Streight's best officers, was killed. But Forrest was driven back again. And Streight hurried on, burning the bridge over the Coosa River and destroying the Round Mountain Ironworks near by, which was a considerable manufactory of military supplies. Streight then reached Gadsden and even some miles beyond. But in this hurried chase many of his mules and horses failed. They could not keep up, and as his command became scattered, those in advance had to delay to let the others come up; and soon all found themselves in the presence of a superior force. Still the struggle continued. But at last, on May 3, Streight was obliged to surrender his whole force—1,466 officers and men. He had already lost 100 in killed and wounded. The surrender occurred when within fifteen miles of Rome, one of the great objectives of Streight's raid, where there were extensive munition plants which he purposed to destroy.

And so ended this raid. Streight's common soldiers were promptly exchanged. But he and his officers were held, for a time, in prison as felons, on the ground that they had violated the criminal code of Georgia, by inciting slaves to insurrection. The pretext for this charge was the appearance in his ranks of some negroes, one of them having arms on his person. But Streight claimed that they were merely servants of the officers and that the arms on the one belonged to his master. This claim was finally allowed. But Streight, with the other officers, was taken to Libby Prison at Richmond, instead of being exchanged. From there, after a long confinement, he with more than a hundred others dug their way out and made a sensational escape. Sixty succeeded in reaching the Union lines.

With the exception of this raid nothing of interest occurred in Rosecrans' camp. The authorities at Washington, through Halleck, were still insisting upon an advance. But Rosecrans yielded only so far as to submit the question to his corps and division commanders. And they advised delay. But at last Burnside advanced on Knoxville to capture and hold that place, and events foreshadowed that Grant, who had been urging the advance of Rosecrans to keep Bragg from reinforcing the armies about Vicksburg, was soon to receive the surrender of that city. Then with Grant free to go elsewhere, could Rosecrans continue to hold his place at the head of the army? This consideration must have presented itself to him; for after six months of inactivity, he decided to advance. So on June 23 he left Murfreesboro and, moving to the south-east, turned Bragg's right and threatened his line of supply. Bragg, to save this line, was compelled to withdraw from the extensive works that he had constructed at Shelbyville and Tullahoma. The details of this movement, however, will be described later.

Let us now turn to Grant and review the raids against his lines. When, before the battle of Stone River, Bragg sent Morgan on his second raid into Kentucky, he dispatched Forrest into West Tennessee to operate on Grant's communications. Forrest left Columbia on December 11, 1862, and two days later, at Clifton, some twenty miles east of Lexington, reached the Tennessee River. He crossed on a flatboat, swimming his horses. But as the boat could not carry a large number, this was slow work, and only after much labour was the crossing accomplished in two days and nights. This placed Forrest in Grant's district. The latter had been advised of his coming, and promptly notified Brigadier-General J. C. Sullivan, in command at Jackson, Tenn.

The same day he jogged him again: 'Don't fail to get up a force and attack the enemy. Never wait to have them attack you.' And just here Grant unconsciously revealed one of the secrets of his own success. He was always ready for a fight; would pitch in first; pummel his adversary and get him down at the start.

And now he took other precautions to meet Forrest. He sent Colonel John W. Fuller with a brigade of infantry, by rail, from Oxford, Miss., to reinforce Sullivan, and also sent forces from Corinth and Fort Henry. But as the Confederates were all cavalry and the Union nearly all infantry, Forrest found easy means of evading them for a time. It was not his purpose to fight, but rather to strike isolated garrisons and capture them and destroy the railroads. But, however this might be, Grant purposed to keep him busy.

At Lexington, Forrest encountered Colonel Robert G. Ingersoll with 800 cavalry and a section of artillery. The colonel was taken with his guns and 148 of his men and, what Forrest most needed, seventy of his horses. The latter were quickly hitched in the places of his own that had been exhausted in hauling his artillery. And pressing on towards Jackson, and driving the pickets in, he sent a detachment to the right and two others to the left of the town, one to tear up the railroad to Bolivar and the others that to Corinth. Forrest himself, with two small battalions that remained, turned from

Jackson, which he considered too strongly garrisoned for his force, and pressed rapidly on to Humboldt and Trenton.

At ten o'clock, the night of December 18, the 8th Tennessee, under Colonel Dibrell, moved around to the north of Jackson to capture Carroll and destroy the railroad to Columbus, Ky. After some trouble in securing guides, and an all-night ride, they reached the station, and with a yell charged the stockade and promptly carried it. The 8th was armed in part with 400 flint-lock muskets, and the men took all the arms of the garrison, stacked their own with what stores they captured and could not carry, in the stockade, and burned all together. After tearing up the railroad for a considerable distance the regiment joined Forrest again near Spring Creek. The next day it was sent to destroy the stockade and bridge at Forked Deer River, but here it was repulsed. The guard was strongly fortified, in a well-chosen position, protected by two creeks and a wide swampy bottom, which rendered the approach of cavalry impossible. It was also opportunely reinforced by a trainload of soldiers from Jackson. So when night came Colonel Dibrell discreetly withdrew, and rejoined Forrest at Trenton on the 20th.

When Forrest had reached Trenton earlier in the day, he sent one of his battalions to the rear of the town while he, with the other, dashed into it and attacked the garrison. It was fortified behind some cotton, in bales, and tobacco, in hogsheads, at the depot, but was without artillery. After a short engagement, it surrendered. There were 700 in all, and, with others taken at Carroll and Humboldt, were all paroled. Colonel Dibrell here found enough good guns to finish equipping his regiment. But after providing his men from the stores, he fired the depot and burned the remaining supplies, together with 600 bales of cotton, 200 barrels of pork and a large lot of tobacco in hogsheads. After seeing it destroyed, he moved northward, laying waste the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, destroying a bridge over the bayou near Moscow and others over the North and South Forks of the Obion River, with nearly four miles of trestle in the bottom between. Forrest could now say, as he did in his report, with a good deal of complacency, 'We have made a clean sweep of the Federals . . . north of Jackson, and know of none, except at Fort Heiman, Paducah and Columbus, north of Jackson and west of the Tennessee River.' He had scoured the country from Jackson, Tenn., to within ten miles of Columbus, Ky. This was for a distance of eighty miles. And from Union City he had moved from the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, which he had been wrecking, and followed a branch road leading to McKenzie, destroying all the bridges and trestles as he went.

But he was not home yet. And it is a pretty good maxim, 'not to holler till you get out of the woods.' Forrest had reason to feel very well satisfied with what he had accomplished, but his report of what followed was of a different tenour. From McKenzie he turned southward towards Lexington, avoiding Trenton, Humboldt and Huntingdon, because he now found them occupied by Grant's troops. Difficulties began to thicken in his path. In crossing the bottom at McKenzie, on December 28, the roads were so heavy that his artillery and wagons could with difficulty be got through. The bridges were

decayed and gave way, forcing him to leave the road and drag through the bottom and creeks. Time was all important, with an army in detachments hovering around him. But by working the entire night he got through at last, though only to find his men and horses so much exhausted that he was obliged to halt and go into camp before he was half-way to Lexington. He felt he should have accomplished the whole distance that day, and had hoped to escape pursuit. For Grant's troops, as he learned, had left that road unguarded and gone to the north, thinking he would attempt to cross the Tennessee there. But the next morning he had not gone more than four miles, when he met a force of 1,500 men with three pieces of artillery under Colonel Cyrus L. Dunham. They had promptly, on receipt of an order the day before, thrown themselves across his path, and then, finding that they had succeeded in getting in front of him, that night sent a dispatch to General Sullivan informing him of their position, and saying that they would try to coax or force a fight out of Forrest in the morning.

They met at Parker's Cross Roads. Dunham took a position behind the crest of a ridge running at right angles to Forrest's path. It was in the edge of some timber, with open fields in front. When Forrest came up, he passed the cross roads eastwardly as if desirous of escaping in that direction. But Dunham made an assault, and Forrest returned it. The fight continued from ten until three—five hours. Forrest had 1,800 men and ten guns, in two batteries. One he placed in front and the other on a perpendicular ridge to Dunham's right, so situated as to concentrate a fire upon Dunham's line and enfilade a part of it. Dunham determined to take this battery on his right at all hazards. The requisite orders had been given and Dunham was riding along the line to see that his orders were understood, when he was suddenly and furiously attacked from the rear by a heavy dismounted force that had approached under cover of the hills and woods beyond.

This was the crisis of the fight. Dunham's main line was faced at once to the rear and met the charge and drove the Confederates back, inflicting a heavy loss in killed and wounded, and taking some prisoners. The cavalry, charging up the road on Dunham's other side, were also repulsed by two companies, left to protect his position there. The cavalry rallied and made a second charge and were again repulsed. Then came a lull in the fight, and a white flag appeared. An aide of Forrest approached and, upon being asked his message, replied that General Forrest understood they had surrendered. 'The General is entirely mistaken; we have never thought of surrendering,' was the reply. If the flag had been hoisted, it was without authority of Colonel Dunham. The aide departed, but soon after returned with a demand from Forrest for an unconditional surrender. 'Tell him I never surrender. If he thinks he can take me, he can come and try,' was Dunham's reply. The parley was hardly ended, when Forrest's cavalry on Dunham's front commenced to withdraw hastily, past his right, to the south. The stampede of horses and horse-holders at his rear, as he came on the field, had announced to Forrest that help for Dunham was at hand, and finding that his own command was now in turn exposed to a fire on both front and rear, he quickly withdrew,

followed by the fire of the Union forces. He was able to carry off six pieces of his own artillery. Three he lost, with three more that he had captured from Dunham. One of his guns had burst during the action.

The cause of his sudden departure was the appearance of General Sullivan with Fuller's brigade which had been sent by Grant from Oxford, Miss. They had been chasing Forrest from place to place, and had come that morning from Huntingdon, sixteen miles away, in answer to the dispatch of Durham the night before. They had found that chasing cavalry with infantry was hard and generally very unsatisfactory work. But here some hundreds of Forrest's cavalry had dismounted to fight as infantry, and had left their horses in the orchard and yard at Parker's house in their rear. Fuller came up on this side. And these horses were the first trophies that fell into his hands. In the stampede that followed, the riders had rushed to get their horses, but instead, more than three hundred fell into Fuller's hands. A small train of wagons, which Forrest had gathered in his raid, was also taken, with all his ammunition. The loss of the latter was sorely felt. It had been his intention to continue his raid southward, and he had sent an advance to accumulate forage for his command in that direction. But he now found it necessary at once to recross the Tennessee River and fit up for a retreat. He crossed at Clifton, where he raised the flatboat which had been used in coming up and then sunk, and with its help was soon over the river and back in Columbia. Dunham returned his loss in killed and wounded at 162, and Forrest estimated his at 60. But in his list Forrest was called on to deplore the death of Colonel Napier, who was killed while leading his regiment in the charge on foot.

But it was not the purpose of these raids to fight. Bragg hoped by sending Forrest across the Tennessee to create a diversion in favour of the Confederate army in Central Mississippi. Pemberton was there with 33,000 troops and was being pressed by Grant, who had left Jackson, Tenn., on November 3, 1862, for a movement to Holly Springs and perhaps Grenada. On December 11, when Forrest started on his raid, Grant had already passed Holly Springs and was at Oxford, half-way to Grenada, on the Mississippi Central Railroad. When Grant started, Pemberton was at Holly Springs with 13,000 men and had 10,000 farther north behind the Coldwater and 10,000 more farther south behind the Yalobusha at Grenada. He retired his whole force, first behind the Tallahatchie and then, as Grant advanced, behind the Yalobusha. Grant thought that by moving down the Mississippi Central he would be able to cause the evacuation of Vicksburg and to capture and destroy all the boats on the Yazoo River, which would lay between him and the Mississippi. It was by an inland march, parallel to the river, that he had already caused the Mississippi to be opened from Cairo to Memphis, and he believed by following the same plan he could open it farther south. Bragg purposed to compel his return by sending Forrest to cut his line of supplies.

Grant did not seem affected by Forrest's raid. But it was otherwise with one made farther south. Fearing that his line of supply might be cut, Grant had accumulated stores to the value of \$1,500,000 at Holly Springs to support his army in case communication with the

North should be interrupted. Learning of this depot, General Van Dorn started from Grenada with 3,500 cavalry to operate on this line. It was planned that his raid should be made at the same time as Forrest's. Most of the cavalry Grant had was then absent on an expedition against the Mobile and Ohio Railroad near Tupelo. So that both Forrest's and Van Dorn's raids were opportunely planned. Word was received by Grant on December 19 that a body of Confederate cavalry had left Grenada and was passing his left, going northward. At once divining that this meant an attempt on his line back of Oxford, Grant telegraphed the commanding officers north of him as far as Bolivar that the enemy was operating in that direction and to be prepared to defend their posts and hold them at all hazards. These messages were all received.

But notwithstanding this warning the commandant at Holly Springs said nothing of the receipt of such dispatch to his subordinates and made no preparations to meet Van Dorn. The Union forces were scattered in four or five different parts of the town; one was in the fair ground. And the officers were quietly sleeping in the houses of Confederate citizens, where it was reported the owners, aware of the approach of Van Dorn, had been agreeable and unusually lavish with wine. At five o'clock in the morning, December 20, the commandant learned from a contraband that Van Dorn with a large force was near at hand and advancing rapidly. Soon after, he came dashing into the town. The 2nd Illinois, the force encamped in the fair ground, made such defence as it could for itself, part of the regiment cutting its way out at last, and part being captured. But the commandant of the post was taken among the first, and his scattered forces in the town surrendered, almost without firing a gun. He had half as many men as Van Dorn, and this number behind fortifications could easily have held the place till a pursuing force, which Grant had promptly sent, could reach him. But he did nothing.

All of the immense stores were burned. And the depot, armoury and ordnance buildings, with a great portion of the business part of the town, were also soon in ruins. No supplies were left even for the sick that had been collected in hospitals there, or the paroled prisoners. The commandant, who was soon paroled, wrote Grant to know what could be done for them. 'My fate,' he added, 'is most mortifying. I have wished a hundred times to-day that I had been killed.' And well he might! For on January 8, by order of General Grant, he was dismissed from the service, his dismissal 'to take effect from the 20th day of December, 1862, the date of his cowardly and disgraceful conduct,' as the order read. And two days later President Lincoln approved this dismissal, and further censured him for allowing his troops 'to be found in bed at the time of the attack.'

Van Dorn advanced as far north as Bolivar, attacking in succession the posts at Coldwater, Davis' Mill, Bolivar and Middleburg. But he was repulsed at each of these places. He then turned to the south-east, followed by a pursuing force, sent after him by Grant. But the pursuit was feeble, the cavalry force of which it was partly composed was small and the infantry could not keep pace. And so at Ripley the pursuit was given up, and Van Dorn returned to Grenada in safety.

He had dealt Grant a heavy blow. Living off the country was not understood, in military circles, to be possible at this stage of the war. Later it was, and especially after Sherman's march to the sea. But at this period the base and the line of supply were considered indispensable to an army when operating in hostile territory. Grant felt compelled to turn back. The day after the surrender of Holly Springs, he telegraphed Halleck that he would like to send two divisions more to Memphis and join the river expedition against Vicksburg. And five days later he explained: 'It is perfectly impracticable to go farther south by this route, depending on the road for supplies. And the country does not afford them.'

To be compelled to retreat was a bitter experience for Grant. He was always, as he tells us, averse to turning back. And we know how often this disposition was shown during the course of the war. Tenacious of purpose, he was never known before, except at Belmont, after he had gained his battle, and perhaps never again during the war, to give up a plan of campaign after he had deliberately entered upon it. His plan, once finally adopted, was carried through.

But it is necessary to go back a little to understand Grant's suggestion to Halleck that he would like now to return to Memphis and join the river expedition against Vicksburg. More than a month before the capture of Holly Springs, Halleck had telegraphed Grant that five regiments had left Illinois for Memphis, which was to be made the depot of a joint military and naval expedition against Vicksburg. Grant had been getting from the newspapers rumours that there was to be such an expedition down the Mississippi, but this was the first official information he had of it. General McClelland was absent on leave from the army, and without Grant's knowledge had been in Washington and had an interview with the President. Lincoln and McClelland had known one another before the war. McClelland had been elected to Congress, as a Democrat, from Illinois. And when the war broke out he had resigned his seat for a career in the army. Though he had no previous military training, he was given high rank with the hope that his stand would influence others of his party in favour of the prosecution of the war. Lincoln was anxious to have a united North. And with these things in his favour McClelland, in his interview with the President, had urged an expedition down the Mississippi River, from Memphis, for the capture of Vicksburg, with himself in command. He had so far prevailed that he was given authority to raise troops for this purpose in Illinois and also in Iowa and Indiana. He hoped that he would be given command of the expedition, but this had not been settled. Halleck and Stanton were consulted, but neither seemed to have felt at liberty to disclose his information to Grant, though he was in command in this district. McClelland's record as a soldier had been good. He was a hard fighter, and under the eye of Grant had done good service at Forts Henry and Donelson and at Shiloh. But Halleck seems to have shared Grant's mistrust of his fitness, owing to his lack of experience and professional training, for an important independent command.

The mention now by Halleck of a river expedition against Vicksburg at once arrested Grant's attention. The evening after the

receipt of this word from Halleck, he telegraphed to know if he was to lie still in Tennessee while the expedition was fitted out from Memphis, or push on towards Holly Springs and Grenada, whither he had started; whether he was to have Sherman, who was in command at Memphis, still subject to his orders; and what, if any, more troops were to be sent to him. To this Halleck answered, the next day, that he was in command of all troops sent to his department and had permission to fight the enemy where he pleased. Halleck has been frequently criticised by writers on the Civil War for obstructing Grant in his efforts to fight the battles of the Union, but this generous confidence shows that here at least there was no foundation for such a criticism.

Halleck doubted the propriety of moving upon Vicksburg through Central Mississippi. And when Grant asked for more locomotives with which to equip the railroads, over which his supplies were to be drawn, Halleck told him they could not be sent, and further that it was not advisable to put the railroads in operation south of Memphis. And in this, too, there was good sense. He again reiterated that the enemy must be turned by a movement down the river from Memphis as soon as sufficient forces could be collected. He asked Grant how many men he had, and Grant reported, on November 24, that there were 72,000 in his department.

During the advance into Mississippi, Grant had ordered Sherman to his support with two divisions. But now that he saw a movement down the river was decided on, and that there was danger of McClelland being placed in command, he ordered Sherman back to Memphis with his troops, and directed him to organise all he found there and proceed with them down the river to Vicksburg and co-operate with Flag-Officer Porter in the reduction of that place. The reason for this haste was that Grant feared, if he delayed, that McClelland might come with authority to command the expedition, and he wished to forestall that if possible.

Sherman and Grant had discussed the subject and had agreed that they would co-operate. Grant was to move through Central Mississippi, holding Pemberton in his front, while Sherman descended the Mississippi and with Porter attacked and captured the city. The only army for its defence was that of Pemberton, now before Grant at Grenada. Sherman and Porter, they thought, had force enough to reduce the place if Pemberton remained away. But if Pemberton went with his army to succour the city, then Grant with his was to follow. And crowding Pemberton between them, they would capture both him and the city. The plan was a good one, but, like most plans, it had its weak place. The weak place Van Dorn saw. It was the long line of supply that would be necessary to support Grant's army. Too long it was already. And longer it would be if Pemberton retreated and Grant pursued. Van Dorn's stroke in destroying the depot at Holly Springs and the railroad back of it quickly revealed this.

As Grant had, two days before his supplies were destroyed, received an order from Washington to divide his army into four corps and give McClelland command of one that would be a part of the army operating

down the river, he saw another reason for himself going to Memphis and taking command of the expedition. McClernand was Sherman's senior. Though both were major-generals, McClernand had been appointed first. And this would give him the right to command over Sherman. But as Grant's commission ante-dated both of theirs, if he went he would have the command. And besides the whole movement was in Grant's district, where he was in control. Both Grant and Sherman felt that McClernand was unfitted for the command, and desired to keep him out of it. And they also thought that the authorities at Washington were not unwilling to have this done. In fact, Halleck had telegraphed Grant that it was the President's wish that McClernand have the command, but that he was to be under Grant's direction.

When the order directing the giving of the command of a corps to McClernand was received, Grant was at Oxford, Miss. He at once obeyed by telegraphing McClernand the same day of this assignment. But Grant's means of communication had been interrupted, as well as his line of supply, and before McClernand received the message, Sherman had moved with his army to Vicksburg under Grant's previous order. He left Memphis on December 20, the day Van Dorn captured Holly Springs, and reached the mouth of the Yazoo River on the 25th. Admiral Porter was already there with his fleet. Sherman stopped on the way at Helena, to take on Steele's division, which had been ordered to join him from Arkansas, and at Milliken's Bend to debark a detachment to destroy the Shreveport and Texas Railroad, which had been carrying supplies from the west to Vicksburg. The latter division rejoined him a day later, and the whole army was soon landed at Johnson's plantation on the Yazoo River, about six miles above Vicksburg. The landing-place was low, and the intervening space to the bluff, on which the city stood, was cut by swamps and pools of standing water.

The defences on the line of the Yazoo were very formidable. They were made so largely by nature. The broken ridge of hills that touched the Mississippi at Vicksburg extended into the interior almost at right angles to the general course of the river for a distance of sixty miles or more. The Yazoo touched the base of these hills, at a point known as Snyder's Mill, about twelve miles from the city. It then, diverging from the hills, entered the Mississippi about six miles above Vicksburg. There was thus left between the two rivers and the hills a triangular tract of low land, densely wooded except where parts had been cleared for the purposes of cultivation. It was intersected by bayous and low swampy ground. Where this low bottom touched the hill was one of nature's principal out-works to Vicksburg. Commencing at Snyder's Mill, next the hills, there was a swamp, and then lower down an old bed of the river, containing considerable water and to be crossed only by bridging, except at three points, where ravines coming down from the hills had brought sufficient deposit to fill the old bed. Beyond the termination of this bayou there was a belt of timber extending to the Mississippi. This had been felled by cutting the trees off four feet from the ground and throwing the tops out so as to form a heavy abatis. Thus at the base of the hill there was a complete obstruc-

tion from Snyder's Mill to the Mississippi, with only three passages across it.

This natural defence had been fortified by the Confederates so as to make it well-nigh impregnable. In front of the three passages, after the bayou had been crossed, a storming party would meet first an abatis of felled timber ; back of this, a line of rifle-pits ; higher up, a second line of rifle-pits ; and on the top of the bluffs, parapets masking batteries of heavy guns so arranged as to sweep the approach with direct and cross fires. There was a fortified position at the end next Snyder's Mill on the bluff and another in the bottom on the bank of the Yazoo River. The river was also here completely obstructed by a line of rafts. At the other end there were the field works of Vicksburg. Extending along the bluffs, about half the distance between, there was a line of works. And this whole line was so connected that each part could support the others in case any particular point was threatened. The defences were so constructed as not only to protect the city of Vicksburg, but also prevent the navigation of the Yazoo River.

This river drained a region of great wealth and fertility, which extended into the heart of the state. Here, in the alluvial soil formed by the deposits of the rivers, when, in times of high waters (usually twice each year at least), they overflowed their banks, were rich plantations that produced untold crops of corn and cotton and rice and tobacco. They were tilled by slaves and well stocked with cattle and hogs and mules. The Yazoo was navigable at an ordinary stage to the Mississippi Central Railroad, and carried a large amount of property in steamboats and other craft. It was important to protect this fertile field from the blight of war. But it was still more important to prevent the Federal army from getting a foothold on the bluffs and using it as a base for investing Jackson, the capital of the state, and Vicksburg, its principal city, and for getting control of the two great trunk lines of railroad, one from Memphis to the Gulf and the other from the Mississippi to the sea. The interests at stake were great as well as the preparations that had been made to defend them.

When Sherman landed on December 26 on this low land south of the Yazoo, for the purpose of effecting a lodgement on the bluffs back of Vicksburg, he was warned by the marks on the trees, ten feet above the ground, that a flood might be expected at that season that would submerge his whole army. He was disappointed at having no word from either Grant or Banks. The latter had succeeded Butler in command at New Orleans, and was expected to co-operate in the movement on Vicksburg. Grant was only a hundred miles away, as he supposed, and moving in this direction. But Sherman determined to assault at once. He selected a line of attack on the crossing made over the old river bed by Chickasaw Creek. On one side of the crossing was the old river bed, here known as Fishing Lake, and on the other the creek here known as Chickasaw Bayou. Both widened out into sheets of water impassable for troops.

Sherman had 32,000 men in four divisions. Steele's division formed the extreme left, and was on the east side of Chickasaw Bayou ; Morgan's was next, on the west side of this bayou. Then came M. L.

Smith's. And on the right, beyond the west end of Fishing Lake, was A. J. Smith's. The skirmishers of the enemy were driven back. And there were reconnaissances on the 28th and 29th, in one of which M. L. Smith was severely wounded and obliged to give up his command. And his division thereafter acted with A. J. Smith's.

Sherman's plan was by a prompt and concentrated movement to break the centre near Chickasaw Creek, at the east end of Fishing Lake, and, once in position, to turn to Vicksburg or towards Snyder's Mill. He supposed the force in front of him was about 15,000, and would be increased from day to day. So that time was everything. And he determined to assault the hills in front of Morgan on the 29th. Morgan was to carry the position to the summit of the hill; Steele's division to support him. While A. J. Smith, with his two divisions, was to cross on the sand-spit bordering the Mississippi, undermine the steep bank of the bayou on the farther side and carry the levee parapet and the first line of rifle-pits, and so prevent a concentration on Morgan.

The troops were massed closely. All the supports were well in hand. Blair's and Thayer's brigades of Steele's division were with Morgan. At twelve o'clock the signal was given and the troops pressed forward. Blair's brigade, through a storm of shell and rifle bullets, carried the first and then the second range of rifle-pits. Here they turned and saw De Courcy's brigade following over the first range of rifle-pits. Encouraged by this support, they pressed forward. De Courcy was with them and one regiment of Thayer's, the 4th Iowa. Thayer had started with six regiments, himself on foot at the head of the one in front. He crossed the first rifle-pit and then, turning, saw he had but one regiment and was inside the enemy's works. He had ordered each of the others to follow the one preceding it. But the regiment following this one had been ordered by General Steele in person to turn off in another direction after the column had started forward. And so it being turned had carried the other four with it, leaving Thayer with the one alone. Nothing daunted, he pressed on with Blair and De Courcy. Together they reached the foot of the formidable works at the top of the bluff. And under the dreadful direct and cross fires they poured out their lives there. Colonel Dister, of the 58th Ohio, mounted the works and fell dead while urging his men forward. Colonel Fletcher was desperately wounded and captured. Major Jaensch of the same regiment, the 31st Missouri, was killed. The troops were falling all around. The fire was so severe that some of the men lay down to avoid it and were captured; while others went back as they came, over the large open space of more than half a mile from the top of the bluff to the bayou, many of them falling as they went. Seeing the retreat begin as the 42nd Ohio was advancing, General Steele had halted it at the bottom of the road under the bank of the bayou, and deployed it to cover the retreat. This line opened for them, and the defeated column deployed and re-entered the Union lines in perfect order.

On the right, A. J. Smith had ordered one regiment from his divisions, the 6th Missouri, to advance. It crossed the narrow sand bar, but found the ascent of the bank under the rifle-pits impracticable.

Unable to go forward or back, they hovered close under the bank for protection from the Confederates, who were strongly posted above them and were using an old levee as a rifle-pit. The 6th remained in this position till nightfall, and then under cover of darkness they stole back to their former lines. This was the extent of Smith's diversion in favour of Morgan. His loss was 14 killed and 43 wounded.

But the loss in front of Morgan was very heavy, considering the number engaged. There were not more than six thousand engaged. Yet Blair lost, out of his four regiments, 743. De Courcy's loss was about 700. And the 4th Iowa's, Thayer's, was 111. The total loss to Sherman's army was 1,929, and of these 191 were killed, 982 wounded and 756 captured. Morgan attributed the failure of the assault to lack of support from A. J. Smith and Colonel Lindsey. The latter had been ordered with his brigade to advance to the assault by turning Chickasaw Bayou on the right. This was not even attempted. He frittered away the whole time occupied by the assault, about four hours, in a fruitless attempt to build a pontoon bridge over the bayou in his front.

But the evidence is conclusive that the assault could not have succeeded even with this support. Sherman supposed there were about 15,000 men in his front. This was the number of the original garrison. But Pemberton had been kept informed by spies every day of the progress of the expedition from the hour it left Memphis. He had the inside line, with railroad connections, all the way from Grenada to Vicksburg, and could send reinforcements from one point to the other in a few hours. On December 21, the day after Sherman left Memphis, he ordered one brigade, Vaughn's, to Vicksburg. The day Porter's gunboats arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo, the 24th, he ordered another forward, Gregg's. He came to Vicksburg himself on the 26th, the day Sherman landed at Johnson's plantation. On the way he ordered up another regiment, the 40th Alabama, from Columbus to Vicksburg. And on the 27th, the day of Sherman's first reconnaissance, a third brigade, Barton's, arrived. Thus Pemberton had now under him at Vicksburg 28,000 troops. These had all been placed in line on the bluffs, where they were behind breastworks commanding every approach. A thousand troops thus stationed could have successfully overcome an assaulting column of ten thousand. The assault of Morgan actually fell upon the Confederate front occupied by General Stephen D. Lee. Lee had only six regiments, and yet he met the assault of six thousand troops and drove them back, inflicting upon them a loss of one-third of their whole number, with a loss to himself of less than a hundred. The whole Confederate loss of the three days, 27th, 28th and 29th, was only 57 killed, 120 wounded and 10 missing. These facts show that the works were too strong to be carried by an assault. And they never were. Sherman reported to Grant: 'I attribute our failure to the strength of the enemy's position both natural and artificial.'

During the night it rained very hard, and the troops upon the swampy ground had to shelter themselves as best they could with their blankets and rubber shawls. It was all the shelter they had. Sherman visited Porter on his flag-boat, to talk over the situation.

The next day, after a personal examination of the various positions, they were forced to the conclusion that they could not break the centre. Sherman then proposed to Porter that if he would cover a landing at some point near Snyder's Mill, he would send 10,000 troops and assault the batteries there. This if successful would give them possession of the Yazoo and offer a connection with Grant. Porter agreed. And it was arranged that the troops should be embarked immediately after dark on the 31st and, under cover of all the gunboats, proceed quickly up to the batteries and engage and silence them. And the troops were then to disembark and storm the works. While this was going on, Sherman was to attack at the centre and prevent reinforcements going up to the bluff, and in case of success there to move all his forces to that point. Steele's division, with one brigade of M. L. Smith's, were designated and embarked. The assault was to take place at 4 A.M. But about daylight, when everything was in readiness, Sherman received a note from Steele, saying that Porter found the fog so dense on the river that the boats could not move and the expedition must be postponed. And before the next night he received a note from Porter himself saying that as the moon did not set till 5.25, the landing would be a daylight affair, which in his judgment was too hazardous. Sherman reluctantly agreed that this conclusion was right, and so the only remaining chance of securing a lodgement on the bluffs, from which to operate against Vicksburg and the railroads and up the Yazoo River, was abandoned.

One-third of the army was already embarked in making ready for the assault at Snyder's Mill. The rest were bivouacking in the low, swampy timber land, liable to overflows from floods in the rivers, which might engulf them all. He could see no reason for remaining longer in such an unenviable place. So the order was given, and by sunrise of January 2 all the men and materials were on board the transports. But at this point word came that General McClernand had reached the mouth of the Yazoo. And he was consulted. With his approval the discomfited army then started, in accordance with Sherman's previous plan, for Milliken's Bend, ten miles above, where there was a large extent of cleared land and some houses, with better roads back and so a better chance for corn and forage, with the same advantages for operating against Vicksburg or the enemy inland.

And thus the first attempt on Vicksburg ended in dismal failure. The Confederate regiments engaged were by special order permitted to have 'Vicksburg' inscribed on their banners, and Brigadier-General Stephen D. Lee, owing to the gallantry shown by himself and his command, was authorised by General Pemberton to designate a suitable officer of his staff to carry to Richmond the standards captured from Sherman's troops.

It has been a mooted question whether the plan first suggested by Grant to Halleck was not the proper one for taking Vicksburg. He proposed to unite the whole army, repair the railroad from Memphis, making that city his base, and, advancing down the Mississippi Central Railroad, take Vicksburg from the rear. But this is idle speculation, interesting to professional soldiers, but having little place in a history of actual events. Such a plan might have succeeded. But Memphis,

the base, and Vicksburg, the objective point, are two hundred miles apart in an air line, and by the route proposed, through Jackson, forty more. Every mile of this line was through a hostile country, and to keep the railroad open would have required an army, distributed at intermediate posts. And, perhaps, that would not have succeeded in warding off the destroyers. So successful a soldier as Grant did not ward off Van Dorn and Forrest, when his line was shorter. The great advantage of the Mississippi as a line, was that it could neither be torn up nor destroyed. Man could not stop the flow of its waters, and so the path for the conveyance was always there. By the aid of gunboats the conveyance itself could be protected. Hence the authorities at Washington adopted the river as the line. And Grant, after his experience with Van Dorn, was willing to defer to their judgment. Whatever may be said of the other plan, this one actually did succeed.

Sherman could now see no way out of the dilemma in which he was placed. He could not pass the batteries with his troops. He could not gain a foothold on the bluffs above. What was to be done? From McClernand he had learned of the destruction of Grant's supplies at Holly Springs and of his retreat. There was no need for thoughts of forming a junction with him. They must turn to something nearer at hand or let the army lie idle. The Confederates had built a fort on the Arkansas River at a place called Arkansas Post. It was garrisoned by 5,000 troops, under General T. J. Churchill. No extended operations could be conducted against Vicksburg while this fort remained in the rear, menacing the line of supply. A few days before, the U.S. Transport *Blue Wing*, laden with valuable military stores for the army, had fallen a prey to a detachment sent out from there.

On January 4, 1863, McClernand assumed command at Milliken's Bend. He designated his army, the Army of the Mississippi. It was mainly composed of two corps, the Thirteenth, theretofore McClernand's, and the Fifteenth, Sherman's. As McClernand desired to give his undivided attention to the general command, he placed Brigadier-General Geo. W. Morgan over the Thirteenth Corps, he being the senior division commander, and Sherman assumed his old place at the head of the Fifteenth. After a conference with Sherman, it was decided to undertake an expedition for the reduction of Arkansas Post, while waiting to see whether Grant would recall the army or alter his plan for the capture of Vicksburg. So on the day he assumed command McClernand embarked his army on this expedition. Four days later he arrived at the mouth of the White River and, passing up and thence through a cut-off, he reached a landing three miles below Arkansas Post on the evening of the 9th. Here he commenced to debark his troops.

Arkansas Post was a small village with a population of about a hundred, settled by the French as early as 1685. It lay on the left bank of the Arkansas River, about fifty miles from its mouth and a hundred and twenty below Little Rock, of which it was an out-work. It was the county seat of Arkansas County and the centre of a fruitful country, abounding in cattle, corn and tobacco. It lay on high ground

about twenty-five feet above the river, and was, therefore, beyond reach of floods. Fort Hindman was erected, within the village, upon the bank and at the head of a sweeping bend of the river, giving it a clear view, either up or down, for a mile or more. The position was a strong one. On the Confederate right was a compactly built earth fort with four bastion fronts, enclosing a space of a hundred square yards. Thence, running back about three-fourths of a mile, and extending across the high ground on which the village stood to a bayou behind it, was a line of hastily constructed rifle-pits or parapets. In the fort were three heavy iron guns, four rifled 3-inch and four smooth-bore 6-pounders. Along the rifle-pits there were six other field-pieces—howitzers and 3-inch rifled guns.

When Sherman was landed, he was pushed out with his corps to confront the line of rifle-pits on the road farthest from the river, while Morgan's corps occupied the front from his left to the river. One brigade of Morgan's, Lindsey's, was sent across the river to hold the right bank. And another brigade, De Courcy's, was left to guard the landing-place. Late in the evening of the 10th, Porter's fleet made a furious attack on the fort, while Sherman and Morgan pressed close up to the rifle-pits. The next day the gunboats opened at 1 P.M. and were followed by the field batteries. The gunboats' fire was at first slow and steady, from a distance, but rapidly approached the fort, and then enveloped it in a storm of shot and shell. The fleet finally passed above the fort and opened a reverse fire, silencing all the guns but one. The field batteries continued their fire for fifteen minutes. Then their firing was stopped and the infantry columns advanced to the assault. The line sprang forward with a cheer. The first hundred yards of clear space was crossed with a bound. Then came a belt of three hundred yards, cut up by gullies and depressions and covered with trees and brush and fallen timber. Here the assaulting line encountered the well-directed fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry, from behind perfect cover, and the progress was checked. But by 3 P.M. the line was within a hundred yards of the trenches, out-flanking the left and enveloping the Confederate position. A brisk fire was kept up along the whole line until about four, when white flags were seen on the parapet. They seem to have been hoisted without authority. But Brigadier-General Churchill, the commandant, realising that resistance was useless, after the reduction of the fort, in the face of the hopeless disparity of numbers, acquiesced and surrendered. The prisoners taken numbered, by actual count, 4,791. And with the property taken Sherman was delighted to find the ammunition that had been shipped to him from Memphis, but which had been captured on the *Blue Wing*. McClernand's loss was 129 killed, 831 wounded and 17 missing. Churchill estimated his loss at 60 killed and 80 wounded, beside the captured.

The prisoners were sent to St. Louis, and all the Confederate defences, together with the buildings used for military purposes, were destroyed. A detachment of a hundred troops was sent up the river to South Bend to capture or destroy 4,800 bushels of corn. This was burned. Just as the torch was applied, the boat was attacked by guerillas, that had been following it. This caused a hasty retreat. The lines

were cut and the boat dropped out and started on its return, followed for several miles by the guerillas, who at different points fired into the boat, wounding some of the men. The next day, by way of retaliation, Colonel Stewart was sent up with a gunboat and a regiment. He burned 7,800 bushels of corn and sent a detachment inland two miles that burned 22,500 bushels more. They also captured some sheep and mules and burned the mansion and storehouse of a citizen at the place where the expedition of the day before had been attacked. A notice was left that guerilla warfare was recognised as assassination, and that further devastation would follow its repetition.

Of course such warfare was not to be commended. It was degenerating into lawlessness. McClernand had become intoxicated with his success. He was now contemplating an expedition against Little Rock, and thence to Brownsville, a place midway between the Arkansas and the White River. He submitted the plan to both Porter and Sherman in writing, and also corresponded with the commandant of the forces at Helena to secure his co-operation in a movement into Central Arkansas, as a diversion in favour of General Curtis, who was operating in Missouri. These were all movements nowhere provided for under his orders, some of them mere chimera. They were withdrawing an army of 32,000 men from the purpose to which it was assigned, the capture of Vicksburg, and involving it in other operations which might consume months. Grant, from a distance, had not viewed with favour even the expedition against Arkansas Post. He had called it 'a wild-goose chase' in a communication with Halleck. And Halleck in turn had authorised Grant to relieve McClernand and give the command to the next in rank, or assume it himself. But the expedition against Arkansas Post was unquestionably a wise movement, and Grant so confessed later. No movement against Vicksburg could be safely conducted with such an obstruction behind to the line of supply. It was only fifteen miles from the Mississippi River and would have been a harbour for piratical excursions against Union transports on their way up and down. But McClernand should have submitted the question of an expedition against it to Grant and received his approval. Grant was his superior.

There were other instances of insubordination on the part of McClernand that were less pardonable. The day before he assumed command at Milliken's Bend, he wrote Stanton that, either through the intention of Halleck or a strange occurrence of accidents, the authority of the President and himself had been set at naught, and he had been deprived of the command that had fallen to Sherman. Then, in the same letter, he launched into the reasons for Sherman's failure to take Vicksburg; first, much valuable time had been lost in setting the expedition on foot, thus giving the Confederates an opportunity to fortify against the attack when made; second, it lacked every kind of co-operation, by Grant's giving up his advance toward Grenada and Jackson; and third, the organisation of the expedition was 'essentially defective,' because the numbers of the infantry, sharpshooters, sappers, cavalry and light and heavy artillery had not been properly proportioned.' He had suggested the number of each as well as the batteries he wanted, and the kinds of guns. 'Instead

of with these proportions,' he wrote, 'the expedition was constructed without the least harmony in its elements, and with no regard to that effectiveness which is alone to be obtained by giving to each arm its proper proportion.' These were all thrusts at his superiors, Halleck and Grant, privately and without their knowledge, conveyed to the Secretary, who was their superior. After his capture of Arkansas Post, and while still there, he wrote the President: 'I believe my success here is gall and wormwood to the clique of West Pointers, who have been persecuting me for months. How can you expect success when men controlling the military destinies of the country are more chagrined at the success of your volunteer officers than the very enemy beaten by the latter in battle? Something must be done to take the hand of oppression off citizen soldiers whose zeal for their country has prompted them to take up arms, or all will be lost. Do not let me be clandestinely destroyed, or, what is worse, dishonoured, without a hearing.' Then he asks that his command be made independent of Grant. 'The Mississippi River,' he writes in the same letter, 'being the only channel of communication, and that being infested with guerillas, how can General Grant at a distance of 400 miles intelligently command the army with me? He cannot do it. It should be made an independent command, as both you and the Secretary of War, as I believe, originally intended.' This was a proposition to reduce his superior's authority. He asked to have Grant deprived of the command of the army sent against Vicksburg, approximately one-half his troops, of the aid of Porter's fleet, and of his control over the Mississippi River.

This did not amount to Grant's removal, but it would have been a long step in that direction, just as he was approaching Vicksburg, the scene of his greatest triumph. But Grant was still in command. On the receipt of McClernand's report of the capture of Arkansas Post, he wrote him, 'Unless there is some object not visible at this distance, your forces should return to Milliken's Bend or some point convenient for operating on Vicksburg.' McClernand received this order on January 15, and promptly obeyed. Sherman embarked on the 16th and Morgan on the 17th, and all were together at the mouth of the Arkansas that evening. Here they were joined by Grant, who had come to Napoleon to get in touch with affairs at the front, before making his final arrangements to leave Memphis and assume command. While still at Holly Springs, General McPherson had written Grant: 'In consequence of orders from Washington placing General McClernand in charge of the expedition under you I would, if in your place, proceed to Memphis and take command of it myself. It is the great feature of the campaign, and its execution rightfully belongs to you. In case you go, I would like to accompany you with two divisions, Lauman's and Logan's; but I am ready for any position to which you may assign me.' This Grant already knew to be Sherman's feeling, and he accordingly decided to assume the command in person.

Sherman, learning from a remark dropped by McClernand, that Grant disapproved the movement against Arkansas Post, wrote him semi-officially a defence of this step. He admitted that if Banks had reduced Port Hudson and appeared at Vicksburg during their absence

he would feel the force of the disapproval. But he assumed that they would be back at Vicksburg before Banks got there. And so he felt that no bad result could occur. But he argued that so long as Arkansas Post existed on their flank, with boats to ship cannon and men to the mouth of the Arkansas, they would be annoyed beyond measure while operating below. The capture of the *Blue Wing* was a mere sample. He again urged Grant to come to Vicksburg and see the situation. He was afraid McClelland would attempt some impossibility, like an effort to force a passage somewhere between the mouth of the Yazoo and Haynes' Bluff. The importance of Vicksburg could not be over-estimated, he wrote. And he added what, in the light of future events, have become words of wisdom: 'If possible, a larger force should somehow reach the ridge between the Black and Yazoo, so as to approach from the rear.' This was the true plan for taking Vicksburg, as was afterwards clearly proved by many unsuccessful trials in other directions. 'We have had a good deal of real sickness,' he wrote, 'and still more of that sort which develops on the approach of danger.'

Sherman was a peculiarly lovable man. Everywhere his reports and correspondence show his good sense and cool judgment, interspersed with occasional flashes of wit, that bring out the character of the man as well as the general. In one of his field orders he directed surgeons to see that the ambulances were kept clear of soldiers on the march who were not really sick. Men who were temporarily exhausted must, when rested, give place to others, as it was not intended 'to transport the army to the scene of action in ambulances.' Again, in taking leave of two of his divisions that had been assigned to a different command, his consideration for his soldiers comes out, when he wrote that their routes would for a short time be different, but that he would watch with a feeling heart for the familiar colours of the regiments from which he was thus temporarily separated. And he assured the men and officers that their general studied by night and day the plan which led to victorious results at the least cost of life and treasure.

Sherman was now forty-two years of age. His father and grandfather were both attorneys at Norwalk, Conn. The father emigrated to Ohio as early as 1810, when the state was almost a wilderness. He settled at Lancaster, the county seat of Fairfield County, and there commenced the practice of law. He rose rapidly in the estimation of his neighbours, and in 1823 was chosen by the Legislature a Judge of the Supreme Court. The law required a session of this court to be held in each county of the state once a year. While engaged in the discharge of this duty, he was attacked by cholera at Lebanon in Warren County and died, in 1829, in the forty-first year of his age, leaving a widow and eleven children, the eldest eighteen and the youngest less than a year old. As his estate was small it was deemed impossible to keep this large family together.

William Tecumseh, the third child, was then nine years of age. He was named after the celebrated Indian chief, whose bravery and humanity to prisoners his father admired. Soon after the father's death the child was to be baptised. The Presbyterian minister officiating suggested the omission of the middle name, that of a heathen warrior,

as improper to be given to a Christian child. But the lad quickly spoke up : ' My father called me " Tecumseh," and if you won't baptise me by that name, you won't baptise me at all.' And so the question was settled. The children were soon separated. ' Cump,' as he was called, was adopted into the family of the Hon. Thomas Ewing, a neighbour and friend of his father, who was twice a U.S. senator from Ohio, and later in the Cabinets of Harrison, Tyler and Polk. Through him, ' Cump' received an appointment to West Point, where he graduated in 1840, sixth in his class. Soon after, he married Ellen Ewing, the daughter of his benefactor. After a short service in the army, in South Carolina and California, he resigned his commission as captain to engage in banking in the latter state. Then he tried the practice of law at Leavenworth, Kans. Later he became President of the Louisiana State Military Academy, and was so engaged at the outbreak of the war. He promptly resigned this position and went north and entered the Union Army. He commanded a brigade at the battle of Bull Run and was later assigned to the Western Army. Here, with Grant, he formed one of the most beautiful friendships, and also established one of the greatest military reputations of the war.

Grant soon learned to rely on Sherman as he never did upon any of his other generals. He was willing to hear the opinions of all, reserving the final decision to himself. But Sherman showed so much good sense in forming his opinions and was so frank in expressing them, always thoughtful of the lives of his men and of the government property in his keeping, cautious in movements, calculating the chances of success to a nicety before committing himself, that he was an invaluable counsellor to one of Grant's more bold and wide-sweeping genius. Between Sherman and his soldiers there was a warm and affectionate relation. Always approachable, always solicitous for their comfort, as well as their safety, entering into the spirit of the rough fun of their lives, his relation became somewhat paternal. They were his ' boys,' and he was ' Old Pap Sherman.' Grant saw his men from a distance. They were his soldiers, marching and fighting machines, to work his will. After his victories were won, they looked at him as their victorious general, who, through hard scenes of blood, had led them to triumph. But Sherman, as no other, found a place in their affections. He was more even-tempered. Underneath Grant's silent and impassive exterior there were springs of restless activity, that sometimes, control them as he would, found vent in explosions. Some instances appear in the record of his recent campaign. Some in the letters already referred to about McClelland.

The day of McClelland's capture of Arkansas Post, Grant wrote him very brusquely : ' Unless absolutely necessary for the object of your expedition, you will abstain from all moves not connected with it. . . . From the best information I have, Milliken's Bend is the proper place for you to be, and, unless there is some good reason of which I am not advised, you will immediately proceed to that point,' etc. Rather cold comfort this for the general who had just captured a hostile and troublesome garrison ! His dispatch of the same day to Halleck : ' General McClelland has fallen back to White River, and gone on a wild-goose chase to the Post of Arkansas,' was not calculated

to propitiate the General-in-Chief. For he promptly answered the next day: 'You are hereby authorised to relieve General McClelland from command of the expedition against Vicksburg, giving it to the next in rank or taking it yourself.'

Trading peddlers had followed Grant's army for the purpose of purchasing the products of the country in which he was operating, particularly cotton. This was for the gains they might make. They were interfering with the army, dealing with the soldiers and destroying discipline. Of this class the Jews were particularly numerous, and persistently troublesome. Grant at last lost patience with them and published a general order: 'The Jews as a class, violating every regulation of trade established by the Treasury Department, and also department orders, are hereby expelled from the department within twenty-four hours from the receipt of this order.' Post commanders were to see that they left and that any one returning be arrested and held in confinement until an opportunity occurred of sending them out as prisoners. This it will be noticed was a very sweeping order, more so perhaps than Grant intended. His purpose was only to rid his army of a nuisance. But the terms were so sweeping as to include all of that nationality within his department. Some Jews had been residents of and doing business as merchants in the cities and villages now within Grant's department for many years. The order was not intended to apply to them. But it did. Some of this class, feeling themselves aggrieved, appealed to President Lincoln, urging that the enforcement of the order would be the grossest violation of the Constitution and their rights as citizens, and would place them as outlaws before the world. They asked his interposition. This brought a communication from Halleck requiring Grant summarily to rescind the order. At Washington they saw its political trend, for the effect it might have upon voters at the coming election was apparent. But Grant in his hasty outburst of impatience had not thought of that. However, thorough soldier as he was, upon receipt of his General-in-Chief's command, he at once revoked the order.

He had trouble also with a telegraph official. The Secretary of War had appointed a superintendent of telegraphs who was to construct and manage the military lines. He in turn had appointed a deputy for Grant's department. This official permitted private and commercial business, cotton dispatches, etc., to delay military communications for a whole day, seeming to rely upon his independence of Grant's control, though head of that department. Grant issued an order that private dispatches might be sent over the wires before 10 A.M. when they did not interfere with military business. The deputy undertook to ignore this order and Grant removed him. He scouted the idea that the creation of a superintendency of telegraphs left the lines within that department a distinct organisation, that could not be controlled or directed by the department commander. Notwithstanding, the superintendent asked his deputy to return, after Grant had sent him out of the department, under guard, to prevent him interfering with the local operators. But the deputy was too wise to do that. 'I desire to return to the department,' he wrote, 'in preference to any other position in the service, but to do so I must have the safe-conduct

of the War Department, or General Grant will shoot me.' Grant designated another man to act in his stead, in his department, and so the matter was allowed to rest. There was no need that any one should be shot, but only that a meddlesome subordinate be kept out of the district.

Grant was greatly annoyed while in Central Mississippi by the number of contrabands that flocked to his army. Some of them were deserted by their masters upon the plantations at the approach of the Union Army; others ran away. They came in such numbers that Grant scarcely knew what to do with them. The question of emancipation was really settling itself, as it had been ever since the war began, and as it would have continued to do, without any aid of the proclamation of the President. The slaves were renouncing the claims of their masters and fleeing from bondage and the latter were powerless to prevent it. They had no means of recovering them. The exodus was so general and, without the assurance of freedom where they were, would have been so universal, that the remedy for it, like the punishment (of those who had taken up arms against their government) for treason, was not to be considered. The blacks never could be reenslaved. Too many were escaping.

Grant had never been an Abolitionist or an extreme anti-slavery man. In 1856 he had voted for Buchanan for President. In 1860 he could not vote, owing to a recent change in his place of residence, but if he had, he would probably have voted for Douglas. Now he was simply a soldier fighting the battles of his country. He wished to see his cause triumph. He was in no sense a politician, and did not assume to be a statesman. So far as he had any political view of the struggle, it was as a Union man, believing there was a good government and should be one nation. He wished to see the old relations maintained. Secession he believed to be wrong, and the remedy, if any, for the alleged wrongs of the South should come through the votes of the people of the whole country. Therefore, when the slaves came in such numbers to his army and had to be fed out of the supplies furnished for his soldiers, Grant's first thought was not to free them from slavery, but to rid his army of the incumbrance. After Van Dorn captured Holly Springs this was imperative.

Some were employed upon fortifications, others were put to menial work in the hospitals. Citizens, whose negroes had run off and had cotton to pick, he allowed to hire those in his camps from the Government officer in whose charge they were placed. This was the beginning of a systematic treatment of the subject of employing the idle negroes in the South, which under the direction of the Freedmen's Bureau later became an organised department of the Government. The farther south Grant's army penetrated, the greater the trouble became. Finally, at Oxford, Miss., he issued an order excluding coloured women and children thereafter from the army and directing all of them as well as the unemployed men to be sent to an army chaplain whom he had made superintendent of contrabands at Grand Junction. This superintendent was to have charge of them. A few days later he wrote to Halleck: 'Contraband question is becoming a serious one. What shall I do with surplus negroes? I authorised an Ohio philan-

thropist a few days ago to take all that were at Columbus (Ky.) to his state at Government expense. Would like to dispose of more the same way.'

But notwithstanding this burst of impatience, the fact remains that the coloured people of the South were of invaluable assistance to the Union armies. They appreciated that slavery caused the war, that Lincoln's soldiers were their friends, and that freedom followed where they went. In many ways the negroes befriended them. Their cabins were always open and they were willing to share with them their humble fare. They were ready to furnish information about the roads, the country, the movements and camps of the Confederates. They did not assume to be scouts, but being unknown to white people, supposed to be merely slaves from neighbouring plantations, unobtrusive in their behaviour, they passed from place to place between and even within the lines of the armies, unchallenged and with little risk to themselves. They brought all sorts of needed information. The records of the war abound in instances. Take one at random.

'I have a negro,' wrote one of his brigadiers to Grant, 'who left Abbeville last night at eleven o'clock. He is a servant to a private in General Lovell's force. He heard his master say that Price with his army had gone to Panola, on Grenada and Memphis road. He says the bulk of the rebel army is at Tallahatchie, mouth of Tippah, and at Rocky Ford. He says orders were given yesterday morning to strike tents and put three days' rations in haversacks, and thinks it is a preparation to leave, but knows nothing more to confirm it. He says the enemy was in line of battle yesterday at Tallahatchie. He thinks the railroad bridge is not injured yet.'

Here was a coloured man direct from the hostile army bringing information in detail of its position and of movements in progress, as well as in contemplation. Grant was then at Holly Springs, pursuing Pemberton southward along the Mississippi Central Railroad, and the information was important to him. To the common soldier the contraband was ever a welcome visitor in camp, propitiating, by his easy adaptability and unfailing good humour every one he met; ready to cook a meal, care for a horse, do any menial service, to carry or use a gun, to succour the wounded or care for the dead. Frequently he attached himself to some officer as a servant, and followed his fortune to the close of the war, and then went north to spend the remainder of his days near him or in his service or that of his family. Occasionally he was received as a volunteer in some white regiment. But generally, without any recognised connection, he attached himself to some company or squad and kept along. After the war he was proud to be permitted on Decoration Day to march in the soldiers' column, even though not eligible to receive a pension because his name was not on the rolls.

CHAPTER XXVII

Campaign above Vicksburg—The Canal—The Lake Providence Passage—
Attempt by Moon Lake—That by Yazoo River—Grant devises a
Fifth Plan.

GRANT returned to Memphis on January 20, 1863. His army in Central Mississippi had been retired to this point after the capture of Holly Springs. The Mississippi Central Railroad had been abandoned; but that to Chattanooga was held. Memphis was to be his base. Having disposed of affairs there, so as not to suffer by his absence, he left General Hurlbut in command and on the 29th went to Young's Point to assume command of the operations against Vicksburg. Against his assumption of the command, McClernand protested, on the ground that the Secretary of War had ordered him to enlist troops in Indiana, Illinois and Iowa, so that whenever a sufficient force was raised, an expedition would be organised under his (McClernand's) command. He protested also on the ground that the order of the President was that he was to have the immediate command under Grant's direction. He requested that his protest be forwarded to the Secretary and the President. 'I regret this,' he added in his communication to Grant, 'not only in respect for the President and Secretary, under whose express authority I claim the right to command the expedition, but in justice to myself as its author and actual promoter.' The protest was forwarded to Washington, as he requested, but nothing more was heard of it.

This was a disappointment to McClernand, who had laboured and hoped for an independent command. To open the great river that drained the basin of the continent and had carried the commerce of the East and West and North-West, to restore trade to the channel that nature had formed and man had adopted, but which the rebellion had closed, was a project upon which his mind had dwelt, and which he realised would bring fame to some one. But it was a subject that had engrossed Grant's attention too, ever since he left Cairo on his victorious campaign against Forts Henry and Donelson, and Shiloh. This had resulted in the opening of the river to Memphis. It would hardly be expected that he would voluntarily retire from the field now; or that the army which had been gathered around him would permit this, in silence. Lincoln and Stanton, under the importunity of McClernand, had probably intimated a concession of such authority to him, but if so, their more sober reflection had convinced them that it would not be wise. Grant had frankly stated his own opinion in transmitting the protest to Washington. 'If General Sherman had been left in command,' he wrote, 'such is my

confidence in him that I would not have thought my presence necessary. But whether I do General McClernand injustice or not, I have not confidence in his ability as a soldier to conduct an expedition of the magnitude of this one, successfully. In this opinion, I have no doubt but I am borne out by a majority of the officers of the expedition, though I have not questioned one of them on the subject.'

To comprehend the difficulties of the command, let us consider them briefly. Vicksburg stood on a bluff about two hundred feet above the surface of the river. This bluff was a part of the great plateau that covered two-thirds of the state of Mississippi. The other one-third was the alluvial valley of the Mississippi River, low, everywhere cut up by lakes and pools, the remains of former channels of the river. The driest parts of this valley were cleared and cultivated and made the most fertile plantations of the state; the rest, and this included the banks of the rivers and the lagoons, was covered by a dense growth of trees and vines and matted weeds and underbrush that made it altogether impenetrable, till paths were broken through it. This was all liable to overflow by floods of the river, and just now was mostly under water. The bluff on which the city stood here touches the river and then recedes from it to the north-east till its farthest point is sixty miles away. Then it gradually approaches the river and touches it again at Memphis, two hundred miles above. Below Vicksburg the bluff follows the general course of the river to the southern boundary of the state. Along the base of this bluff for a hundred miles north-east of Vicksburg flowed the Yazoo River, formed by a confluence of the Tallahatchie and the Yalobusha, both of which found their sources in the high land farther to the north-east. These rivers formed further barriers to any approach to the high ground from the north.

It must be kept in mind that the Mississippi River from Memphis to Vicksburg was higher than the country on its east side and was only kept in place by levees. Sometimes the levee, little higher than the surface of the river at flood stage, was broken over and the water poured through the crevasse thus made with great force. The winter of 1862-3 was unusually wet and, as a consequence, almost the whole country from the bluffs to the levee was under water. Conditions upon the western bank were much the same, water everywhere. Almost the only ground that could be depended on to continue above water was the levee. When Grant went to the front he found the troops already there, Sherman's and McClernand's corps, encamped on the point of high ground on the west bank of the Mississippi, opposite the mouth of the Yazoo, and formed by its wash. This was known as Young's Point. The corps that followed Grant, McPherson's, was ordered into camp at Lake Providence, seventy miles higher up, but on the same side. Both were on the levee. Even there the danger of being submerged was so great that they retained the transports on which they came down, as a refuge to which they could flee in case the water rose higher. During the winter there were alternate rises and falls, but the Mississippi always continued high. Under these circumstances it was not possible either to march or transport troops across country. The roads were

covered, and yet the water was not of sufficient depth for transports. They could only follow the course of the streams, and here overhanging limbs of trees often formed impassable barriers.

It was already known that the defences along the bluffs, both on the Yazoo and the Mississippi, were impregnable. An assault upon them was no longer considered. Nor could troops be carried by those on the Mississippi. The danger of the transports being sunk was too great. The question that confronted Grant was how to place his army on the high ground to the rear of Vicksburg and so reach the defences with a force sufficiently large to break through them and capture the city. Before this question was solved, four plans were successively tried and abandoned.

The plan that had seemed practicable to President Lincoln, who in his early days had boated on the Mississippi and was familiar with its easy changes of direction, was to cut a canal through the tongue of land opposite the city and by it carry the army below, far enough to reach an unguarded point where a landing could be made. This plan was explained to Grant and he was favourably impressed with it before he reached Young's Point. Upon arriving, he at once adopted it. The line for this canal was substantially that of the ditch commenced by General Thomas Williams when he, in company with Admiral Farragut, attempted the capture of Vicksburg the year before. It was the same, too, adopted by the state of Louisiana in her boundary dispute with Mississippi. The river was dammed out. The old Williams' channel was cleaned up. With the aid of some contrabands that were secured from neighbouring plantations, the work of widening and deepening went on vigorously for six weeks. Steam dredges were brought from the North, and they too were used. Thus the work progressed, under such disadvantages from mud and water, as well as it could, till March 8, when a sudden rise of the river burst the dam that had been made to keep it out, flooded the working places, carried in a lot of silt and debris, and lodged it there, substantially undoing all that had been accomplished. This demonstrated that the current of the river would not cut a new channel there. So the work was abandoned.

If the canal could have been completed, it would not have served its purpose, for at its mouth it ran at right angles to the eastern bank of the river. The Confederates, seeing the work progress, had established batteries on the bluffs opposite the mouth, and thus were able to sweep its whole length. They shelled the men at their work and compelled Grant to remove the dredges. If completed, the passage of transports carrying troops would have been attended with such hazards that Grant could hardly have used them.

It is interesting to note that, after the lapse of some years, what was attempted in vain by men so often has been accomplished by nature so easily. In the years following the war, the action of the current of the river continued to wear away this peninsula until it left only a strip about a hundred yards wide on either side of the Vicksburg and Shreveport Railroad. Finally, on the afternoon of April 27, 1876, this narrow strip gave way and the water of the river went over it just south of where the railroad station known as De

Soto stood in 1863. The next morning a steamboat passed through the break. And the following year the break became the main channel, a mile wide and sometimes a hundred feet deep, leaving Vicksburg in time of drought completely separated from the river by an impassable barrier of mud. This had seriously impeded the growth, and might ultimately, owing to insanitary conditions, have caused great damage to the city. To prevent this the U.S. Government has cut a channel for the Yazoo along the city front. And this has, in a measure, remedied the evil. But nevertheless the action of the river showed where the canal should have been to catch the current and secure its aid in cutting a channel. But unfortunately it was two miles nearer the city than 'Grant's Canal,' the location of which is still pointed out, with two or three feet of water in it. But this last canal would have been commanded through its whole length by the frowning batteries on the front of the city. No transport conveying soldiers could have hoped to pass them. So that the river at last has conclusively established the impracticability of the canal.

While work on the canal was in progress other plans were tried. The day after Grant arrived he ordered McPherson to cut the levee at Lake Providence, hoping thus to find a passage for transports. Lake Providence and Bayous Baxter and Macon, and the rivers Tensas, Washita, and Red on the Louisiana side, in times of flood formed a chain of water from the Mississippi above to the Mississippi below Vicksburg. But the work developed the difficulties of such a passage. The bayous were narrow and so crooked that it would be almost impossible for steamboats to follow their sinuous channels. They would have to be straightened. They were also shallow. Bayou Baxter at its southern end terminated in a cypress swamp where the water was not more than two or three feet deep. This swamp was covered with timber so thickly that, to make a passage at all, the trees had to be cut, under water sometimes, and the stumps removed and a channel dug amid the roots. This was a laborious undertaking and in winter attended with great hardships. But there was another objection to this plan. It caused the transports that entered it, if they succeeded in passing at all, to reach the Mississippi almost four hundred miles by the river below Vicksburg, and not far above Port Hudson, a strongly fortified post of the Confederacy. All the part of the Mississippi between Port Hudson and Vicksburg was held by the Confederates, and navigation would necessarily be dangerous there. Along the sinuous courses of the bayous and smaller rivers, the troops would be exposed to the fire of sharpshooters and guerillas hidden in the timber. The outlook was altogether so unpromising that, when the canal proved a failure, this plan also was abandoned.

Colonel Wilson, a member of Grant's staff, was then sent to try a third plan. There had formerly been a break in the river bank six miles below Helena, Ark., but on the Mississippi side. This cut let the water into Moon Lake, whence it passed through a channel known as Yazoo Pass into the Coldwater River, thence through the Tallahatchie till it united with the Yalobusha, fifty miles below, to form the Yazoo River. This route thus formed a half-circle, with

each end in the Mississippi River. It was followed in former years by small steamers which did the carrying trade for the planters and villagers of this fertile country, and was used as a short route either above or below to the Mississippi. By going through the river they could complete the circuit. The state of Mississippi, some years prior to 1863, had interrupted this channel by building a strong levee across the break in the river bank near Helena, and thus completely stopped the flow of the water into Moon Lake. Wilson was to open up the break and, if possible, restore the passage, so that Grant's troops could be carried through it to the high ground back of Vicksburg.

This looked feasible. On February 2, a mine that Wilson had planted in the levee was exploded, opening a crevasse, and the river being at flood stage, the water rushed through, and in an incredibly short time opened a wide passage. The water once beyond the levee filled the bayous and covered the little dry land. On February 24, General Ross with a brigade of soldiers and transports, convoyed by gunboats, moved into this new channel. But the Confederates, seeing the danger, felled trees across the narrow places at Yazoo Pass and on the Coldwater, some of them into and under the water, creating obstructions that were difficult to move. It was much easier to fell them in than to pull them out, with their branches inextricably entangled. However, by dint of hard labour Ross progressed till he approached the confluence of the Tallahatchie and the Yalobusha near Greenwood. Here, on the narrow strip of land between the Tallahatchie and the Yazoo Rivers, 2,000 Confederates that had come down the Yalobusha from Grenada had landed and thrown up a fortification, which they called Fort Pemberton, in honour of the commandant at Vicksburg, and had planted themselves, with eight heavy guns, behind it. The location was almost an island. No land approach could be had. Ross' troops could lend no aid. The two gunboats made repeated attacks, but nothing could be done. The fortification could neither be reduced, nor passed by the transports. Ross gave up the struggle and returned to Yazoo Pass, with a loss of six killed and twenty-five wounded. The Confederate loss was less. At Yazoo Pass, Ross met General Quinby coming to his support with another brigade. Quinby was his superior, and, not being satisfied with the report of Ross, he determined to try again to reduce Fort Pemberton. So together they returned with all their troops and the gunboats under the command of Lieutenant Foster. The troops were landed and a careful examination made. Foster was already satisfied and was threatening to withdraw with his gunboats. Quinby, afraid of being left without their support, was thus helped to a decision that the undertaking was hopeless. And together they steamed away on April 4, leaving General Loring, commanding the fort, victorious.

This expedition consumed so much time that Grant, not having heard of the union of Ross and Quinby, became alarmed for the safety of the troops. With the hope of rescuing them as well as of making another effort to reach the high ground, he attempted a passage by entering the mouth of the Yazoo and passing thence through Steele's and Black Bayous into Deer Creek, thence through Rolling Fork

and the Big Sunflower Rivers to the Yazoo again about ten miles above Haynes' Bluff. This would be a diversion in favour of Ross and Quinby, and, if successful, would give Grant access to the bluffs back of the Confederate entrenchments about Vicksburg. This route had been prospected as far as Deer Creek by Admiral Porter, and declared practicable. Beyond Deer Creek the streams were known to be navigable. Porter started ahead, on March 15, with five ironclads and four mortar-boats, and was accompanied by Sherman with the 8th Missouri and fifty pioneers as far as the entrance to Black Bayou. Here Sherman set the pioneers to work clearing away the trees and brush. Black Bayou was about four miles long, narrow, crooked and filled with trees. The heavy ironclads could force their way through by pressing aside the bushes and limbs of the trees, but the transports could not follow them. Sherman was followed the next day by Stuart's division of his corps. But he continued in a tug to examine the passages to the Rolling Fork, until, having lost the rudder and the smoke-stack, too, of his tug, he became 'satisfied that the only dry land in this climate was to be found on Deer Creek.' Then he returned and renewed the orders to push the work of clearing out Black Bayou.

While Sherman was so employed, the gunboats pushing ahead had almost reached the outlet of Deer Creek into the Rolling Fork, where it was hoped the difficulties of navigation would end. But here they were attacked by sharpshooters concealed in the timber. Deer Creek was a narrow, sluggish stream, full of willow bushes and overhanging trees. The ironclads moved like snails, but with great power, forcing the saplings and bushes and drift aside. But the enemy had begun further to obstruct his progress by felling trees in the channel and firing from ambush on the working parties, when exposed on the decks or on the banks of the stream. They were at last getting to his rear and attempting to close him in by casting trees across the path he had traversed. The situation had become critical, for 4,000 troops had been sent out from Haynes' Bluff under General Featherston to operate as sharpshooters against him. All the men with Porter did not amount to so many, and against such an enemy the gunboats were powerless. Porter himself dispatched a negro to Sherman for assistance. The messenger found him at Black Bayou. The transports had been labouring along, but owing to their more rambling construction, with high stacks and light guard-rails, they became more easily entangled in the tree tops than the ironclads. Only 800 men were with Sherman when found. But he sent them forward under Colonel Giles A. Smith, and himself hastened back on a tug to hurry up others. By night he had three steamboat loads more at the foot of Black Bayou. To undertake to pass its channel in the darkness was out of the question. So he landed them at the first visible ground above water on the south shore and conducted them through the dense cane-brake by lighted torches up to an open plantation, two miles and a half, where they encamped for the night. As soon as it was light they pushed forward, and shortly after noon came to a detachment of the 8th Missouri, stationed at Indian Mound to prevent the enemy from felling trees in Deer Creek to the rear of the fleet. Pushing on farther, the advance guard came in contact

with the enemy. The arrival was opportune. The two leading battalions pushed the enemy along the swamp in the rear of the plantation fields that bordered Deer Creek for two miles, and until they were to the north and rear of the fleet. They met Colonel Smith coming down to interpose between this same party and his outlying detachment.

It was found that Porter had discovered the route to be far more difficult than he was led to believe, and had abandoned the effort to reach the Yazoo. He was now attempting to back his boats out of Deer Creek, for he could not turn them. So dispositions were made to cover the boats while engaged in this slow and tedious retreat. It took three days for them to reach the plantations where Sherman had encamped for the night on his advance. But not a shot was fired at the gunboats during this retreat. The enemy hung upon the rear of Sherman's protecting column till March 26, when he embarked his men on the gunboats and transports. During the night of the 27th they all reached their original camps, glad to be back, and Grant glad to see them and to know that his troops were all now safely out of the Yazoo country.

Thus ended Grant's fourth unsuccessful attempt to reach the high ground. In every one he had failed. In some he had little faith, but he held himself ready to make the most of them, if they should prove better than he anticipated. In others, he expected success, and was disappointed. But Grant was a man that was not easily discouraged. His defeats only nerved his strong will to accomplish in some other way what he had thus far tried and failed. One purpose these plans had served. This was to keep his men employed during the long months of the dreary winter. They had come through it in good health and fine spirits. The *morale* of the army never was better. Now the waters of the rivers were falling and the low lands were beginning to appear. Roads that had been covered were already becoming dry. The season had come when something could be done. These unsuccessful attempts had lulled the Confederate garrison into a fancied confidence that their position was impregnable, and they had been induced to relax their vigilance. This was a dangerous frame of mind to indulge when opposed by a man of such restless activity. But the Confederates had watched him in so many directions and warded him off so easily, that confidence was natural. If Grant had designs in any other direction they could not imagine where, and at any rate they had always started a day or a week after he did and still been in time to check all his plans.

But Grant had been working out in his own mind another plan of reaching the bluffs. So far he had communicated it to no one. As it was altogether his own, the secret was safe. He never talked much. And the success of *this* plan depended on its being unexpected. His 20,000 men must be thrown across the Mississippi River, and if this were attempted in the face of Pemberton's army of 28,000, it could not succeed.

Only three courses seemed to remain. First, to abandon the river, go back to Memphis and renew his campaign down the Mississippi Central Railroad. This was the plan a soldier would naturally have

chosen to reduce Vicksburg. It had been Grant's original plan. Sherman, in the memorable letter, which he quotes in full in his Memoirs, urged it again when he learned that Grant contemplated sending boats past the batteries and attempting to throw his troops over the river and maintain a campaign without a base or a line of supply. Indeed, no part of the river plan thus far tried was Grant's, and he might easily have thrown the blame for failure on others. But it was not his way to spend time arguing responsibility upon others' shoulders. He preferred to accept the means that were furnished and bend every energy to make the work in hand a success. To go back to Memphis would appear as a confession of defeat. There were political considerations too that would not suffer this. The war had been in progress for two years. Croakers in the North were already arguing that it was a failure, and were clamouring for peace on any terms, with a cessation of the waste of money and of human life. Grant could not afford to appear to fail in the face of such talk. It might cost him his place. He had not then the standing he afterwards attained. In the public estimation he was ranked with Hooker and Rosecrans and Banks, then commanding the other armies. He had little to show but one successful battle, Fort Donelson, to which might be added the bloody field of Shiloh, though each side claimed the victory there. Since then, the battles of Iuka and Corinth, though in his district, had been fought by other generals, and the credit was given to them. Many good men felt that it was already time, after his long want of success at Vicksburg and elsewhere, to admit his want of capacity and add his name to the dreary list of failures, McClellan, Pope, Burnside and Buell. But Lincoln, who was largely responsible for the river plan, could be equally magnanimous and not complain of Grant, if Grant did not complain of Lincoln. He could argue that Grant was not done yet, urge others to see him through before they condemned him. But he could not do this if Grant gave up and went back to Memphis. That would be retreat and a confession of failure. In the condition of the public mind the President would then probably feel that he could not ignore the demand for a change.

A second course was to try another assault on the front from Vicksburg to Haynes' Bluff. This meant great loss of life with almost a certainty of defeat. With Sherman's experience before him, this would be considered unpardonable. It, too, might end his career. For such cause he had seen commanders of the Army of the Potomac, one after another, retired.

The third and last plan was to move quickly down the river bank, which the roads, having now emerged from the water, permitted, throw his men across at some unexpected point, interpose his own army between the Confederates within the city and those without, beat them in detail, establish a base on the Yazoo and entrench, and wait for the city to surrender, or take it by storm. This plan offered the best chance of success even if it were problematical. And it insured his continuance in command, at least until it was tried. It was the turning-point of Grant's career. If it failed, the result could hardly be worse than the other plans promised. If it succeeded,

a great career was open before him. It did succeed, and Chattanooga, Appomattox, and the Presidency followed, with an immortal fame.

Although the war had been in progress for two years, the North had gained but one substantial victory. This was at Fort Donelson. Hence arose the talk that the war was a failure. It was affecting the elections unfavourably. To correct this situation the Administration was anxious for a victory now. An incident that occurred at this time curiously illustrates this. Halleck wrote Grant: 'There is a vacant major-generalcy in the Regular Army, and I am authorised to say that it will be given to the general in the field who first wins an important and decisive victory.' Grant coolly pocketed the letter and said nothing about it. The same offer was made to Rosecrans. But he resented it, with a sharp letter in reply, about a general who had command of an army, who would not, from a sense of duty, do his best to secure the victory without the stimulus of such a reward. And his friends likened it to a lawyer who was asked to work for a contingent fee, a thrust at Halleck, who, though a graduate of West Point, had, like Sherman, abandoned the army to engage in the practice of law in California, and who was said to have sometimes taken suits to establish controverted land titles, then common there, upon contingent fees. But such fees are common among lawyers everywhere and there is nothing dishonourable in the practice of taking them. In fact, where the fees are not contingent, attorneys usually charge higher for their work in cases where success has attended their efforts than where the result has been adverse to their clients. A system of rewards as well as punishments is at least as old as the Christian religion. And rewards are held out everywhere in the ordinary affairs of life. There was no reason why Halleck, with the permission of Lincoln, should not offer such an inducement to the generals at this time commanding the armies.

A little later Halleck returned to the subject again: 'The eyes and the hopes of the whole country,' he wrote Grant, 'are now directed to your army. In my opinion, the opening of the Mississippi River will be to us of more advantage than the capture of forty Richmonds. We shall omit nothing which we can do to assist you.' Another effort to encourage Grant to the utmost! And again: 'You are too well advised of the anxiety of the Government for your success, and its disappointment at the delay, to render it necessary to urge upon you the importance of early action. I am confident that you will do everything possible to open the Mississippi River. In my opinion this is the most important operation of the war, and nothing must be neglected to secure success.'

The relations of Halleck and Grant were, at this critical time in Grant's career, most cordial. When McClelland was intriguely to get command of the expedition against Vicksburg, he could secure the attention of both Lincoln and Stanton, but Halleck turned to him a deaf ear, and without mentioning McClelland's connection with it, gave Grant information of what was transpiring. When McClelland's protest against Grant's assumption of the command was sent to Washington, it was to Halleck's department that Grant's letter enclosing it was addressed. This was a fact which shows upon

whose fidelity Grant then relied. Halleck seems to have been unfairly dealt with. As has been said, he was severely criticised as general-in-chief for interfering with the operations of generals in the field and for not supporting them properly with men and means. But the records are exactly to the contrary in his dealings with Grant. When Halleck suggested sending additional troops to Vicksburg, Grant answered that he had troops enough for the present, but would need more before the capture of the city could be made, and advised that preparations be taken to furnish them then. And they were.

On April 4, after the return of the troops from the Yazoo country, when it was conceded that the four plans had failed and that an approach from the north must now be considered impracticable, Grant quietly breaks to Halleck his intention of sending the fleet past the batteries, moving his army down by the west bank to the neighbourhood of New Carthage and, once there, to cross either to Warrenton or Grand Gulf. From either of these points there were good roads to Vicksburg, and from Grand Gulf one to Jackson and the Black River bridges. 'This is the only move,' he added, 'I now see practicable, and hope it will meet your approval. I will keep my army together, and see to it that I am not cut off from my supplies, or beaten in any other way than in a fair fight.' Halleck made no reply. The correspondence shows their complete confidence in one another and their mutual hope for success.

CHAPTER XXVIII

The Army marches to the South—Crosses the Mississippi—The Campaign back of Vicksburg—Grierson's Raid—Pemberton bewildered—Prepares to meet Grant—Battles of Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, Champion's Hill and Big Black Bridge—Grant invests Vicksburg.

ON March 29 the Thirteenth Army Corps, under McClernand, was ordered to take up the line of march from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage. The Seventeenth, McPherson's, was to follow. Neither was to move faster than supplies and ammunition could be transported to them. Accordingly, Brigadier-General Osterhaus, the next morning, March 30, pushed out his division of McClernand's corps carefully. The roads, though level, were intolerably bad and the movement was necessarily slow. He reached Roundaway Bayou, opposite Richmond, about 2 P.M. The village lay in Louisiana, about twenty miles back from the river at Vicksburg. Some Confederate cavalry pickets were found in the town, upon whom fire was opened. Then some of the men crossed the bayou in skiffs and attacked. The pickets fled, leaving two of their wounded behind and carrying off seven more. The town was permanently occupied as a convenient point on a line of supplies. Osterhaus' advance pushed on and the practicability of a road to New Carthage was established. A bridge two hundred feet long, made of logs taken from houses, was thrown across the bayou at Richmond, old roads were repaired, new ones made, and the division reached Smith's plantations, two miles north of New Carthage, on April 4. Detachments of Confederate cavalry and infantry had retarded the advance, but they now returned to their camp at Perkins' plantation, six miles below. It was found that the levee of Bayou Vidal near the town was broken in several places, leaving New Carthage on an island. Another route had to be found around the Vidal to Perkins' plantation, making the whole distance to be marched from Milliken's Bend thirty-five miles. Over this distance supplies of ordnance stores and provisions had to be hauled by wagons, with which to commence the campaign on the opposite side of the river. This involved great labour.

On the night of April 16, Porter's ironclads and three transports, with their boilers protected by hay and cotton, ran the batteries at Vicksburg. The transports also carried cargoes of commissary stores. All three of the transports were struck frequently, and one of them was set on fire and entirely consumed. The other two were not seriously disabled, and no one on board any of them was seriously hurt. They had succeeded so well that Grant ordered six more transports to be prepared in the same manner for running the batteries.

They left Milliken's Bend on the night of April 22, and five of them got through, in a somewhat damaged condition. The other received a shot in her hull below the water-line and sank on the Louisiana shore, soon after passing the batteries. The crews of seven of the transports were composed of men taken from the army. Upon the call for volunteers for this dangerous service, officers and men presented themselves by hundreds. Grant remarked that it was a striking feature of his army that there was nothing which man could be called upon to do, mechanical or professional, that accomplished men could not be found in his ranks for the duty required. For river service men were especially numerous. The army had been largely recruited along the Upper Mississippi and its tributaries; and there were many river men among these soldiers.

The transports injured in running the blockade were immediately repaired under the direction of Admiral Porter. In a short time five were in running order and the others in condition to be used as barges in moving troops. With the last six transports that had passed the batteries, twelve barges loaded with forage and rations were sent in tow, and half of them got through in condition to be used to ferry troops. Having found New Carthage entirely unsuitable as a place to embark his troops, Grant moved to Hard Times Landing, on the Louisiana shore, around a bend in the river and a short distance above Grand Gulf. Not having sufficient transports to move his men, and besides desiring to preserve as much secrecy as possible about the movement by keeping his troops out of sight from across the river, to reach there he adopted a circuitous route on the west shores of Bayou Vidal and Lake St. Joseph. This increased the march to seventy miles from Milliken's Bend, the point of starting, to Hard Times. When McClelland's troops reached the landing, McPherson's, which were to follow, being well on the way, so many of the former as could be were crowded on the transports and carried down near Grand Gulf. This was on April 29. The gunboats were to silence the Confederate guns and then the troops were to be landed and carry the fortifications by storm.

At 8 A.M. Porter commenced the attack on Grand Gulf and maintained it for more than five hours. It was bravely done. Many times the gunboats seemed to be within pistol-shot of the batteries. The whole river front was a sheet of flame, darkened by smoke. But it was soon apparent that the guns were too elevated and the fortifications too strong to be taken. Besides, the whole range of hills was lined with rifle-pits and supplied with field artillery, that could be moved from place to place as emergency required. Grant, who had witnessed the engagement from a tug lying above in the river, determined to run the batteries and seek a point still farther down where a less threatening landing could be made. Rodney, ten miles below Grand Gulf, was the point now selected. So the troops were all landed and marched across the peninsula opposite Grand Gulf to De Shroon's plantation.

As soon as it was dark the gunboats again engaged the batteries, and all the transports ran by without material injury and tied up at De Shroon's. During the night a coloured man came into camp,

from whom it was learned that there was a good road from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, which lay on the high ground back from the river. Bruinsburg was five miles nearer De Shroon's than Rodney, the landing-place that had been chosen. This would reduce the distance the transports had to travel in ferrying the troops by ten miles for each trip. Bruinsburg was, therefore, chosen as the point of debarkation, and as soon as it was light the work of ferrying the troops over was commenced. Every available transport, ironclad and tow-boat was used, and by noon McClelland's men were over. By four o'clock three days' rations were issued to them, and they then began the march to Port Gibson. McPherson's corps followed as soon as it could be put across the river. Not a Confederate had appeared, not a life was lost, and the army was now over the river and on the high ground. The wish of Grant seemed already realised. It was a matter of the greatest importance to secure a firm foothold without resistance. So the march when commenced was continued into the night. At two o'clock on the morning of May 1, about eight miles out from Bruinsburg, and still four from Port Gibson, the first Confederates were met, and when attacked fell back, but were not pursued. McClelland bivouacked here till dawn. Then a sharp fight followed; and that morning, May 2, Grant entered Port Gibson.

The troops McClelland struck were Green's brigade, which had been sent by General Bowen from Grand Gulf on the preceding afternoon. Only two days before they were ordered by Pemberton to Bowen's support from Edward's station. To understand how Grant was permitted to secure this foothold without opposition, we must go back a month and review what had taken place among the Confederates. During this time, Pemberton himself was in Jackson. Under him was Major-General C. L. Stevenson, in command of the position at Vicksburg, running from Haynes' Bluff on the Yazoo to Grand Gulf on the Mississippi. He had 22,000 effective troops. Besides these, Major-General Frank Gardner at Port Hudson had 16,000; Major-General W. W. Loring at Grenada and that neighbourhood had 7,000; and Brigadier-General J. R. Chalmers, in Northern Mississippi, where they could observe General Hurlbut's troops, had 5,000. On April 7 Pemberton received a telegram from President Davis, directing him to send some reinforcements to Bragg, if circumstances in his department would permit. He replied that it was not safe to weaken his army now, but if he ascertained that Grant was reinforcing Rosecrans, then he would dispatch troops to Bragg. A few days later Grant sent Ellet's Marine Brigade, numbering about 2,000, to the Tennessee. Scouts seeing these troops going up the Mississippi, and empty transports coming down, the inference was that Grant was withdrawing from Vicksburg to reinforce Rosecrans. Pemberton accordingly telegraphed to Chattanooga that he could send 4,000; and Buford's and Rust's brigades, numbering that many, that had just arrived at Jackson from Port Hudson, on their way to Vicksburg, were sent on to Bragg. Still more were asked, and Tilghman's and Vaughn's brigades were ordered to be in readiness to move. But later information convinced Pemberton that the conclusion that Grant was making a retrograde movement was a mis-

take, and that instead an early attack on Vicksburg must be expected. Then Tilghman's and Vaughn's brigades were retained. On April 17 Stevenson notified Pemberton that eight boats had attempted to pass the batteries at Vicksburg and that five had succeeded, that Grant now had nine boats between there and Port Hudson. Stevenson therefore advised that no more troops be sent to Chattanooga and that those which had been, should be brought back. They were soon all returned. General Bowen, in command at Grand Gulf, was advised of the passage of the boats and the reinforcements were sent to him. When McClelland began his advance from Richmond to New Carthage, Bowen had sent three of his regiments across the river, to support the cavalry already there, and hold him in check. Bowen had reported McClelland's movement to Pemberton, but neither attached much importance to it. But the passing of the boats changed Pemberton's mind, and he ordered Bowen to withdraw his troops from across the river.

When Grant moved McClelland to New Carthage, he started Sherman up the Yazoo to make a demonstration against Haynes' Bluff. He wished to divert attention in that direction and conceal his real movement down the river. It was Sherman that first attracted the attention of Stevenson. The chain-raft across the river at Haynes' Bluff had been out of repair and it was speedily replaced. Sherman absorbed all of Stevenson's attention till he was awakened to what was transpiring across the river by the passage of the boats. But even then he did not realise its full meaning, and the batteries were strengthened at Haynes' Bluff at the expense of Vicksburg.

While he was thus bewildered as to where the threatened blow would fall, another still greater source of trouble to Pemberton arose. This was the cavalry raid of Brigadier-General B. H. Grierson. It was one of the most daring and successful raids. Pemberton himself wrote: 'So great was the consternation created by this raid that it was impossible to obtain any reliable information of the enemy's movements, rumour placing him in various places at the same time.' Grierson traversed the entire state, passing within thirty miles of Pemberton's headquarters at Jackson, bringing war home to the very doors of the people, creating demands for protection in many directions. Yet Pemberton was almost without cavalry, and was compelled to employ infantry, and thus weaken his force in that arm at numerous important points, in his fruitless efforts to capture him. Grierson was sent out by General Hurlbut at the suggestion of Grant, to withdraw still further the attention of Pemberton from the movement down the river.

He left La Grange, Tenn., on April 17, with 1,700 cavalry. As the Confederate General Chalmers was guarding Northern Mississippi, two small forces of infantry, one from La Grange and another from Memphis, were sent out to attract his attention and give Grierson a good start. The ruse succeeded, and Grierson was soon well on his way. Advancing rapidly southward, he crossed the Tallahatchie the afternoon of the next day near New Albany, and encamped four miles beyond. It was the wet season and the rain fell in torrents all that night. His command moved in three columns, so as to elude pursuit, breaking up

small camps of Confederates, killing and wounding some and taking others prisoners. At Pontotoc he captured a mill, a large quantity of Confederate salt and some camp equipage, and destroyed them all. The next day he detached 175, the least effective portion of his command, with a gun and all prisoners, led horses and captured property, to be taken back to La Grange. They marched in column of four, before daylight, through Pontotoc, to give the impression that the whole command had returned. Then cutting the telegraph wires on the Mississippi Central Railroad, Grierson himself hurried on with the rest of his troops through Houston and Starkville. Near Columbus he detached Colonel Hatch with 500 more of his men to destroy the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. But they were pursued by a Confederate force that had been sent out to capture Grierson. They drew this force away from *him* and after *them*, with a running fight of several days, and at last *they* succeeded in eluding their pursuers and reached La Grange in safety.

Grierson himself still pushed resolutely on towards Louisville with his remaining force, now numbering only 950, capturing and destroying Confederate property and cutting and destroying railroads and telegraphs wherever he went. He approached Louisville through a dismal swamp, belly-deep in mud, swimming his horses to cross streams, and finally encamped for the night, in the midst of a violent storm of wind and rain, near the town. The next morning he destroyed a large tannery and shoe factory in the service of the Confederates, with a great quantity of boots and shoes and leather and machinery, estimated at \$50,000 worth, and captured a quartermaster, there from Port Hudson to lay in a supply for his command. He passed through Louisville in the night and crossed the railroad, between Jackson and Meridian, at Newton. Here he captured two trains, loaded with ties and commissary and quartermaster's stores. They, with a quantity of stores and arms in the town, were destroyed; the locomotives were exploded; the track was torn up and a bridge near by was destroyed. A battalion, sent out to the east, also destroyed three bridges and several hundred feet of trestle-work and the telegraph line for ten miles. Seventy-five prisoners captured were paroled. This was the objective point of his order. And the instructions were to move in any direction from here which in his judgment would be best for the safety of his men and the success of the expedition. Knowing that large forces had been sent out to intercept his return, he at once decided to move south. After passing through Raleigh, he sent a scout, disguised as a citizen, to cut the telegraph and if possible fire a bridge or trestle on the Southern Railroad. The scout started at midnight. And when within seven miles of the railroad he came upon a regiment of Confederate cavalry in search of Grierson. He succeeded in misdirecting them and then hurried back to camp with the news.

Grierson had learned that a fight was momentarily expected at Grand Gulf, and he therefore decided to make a rapid march across Pearl River and strike the New Orleans, Galveston and Great Northern Railroad and destroy it and endeavour to reach Grant's army, after striking the flank of Pemberton's. A detachment was sent to Hazelhurst which captured a number of cars loaded with ammunition and

stores for the Confederates at Grand Gulf. They were destroyed, as well as the railroad and telegraph. Finding it would be impossible to reach Grand Gulf, he again turned southward along the railroad, destroying depots, cars, bridges and water-tanks, and endeavouring to reach Baton Rouge, a Union post. As he approached Port Hudson, held by the Confederate General Gardner with 16,000 troops, he met two detachments of their cavalry. And after engaging each, he drove them away from his path and hurried on without halting. The enemy were now on his track in earnest, and were sending forces in all directions to intercept him. But he crossed the Amite River, a wide and rapid stream, at midnight, two hours ahead of the heavy column of infantry and artillery that had been sent to intercept him. At Sandy Creek he boldly attacked a Confederate camp and captured the troops and burned their tents and destroyed their arms. At the Comite River he surprised and captured Miles' Legion of Stuart's cavalry, who were picketing the crossing. And having forded the river, he halted to feed within four miles of Baton Rouge. General Augur, in command there, having now first heard of his approach, sent two companies of cavalry to meet him, and together they marched into town. And Grierson's men 'were most heartily welcomed!' And it is needless to say that they were gratified.

Grierson had travelled upwards of 600 miles in sixteen days, killed and wounded 100 of the enemy, captured and paroled 500 more, destroyed 50 or 60 miles of railroad and telegraph, taken 3,000 stand of arms and 1,000 horses and mules. And his loss was only three killed, seven wounded and five left on the route, sick. Two thousand cavalry from Greenwood and Grenada, 1,300 from Mobile, and expeditions from Vicksburg, Port Gibson and Port Hudson were sent out to intercept him; but with Colton's Map of Mississippi in his pocket and some good scouts, he succeeded in eluding them all, as well as the bands of militia that were gathered along the road to capture him. This certainly was honour enough for this hard-riding trooper and his men. But it was as nothing compared with the good it did Grant. The days of Grierson's raid were from April 17, when Grant sent the gunboats past the batteries of Vicksburg, to May 2, when he entered Port Gibson. These were critical days in Grant's calendar. He was passing his men and his transports down the river, ferrying his troops over and getting a firm foothold on the high ground. Then it was, if ever, that Pemberton could have defeated his whole plan. But Pemberton was in Jackson. The country was excited. Calls for protection were coming from all directions. Pemberton was absorbed with this wild ride of less than 1,000 men, when the fate of Vicksburg and the opening of the Mississippi River, the greatest single interest of the Confederacy, was hanging in the balance. And he should have had his eyes fixed there. For the great and fertile states of Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas, whence the South had been drawing her supplies, were at stake. In area this was approximately half what remained of the Confederacy. With the Mississippi River patrolled by Union gunboats and the ocean ports blockaded this fertile region would be lost.

But Pemberton was not a great general, and to this must be traced one of the reasons for the fall of Vicksburg. The strength of his and

of Grant's commands were about equal. According to his returns for March 31, Pemberton's had an effective strength of 50,000 men, including the garrison of Port Hudson, now reduced to about 6,000. But two brigades, 5,000 men, sent to Pemberton from South Carolina on May 5 and 3,000 cavalry that came from Bragg's army about the same time, bring his force up to this figure without the garrison of Port Hudson. Grant's return for April showed 50,068. In addition to this, it is true, Grant had the co-operation of Porter's fleet. But, on the other hand, Pemberton was fighting behind entrenchments so strong that they have seldom been equalled, and was operating in his own country, where he and his men were familiar with all the roads, rivers and positions. These were great advantages and fully counter-balanced the help of the fleet. So that the armies were not unequally matched.

But there was a vast disparity in the commanders. Grant, as we know now, was the greatest military genius of the war. Pemberton was an anomaly. He had held no important command before, and after this campaign he disappeared entirely. Both his appearance and his disappearance were alike sudden, and the first at least seems inexplicable. Grant had been training for two years in high command, and had acquired a confidence in his own ability to wield a large army. Pemberton had come to dazzling power so suddenly that he was unprepared for it, and failed. In corps commanders, the disparity was equally noticeable. Sherman, McPherson and McClelland were all tried men, cool, hard fighters. Next to Grant, as a soldier in the Union army, has always stood Sherman. McPherson died early, but his great fame was already assured. While there is some disposition to question McClelland's title, his subsequent removal from command must be ascribed to his want of judgment and of subordination, rather than of courage and ability to fight. He was now assigned by Grant to lead the advance and was given the largest of all the corps. As against these old and tried campaigners, Pemberton's subalterns, Smith, Forney, Irving and Stevenson, hardly rise above mediocre. Bowen belongs to a different class. At the head of a brigade of hard-fighting Missouri troops, he left the impress of his strong hand upon many of the earlier battles in the West. He was now fighting his last campaign. Worn down by the battles of Grand Gulf and Port Gibson, and his heroic defence of Champion's Hill, succeeded by the hard work and exposure of the siege, he perished by disease on the march from Vicksburg to Jackson, after the surrender.

These men were then holding the lines about Vicksburg. Pemberton was in Jackson. But during the evening of April 30 he received a telegram from Grand Gulf that Grant had 3,000 troops within ten miles of Port Gibson, and that others were landing at Bruinsburg. This was the first information Pemberton had of the landing of the Union army. A little later came the word that prisoners reported the force at 20,000. Pemberton immediately ordered all his detachments at Grenada, Columbus and Meridian to move at once to Jackson, while he took the train to Vicksburg. Troops were ordered from there to reinforce Bowen at Port Gibson. But at 5.30 Bowen telegraphed that he was falling back across Bayou Pierre, where he would endeavour

to hold a position till the arrival of the reinforcements. That night reinforcements did reach him; but the next morning Pemberton learned that, instead of being able to make a stand on Bayou Pierre, he had been compelled to fall back eight miles nearer to Vicksburg, and had crossed the Big Black River at Hankinson's Ferry. Pemberton, now fully aroused to the danger of his position, ordered all the troops from Grenada, Columbus and Jackson to be brought to Vicksburg as rapidly as possible.

On May 1 Pemberton telegraphed General Joseph E. Johnston, in command of the department, that he must have large reinforcements, that Grant's movement threatened Jackson, and if successful would cut off Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Johnston, in reply, directed him to concentrate his forces and attack Grant immediately, saying that success would give back whatever places would have to be abandoned to win it. Pemberton did not follow this direction from his chief. He preferred to keep behind the Big Black, holding that as his line, so that his army could easily retreat to the entrenchments about Vicksburg. Personally he remained within the entrenchments. And on the 5th he telegraphed Johnston again that 6,000 cavalry were needed to keep his communications open. Already the danger of being closed in had occurred to him. But he was over-estimating Grant's strength, for he added that Grant had double the troops that he could bring into the field, which, as we have seen, was not true, for their forces were about equal. The next day he telegraphed to Richmond for more troops, adding that the stake was a great one, that he could see nothing so important. On May 7 President Davis answered that all the assistance in his power to send would be forwarded, but that it was necessary to hold Port Hudson as a means of keeping up their communication with the Trans-Mississippi Dept. Major-General Gardner, who was in command at Port Hudson under Pemberton, and had previously been ordered to Jackson with 5,000 troops to reinforce him there, was now directed to return with 2,000 and hold that place at all hazards.

Pemberton disposed his troops about Vicksburg so as to occupy positions on the roads to Hall's and Baldwin's Ferries over the Big Black and the line of the river from there to Bovina and Edwards stations on the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad. Each division was placed so as to be within supporting distance of the other. All the cavalry that could be collected was placed under the command of Colonel Wirt Adams, and he was ordered to harass Grant's line of march, cut his communications and patrol the country so as to prevent him from collecting provisions and supplies. Thus it will be seen that Pemberton had chosen the Big Black as his line of defence. He was guarding all the crossings and keeping his army in hand so that if Grant attempted to pass that river anywhere, in advancing on Vicksburg, he would fall upon his army and defeat it or at least prevent the passage.

Johnston, who was then at Tullahoma, Tenn., with Bragg's army, was directed on May 9 by the Confederate Secretary of War to go to Mississippi and take 'chief command' of the army 'in the field.' He started the next morning, and reached Jackson on the evening of

the 13th. He found there the brigades of Gregg and Walker, about 6,000. These, with Maxey's brigade from Port Hudson and some reinforcements from the East, he calculated would give him the next day 11,000 troops. But he also heard that Sherman occupied Clinton, ten miles west of Jackson, and between himself and Edwards, where Pemberton lay with the remainder of his army. He at once sent a dispatch to Pemberton informing him of his arrival and of the occupation of Clinton by Sherman, and urged the importance of re-establishing their communications. He ordered him to come up and attack Sherman's rear at once, while he would strike him in front, adding that he should bring all his force quickly, that time was all-important, and that to beat such a detachment would be of immense value. But Johnston was too clear-headed not to appreciate the real situation, for the same night he telegraphed the Secretary of War: 'I arrived this evening, finding the enemy's force between this place and General Pemberton, cutting off the communication. I am too late.'

Let us now go back and see what Grant had done to lead up to this situation. When he defeated the Confederates at Port Gibson, he pushed on through the town and found the bridges over the South Fork of Bayou Pierre on the roads to Grand Gulf and Vicksburg both destroyed. Bowen had retreated by both routes and left a battery and several regiments of infantry at the crossing of the Grand Gulf road, to obstruct a passage and prevent the reconstruction of the bridge. Grant sent a detachment to drive them away or keep them occupied while his troops built a bridge at the other crossing. This was completed, a hundred and twenty feet long, and the whole of McPherson's two divisions crossed before night. They then marched eight miles to the North Fork, and during the next night built a bridge over it, so that the troops were marching across by five o'clock the following morning. McPherson hurried on to Willow Springs, and held the road from there to the Big Black River till McClernand came up, while Grant himself left them here and went to Grand Gulf. A few miles before reaching the town he learned, from some contrabands and prisoners who were taken, that the last of the Confederates had gone. So, leaving the brigade that attended him there, he rode with a cavalry squad unopposed into this town which he had in vain tried to take from the water side with the aid of Porter's powerful fleet. Grant's turning movement had compelled its evacuation.

For six days Grant had been without a change of linen or a meal, except such as he could pick up among his soldiers, or even a tent to cover him. The army was travelling light, and he had set an example to his men. Naturally the first thing he did on reaching Grand Gulf was to get a bath and don some fresh underwear that he borrowed from one of the naval officers. Then, with a good meal on the flagship, he felt better than perhaps most of his men.

Here a letter was handed him that quickly changed the whole plan of his campaign. The promptness with which he passed from the one to another upon which such great destinies hung, without time for serious reflection, shows the wonderful versatility of the man. His marvellous power of deciding great questions, upon which hung the fate of an army or a campaign, quickly and with unerring judgment, was one of

the great secrets of Napoleon's success. Up to this time it was Grant's intention to collect all his forces at Grand Gulf, accumulate a supply of provisions and ordnance stores, and then detach McClelland's corps to co-operate with Banks in the reduction of Port Hudson. This done, they could unite their forces for the capture of Vicksburg. But now Grant received a letter from Banks on the Red River, in Arkansas, where he had been frittering away his time on a fruitless expedition, giving May 10 as the earliest date when he could be ready to assist in the reduction of Port Hudson.

This settled the question for Grant. Through the whole campaign Banks had proved a disappointment. Much had been promised and nothing received. Grant decided that he could not wait. The reduction of Port Hudson, he estimated, could only add 12,000 men to his army, for operations against Vicksburg, perhaps not more than 10,000 after losses and pickets for the river were deducted, while he now had word that troops were expected at Jackson from the East with General Beauregard in command. He reflected that the delay of a month, which would be necessary to reduce Port Hudson, would enable the Confederates to add more to their army at Jackson than Banks would add to his at Grand Gulf. The result would be that he would not be relatively as strong then as now. Grant's resolution was fixed. Two corps of his army were already fifteen miles on the road to either Vicksburg or Jackson, as he might choose. He would set his face to the front and strike quickly.

Halleck had approved of co-operation with Banks. But Grant felt that, with his habitual caution, he would not approve of this new plan. So his approval was not asked. Grant assumed the responsibility. He felt there was no other plan equally promising of success, and that he could try it and know whether it would succeed before word could be carried to Washington and back. It took from four to six days for his letters to reach Memphis. So he was assured that he would not be interfered with till his plan was tried. Besides, to stand idle where he was, without a base, in a hostile country, with hostile armies on both sides of him, liable to be reinforced quickly—for it must be remembered that the Confederates held the railroads and the interior lines and could bring troops from every direction sooner than he, who held no line but the slow-flowing river, and that interrupted at Vicksburg—to stand idle under such circumstances was to invite disaster. A vigorous use of the means he had was his best weapon. So having written letters to Washington to inform them what had been done, and having prepared orders for all his corps commanders, he left Grand Gulf at midnight and reached the advance of his army at Hankinson's Ferry on the Big Black before dawn.

The Big Black was a deep and rapid stream. It took its rise in the high lands of the north-eastern part of the state, and flowed thence south-west, two hundred miles nearly parallel with the Yazoo, and entered the Mississippi at Grand Gulf. The Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad crossed it by the Big Black Bridge, near Edwards, twenty miles above Hankinson's Ferry, but only ten from Vicksburg. South-east of the Big Black, and nearly parallel with it, ran Bayou Pierre, a smaller stream which entered the Mississippi at Bruinsburg. Between

these two streams, which were not more than ten miles apart, there was a dividing ridge, running from the Mississippi River to the north-east. This divide was cut by numerous deep ravines, with sharp, wooded sides, mostly leading north-west into the Big Black. In succession from the south-west to the north-east, the direction of Grant's march, the principal streams were Big Sandy Creek, Five Mile Creek, and, still farther on, Fourteen Mile Creek. All were south of the railroad from Vicksburg to Jackson. After leaving Port Gibson Grant had crossed Bayou Pierre and pressed rapidly to the dividing ridge, and his army was now near the line of the Big Black. On the other side of this river and not far away were the outer defences of Vicksburg. Grant was leaving them to his left and passing on to the north-east.

While waiting at Hankinson's Ferry to let Sherman come up and to get forward supplies of hard bread, coffee and salt, which he could not obtain from the country, demonstrations were made to induce Pemberton to believe that he would cross the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry and at Hall's, ten miles above, and attack Vicksburg. For the same purpose reconnaissances were made on the west side of the river to within six miles of Warrenton, the Confederate outpost on the Mississippi nearest Vicksburg. These ruses succeeded in confining Pemberton to his side. On May 7 Grant ordered an advance, McPherson's corps to keep the road nearest the Big Black to Rocky Springs, McClermand's corps to reach the same place by the ridge road from Willow Springs, Sherman to follow, with his troops on both roads. Both McPherson and McClermand passed the night at Rocky Springs, and then the former moved toward Raymond, by way of Utica, while the latter crossed to the Big Sandy and then to Five Mile Creek, hugging the Big Black and guarding all the crossings to prevent Pemberton from falling upon his rear. But Sherman followed the ridge to Auburn. Both McClermand and Sherman soon after crossed Fourteen Mile Creek. All the while they were skirmishing with Confederate detachments. But the opposition was not serious. The army was now fronting nearly parallel with the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad, and about seven miles south of it, McPherson near Raymond, and Sherman and McClermand on Fourteen Mile Creek. McClermand's pickets were within two miles of Edwards, where Pemberton had stationed a force in expectation of an attack, and with a view of protecting the bridge over the Big Black. Grant estimated that Pemberton had only 18,000 troops, but in this he was in error, for that force was much larger. But he was right in calculating that Pemberton's force was divided between Vicksburg and Jackson. His plan was to throw his army between them and fight each in detail. Thus presenting a superior number to each part of Pemberton's army, Grant was following a plan of campaign that has been familiar to great soldiers.

McPherson met the Confederates on the afternoon of May 12, about two miles west of Raymond. Logan was in advance. The head of the column was deployed and the wagons at the rear were ordered off the road so that the rest of the command might come forward. But in the meantime Logan pressed forward with vigour,

and the Confederates, two brigades numbering about 6,000, under Brigadier-General John Gregg, after a sharp fight, were driven back and retreated through the town and towards Jackson. McPherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded and 37 missing. Gregg's loss was 100 killed, 305 wounded and 415 captured. The rough and impracticable nature of the country, with its numerous ravines, lined with timber and a dense undergrowth of vines and bushes, prevented an effective use of artillery or a rapid pursuit.

Information was now received by Grant of Johnston's coming to Jackson and that reinforcements were arriving. As Gregg had retreated in that direction, Grant concluded that the time had come to strike there. McPherson was ordered towards Clinton, to break up the railroad and interrupt communication with Pemberton, while Sherman and McClernand were to march to Raymond. Thus Grant's whole army had faced suddenly to the east and was moving upon Jackson and away from Vicksburg. His purpose was, when he turned upon Vicksburg, to leave no enemy in his rear. This was the situation when Johnston came to Jackson and found Union troops, under Sherman as he supposed, but in reality McPherson, at Clinton, which were cutting off his communication with Pemberton.

The next morning, May 14, found McPherson and Sherman moving towards Jackson on converging roads. One division of McClernand's, Hovey's, was sent to Clinton, to be in position to support McPherson; another was sent to Mississippi Springs to support Sherman; a third was ordered to Raymond, where it could support either. In reality Grant feared an attack on his rear, as we have seen Johnston had ordered, and had placed these divisions so as to meet such an attack if made by Pemberton. McClernand's fourth division had been left near Edwards to watch and obstruct such a movement if made. This disposition placed all of this corps, in case they were not needed at Jackson, one day's march nearer Vicksburg and Pemberton's army. Grant hoped to turn quickly and defeat him before he could reach his entrenchments again.

All the night before the movement on Jackson the rain fell in torrents. The roads from being dusty had become muddy and slippery. In some places, where the land was low, they were covered with water a foot deep. But the troops were in good spirits and trudged along in excellent order and without straggling. There was enough danger and excitement in their lives now to keep all interested; and their long confinement near the rivers and the swamps had made almost any other situation tolerable. At ten o'clock they were within three miles of Jackson. The guns in front of McPherson on the left and Sherman's cavalry on the right announced that the enemy was there. The troops in advance were deployed to the right and left; those to the rear closed up and, when all were ready, a determined advance on the line, preceded by skirmishers, soon drove the Confederates within their rifle-pits around the city. The bulk of them proved to be in front of McPherson. After a heavy engagement there for more than two hours, they withdrew. Sherman thought that he detected the weakness of the line in front of him. A brigade was sent to make a detour to the right, and finding that the line was

held only by some artillerists, with heavy guns, commanding the roads by which Sherman would be expected to advance, he moved quietly in behind and surrounded and captured them. And the capture of Jackson quickly followed. Johnston lost 17 guns and 845 men in killed, wounded and captured. McPherson's loss was 65, and Sherman's 25. Jackson had been used as a depot of supply, and much ammunition and some valuable public stores were captured. Johnston retreated to the north by the Canton road. And Grant that night slept in the bed Johnston had occupied the night before.

Sherman was ordered to occupy the rifle-pits and effectually destroy all the railroads entering the city. This he did by tearing them up, burning the ties and warping the iron for a distance of from three to ten miles in each of the four directions the roads ran from the city. The Pearl River Bridge was also destroyed. The work was effectually done, and when finished Sherman declared that Jackson, as a railroad centre or Government depot for stores and military factories, could be of little use for the next six months. The arsenal buildings, the Government foundry, the gun-carriage factory, with carpenter and paint shops, were destroyed, as well as a large cotton-mill, that Sherman found turning out before him canvas for tents with the letters 'C.S.A.' woven in each bolt. Some other buildings were burned whose destruction could not be justified by the rules of war, among them the 'Catholic Church' and the 'Confederate Hotel.' This Sherman regretted. It must be remembered that his wife and her family were Catholics. The church was burned by accident, but the hotel probably from malice actuated by its name. Though a brigade was stationed in the city to maintain order, the mass of soldiers and camp followers that thronged the place was so great that, as a result of some bad rum, taken from the stores, it was found impossible altogether to prevent acts that were to be regretted, but whose authors could neither be detected nor punished.

The night after the battle of Jackson, Grant learned that Johnston had ordered Pemberton to come up and attack his rear. So Grant's next move was to fall quickly on Pemberton and defeat him before he would have time to unite his force with Johnston's retreating, but still compact, column. Grant ordered McClernand with his own corps and a division of Sherman's, that had come up from the river as a guard to a wagon train, to face about and march towards Edwards, where Pemberton was hovering, near the crossing of the Big Black. The different divisions, marching by converging roads, were to rendezvous at Bolton, near Champion's Hill. McPherson was ordered back to Clinton, but Sherman was to remain in Jackson and complete his work there. Grant left Jackson the afternoon of the 15th and rode out to Clinton. The next morning two employees of the railroad, who had passed through Pemberton's army the night before, were brought to his headquarters, and they stated that Pemberton had eighty regiments and ten batteries, and that his whole force was estimated at 25,000. The number surprised Grant, and he at once telegraphed Sherman to move his command to Bolton with all possible speed. Within an hour from the receipt of the dispatch

Sherman was in motion. And Grant's whole army was now moving along the railroad towards Vicksburg and against Pemberton.

When Johnston sent the dispatch to Pemberton, directing him to come up and attack Grant's rear, the dispatch was carried around McPherson's flank and delivered to Pemberton at Bovina, a station on the railroad, at seven o'clock the next morning.

As Grant was keeping his force together, he having written Halleck he would, and as it equalled in numbers the Confederates, their only movement was to attack Grant front and rear at the same time. Thus only could they oppose their whole force, now divided, to his. Johnston had so ordered Pemberton, and the latter should have obeyed the order at once. He did answer that, though he thought Johnston did not fully comprehend the position that Vicksburg would be left in, still he would comply. And he issued an order for his troops to make the movement. Thus far all was well. However, he continued to question the propriety of the order, as he had no right to do. And then he went further wrong. About noon, and before his troops had got into motion under the order, he called a council of war to decide whether Johnston should be obeyed. His generals having met, he read the order to them and asked their opinions. A majority of them were in favour of obeying, but the two senior officers, Loring and Stevenson, advised a movement against Grant's communications, for the purpose of cutting off his supplies and compelling him to retreat. Pemberton was not in favour of moving at all. He wished to make a stand in some good position and await Grant's attack. But as all his generals were urging an advance he decided to follow the advice of Loring and Stevenson and move on Grant's communications. So he sent word to Johnston that he would make this movement instead of the one ordered.

Johnston answered: 'Impracticable! The only move by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton, and informing me that we may move to that point.' Thus we have this curious situation, on the same day, but after the retreat from Jackson, of Johnston moving to the north-west to get to Pemberton, and Pemberton moving to the south-east and away from Johnston! It was a sad spectacle for the Confederacy. But the outcome was even sadder.

Pemberton's army set out on the march towards Dillon's, near Raymond, where Grant's train really was, though securely guarded by McClernand. When Pemberton reached the ford on Baker's Creek on the afternoon of the 15th, he found the stream raised by the recent heavy rains so that it was impassable. His army was then marched up the stream to the bridge, where the Clinton Road to Edwards crossed. Here he crossed and proceeded to the forks of the road south of Champion's Hill, where the head of his column turned to the right into a cross-road leading to the road he first attempted to travel, but had been compelled to abandon at the ford. Along this cross-road, between Elliston's and Dillon's, his army passed the night. At 6.30 the next morning, May 16, a courier arrived from Johnston with the answer to the dispatch. The order to effect a junction *north* of the railroad, which Pemberton had submitted to a council and had decided not to obey, was here repeated, after his

advance had already reached Grant's line and was skirmishing with McClernand's troops who were guarding the train. Now Pemberton, hopelessly confused and fearful of being defeated, decided to obey. Orders were given for his train to get out of the way and to counter-march the troops to Edwards, the place of starting. He intended to take the road from there to Brownsville in order to unite with Johnston. This would take him around Grant. But he was too late, for Grant was now upon him.

On the morning of the 16th Grant had seven divisions within four miles of Champion's Hill, five of them under McClernand and two under McPherson. McPherson had come out from Jackson the day before and camped near Bolton; while McClernand had been stationed about Clinton and Raymond, to be ready to march to Jackson in case his help should be needed, or to defend the rear, or turn on Pemberton, after the capture of Jackson. But one of his divisions, Hovey's, had preceded McPherson, the day before, from Clinton to Bolton. It was on the Clinton Road to Edwards. This road led by Champion's Hill, and hence Hovey's division was the nearest of all Grant's troops to it. South of it were two other roads to Edwards, known as the Middle and Direct Roads from Raymond. Osterhaus' and Carr's divisions were on the Middle Road immediately south of Hovey, and Smith's and Blair's were on the Direct Road, still farther south. Grant was moving all these troops forward cautiously towards Edwards.

Pemberton's army that night lay, as we have seen, on the cross-road from Champion's Hill to the Direct Road from Raymond. This was not more than four miles from Grant's. The next morning, finding that Grant was upon him, Pemberton moved two divisions of his army, Stevenson's and Bowen's, northward to take positions on Champion's Hill, the former on the north slope, the latter on the east, leaving Loring's division along the cross-road running south from the hill. Stevenson's line ran east and west, but Bowen's and Loring's north and south. So the latter were across the line of Grant's approach. They were thrown across Grant's path with a view to preventing his advance towards Vicksburg. Stevenson's line running east and west would prevent him passing around the north flank of Bowen so as to reach the road, behind him and Loring, to Vicksburg. This road passed along the south side of the hill. And it would also prevent him passing along the railroad which lay along the north side.

Champion's Hill was a part of a plantation then owned by a planter of that name, who lived on the Clinton Road on the north-eastern slope. The hill was only seventy or eighty feet high. And its height would not ordinarily give it prominence. But as the surrounding country was comparatively flat, it became a prominent feature of the landscape. Its greatest length was from east to west. The north and eastern slopes were abrupt, somewhat covered with timber and cut by gullies, while its south and western sides were gently sloping and mostly tillable. The Clinton Road, nearly straight for six miles to the east, struck the north-east corner of the hill and then turned at right angles and ran a mile south along the foot of the eastern slope, where it united with the Middle Road from Raymond.

Here it turned at right angles, again to the west, and pursued a gentle grade down to the Baker's Creek Bridge, which Pemberton had crossed in coming forward. Two of the roads by which Grant's troops were approaching thus passed along the east and south slopes of the hill. On each of these roads Grant had several divisions: McPherson was coming by one and McClernand by the other. Bowen's division of Pemberton's army faced the road along the east slope. And the road along the south slope separated this division from Loring's. These circumstances will be seen to figure in the battle of Champion's Hill.

Hovey's, the first of Grant's divisions on the field, was moving at the time with skirmishers thrown forward, exchanging shots with those of the Confederates. By eleven o'clock this skirmishing had grown into a hardly contested battle with Bowen's troops. Before any others could get up to support him, Hovey had captured eleven guns and driven the line in front of him up the hill. But as he started at the angle formed by the meeting of Bowen's line with Stevenson's, as they were driven back the angle became smaller and the lines compressed, and Bowen's division rallying, fighting desperately, drove Hovey back with the loss of all his captured guns but two. Grant in coming up to this line had found the road in front of Logan's division, which was following Hovey's, blocked by wagons. He ordered them to one side so as to let Logan pass, and the latter went forward promptly. When he reached the rear of Hovey he moved around to the north side of the hill so as to form in front of Stevenson. Croker coming up, fell in behind Hovey, just as he was driven back and was calling for reinforcements. Grant directed first one and then a second brigade from Croker's division to reinforce him. Hovey's battery, located near the Champion house, was doing good work. All this time Logan's division was working upon Stevenson's front, and this weakened Bowen, for Stevenson had been supporting him. Hovey, supported by Croker, now went forward again and, on his right, went up two brigades of Logan. Slowly but surely they climbed the wooded slope, Stevenson and Bowen sullenly yielding, till at last the Union line held the crest of the hill and captured some of the Confederate guns again. Here they held on for an hour or more. Then Bowen and Stevenson closed up and came forward again, their troops massed and fighting desperately. Hovey stubbornly yielded and was driven back. And again he called for support, but there was none to give. All day Grant had waited anxiously for McClernand, and had sent messenger after messenger for him, but still he did not come. Grant, as a last alternative, ordered McPherson to move his line to the left around to Hovey so as to give him the needed aid. Hovey had been desperately sustaining the brunt of the battle and deserved support. Thus strengthened again, a third time he went forward. The movement of McPherson to the left had now uncovered the Confederate line of retreat. For McPherson's line had passed around the hill so far as to threaten the road to Edwards that passed westward along the south side. Exhausted by the desperate efforts of four hours, their ranks thinned by death and wounds, discouraged because reinforcements that were sent for did not come, the Confederates broke and fled, some crossing Baker's Creek by the bridge

and some by the ford, two miles below, that had now become passable. As Grant followed in pursuit, he met some of McClernand's troops coming up. They were fresh, and were ordered to pursue them vigorously to the Big Black. The pursuit was continued until dark, and resulted in the capture of some stragglers and a train of cars loaded with commissary and ordnance stores.

The whole weight of the battle had fallen on three divisions, Hovey's, Croker's and Logan's. McClernand's four divisions, more than half the army, were on the Middle and Direct Roads from Raymond. He was himself with three of the divisions on the Middle Road, which led directly to the battle-field, uniting with the Clinton Road at the south-west corner of Champion's Hill. He was directed by Grant to push forward and attack. And he did order his troops to attack 'vigorously.' But the attack was by no means vigorous. The hesitation was because Loring, who was in his front, lay in a forest behind a ravine, presenting a front of artillery and infantry where it was impossible to discover his numbers. But the road to the north was open, and had been traversed by couriers from Grant bearing dispatches ordering him forward several times. They traversed it without escorts and in safety; but McClernand did not come till Pemberton had been driven from the field after a terrible contest of more than four hours. Grant was dissatisfied. If McClernand had come up promptly, nothing, it seems, could have prevented the capture of Pemberton's army and of Vicksburg without a siege. But instead of coming up promptly, McClernand actually did send an order to Hovey, who commanded the only one of his divisions that was engaged, to join on to his right. This would have meant to withdraw from the front of the enemy and let Bowen enter between McPherson's and McClernand's corps. Grant happily was present when Hovey received this order and promptly countermanded it. And thus nothing but good luck seemed to save the army from disaster.

The Confederate General Loring, who had been across the ravine in front of McClernand, had been ordered to send assistance to Bowen and Stevenson. He took two of his brigades, and had advanced to the forks of the roads at Champion's Hill when he found Bowen and Stevenson in full retreat. He was ordered to remain there with his fresh brigades and cover the retreat. But one of McClernand's divisions (Osterhaus') that had now come forward in the pursuit quickly brushed him aside. He then retreated towards the ford over Baker's Creek. And on the way he met his third brigade that had been left to protect the road to the ford, but had fallen in with another division of McClernand's (Smith's) and had been driven off with the loss of their commander, General Tilghman. With his three brigades, Loring now sought to cross the ford. But there he found a third division of McClernand's (Carr's) ahead of him. Loring then turned south, abandoning all his artillery, and after wandering about over unknown roads, he reached Crystal Springs, on the railroad twenty-five miles south of Jackson, the next day, 'without baggage, wagons, or cooking utensils.' His division was not afterwards united to Pemberton's army, but later joined the troops under Johnston.

The blow to Pemberton had been a crushing one. He had lost more than 3,000 in killed and wounded, and as many more of his troops

were captured. Grant's loss was 2,254 killed and wounded, and 187 missing. Of this total loss 1,200 fell on Hovey alone, 400 on Logan and nearly 700 on Croker. The other *four* divisions, under McClernand, lost only 141. And these figures show the minor part he played in the battle. In the precipitancy of their flight, many of Pemberton's troops threw away their guns and knapsacks and abandoned their artillery. Much war material and thirty pieces of artillery were picked up by Grant's troops on the field.

During the night the demoralised fragments of Pemberton's army kept arriving at the railroad bridge over the Big Black. Some passed over and on towards Vicksburg, as far as Mount Alban. Bowen's division, which remained better organised than the others, was ordered into some trenches that had been previously dug east of the river and on each side of the railroad. The river here makes a bend somewhat the shape of a horseshoe. The railroad enters at the heel and crosses the stream at the toe. The whole tract enclosed was low ground. Across the narrow heel there ran a bayou which in times of flood became a cut through which the water of the river passed. It was now a pond of water two or three feet deep, and ten or twenty wide, filled with trees and brush. The Confederate trench had been dug, just back of it, from the river above to the river below, and the trees in the bayou had been cut so as to fall into the water. Thus arranged, the bayou opposed a serious obstacle to an assault upon the pits. And the pits, running north and south for nearly a mile, made an excellent cover for infantry. At frequent intervals dispositions were made for field artillery.

Brigadier-General Vaughn, of M. T. Smith's division of Pemberton's army, had been occupying these trenches and, as he had not been at Champion's Hill, his men were fresh and were supposed not to be demoralised. Pemberton knew that Bowen's could be depended upon. One of Bowen's brigades was placed on the left and the other on the right, with Vaughn occupying the centre of the Confederate line. In front of them was McClernand's corps of Grant's army, Carr on the right, Osterhaus in the centre, and A. J. Smith on the left, their troops all deployed. The extreme right was held by Lawler's brigade. Behind the Union line was McPherson's corps, ready to move up when ordered. Grant stood by, talking to a courier from General Banks. He had brought a letter from General Halleck. This letter ordered Grant to return to Grand Gulf and operate from there, with Banks, against Port Hudson; and having reduced that, then to continue their joint movement against Vicksburg. Grant told the courier that it was too late, that Halleck, if he knew the situation as it was now, would not give such an order. But the courier insisted, and was arguing vigorously that it was Grant's duty to do what the letter directed. Here their conversation was interrupted by a loud cheer on the right. Grant turned and saw Lawler in his shirt sleeves leading his brigade in a furious charge upon Vaughn. Vaughn's line between the railroad and the first skirt of timber north of it, after firing a few shots, broke and ran in disorder. Grant mounted his horse and rode away. And he never saw the courier again.

In addition to the railroad bridge, which Pemberton had taken the precaution to have floored with planks, a river steamer from which

the machinery had been taken was converted into a bridge, by anchoring her fore and aft across the stream, with an approach made to either end from the banks. Thus two bridges were provided. Lawler and the troops following in pursuit of Vaughn were rapidly advancing towards the bridges. Bowen's brigade commanders, seeing that their only hope of escape might soon be cut off, ordered their troops to fall back. 'In this precipitate retreat,' wrote Pemberton, 'but little order was observed, the object of all being to reach the bridges as rapidly as possible. Many were unable to do so, but effected their escape by swimming the river. Some were drowned in the attempt; a considerable number unable to swim, and others too timid to expose themselves to the fire of the enemy by an effort to escape, remained in the trenches and were made prisoners.' This was a dismal picture of demoralisation for a commander to draw of his own troops. But it was nevertheless true. It was painfully apparent that the *morale* of his army would not permit him now to attempt to hold the line of the Big Black according to his plan at the beginning of the campaign. There was danger of flank movements both on the north and the south. So nothing remained but to retire within the defences of Vicksburg and endeavour to reorganise this depressed and discomfited army. He had lost 18 guns, and 1,751 of his men were captured. The number of his killed and wounded was not large. Grant lost 39 killed and 237 wounded. During the two weeks he was out of his trenches Pemberton had lost the whole of Loring's division (8,700) and 5,300 besides. So that his effective force had been reduced from 35,000 to 21,000, though he had within the trenches non-effectives numbering half as many more.

It is fair to state that the advance from Edwards was made against Pemberton's judgment. He truly stated his position when he wrote afterwards: 'My own views were strongly expressed as unfavourable to any advance which would separate me from Vicksburg.' He did not put his own judgment, he added, so far in opposition as to prevent a movement altogether, but he believed the only possibility of success to be in the plan of cutting Grant's communications. By depriving him of food and forage, he thought he could compel him to return to Grand Gulf. But in this he was mistaken. Grant had carefully foreguarded such an attempt. His troops once landed, he issued three days' rations to them; he took no train along, so that henceforth he could live off the country till he was able to establish a base on the bluffs overlooking the Yazoo River. True, Blair's division of Sherman's corps, the last to come up, did bring a train and some supplies, but Grant could have done without them. The country through which he passed afforded an abundance of everything but bread and coffee, and for these substitutes were found. Moreover, Blair did not arrive until Grant was in front of Jackson, where stores were taken in large quantities.

Nor was Pemberton right in believing that, just at the time of the landing of Grant, the safety of Vicksburg was of paramount importance, and that under no circumstances could he abandon his communications with it; and that he must also leave sufficient forces to protect the river front and the approaches by Haynes' Bluff above and Warrenton below. Just at that time the thing of

paramount importance was to whip Grant. If Pemberton had marched out with his whole force and done that quickly, everything he abandoned to accomplish that would have come back to him. But afraid to leave the entrenchments, he let Grant get a firm position between him and Johnston before he attempted to move. With Grant in this position, Vicksburg was worth no more than an isolated castle. It was effectually cut off on all sides, and afforded no communication then with the district across the river. But if, leaving the smallest garrison to hold it, he had marched out to fight Grant, his hold upon Vicksburg would have been secure if he succeeded, and if he failed he would have saved his army and its equipments (less the losses in battle), to unite with Johnston. By the fatal course he adopted he lost everything—the city, the army, his artillery and trains, and his own military reputation as well.

Even after the battle of the Big Black, Pemberton might have saved most of his army by a rapid retreat to the north-west to join Johnston. The battle was over by nine o'clock on the morning of May 17. His troops had promptly burned the bridges behind them, so that, the river being high, Grant's army was not able to cross until eight o'clock the next morning. This time would have given him a long start to the north. But Pemberton, within an hour after his defeat, left orders with General Stevenson to conduct the retreat, while he hurried on to Vicksburg to prepare for its defence. This he did by withdrawing the troops from the defences along the bluffs, from the city to Snyder's Mill. All the stores that could be moved were to be sent to Vicksburg, the rest, including heavy guns, were to be destroyed. A few men were left in the trenches to forward the stores and complete the work of destruction. They made a show of force by picking off the Union skirmishers and anyone that appeared in advance of their line.

Sherman had crossed the Big Black at Bridgeport, and his corps marched down on the north side along the bluffs where these trenches lay. Grant had joined this column, and he and Sherman rode together. They had ridden on ahead. Grant was looking for a suitable place for a landing from which supplies could be brought from the Yazoo. His troops had been for some time on short rations of bread and coffee and he was growing anxious. As he and Sherman rode along, the Confederate bullets were dropping about them from the remnants of garrisons that were picking off the Union men. And a soldier had just been killed as he stood by Grant's side. But when they came to the spot, overlooking the Chickasaw Bayou, where Sherman, five months before, had fought for a lodgement on the bluffs and failed, they stopped. Sherman had never retracted the opinion he gave Grant against the campaign below and back of Vicksburg, though he had loyally co-operated in carrying it out. But here, seeing it completed, he turned to Grant and said, that up to this minute he had felt no positive assurance of success. 'This, however,' he added, 'is the end of one of the greatest campaigns in history, and you ought to make a report of it at once. Vicksburg is not yet captured and there is no telling what may happen before it is. But whether captured or not, *this* is a complete and successful campaign.'

CHAPTER XXIX

Siege and Surrender of Vicksburg—Grant Assaults—Unsuccessful—
Throwing-up Union Works—The Mines—Pemberton, starved out,
surrenders.

THE army reached the rear of Vicksburg on May 18, 1863, and went into position, Sherman on the right, his line running from the Mississippi River to the Graveyard Road, McPherson in the centre from the Graveyard to the Baldwin's Ferry Road, McClernand on the left from the Baldwin's Ferry Road southward. There was a short space between McClernand's left and the Mississippi not yet occupied, into which Herron's and Lauman's divisions afterwards moved. In front of Sherman was the Confederate Major-General M. L. Smith; in front of McPherson, Major-General Forney, with Major-General Bowen in his rear; in front of McClernand and the rest of the line was Major-General Stevenson.

The country about Vicksburg was admirably suited for defence. The bluff on which the city stood, here about two hundred and fifty feet above the river, was composed of red clay, so tenacious that when cuts were made for the opening of streets, the sides remained standing almost as perpendicular as a stone wall. During the siege, at such places doors were cut into the banks and then widened out into a room, and sometimes into others still behind. In such apartments families lived, safely protected by the character of the clay from the caving in of the roof and from danger of shells. As might be expected from such soil, gullies cut by the washing of water for ages were numerous and deep, and their perpendicular sides were overgrown with dense thickets, almost impenetrable for troops.

There were a succession of ridges about the city. One just north started from the river at a bluff known as Fort Hill, where the Spaniards ascending the Mississippi, at a very early day, on a voyage of discovery, had located a fort. This ridge ran thence eastward to where it was crossed by the Graveyard Road, about two miles from the city. Here the ridge was intersected by another running south to the Baldwin's Ferry Road, where it curved to the south-west and ran to the river bank below the city. The crests of these ridges, nearly on the same level all the way, had been selected in the autumn of 1862 as the line of defence, and they were thoroughly fortified. At commanding points, averaging about two hundred yards apart, batteries of various forms, redans, lunettes or closed redoubts, had been constructed, with parapets twenty-five feet thick and ten feet high, and a ditch seven feet deep, giving the parapet a height of seventeen feet from the bottom of the ditch. Between these salients there was

a line of entrenchments ten feet thick and five feet high, with a ditch in front four feet deep. This line, eight miles long, was broken at only two places—where it was cut by Stout's and again by Glass' Bayous. Here these bayous, of course, gave their protection. Along this line were 128 pieces of artillery, 36 of them siege guns. On the river side of the city there was a chain of water batteries, mounting 31 pieces of siege artillery and 13 smaller guns. Within the works there were 20,000 effective men.

The deep ravines, with their sides overgrown with vines and cane and underbrush, their tops covered with dense forests, through which men marching could maintain no organisation, and the succession of gullies or washes occurring irregularly along the sides of the ridges, added to the difficulties of a besieging army. As the Confederate line, necessarily irregular in direction, ran from the head of one ravine straight to the head of another, batteries, built at the angles in an outer work, in which a few men were placed and well protected, completely commanded the approaches to the main line. Hence the Confederate defences were easily accessible at only three points—where they were approached by the Graveyard, the Baldwin's Ferry, and the Jackson Roads—and here their front was protected by cross fires of artillery that, with canister, could sweep approaching lines. Taking the position as a whole, Sherman well described how formidable it was, when he said that after the war he visited Sevastopol, the celebrated stronghold of the Crimean War, and without hesitation he declared that Vicksburg was the more difficult of the two.

On May 19, while the troops were moving into position, there were constant skirmishes with the Confederates. As they had recently been defeated at Champion's Hill and the Big Black, Grant believed they were so badly demoralised that they would not make much effort to hold the city. He accordingly ordered an assault to be made at two o'clock that day. It was made with spirit, and, though it failed, the result was that his troops obtained more advanced positions, where they were protected from the enemy's fire.

The assault was repeated three days later, on the 22nd; Grant in the meantime establishing a base on the Yazoo River, north of the city, whence he could draw supplies of food and ammunition. He still believed he could capture the works, and that, whether he could or not, his men would not willingly submit to the drudgery of a siege and the labour necessary to build entrenchments, until the experiment had been tried. Johnston, besides, was assembling an army in the rear. And it was important for Grant to make quick work of the capture of Vicksburg so as to be able to turn and crush Johnston before he could gather a force sufficient to strike. He might compel the raising of the siege after all Grant's labour of getting into position, or he might even defeat and capture the Union army. Johnston was a thorough tactician, and Grant appreciated his ability. The situation was critical. But if Grant could capture the city and then turn on Johnston and defeat him, the fall of Port Hudson and the opening of the Mississippi would follow, without the necessity of bringing more troops from the north.

The bulk of the Union troops were along the line between the Baldwin's Ferry and the Graveyard Roads. Between them was the Jackson Road. The three roads were selected as the points for assault. Every effort was to be put forth to make it a success. Sharpshooters and the artillery were to keep up a fire from daylight all along the line, and the fleet on the river was to bombard the water batteries. The corps commanders had set their watches by Grant's, and at ten o'clock a simultaneous assault was to be made. An advance party of 150 volunteers, known since as 'The Forlorn Hope,' by reason of the danger they incurred and the little likelihood of their surviving, were provided with planks and poles. They were to rush forward and build bridges across the ditch in front of the Confederate parapets so as to give access and a better prospect of success. And the storming parties were to follow and scale the works.

Promptly at the appointed time the assault was made by all three corps. Each had many more men than could be used on such ground. So some brigades were designated to form the storming party, while others were held in readiness to support them in case they succeeded in entering the works. Grant had taken a commanding position near McPherson's front, from which he could see the advancing columns of that corps and a part of Sherman's and McClelland's. The assault was gallantly made. But it was met by a blaze of fire and cross fire all along the line. Each corps, however, succeeded in reaching the works and planting flags upon the parapet. But they were all at last compelled to retire before the withering fire of the Confederates. No troops succeeded in entering the works save Sergeant Griffith of the 22nd Iowa, with eleven privates of the same regiment. Of these none returned but the sergeant and one of the men. The work entered was an outer one, commanded by an inner, to which the Confederates had retreated and from which they continued the fight upon the sergeant and his men. Two other of McClelland's brigades, fired by this example of bravery, rushed forward and carried the ditch and slope of another heavy earthwork, and planted their colours upon the parapet. While a captain of artillery, not less daring, carried forward one of his pieces by hand quite to the ditch, and double shotting it, fired into an embrasure, disabling a gun there ready to be discharged, and scattering death among the Confederate cannoneers. McClelland's men never fought more desperately. For eight hours they maintained their ground.

At eleven o'clock McClelland informed Grant that he was heavily engaged and that the enemy were massing upon him, suggesting a vigorous blow from McPherson to make a diversion in his favour. Grant answered that, if his advance was weak, he must strengthen it by drawing upon his reserve or other parts of the lines. Grant then left his place of observation and rode around to Sherman, and had just reached there when he received a second dispatch from McClelland, saying that he had gained the enemy's entrenchments at several points, but was brought to a stand, and adding that he had sent word to McArthur, who was on his way from Warrenton, asking for reinforcements. He asked Grant whether it would not be best to concentrate the whole or a part of this command on that line. Grant

answered directing him to communicate with McArthur and use his forces to the best advantage. A little later Grant received a third dispatch from him saying that he was hotly engaged and had part possession of two forts, that the Stars and Stripes were floating over them, and that a vigorous push ought to be made all along the line. Grant handed this message to Sherman, saying that he didn't believe a word of it. But Sherman argued that the note was official and must be credited, and offered to renew the assault with new troops. Grant then showed the dispatch to McPherson and directed both of them to renew the assault. And he then telegraphed to McClernand that Sherman and McPherson were pressing the enemy, and that the latter had gained some successes. And a little later he notified McClernand that Quinby's division was to be sent him by McPherson. McClernand answered that as soon as McArthur's and Quinby's troops arrived he would press the enemy quickly and doubted not that he would force his way through, that he had lost no ground, and that his men were in two of the enemy's forts. He now added, however, 'but they are commanded by rifle-pits in the rear. Several prisoners have been taken, who intimate that the rear is strong.' Here was the gist of the whole matter, but of which Grant had been kept ignorant until after the second assault had been made.

This was vigorously made by both Sherman and McPherson with new troops. But it was merely a repetition of the first, equally unsuccessful and equally bloody. 'It resulted,' wrote Grant, 'in the increase of our mortality list fully fifty per cent., without advancing our position or giving us other advantages.' McPherson and Sherman both lost some valuable officers. And it is needless to add that, had the facts been known and Grant not been induced to it by McClernand's misleading dispatches, the second assault would never have been ordered. It turned out that McClernand, instead of having captured some points of the Confederate main parapet, had only taken one or two small out-lying lunettes open to the rear, where his men were at the mercy of the enemy behind their main parapet. The affair caused much feeling with Grant as well as with Sherman and McPherson. And McClernand was severely criticised. The feeling towards him had already been unfriendly owing to his well understood attempts to supplant Grant. And now it was felt that he was incompetent even for the command he held. Being an unprofessional soldier and unacquainted with the art of fortification, McClernand probably did not know what to expect to find behind the lunettes. His advice to renew the assaults had been honest, but in ignorance of the facts.

Following this strained condition of affairs another circumstance occurred that brought decisive consequences to McClernand. A few days after this assault he issued a sort of congratulatory address to his troops, first published in a St. Louis newspaper. In this he recited that they were the first to march from Miliken's Bend to Perkins' Plantation; the first to cross the river and plant their colours on the soil of Mississippi; the first to push into Port Gibson and drive Pemberton's troops away, in consequence of which Grand Gulf had been evacuated; that they had met the enemy at Champion's

Hill and heavily engaged him, and after an obstinate fight, with the assistance of McPherson's, had beaten and routed Pemberton ; that at dawn the next day they had again advanced upon him at the Big Black, and driven his army at the point of the bayonet ; and finally, in the assault upon the enemy's works at Vicksburg, that they had made a lodgement and planted their colours upon two of the enemy's bastions and held them for hours and only withdrew after the enemy had largely been massed and concentrated against them. The last reflected on Grant for permitting this and for not properly supporting them. In fact, McClelland was claiming the credit for pretty much all that had been done and was putting upon others all the blame for what had not been accomplished. It was a most uncalled-for and unfortunate bit of braggadocio, very well suited, perhaps, for an electioneering circular in a political campaign, as both Sherman and McPherson insisted that it really was, but utterly misplaced as a military order.

Grant's first knowledge of it was when Sherman called attention to it on June 17. The next day McPherson complained. Both said that their commands were complaining of it as doing them an injustice ; and that, as it was being published and widely circulated in the North as if for political purposes, it had become a serious matter. It was already disturbing the discipline of the army and causing criminations and recriminations between the different corps and their commanders. Grant had not been furnished a copy of it, as the army regulations required, perhaps because he had previously felt obliged to criticise McClelland's reports. They were generally highly coloured and inclined to braggadocio. He now wrote McClelland, enclosing a copy clipped from one of the newspapers, and asked him if it was a true copy. McClelland replied that it was. And Grant at once relieved him from his command and ordered him home. The publication was a direct violation of orders of the War Department and of General Grant, which forbade the publication of all official letters and reports. And in case of an alleged violation the orders required the name of the offender to be laid before the commanding general, so that inquiry could be made and, if found guilty, he could be dismissed from the service.

Major-General Ord was appointed to succeed him in command of the Thirteenth Army Corps. McClelland protested to Grant and asked both Stanton and Halleck to reinstate him. But both requests were ignored. And thus practically ended McClelland's career. The next year he was given an unimportant command in Texas. But nothing of note occurred there, and he soon resigned and went home. It was a regrettable end of what had promised to be an enviable career. McClelland would fight ; he had pluck and endurance, and he was given a high rank where he could exhibit these traits. But he was certainly lacking in subordination, and was injuring the efficiency of the army. Under these circumstances his own soldiers did not regret his removal, while the rest of the army felt that he had received a merited rebuke for casting unjust reflections upon them. And the verdict of history has been that Grant did right.

Grant had lost in the two assaults 4,075 men, of whom 563 were

killed. He and his army were now convinced that it was useless to attempt to take the works by storm. They were too strong. The army was, therefore, ready for the labour of a siege. Roads had already been opened from the Yazoo River, around the rear of the army, by which supplies could be brought. Ground was selected for camps, tents were erected, and the pick and spade were taken up. Though the Confederate line was seven miles, that of Grant was twice as long, for his extended from Haynes' Bluff along the Yazoo, as well as around the city. He did not have troops enough to man these lines, but Halleck, appreciating the situation, forwarded reinforcements without being asked. A strong division under General Herron, sent from St. Louis, was placed, with General Lauman's division, to fill up the gap in the line between Ord's left and the Mississippi. Two divisions from Cincinnati, under General Parke, were dispatched to Haynes' Bluff. Halleck had sent both Herron and Parke. These, with some troops that Grant ordered from Memphis, swelled his army to 71,000, almost double what he had when he reached the city.

All the officers who had graduated at West Point, where they had studied engineering, were required to assist in the work of running out lines. Negroes, who came into the camps and were paid for their work, as well as the soldiers, laboured at building the batteries and throwing up the entrenchments. A double line had to be run, one for protection against Pemberton's army in Vicksburg, and one against Johnston, who was constantly receiving reinforcements, and had now accumulated an army as large as Grant had prior to the battle of Champion's Hill. The works were made especially strong along the roads leading towards the city, as they would be Johnston's natural means of approach, if he attempted to raise the siege. All commanding points within range of Pemberton's works were also occupied and entrenched.

On May 27, thinking the fleet could so reduce the batteries on Fort Hill that an opening in the line might be made there, Porter subjected that point to a vigorous bombardment. But his gunboat was shot through and through by the plunging fire from Fort Hill. She sank, and 36 of her crew were either killed, wounded or drowned. After this the efforts of the fleet were directed to a bombardment of the city. And this was constantly kept up during the siege.

A mine was run under the Confederate parapet on the road to Jackson, and on June 25 it was exploded, a heavy artillery fire all along the line accompanying it. The Confederates, learning of the mine, had built an interior line of defences farther back, and had removed most of the men there, leaving only a few in the works undermined. But these few were thrown into the air, some coming down dead and some alive. Among the latter was a coloured man, who came down more frightened than hurt. When asked how far he had gone up, he answered, with a scratch and a shake of his head, ' 'Bout t'ree mile.' But he survived, and to the end of the siege did service in General Logan's quarters, before which he landed when he came down. When the explosion occurred, two regiments that had been previously placed near at hand, under cover, rushed in and took possession of the crater made by the explosion. They attempted to

hold it, but were compelled to retire by the shower of grenades and shells with fuses lighted that came from the inner Confederate line.

Another mine was exploded on July 1, leaving a large hole in their line and killing and wounding some of their men. But this time no attempt was made to occupy it. Three other mines had been started, and were soon to be exploded, one in front of each corps. They were to be exploded at the same time, and an assault was to follow. Grant had now 220 guns in position, mostly light field-pieces. But he had a battery of heavy guns, which Porter had sent up from the fleet, and they were manned and commanded by officers and men from the navy. Thus the coils were tightened about the doomed city.

But while Pemberton was besieged, Johnston had to be watched. Sherman was sent to command the line that was established from Haynes' Bluff to the railroad bridge over the Big Black River. The purpose was to guard against any attack on that side. A brigade of infantry and 1,200 cavalry were stationed to watch the crossings of the river and destroy the roads beyond it. They were to gather up and bring in or destroy all the supplies in the neighbourhood, so as to prevent them from being used to support Johnston's army. This precaution was wisely taken, for it added to Johnston's difficulties, which were already numerous. Loring's troops had joined him, but they were without guns, wagons or camp equipments. Other troops that were sent to him also came without wagons. And the railroads were still disabled from Grierson's raid, and the work of Sherman about Jackson. So that though Johnston was in a friendly country, where provisions might have been had, he was without the means of bringing them in, and to destroy those in his path was to deprive him of the ability to move.

After his unsuccessful attempt to unite with Pemberton, Johnston had marched his army from the Big Black back to Canton, and here he continued, hardly knowing what to do. He was corresponding with the authorities at Richmond. But he could see nothing but difficulties whichever way he turned. To withdraw troops from Bragg was to give up Tennessee. To attempt to raise the siege of Port Hudson was to abandon Jackson. To undertake to save Pemberton was 'desperate.' So Johnston was getting nothing done. And in the meantime Pemberton was shut up in Vicksburg, the patience of his men fast becoming exhausted and his supplies being consumed. Johnston got a message to him on June 20 suggesting that the utmost both could do was to save the army, that the city was doomed. Pemberton replied suggesting that Johnston attack Grant on the north of the railroad, while he would attempt to cut himself out on the south. Johnston answered that he feared he could accomplish nothing, and suggested that Pemberton try to cross the river and escape that way. This was the last communication that Pemberton received. The city was now closely besieged, and communication had become impossible.

Each then set about to do what the other had suggested. Pemberton attempted to construct some rude boats, out of materials taken from houses torn down in the city for that purpose, with a view to crossing the river. The attempt would have been a desperate one, for Porter's fleet patrolled the river, and before a boat loaded with men could have

been propelled by hand across the wide reach of water, it must have been shot to pieces and sunk. Grant had word of the scheme and notified Porter to be on his guard. And materials were collected on the farther bank to make a quick fire and light up the river whenever it would be attempted. A body of Confederate troops across the river, under Major-General Dick Taylor, was expected to co-operate. A detachment did attack Grant's outpost on that side, composed of some coloured and white troops. It was the first engagement of coloured troops, and they fought well, driving Taylor's men off with some loss. The scheme to cross the river went no further. The boats never were launched.

Johnston's attempt to assault Grant north of the railroad, while Pemberton would try to cut his way out to the south, made little more progress. For six weeks Johnston had been gathering an army, and at last he felt able to move. But it was not with the determination of attacking Grant behind his trenchments. Johnston was too wary to do that. His purpose was rather to make an armed reconnaissance to see if he could find some weak place in Grant's line where he could break through, so as to save Pemberton's army. On June 29 his army marched towards the Big Black, and on the evening of July 1 encamped between Brownsville and the river. Reconnaissances occupied the next two days, and they convinced Johnston that an attack north of the railroad was impracticable. He then determined to make examinations south of the railroad. On the night of the 3rd a message was sent to Pemberton that an attempt to create a diversion in his favour by an attack on Grant would be made about the 7th. This message never reached Pemberton. But on the 5th Johnston learned of the surrender, and he then fell back on Jackson.

For forty-five days Pemberton had endured the labours of a siege. And on the first day of July he addressed a note to each of his division commanders, saying that unless the siege was raised or supplies thrown in, it would be necessary to evacuate, that he could see no prospect of relief, and he therefore asked them to inform him of the condition of the troops and of their ability to undergo and accomplish an evacuation. Stevenson answered that his men, from long confinement in the trenches on short rations, were necessarily much enfeebled, and that a considerable number would be unable to make the marches and endure the fatigues, but he believed that most of them, rather than be captured, would exert themselves to the utmost to accomplish it. Forney favoured the continuation of the siege. While Smith and Bowen recommended a surrender. They all agreed that their men were in no condition to stand the hardships incident to marching and fighting. Bowen, the sturdiest fighter of them all, said that, if they attempted to cut their way out, they could not, in his opinion, save two-thirds of their number, and that no provision could be made for the wounded who fell in the attempt, and for those left behind in the hospitals, and that they would reach General Johnston, 'if they should get through, a mere handful of broken-down stragglers.' He therefore recommended an immediate proposition to capitulate. If accepted, they would get everything they had a right to hope for, and, if rejected, they could still hold out stubbornly for some days and Grant might

then make them a proposition. If made and rejected while they still had *some* provisions, their men would fight harder, as feeling that the city had been offered, but that the blood of the garrison was demanded, to gratify a mere vindictive feeling against the army.

Since the investment, Pemberton had lost 1,000 men. The meat rations had been cut one-half and the others were greatly reduced. The men were all required to man the trenches, and for weary days and nights they had stood exposed to the sun and rain and fog and damp. Confined to the narrow limits of the trenches, without proper exercise, their limbs were cramped and swollen. They were under a constant fire of shells; and sharpshooters were ready to pick a man off whenever his head appeared above the parapet. They were obliged to husband their ammunition, and at times had almost exhausted their percussion caps. They had been able to smuggle in only a limited supply. While Grant's guns roared at will if there was only a chance of results, they were obliged to reserve their ammunition for times of assault. Their defences were crumbling and their city in ruins. Under these circumstances the men in the ranks became disheartened and threats of mutiny were muttered. The subordinate commanders knew this best. 'So far as I know,' wrote Pemberton, 'not a solitary brigade or regimental commander favoured the scheme of cutting out, and only two, whose views were presented to me, intimated the possibility of making more than one-half of their commands available for that purpose.'

It was really this sentiment pervading the army that compelled action. The ground was slipping from under Pemberton's feet. He scouted the idea in his report that it was want of food or failure of ammunition, though the supply of both was running low. But it was the patience of his men that was exhausted.

'A surrender with or without terms,' he wrote, 'was the only alternative.' Therefore on July 3 he sent a note to Grant proposing an armistice with a view to arranging terms. Grant refused, saying that he had no other terms but an unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Later, Pemberton met Grant in a conference, and the latter still insisting that he had no other terms, Pemberton answered, that if so, the conference could terminate and hostilities be renewed. It was then proposed that General Bowen and Captain Montgomery, who had accompanied Pemberton, with Generals McPherson and Sherman, who were with Grant, should retire and consult, to see if they could suggest anything to aid an agreement. After some conversation between them, the conference broke up, with the understanding that Grant would communicate terms to Pemberton later, the truce that had been declared to be continued till the negotiations should cease. The outcome was that the next morning, July 4, Pemberton surrendered the city and his army; all the prisoners to be paroled, the privates to be permitted to take their clothing, and the officers their side-arms and clothing, and the mounted officers one horse each. They were allowed any amount of rations they deemed necessary from their stores, with cooking utensils, and thirty wagons to transport such articles.

Thus 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, with 172 cannon, about

60,000 muskets and a small amount of ammunition. A week later, the paroles being completed, the Confederate garrison marched out, and the Union army took final possession of the city. It was one of the crowning events of the war. Besides the loss of this army and of the great cante of territory now cut off by the river, the moral effect of the loss of this stronghold upon other nations, and the depressing effect upon its own people, was a blow from which the Confederacy never recovered. They struggled on after Vicksburg and Gettysburg, but it was with the energy of desperation. Their spirit was broken and their hope gone.

As soon as the surrender was made, Grant sent word of it with a copy of the terms to Banks, then besieging Port Hudson, assuring him that he could now send all the troops that were needed to ensure the capture of that post. This message was published, and a copy fell into the hands of General Gardner, the Confederate commandant. He at once wrote Banks to learn if this news was true, saying that if it was, it would be useless for him to hold out longer. Upon being assured that it was, he surrendered Port Hudson with 6,000 men, 51 guns, 5,000 small arms and some stores. This occurred on July 9. And thus this fortification fell, without a blow, as a consequence of the surrender of Vicksburg. The Mississippi was now open from Cairo to the Gulf, and was never closed again.

Grant received the major-generalship in the regular army which Halleck had written would be given to the general in the field who should first gain an important and decisive victory. This was the highest military rank under the existing law. He was also thanked by a joint resolution of Congress, and voted a medal of honour, in recognition of his service in opening the Mississippi River. This Sherman characterised as 'the most important enterprise of the civil war.' Sherman and McPherson were made brigadier-generals in the regular army.

While the negotiations were pending, Sherman was ordered by Grant to be in readiness to move against Johnston as soon as the surrender should be consummated. So on July 8 Sherman moved forward from his line, running from Haynes' Bluff to the Big Black. He crossed the river at three points, and by the 11th was before Jackson, besieging Johnston's army. The siege continued until the night of the 16th, when Johnston quietly withdrew. And the next day Sherman moved into the city. But Johnston had got so much of a start and was moving so rapidly, that after a pursuit as far as Brandon (fourteen miles), by one division, it was given up and Sherman returned to his camp on the Big Black. And so Vicksburg now belonged irrevocably to the North.

Then commenced the dissolution of Grant's army. The Thirteenth Corps, Ord's, which had been under McClernand, went to Texas. The Fifteenth, Sherman's, and the Seventeenth, McPherson's, went to Memphis, while Scofield's division was returned to Missouri and Burnside's to Cincinnati. Grant had suggested a new movement against Mobile. But it did not meet with approval at Washington.

The influence of the capture of Vicksburg upon the North was decisive. It aroused the dormant hopes of patriot hearts as they never

had been before. It was now seen that the Union had a vitality of which they had almost despaired. Hardly conscious had her people been of their own power. They had doubted whether the South could be subdued. Now they saw a drive made into the heart of her territory and her strongest citadel seized and held, despite every effort to retain it. This was a revelation to the North. Hope brightened. The war was no longer 'a failure.' What remained was to march on to final victory. But the country was not yet *all* of this mind. It is interesting to note what the conditions had been before this.

CHAPTER XXX

Outspoken Opposition to the War—Necessity for Conscription—Knights of the Golden Circle—Riotous Opposition to the Draft in New York and Other Cities—The Law upheld.

PROBABLY the darkest period in the existence of the American Union had been the winter 1862-3. Van Dorn had captured the Union depot of supplies at Holly Springs. Pemberton had driven Sherman back from the bluffs at Vicksburg, and was holding Grant at bay in Central Mississippi. Banks lay helpless before Port Hudson, and Rosecrans had stood for half a year idle in Central Tennessee. In the east there had been the bloody and unsuccessful battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and then came the displacement of Hooker by Meade, on the eve of another great battle. This all filled patriotic people with dismay. The early appearance of Lee's army in the streets of Philadelphia and New York was confidently predicted, even in the North, by sympathising friends of the Confederacy. It was not her chieftains, now leading in rebellion, that were held up to reprobation, but Lincoln and the heads of the Departments and leaders in Congress, though *they* were struggling to maintain the Union.

Ex-President Franklin Pierce was the orator at a great democratic mass meeting held at Concord, New Hampshire, on July 4, 1863. In the course of his oration he said: 'Do we not know that the cause of our calamities is the vicious intermeddling of too many of the citizens of the Northern States with the constitutional rights of the Southern States, co-operating with the discontents of the people of those states? Do we not know that the disregard of the Constitution, and of the security it affords to the rights of the states and of individuals, has been the cause of the calamity which our country is called to undergo? And now, war! War in its direst shape! Nor is that all; for in those of the states which are exempt from the actual ravages of war, even here in the loyal states, the mailed hand of military usurpation strikes down the liberties of the people. The President takes the place of the Constitution, and the President himself announces to us that it is treasonable to speak or write otherwise than as he may prescribe; nay, that it is treasonable even to be silent, though we be struck dumb by the shock of the calamities with which evil counsels, incompetency and corruption have overwhelmed our country.' And Governor Seymour, the same day, at a large gathering at the Academy of Music in New York, asserted 'that the Democratic organisation look upon this Administration as hostile to their rights and liberties. To-day, the great masses of conservatives who still battle for time-honoured principles of government, amid denunciation,

contumely and abuse, are the only barriers that stand between this Government and its own destruction.' The allusions here were to the arrest of Vallandigham with a direct reference to the impending draft. But they were in the prevailing tone of the opposition party. In Europe, disunion was spoken of as an accomplished fact, and when the French Emperor made a formal diplomatic offer of his good offices as a mediator, he was regarded on all hands as proposing to arrange for a satisfactory and conclusive separation between the North and the South.

Thus between discouragements at home and in the field, even the loyal people of the North had grown apathetic towards the war. There were heavy losses in the bloody battles of this period, and volunteers were coming forward too slowly to meet the requirements of the service. Something must be done. The question was, what? The Confederate Congress, ten days after the battle of Shiloh, had passed a Conscription Act, whereby all the white males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five were subjected to draft. And, though they had enlisted for one or two years already, they were to be held to serve during the war. The Federal Congress decided to follow in their steps, and on March 3, 1863, passed an Act providing for the enrolment of all able-bodied male citizens, including aliens who had declared their intention to become naturalised, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. And the President was authorised after July 1, 1863, to make drafts from this list of persons to serve in the army. The term was to be for not more than three years, and any one drafted and not reporting for service was to be treated as a deserter. But a commutation of three hundred dollars was to be received in lieu of service. There were also some exemptions from the draft—Federal Judges and Heads of Departments, Governors of States, the only son of a widow or of a father who was dependent on the son's labour for support, and the father of dependent motherless children, under twelve years of age, or the only adult brother of such children, when orphans. The residue of a family which had already two members in the service was also to be exempt.

This law had passed by substantially a party vote in both the Senate and the House. In the first months of the war factional feeling had almost disappeared. Both parties in the North had united. But now the Administration was compelled to fight for its own life at the same time that it was fighting for the life of the nation. During the first year, Lincoln's conservative position on the slavery question had undoubtedly drawn to him the support of the border states as well as many democratic voters in the Northern states. For their love of the Union had proved stronger than their love of Party. It was the importance of the Union and the evils that would follow in the train of its destruction that he had constantly kept before them.

But Congress, a year after the war opened, passed a bill for the emancipation of the slaves in the District of Columbia, and the President approved it. The owners were to be compensated to an amount equal to three hundred dollars a slave. A million dollars was appropriated to pay owners for the slaves thus liberated. This was the

first practical act of emancipation, and it was hailed with delight by the coloured people.

In a special message, communicated to Congress at this same session, President Lincoln urged the adoption of a joint resolution proposing that the United States, in order to co-operate with any state that might adopt gradual emancipation, give to such state pecuniary aid to be used to make compensation for the slaves thus freed. This was a proposition to extend the same principle of emancipation to the border states as had already been applied to the District of Columbia. It was adopted by both Houses of Congress and approved by the President.

But the significant fact is that both these measures were passed by Republican votes. The Douglas Democrats that in the early months of the war had supported the Administration now viewed the field in a more questioning light. Many of them no longer regarded it as an effort to save the Union but as an 'Abolition War.' The former alignment that had supported Lincoln was being abandoned, and there was serious danger of a restoration of party lines as they existed before the war. Then the united Democratic Party was in control. And the political unrest now gave it hopes of regaining this control.

In the central states, the elections of 1862 were influenced to some extent by widespread secret organisations. These societies were known as Knights of the Golden Circle, The Order of American Knights, The Order of the Star, and Sons of Liberty. It was really one and the same organisation, but under different names. If one name used was discovered and published so as to bring the existence of the lodge to public notice, that name was discarded and a new one adopted, but the membership and purposes of the organisation continued the same. It was estimated that more than half a million belonged to the order, and that it was most powerful in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and in the border states, Missouri and Kentucky. Its constitution was purely military. The commander of a state was a major-general; of a congressional district, a brigadier-general; of a county, a colonel; and of a township, a captain. They drilled in secret, usually at night, and made large purchases of arms. It was estimated that 30,000 guns and revolvers were brought by them to Indiana alone.

The air of mystery which surrounded the organisation and the pride of power which numbers seemed to give naturally attracted Democrats of the lower class, as well as ignorant whites who could hardly be considered as belonging to any party. It had its membership mostly in the country districts where the meetings would attract little attention from the officers of the law. For the penalties against treason seemed to exert over the membership a wholesome restraint.

One of their objects was to encourage desertion from the army. Lawyers were hired to urge soldiers, at home on furlough, not to go back and to promise them a legal defence if charged with desertion. Some of the members would even volunteer so as to reach the ranks and persuade soldiers to desert, furnishing them money and citizen's clothes to aid their escape. They sometimes organised to resist squads of soldiers sent to arrest deserters. They were especially hostile

to the draft. Enrolling officers were shot in both Indiana and Illinois, and conspirators to resist the draft were tried and convicted. They kept up communication with the Confederates, sent them arms and ammunition, and in some instances recruits. They also promised them aid in case of an invasion of the North. But their primary object was to defeat the Republicans at the polls. They kept up communication with the Confederates and had lodges in the South, and thus its wishes were known and served. The organisation received much inspiration from political refugees, like Vallandigham and Jacob Thompson, Secretary of the Interior under Buchanan, both now in Canada. And among them were fomented schemes for liberating Confederate prisoners of war, confined in military prisons at points along the shores of the Great Lakes.

Lincoln, while aware of the existence of the organisation and its really treasonable purposes, was disposed to treat it with patient good humour. But General Rosecrans, in whose department it flourished, became much excited and wished to make a crusade against it, proposing to send a special officer to Washington to communicate intelligence of it in detail. But Lincoln, already aware of its existence and its operations, and not caring to give it such importance and publicity, wisely put *him* aside. Governor Morton of Indiana was still more excited, and probably with more cause. For one of the members of the order who was indicted for treasonable practices in connection with it, and had concluded to turn states-evidence, detailed a scheme for forming a North-western Confederacy by seizing the state government of Indiana and holding Governor Morton as a hostage, or putting him to death. The witness also confirmed a story of a general uprising that was to have taken place on August 16, in conjunction with a rebel raid from Cumberland Gap. Governor Morton, greatly disquieted, telegraphed the President that he feared the Legislature of his state, when it met, would pass a joint resolution to acknowledge the Confederacy and urge the North-west to dissolve all constitutional relations with the New England states. But the nearest approach that was ever made to the realisation of all these magnificent schemes was when the Legislature met in January, 1863, the House of Representatives insolently returned Morton's message to him and passed a resolution accepting in its stead that of the Democratic Governor of New York. Measures were also introduced to take the military power of the state from Governor Morton, and vest it in some of the Democratic state officials. The Republicans met this movement by withdrawing in a body, thus leaving the Legislature without a quorum. And the outcome of it all was that no appropriation bills were passed and the Governor was obliged to appeal to the people of his state and the Government at Washington for aid. Some money was advanced by the former, but needing a large sum for an emergency, Secretary Stanton made the Governor his disbursing officer and placed in his hands \$250,000 out of a fund which had been set aside by Act of Congress to purchase munitions of war for use in states where rebellion was threatened. The Secretary held that Indiana was so threatened. Morton, however, appreciating the irregularity of this transaction, remarked, as he took the warrant, that if the cause failed they would

probably have to answer for this with their lives. To which Stanton gruffly replied, 'If the cause fails, I do not wish to live.'

The attempt to make the draft was attended by many scenes of violence. In New York City, as soon as it was announced that the enrolment for this purpose would commence on July 13, the Democratic papers began to vie with one another in opposing it. They complained that the draft was only for the prosecution of an 'Abolition War,' that the quota required of the city was too large, and insinuated that there would be unfairness in drawing the names from the wheel. They argued strenuously that the law was unconstitutional and an outrage against the liberty of individuals and the rights of the states.

In the most northerly ward of the city, inhabited largely by labourers of foreign birth, the drawing commenced at 10 A.M. in a building at the corner of Third Avenue and 46th Street, in the presence of some three hundred persons, mostly spectators. In about half an hour, and after something like a hundred names had been drawn, while all was orderly within the building, a shot was heard in the street, where a crowd had congregated. This became the signal for a shower of bricks at the house. Then the crowd rushed in and, driving out the police and the draft officers, tore up their papers and took possession of the building. A can of turpentine was poured upon the floor and it was set on fire. In a few moments the building was in flames. And it was soon consumed. Only with difficulty was the conflagration stayed, when it had spread to other buildings.

The tidings of this initial success being carried through the city, brought many who were opposed to the draft into the streets. The rioters were increased in number by marching to the great factories and workshops and demanding that work should stop so that the operatives could be permitted to come into the street and join the procession. By afternoon the rioters had become many thousand in number. The harmless and frightened black population of the city was everywhere treated with cruelty. Their homes were burned. Coloured boys were set upon in the streets and pelted with stones and compelled to flee for their lives. In one instance a black man, charged with no offence but his colour, was caught and hung. His clothes were burned from his body. And it was then left hanging, till cut down by the police. A coloured orphan asylum, administered by philanthropic ladies, and costing, with its furnishing, some \$200,000, was sacked and burned, after the children had been driven into the street. The railroads were stopped. Republican newspaper offices were attacked. Other draft-offices were destroyed. The city was in the hands of the mob. The riot extended to other cities, to Brooklyn, Troy and Jamaica in New York, to Jersey City and to Boston. At Brooklyn a new grain-elevator, costing \$100,000, which was obnoxious, as raising the price of bread and reducing the demand for labour, was burned.

The absence of the troops which were usually in or about the city, and had now been called to Central Pennsylvania to repel the invasion of Lee's army, furnished the opportunity for these wild scenes in New York. They were finally checked by the return of the militia and the bringing in of some regiments from the Army of the Potomac. But

the vigorous stand of a small body of regulars, who were in the city, aided materially. On the evening of the fourth day they killed thirteen and wounded eighteen of the rioters and took some others prisoners. But the mob was not suppressed till it had destroyed property whose value was estimated at \$2,000,000, and the city authorities had borrowed and appropriated money to pay bounties to volunteers, sufficient in number to make up the city's quota. This was almost a surrender to the mob.

But it was in this way that the draft was generally obviated. The Government was willing to have volunteers, even though they had to be induced to enter the service by bounties, thinking they made as good soldiers as those who were compelled to enter the service as conscripts. In drafting districts, when the number required under the draft had been fixed as the quota of a county, a township or a ward, the citizens of property liable to the draft would raise, by private subscription, money to pay bounties, to induce others to enter the service. Thus their quota was made up and their district was 'cleared of the draft.' And after all, this was their best method of meeting it. Though the constitutionality of the law was repeatedly questioned by suits in the courts, the attacks upon it were unsuccessful. The law was upheld.

CHAPTER XXXI

Morgan's Last Raid—Reaches Indiana and Ohio—Captured—Imprisoned in the Ohio Penitentiary—Escapes—His Death.

WITH these signs of disaffection in the North, it is not surprising that the Confederates thought that recruits for their service might be had there. Brigadier-General John H. Morgan, then in camp with his division of cavalry at McMinnville, Tenn., growing tired of inactivity, applied to Major-General Joe Wheeler, commanding the cavalry of Bragg's army, at Shelbyville for permission to make a raid upon Louisville, to take and destroy the transportation and shipping and public property as well as its Union defences. He stated that the taking of the garrison to fill up Rosecrans' army had left only about three hundred men for its defence. The application was referred to General Bragg, and he consented that Morgan might go. He was to take 2,000 of his Kentucky troops, those that would be most likely to attract recruits, and four guns. This was not Morgan's whole command. He was not allowed to take all, owing to the probability of an advance being made by Rosecrans. He was to return as soon as possible, and should he hear that Rosecrans was advancing for a general engagement, he was to turn back at once and fall upon the rear of the Union army. As it was hoped that he could move so rapidly that he would be on his return before Rosecrans would know that he had left for Kentucky, it was thought that much good might be accomplished and still this force not be missed. His orders were to break up the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and destroy the Union depots of supplies. But in the letters between Morgan and his superiors it is significant that there was nothing said about his crossing the Ohio River. On the contrary, he was urged, again and again, to observe the importance of a quick return.

Under these instructions, the doughty raider left his camp on June 26. And, crossing the Cumberland River at Burkesville, he marched rapidly northward. He met his first reverse at Tebb's Bend on Green River. Here Colonel O. H. Moore, with 200 men from the 25th Mich., was stationed on the north side of the river. Hearing that Morgan's advance had entered Columbia, ten miles south, he moved out a mile and a half on that side of the river, and taking up a position on the narrows entering the bend, he felled some timber in his front, so as to form an abatis, and threw up breastworks and planted a battery. Here, on the morning of July 4, Morgan found him waiting, firing a shot which disabled two of Moore's men, Morgan sent forward, under a flag of truce, a demand for an immediate and unconditional surrender of the entire force, with the Union defences. Moore promptly answered that the Fourth of July was not the day for

him to entertain such a proposition. And Morgan as promptly attacked. For three and a half hours the conflict was fierce and bloody. At times the enemy occupied one side of the fallen timber and Moore's men the other, in an almost hand-to-hand struggle. Charge after charge was successfully repelled. Moore had only a fraction of his regiment, but they were so well posted and fought so hard that Morgan at last, seeing that he was losing precious time, gave up the struggle and withdrew, with a loss of 50 killed and 200 wounded. Among the former were eight of his commissioned officers. Moore's loss, he being protected by breastworks, was considerably less—6 killed and 23 wounded.

Leaving Moore and his little band, who were too weak to come out of their entrenchments and fight, and yet too strong to be dislodged, Morgan sought another crossing and pushed on to Lebanon, where he was compelled to fight again, this time with better success. It was not his purpose to fight, but rather to destroy Rosecrans' line of supply, and separate, in a chase after himself, forces that might otherwise go to fill up the Union army at Murfreesboro. At Lebanon, he met an infantry force of 380 men. Their scouts being driven back, they all took refuge in the depot, where the goods they had been left to guard were gathered. Here they held out for four hours. Though without artillery, yet, being armed with long-range rifles and being good marksmen, they kept Morgan's men at a distance. At last, however, Morgan took advantage of a flag of truce, sent up ostensibly to demand a surrender, to push his men forward to buildings immediately around that in which the Union men had taken refuge, and to move his artillery to within 300 yards. From these positions, when his demand was refused, he riddled the depot with shot and set it on fire, and then threatened to burn the town. Seeing that further resistance would be useless, the garrison surrendered. And Morgan, feeling the necessity for haste, hurried his captives off double-quick for Springfield, nine miles away. One who gave out was killed by the way, and two others were knocked down and injured by the wheels of the artillery. One of the latter died in a few hours. But at Springfield the others were paroled.

But Morgan had now been delayed so long and the small detachments he had encountered had used the telegraph so vigorously in calling for aid that the country through which he passed was fully aroused. It was less Confederate than it had been. And a brigade of Union cavalry, under General James M. Shackelford, had followed him ever since he crossed the Cumberland. It was now pursuing him closely. So he passed rapidly through Bardstown to Shepherdsville, and here, having tapped the telegraph wires and learned that the forces at Louisville were now too strong for him, he abandoned that objective and, turning sharply to the west, struck the Ohio River at Brandenburg on July 7. This was forty miles below Louisville. A detail that he had sent ahead found two steamboats on the river bank, the *Alice Dean* and the *John J. McCombs*. With them he ferried his troops across the river to Indiana. The *Alice Dean* was then burned. Shackelford, only two miles away, beheld the smoke, and reached the bank in time to hear the shout of triumph from Morgan's men on the other side. But it was twenty-four hours before the

John J. McCombs could bring other boats from Louisville to carry Shackelford over. But once across the chase was resumed. And the race soon became neck and neck.

Thus far Morgan's raids had created little alarm. He had been in Kentucky and the people knew him. But he had never crossed the Ohio. That stream had come to be regarded as an impassable barrier. Much as Morgan might talk of crossing the line and making a raid through the free states, robbing stores, burning property and carrying off horses, this had come to be regarded as mere fanfaronade. But now he was over the river, and those who had before given little heed to his talk were ready to believe that he was going to rob the State Treasury at Indianapolis or that at Columbus or carry away all the money of the banks of Cincinnati. These and all sorts of rumours were circulated of what he would do. And Morgan was careful to spread them, as well as delusive and exaggerated reports of the strength of his command. He tapped the telegraph lines to learn the truth about his adversaries. But he was no less diligent by this means in disseminating falsehood about himself. The wildest consternation overspread Indiana. And, as no one could tell whither he would turn, this feeling spread to the adjoining states. They rose *en masse* to demand his capture.

Morgan was criticised by his superior, General Wheeler, for crossing the Ohio, when his orders required him to go only to Louisville and then return, and gave him the shortest time for the accomplishment of this mission. But Morgan was as fond of adventure as any knight-errant that ever couched a lance. And there was a much better prospect for this north of the Ohio than on the soil of Kentucky, where the march and counter-march of contending armies had made war familiar. And it would be more knightly adventure there, for it would be carrying the war to the enemy's door. The newspapers would be full of his exploits and would carry his fame far and wide. And as for orders, they never did set heavily upon Morgan. Had he not theretofore been permitted to do pretty much as he pleased? And if Bragg did need him, to strike Rosecrans' army in the rear, and he was not there, why should he care? Had Bragg ever appreciated Morgan? When he had fairly earned a major-general's commission, had he not been put off with a brigadier's? With such considerations as these before him, there was still another that must have weighed heavily with Morgan. Could he get back directly, if he really wished to go? Generals Hobson and Judah, and Colonel Wolford, with parts of their divisions, well mounted and armed, and supplied with artillery, were now in pursuit. Morgan had crossed Kentucky so often that they were determined this should be the last time. Shackelford was close behind. Judah, with two brigades, had followed him from the Tennessee border, but, being detained by floods in the Green River, had now directed his march upon Morgan's right flank for the purpose of intercepting him, upon his attempt to return. Colonel Wolford, with four regiments, all mounted, and a battery of four mountain howitzers, had been hardly less persistent in pursuit than Shackelford. Troops were massed at Louisville ready to be sent in any direction. Could he hope to break through these

coils and escape? If he attempted to go back, would not his whole force be captured? But by going on he might throw his pursuers off and escape. Besides, among the noisy opponents of Lincoln's Administration in Indiana and Ohio he might hope to find friends, and perhaps recruits. They had resisted the draft, were bitterly opposing the prosecution of the war, had secretly organised, had sent arms to the South, and were drilling at night in military organisations. There was some ground for believing that his appearance among them would be the signal for an uprising.

In this he was doomed to disappointment. Leaving the river, he struck forty miles northward, into the heart of Indiana, to Salem. On the way his command burned a farmhouse and a flouring-mill. At Salem they destroyed the depot and robbed the stores. Just across the river, within thirty miles of Louisville, they captured a train of cars, destroyed the United States mail and robbed the Express company's safe. Everywhere horses disappeared before them. These were pregnant facts laid bare before the people among whom he was passing. And men of all political parties could read the lesson. One good Democrat, who had openly justified the South in her course and had read Vallandigham's pamphlets with approval, became temporarily unbalanced when he saw his own horses led away. Morgan and his men might be known as Cavaliers in the South, but Northern 'Copperheads' did not seem to appreciate such knight-errantry. They realised that, whatever these intruders might be at home, here in the North they could only be looked on as ordinary horse-thieves and robbers. All turned out cordially with their Union neighbours to defend their barns and their stores.

Once over the river, Shackelford had hardly proceeded five miles in pursuit, when he was met by militia who were eager to assist in overhauling the invader. At other points in Indiana he met similar aid. 'Ohio,' he wrote, 'seemed to vie with her sister Indiana in facilitating our pursuit after the great rebel raider. In each of these two great states our troops were fed and furnished with water from the hands of men, women and children; from the palace and the hut alike we shared their hospitality. He who witnessed the great exhibition of patriotism and love of country in those mighty states, on the passage of the Union army, and then could doubt the ability and purpose of the people to maintain the Government, has certainly been "given over to hardness of heart that he may believe a lie."'

From Salem, Morgan turned eastward toward Madison on the Ohio River, but at Lexington, on the way, he changed his course, again moving northward. And finding a Federal force ahead of him at Vernon, he threatened that place with a small portion of his command, while the balance moved to Versailles and then crossed the states line between Ohio and Indiana at the village of Harrison. The problem now was, how to pass Cincinnati. He expected to find a large force there. It was General Burnside's headquarters as commander of the Department of the Ohio, and he had been collecting an army for the invasion of Eastern Tennessee. General Judah was also expected to come directly to this point from Louisville with his division. Morgan felt that once past the peril that these forces presented, his escape

would be certain, unless the Ohio remained so high that the transports could carry troops to intercept him at the upper fords of the river. He had already seen enough of the spirit of the people to convince him that there was no hope of recruits. He therefore sent detachments in various directions to give the impression that he was marching to Hamilton, twenty miles north of Cincinnati, and then, with his main force, passed half-way between the two places, at the village of Glendale.

The passage was effected by night and by one of the longest marches that Morgan ever made. It was a terrible and trying experience. Strong men sank exhausted in their saddles, after the hard riding and exposure of the previous days. At every halt the officers were compelled to move continually among their commands and pull and haul at the men who had fallen asleep by the road. Some would crawl off into the fields, and unobserved would sleep till they were awakened to captivity by their pursuers. At length day dawned as they neared the Little Miami Railroad. It was at the crossings of the railroads, where troops could be run out from the city, that Morgan anticipated his greatest perils. He approached this last with trepidation. But he had anticipated Burnside. And so crossed without opposition. He halted a short hour to feed and rest his horses within sight of Camp Dennison, burning a nearby park of Government wagons. And that evening he camped for the night at Williamsburg, twenty-eight miles east of the city, having marched in thirty-five hours more than ninety-five miles.

All that night the city of Cincinnati was in the wildest consternation. Dispatches were received that one portion of his force had been at New Haven and another at New Baltimore and that they had partially destroyed both towns. Another dispatch said that they were moving from New Baltimore toward Glendale for the purpose of destroying the bridge over the C. H. and D. Railroad near that place. A dispatch from Hamilton said that they were moving in that direction, but that they might turn and go into Cincinnati, by some of the roads leading through the suburb of Walnut Hills or Mount Auburn. Still another that he had crossed the Little Miami River at Miamiville and attacked the Union pickets there and killed some of them. These reports were entirely without foundation, yet the people of the city were ready to believe almost anything. But as the night and the day passed and brought no sight of Morgan or his troops and it became apparent that the city was not to be attacked, the excitement abated. And the feeling then prevailed that, if Morgan was not going to catch them, perhaps they had better try to catch Morgan.

Judah's troops, that had arrived from Louisville by boat, were dispatched on up the river to head off the galloping column. Some gunboats were brought up to patrol the river. Governor Tod called out 50,000 militia and directed their routes so as to close in on the invaders from different directions by rail. The Confederate *raid* now became a *chase*. Morgan thoroughly realised his situation and put forth every effort to reach the ford at Buffington Island ahead of his pursuers. He moved rapidly eastward, following generally a line through the tier of counties next but one to the river, destroying

bridges, helping himself to the horses, forage and provisions of the people along the road, and skirmishing continually with local bands of militia that were obstructing his path, so as to give his pursuers a chance to overhaul him. But he brushed them all aside, and eight days after he crossed the river into Indiana he stood once more upon its banks opposite Buffington Island. A few hours more of daylight and he would have been safely across and among a people where he might expect help. But he had been delayed by the militia as he came down to the ford. And when he reached it 'a night of solid darkness' had closed around him. And he found in front, to guard the ford, an earthwork hastily thrown up and guarded by militia; in the darkness he could not tell how many. And the worn-out condition of his horses and men determined him to wait till morning before attacking the earthwork and attempting to cross. This delay was fatal.

General Judah's division, provided with fresh horses at Cincinnati, had been carried up the river on transports and landed at Portsmouth. Travelling all that night, they reached the river at Buffington Bar at 5.30 of the morning of the 19th. A dense fog enveloped everything, confining the view of surrounding objects to a radius of about fifty yards. Judah had heard that Morgan had been crossing the river during the night and determined to find if this was true. Attended by a small escort and a section of artillery, his main force having been halted, he pushed cautiously forward in the fog, and suddenly found himself enveloped on front and flank by three dismounted regiments of Morgan, led by Colonel Basil W. Duke. Duke's forces had been disposed for the capture of the militia entrenched at the ford, but which Morgan now learned had abandoned their breastworks and retreated during the night. Duke, as he afterwards expressed it, could not have been more surprised at the presence of Judah's force had it dropped from the clouds. But he rapidly advanced on the little escort, and captured their artillery and twenty or thirty of the men, killing two and mortally wounding Major Danl. McCook. The rest fell back upon the main body, which being rapidly brought into position opened a rapid and accurate artillery fire. In less than half an hour Duke's lines were broken and in retreat, and then a cavalry charge converted the retreat into a rout.

But in the meantime Shackelford, who had followed Morgan relentlessly day and night ever since he crossed the Cumberland, here, by an all-night march, threw himself in his front. His men, notwithstanding their fatigue, closed in rapidly, to the sound of Judah's and Morgan's artillery. Thus hemmed in, front and rear, every man of Morgan's little band that had so long defied a hundred thousand realised that the contest was over. They were almost out of ammunition and hardly numbered now two thousand. And as some tried to escape across the river they found that path raked by the fire of gunboats. A few succeeded. Morgan and part of his force broke through. But 700, among them his brother, Colonel Dick Morgan, and Colonel Duke, his most trusted subordinates, were captured. Here too he lost his artillery and his trains.

Morgan himself, with the remnant of his force, turned back from the river, closely followed by Judah's division and by General Shackel-

ford with 500 of the best mounted of his men. The next day, being hotly pressed, Morgan took refuge on an immense bluff. A flag of truce was sent to demand his unconditional surrender. The flag was met by some of his officers, who asked for an hour, for consultation among themselves. At the expiration of forty minutes a surrender was made, which Shackelford understood included Morgan; but that wily chieftain had slipped away again, this time with 600 officers and men, keeping as before back from the river, but watching for an opportunity to cross at some of the upper fords. But the fords were now all guarded. His men were exhausted by their enormous work, and they were demoralised by pillage and weakened, most of all, by their loss of faith in themselves and their commander. They were surrounded by a multitude of foes, harassed by want, reduced by hunger and exposure, driven hither and thither, doubling and re-doubling on their path in a vain endeavour to escape, only to find themselves at last like foxes without holes. They no longer thought of fight. On their jaded horses they dropped out of the ranks, one by one, by the way, and were gathered up and thrown into the county jails. At length, near Salineville in Columbiana County, Morgan surrendered the miserable remnant of his force, 350 men, admitting to General Shackelford that 'ever since crossing the Ohio he had found every man, woman and child his enemy; every hill top a telegraph; and every bush an ambush.' The surrender took place on July 26, 1863.

Thus in less than three weeks after it crossed into the free states, Morgan's magnificent brigade, composed of the flower of the young men of Kentucky and Tennessee, superbly mounted, admirably equipped with artillery and trains, had been completely wiped out. This had been made possible only by the universal uprising of the people of those states. Their patriotic devotion, seconded by the heroic pursuit of Shackelford, perhaps inspired by it, is above all praise. Never afterward was the loyalty of the people of those states brought in question. The work of organising the militia in Ohio and Indiana, which had been languishing, took a fresh impetus from that day. And as a direct result, the next year Ohio sent 36,254 and Indiana 7,197 of their National Guard to the front, to serve for 100 days. They were all drilled and disciplined troops, and besides these, and perhaps also in a measure as a result of this awakened patriotism of the people, Ohio sent 110,000 volunteers to the war for long terms and Indiana 88,510. Thus Morgan's raid had a contrary effect to that which had been expected.

But knowing how little damage was done, as compared with what might have been, in the wanton destruction of property, who can withhold a tribute of admiration from this bold cavalryman, who could thus plunge among his enemies and lead them a daring chase in a raid across three states? From the jaws of disaster he repeatedly snatched the remnants of his command, and at last refused to desert them, though he believed that, by so doing, he might have saved himself.

It was Morgan's last raid. By order of General Halleck he and his officers were sent to the Ohio Penitentiary at Columbus, where

they were held in close confinement. On the night of November 27, he, with six others, escaped by cutting through the stone floor of his cell with knives from the prison table, thereby reaching an air chamber below, whence they tunnelled through the inner walls of the prison, and then, by means of ropes made from their bed-clothes, scaled the outer wall. Here they donned citizens' clothes. Morgan with a companion boarded the train for Cincinnati, and when they reached its suburbs they checked the speed of the train by the brakes and then, jumping off, ran to the river, where they were ferried across. Morgan thence made his way to Northern Georgia. Soon after, he was in Richmond, where he was accorded an ovation and made a speech recounting his adventures. He then returned to the army. But the days of his brilliant service were over. The criticism of his fellow officers embittered his life. The loss of his brigade had caused a want of confidence in his generalship. A decisive defeat in an attempted raid to Kentucky, the following year, completed the wreck of his fortunes. And at Greenville, Tenn., on the 4th of that September, he was betrayed by the proprietor of the house where he was sleeping, and, as he attempted to escape, he was killed by a Union soldier. And so went out one of the best-known figures of the war in the West.



Walker & Bouie! sc

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